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UNCLAS BRATISLAVA 000215 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPT FOR NP/ECC - PVANSON, ACHURCH, JOHN COFFEY 
CBP/INA FOR PWARKER, BPICKETT 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETTC MNUC PARM PREL KSTC KNNP ETTC PREL LO
SUBJECT: EXBS: UPDATED EXPORT CONTROL SYSTEM STANDARDS 
FOR SLOVAKIA 
 
REF: STATE 27927 
 
¶1.   SUMMARY: This cable updates information for 
   Slovakia's Export Control System Standards, effective 
   February 28, 2005. 
 
¶2.  Begin "Export Control System Standards - Slovakia - 
February 2005". 
 
¶I. Adequate commitment, legal and regulatory framework, 
and governmental structure to regulate transfers of 
weapons and weapons-related technology, and to 
sufficiently deter violations and punish violators 
               I.A. Political Commitment 
¶1. Is there a national commitment to export control 
development? 
     Yes. 
¶2. Do policies currently exist to cooperate 
internationally on harmonization of export control 
policies? 
     Yes, in adherence to EU policies, laws and 
 regulations. 
¶3. Is the subject country willing to work within the 
international community to address common threats? 
     Yes. 
¶4. Are there agencies currently involved in developing 
control policies? 
     Yes. 
     a. What are they? 
     Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
     Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defense, Customs 
     Directorate and the Nuclear Supervision officials. 
¶5. Are there key host-government contacts in the 
national commitment area? 
     Yes. 
     a.   Who are they? 
 
     -- Mr. Franticek Babuska, Director, Sensitive 
     Goods and Trade Management Department - Export 
     Control Office, Ministry of Economy (02/05) 
 
     -- Mr. Miroslav Majernik, Director - Department of 
     License and Customs Policy, Ministry of Economy 
     (02/05) 
 
     -- Mr. Mikulas Turner, Head International 
     Department - Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the 
     Slovak Republic  (02/05) 
 
     -- Mr. Vojtech Decky, Director - Division for 
     Drugs and Other Dangerous Materials, Customs 
     Directorate (02/05) 
 
     -- Mr. Vladamir Stasko, Director - Director 
     General's Office, Customs Directorate (02/05) 
 
     -- Mr. Jaroslav Spisiak, 1st Vice President, 
     Police Presidium, Ministry of Interior (02/05) 
 
     -- Mr. Karol Mistrik, Director - Dept of 
     Disarmament and Council of Europe, Ministry of 
     Foreign Affairs (02/05) 
 
     -- Mr. Henrik Markus, Dept of Disarmament and 
     Council of Europe, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
     (02/05) 
 
     -- Mr. Jaroslav Horvath, Director - Department of 
     European Integration and Foreign Relations, 
     Ministry of Interior (02/05) 
            I.B. Legal Basis and Framework 
 
¶1. Is there a specific legal basis on which to build or 
enhance an export control system? Does it consist of 
laws passed by the legislature? Or constitutional 
provisions? Or is it based (exclusively or primarily) 
on executive authority (i.e., authority of the 
president or equivalent official)? 
     Yes.  Both Slovak national laws and regulations 
     ,many of which have been updated recently, and EU 
     laws and regulations. 
 
¶2. Does the legal basis authorize control of the 
export, re-export and transit of all items on the 
multilateral regime lists (see C below)? 
     Legal basis authorizes controls for import and 
     export as well as re-export. Control for in- 
     transit is in Customs code.  Customs is now 
     obliged to check transit of military material and 
     can stop/return/seize shipments not in accordance 
     with international commitments. 
 
¶3. Does the legal basis authorize control of the 
export, re-export and transit of items for unilateral 
foreign policy reasons, such as human rights and 
regional stability? 
     Yes. 
¶4. Does the legal basis authorize imposition of catch- 
all controls (i.e., controls based on the proposed end- 
use or end-user rather than just the nature of the 
item)? 
     Yes. 
¶5. Does the legal basis authorize imposition of 
controls on activities, such as brokering, finance, and 
other services? 
     Yes. Brokering is inferred under the terminology 
     "mediator" and outlines the duties of brokers in 
     import and export. 
¶6. Is there authority to control transfers of technical 
data and technical assistance, including intangible 
transfers? 
     Yes. 
¶7. Are there legal authorities to impose criminal 
penalties on individuals and legal persons for 
violations of export control requirements? 
     Yes. 
     a. What are the criminal penalties? 
     Imprisonment for up to 8 years. 
¶8. Are there legal authorities to impose civil or 
administrative penalties for violations? 
     Yes. 
     a. What are the civil or administrative penalties? 
     Monetary fines up to 10 million SKK (or 3 times 
     the value of the goods if the value is over 10 
     million SKK) and/or forfeiture of all controlled 
     items. 
¶9. Are there sufficient executive orders, interagency 
agreements, and the like to implement the export 
control system? 
     Yes. 
     a. What do such orders cover? 
     EC Regulation 1334/2000 covers the export, 
     import, re-export, and mediation of all dual-use 
     goods and technology. Slovak Act 179/1998 covers 
     the export, import, re-export, and brokering of 
     military goods and WMD.  The Act was amended in 
     2002 to raise the minimum property a company must 
     own to be authorized to export (i.e., so fewer 
     companies can export munitions items), to increase 
     Customs authority to confiscate in-transit items 
     that are not in compliance with international 
     commitments, and to increase GOS controls on 
     brokers/intermediaries.  There are also Customs 
     and penal codes.  The Customs code was amended to 
     require licenses for refurbishment. 
¶10. Have decrees, regulations or other normative acts 
been promulgated to implement the legal authority? 
     Yes. 
¶11. Do they fully implement the authorities provided 
for? 
     Yes. 
     a. If not, which of the authorities in the items 
     above is not being implemented? 
     N/A 
¶12. Are there legal safeguards against the improper use 
or disclosure of information obtained in the export 
control process? 
     Yes. 
¶13. Are there legal features that routinely interfere 
with the implementation of effective export controls 
(e.g., rigid privacy or property rights, lack of search 
and seizure authority)? Describe them. 
     Yes. Slovak law requires that all intelligence 
 data be stored on a government certified system. Only 
 one system has been certified and agencies can't send 
 and/or share information. 
 
 I.C. Membership or adherence (in terms of policy) to 
      Nonproliferation regimes and international 
                nonproliferation norms 
 
¶1. Wassenaar Arrangement? 
     Yes. 
¶2. Nuclear Suppliers' Group? 
     Yes. 
¶3. Missile Technology Control Regime? 
     No. 
¶4. Australia Group? 
     Yes. 
¶5. Are there laws/regs/guidelines concerning adherence 
to international nonproliferation norms, such as NPT, 
CWC, BWC, and UN embargoes? 
 
     Yes. Also ratified Chemical Weapons Convention, 
     and are active in Biological Weapons Convention. 
 
II. Process for controlling items and evaluating 
transfer requests 
 
                  II.A. Control Lists 
 
¶1. Are there legal authorities to establish and modify 
control lists? 
     Yes. 
¶2. Are the control lists made available to the public? 
     Yes. 
¶3. Are there agencies/personnel in place who are 
responsible for maintaining and regularly updating 
control lists? 
     Yes. 
¶4. Do the control lists conform with multilateral 
nonproliferation regime/arrangement control lists? 
     Yes. 
     a. Wassenaar Arrangement? 
     Yes. 
     b. Nuclear Suppliers' Group? 
     Yes. 
     c. MTCR? 
     Yes. Control lists conform even though Slovakia is 
     not a signatory to this regime. 
     d. Australia Group? 
     Yes. 
¶5. Are the regulations for catch-all controls public? 
     Yes. 
     a. Are catch-all controls used effectively? 
     Catch-all controls are relatively new. 
     b. Is there sufficint industry outreach to 
     explain catch-all provisions for all types of 
     export control regulations? 
     Industry outreach could probably be enhanced, but 
     routine meetings ae held by Ministry of Economy 
     concerning the law and changes. 
 
           II.B. Authorization Requirements 
 
¶1. Is registration of munitions exporters, 
manufacturers and brokers required? 
     Yes. 
¶2. Is there a requirement for registrants to disclose 
foreign ownership/control? 
     Yes. 
¶3. Are the regulations/licensing requirements public? 
     Yes. 
¶4. Do the license applications require information 
sufficient for an informed review and decision? 
     Yes. 
     a. Quantity and description of items? 
     Yes. 
     b. Intended end-use? 
     Yes. 
     c. Valid needs of the end-user? 
     Yes. 
     d. Identification of all parties to the 
     transaction, their address and destination to 
     include intermediate consignees? 
     Yes. 
¶5. Are licenses/authorizations required for exports? 
Which exports (e.g., "munitions and dual-use items on 
the multilateral control lists")? 
     Yes - both. 
¶6. Are licenses/authorizations required for imports? 
Which imports? 
     Yes - all. 
¶7. Are licenses/authorizations required for 
transshipment (involves off-loading of cargo)? 
     Not under existing law, transshipments are under 
     control of Customs only. 
¶8. Are licenses/authorizations required for transit (no 
off-loading of cargo)? 
     There is different approach depending on if goods 
     are considered military material or dual-use: 
 
1/ Military material 
     According to paragraph 22 of act No. 179/1998 - 
     Act on military material trading: 
     Transit up to 7 days - no license required. 
     Transit above 7 days - an entrepreneur has to 
     request MoE to issue permission for transit. 
     According to paragraph 47 of act No. 190/2003 - 
     Act on weapons and munitions 
     MoI issues permission for transit of weapons and 
munitions. 
 
2/ Dual-use goods 
     According to Council Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 
     setting up a Community Regime for the control of 
     exports of dual-use items and technology, transit 
     license is not required.  According to section 21 
     of the Regulation, the license is required only 
     for transit of some dual-use items, which are 
     transited with the EU. These dual-use items are 
     listed in the amendment No. IV. of the Regulation. 
     a. What authorization is required for transit? For 
transshipment? 
     Customs must approve. 
¶9. Are licenses required for re-export (controlled item 
leaves country)? 
     Yes. 
¶10. Are licenses required for re-transfer (change of 
end-use or end-user within country)? 
     Yes. 
¶11. Is there authority to require end-user certificates 
as conditions of license approval? 
     Yes. 
¶12. Are the requirements for end-user certificates 
imposed regularly and effectively? 
     Yes. 
¶13. Is there legal authority for passing information 
regarding bad actors, known violators, etc. to other 
cooperative governments? 
     Yes, but computer security issue severely limits 
     exchange. 
 
                    II.C. Screening 
 
¶1. Are license applications screened to identify 
suspected bad actors? 
     Yes. 
¶2. Is there a database drawing on inter-ministerial 
sources of persons/entities who are debarred or 
suspected of illicit activity (i.e. watch list)? 
     Yes, there is a watch list. In addition, we have 
     provided Slovakia and other Central European 
     countries with the Tracker System and Risk 
     Report/Wisconsin Project database. 
¶3. Are there end-use/end-user verification procedures 
in place? 
     Yes. 
¶4. Are end-use/end-user verification checks conducted 
routinely and frequently? 
     Yes - as needed. 
¶5. Are there pre-license checks? 
     Yes. 
¶6. Are there post-shipment verifications? 
     Yes. 
¶7. Is there international cooperation in identifying 
and preventing transfers of proliferation concern? 
     Yes. 
 
                 II.D. Decision-making 
 
¶1. Does the country have responsible transfer policies? 
     Yes. 
¶2. Are there decision-making criteria for approving 
transfers? 
     Yes. 
¶3. Are these criteria reflected in written guidelines, 
standards and procedures? 
     Yes. 
¶4. Are there policies with respect to specific 
countries, country groups, and areas of conflict? 
     Yes. EU and UN policies are utilized. 
¶5. Are these guidelines comparable to policy/practice 
under U.S. Conventional Arms Transfer policy and dual- 
use export policy? 
     Yes. 
¶6. Are there adequate referral mechanisms, including 
case-tracking and the forwarding of cases to other 
agencies for review before disposition? 
     Yes. The GOS uses the Tracker system.  In 
     addition, there is a working group that includes 
     intelligence representative. This working group, 
     with all relevant agencies, makes recommendation 
     to the committee, which meets once a month. 
¶7. Are policy and national security concerns given 
sufficient weight in decision making (e.g., compared to 
economic factors)? 
     Yes. Foreign Affairs has what amounts to veto 
     power in the committee. 
¶8. Are the licensing process and verification 
procedures being enforced? 
     Yes. 
¶9. Do agencies involved in license processing have the 
ability to deny license applications and to escalate 
decisions to national-level authorities? 
     License approval is based on the consensus of all 
     agencies involved in the application 
     review/approval process.  Dissenters can escalate 
     decisions to the national-level authorities.  MOE 
     and MFA have ability to deny license applications. 
¶10. Are there clear authorities to deny a license, 
specifically for foreign policy and national security 
reasons? 
     Yes. 
¶11. Are there regulations providing for suspension and 
revocation of export licenses/authorizations? 
     Yes. 
¶12. Do licensing officials have access to the 
(intelligence) information necessary to make informed 
decisions during license processing? 
     Yes. Intelligence representative is a member of 
     the working group that reviews every application. 
 
                    II.E. Training 
 
¶1. Are licensing officials adequately trained, 
including technical expertise, to review 
license/authorization requests? 
     Basically, yes.  However, further training would 
     reinforce best practices. 
 
III. An enforcement mechanism that provides authority 
for trained enforcement officers to investigate and 
prevent illegal export 
 
             III.A. Effective enforcement 
 
¶1. Are there law enforcement officials with clear lines 
of authority responsible for conducting investigations, 
making arrests, and prosecuting cases under the export 
control laws and regulations? 
     Yes. Only police investigative reports can be used 
     in prosecution. Customs has authority to 
     investigate but their investigative reports can 
     not be used in prosecution. 
¶2. Are there legal authorities to enforce trade in 
controlled items at all borders (land, sea, air) for 
outbound, inbound, and in-transit cargo? 
     Yes. Customs and the Border Police have authority. 
¶3. Do export control enforcement officials possess 
authority to search, detain and seize products? With a 
warrant? Without a warrant? 
     Yes. Without a warrant. 
¶4. Are there limitations imposed on export enforcement 
officials that hinder the effectiveness of their work? 
What are they? 
     Computer Security certification requirement 
     severely limits sending and sharing intelligence 
     data. 
¶5. Are inspectors adequately trained to identify 
controlled items? 
     Yes. 
¶6. Are inspectors adequately trained in customs 
inspection techniques and procedures? 
     Yes. 
¶7. Does the consignee have to be present during a 
search of goods? 
     No. 
¶8. Are customs and law enforcement officials held 
liable for damage occurring during a search? 
     No. 
¶9. Does a frontline inspector have the authority to 
conduct a search on his own, or does he/she need 
approval from a supervisor. If yes, at what level? 
     Authority exists with frontline inspector. 
¶10. Is corruption a problem within customs/law 
enforcement organizations? 
     Over the past few years Slovakia has taken 
     significant action to reduce corruption.  Although 
     there are still isolated cases, it is not nearly 
     as widespread as it once was. 
¶11. Are there sufficient personnel devoted to export 
enforcement, including at the borders? Are they 
properly trained? 
     Numbers are sufficient but there is need for 
     additional training. 
¶12. Is there sufficient, functioning equipment and 
other resources devoted to interdicting unauthorized 
transfers of controlled items? 
     No. EXBS Advisors preparing equipment requests. 
¶13. Are there regulations published on customs/border 
control procedures and requirements? 
     Yes. 
 
¶14. Are there standard operating procedures at all 
border locations? 
     Yes. 
¶15. Are there actual checks being made at national 
borders, transit points and ports? 
     Yes. All exports of strategic and dual-use goods 
     and technology are inspected by Customs at the 
     border station prior to export. 
¶16. Are there effective transshipment controls at 
national borders, transit points and ports? 
     Yes. 
¶17. What investigative activities are being carried 
out? 
     a. Undercover operations? 
     Yes. 
     b. Stings? 
     Yes. 
     c. Paid informants? 
     Unknown. 
     d. Electronic surveillance? 
     Yes. 
¶18. Are the penalties being enforced with actual 
prosecution? 
     None in the recent past. 
 ¶19. Have they conducted any criminal investigations? 
What were their outcomes? 
     Yes. Outcomes are unknown. 
¶20. Are there sufficient civil and administrative 
penalties for export control violations? 
     Yes. 
¶21. Are criminal penalties used for export control 
violations? 
     Yes. 
¶22. Are there customs assistance agreements with U.S. 
and other multilateral regime partners? 
     Yes. 
¶23. Are there extradition treaties with these partners? 
     Unknown. 
¶24. Does customs have sufficient equipment to detect 
WMD and related items? Sufficient training? 
     No. Portal monitors along Ukraine border are 
     "gamma" only.  More Radiation Detection Pagers and 
     other equipment, such as RIIDs and x-ray 
     equipment, is necessary. 
¶25. Are there procedures in place to ensure proper 
handling of detected WMD materials? 
     Yes. 
     a. What are they (e.g. seizure, proper storage)? 
     Identification, Analysis, Seizure, Evidence 
     Storage. The Ministry of Health has a significant 
     role. Current policy would return highly 
     radioactive materials across the border. 
 
IV. Procedures for the coordination and exchange of 
information 
 
    IV.A. Interagency coordination and exchange of 
   information concerning export (transfer) control 
                      procedures, 
    involved parties, and export (transfer) control 
                      violations 
 
¶1. Provisions for gathering information on controlled 
trade 
     a. Is the information being gathered effectively? 
     Yes. 
     b. Is the information being analyzed with the 
intent to affect policy? 
     Yes.  However, they are hindered because of the 
     existing privacy laws. 
     c. Are there adequate personnel and other 
     resources devoted to gathering information on 
     controlled trade? 
     Yes. 
¶2. Are there mechanisms for timely and discreet 
information exchange among concerned agencies and 
governments? 
     No.  Computer database privacy laws seriously 
     restrict the ability to accomplish this. 
¶3. Do the interdiction officials exchange information 
with the investigatory and prosecutory authorities and 
vice versa? 
     Yes. Customs investigators turn information over 
     to Police who prepare case for the prosecutor. 
¶4. Is there an adequate role for intelligence agencies? 
     Yes. 
¶5. Is the intelligence community providing the 
necessary information? 
     Only during licensing review process at working 
     group level. 
 
¶6. Do border control officials have good working 
relations with their neighboring counterparts, at 
border crossings? 
     Relations are strained at the Ukraine border. 
     Although they meet regularly, there is still a 
     lack of trust. 
 
  IV.B. Industry, public, and Government Cooperation 
         (both licensing and law enforcement) 
 
¶1. Provisions for sharing information with industry and 
the public on export control policy. 
     a. Is the information being shared? 
     Yes. 
     b. Do the authorities inform industries of export 
     licensing/authorization requirements? 
     Yes. 
¶2. Does an industry out-reach program exist? 
     Yes. Through periodic meetings organized through 
     auspices of Chamber of Commerce. 
     a. Are there meetings, conferences, and symposiums 
being held? 
     Yes. 
     b. What means of dissemination exist for the 
     distribution of educational materials to industry? 
     Outreach programs. 
¶3. Does industry have an opportunity to appeal 
license/authorization decisions? 
     Basically, yes, the right of a license review by 
     the court is allowed. 
¶4. Do authorities induce companies to adopt internal 
compliance programs? 
     No. 
¶5. Is the government committed to protection of 
proprietary information of businesses that comply with 
the law? 
     Yes. 
¶6. Are there authorities and procedures for industry to 
make voluntary disclosures? 
     No. 
 
              IV.C. Bilateral Cooperation 
 
¶1. Does subject country exchange policy, license 
decision, law enforcement and intelligence information 
with the U.S. on a bilateral basis as needed and 
periodically? 
     Yes. 
¶2. Is subject country willing to establish arrangements 
to do so? 
     Yes. 
¶3. Will the law enforcement authorities work cases with 
foreign law enforcement authorities? 
     Yes. 
 
¶V. Program Administration and system Automation 
 
                  V.A. Infrastructure 
 
¶1. Are there sufficient infrastructure, administrative 
capabilities, facilities, equipment (automation, 
communications, and data-processing systems)? 
     Yes. 
     a. Is the equipment, including software, up-to- 
date? 
 Yes.  Over the passed few years Customs has 
 implemented an automated commercial data system 
 (ASYCUDA), an automated transit system (NCTS) and 
 TARIC.  MOE uses the Tracker System to assist with 
 export licensing decisions. 
¶2. Are there agencies/personnel responsible for this 
component of the export control system? 
     Yes. 
¶3. Are they adequately trained; including trained to 
use automation equipment? 
     Yes. 
¶4. Are there enough licensing officers to process 
license applications in a timely fashion? 
     Yes. 
 
             V.B. Administrative Structure 
 
¶1. Are there procedures to govern the filing, 
receiving, forwarding and tracking of cases and support 
information? 
     Yes. 
¶2. Do mechanisms exist for interagency and 
international exchange of classified information? 
     Yes. However, varied computer systems severely 
     limits exchange of information between agencies. 
 
¶3. Is training available for information handlers? 
     Yes. 
¶4. Is there a projected timetable and, cost for 
development and implementation of the administrative 
structure, if not in place already? 
     Already in place. 
 
Clearance: 
NP/ECC: 
DOC/BIS/NEC: 
DHS/CBP: 
EXBS Regional Program Advisor: Larry Adkins 
DOE/SLD: 
 
End Export Control System Standards 
 
Questions regarding this report can be directed to 
Larry Adkins, EXBS Senior Advisor, at AmEmbassy 
Bratislava at telephone no.: 421-2-5922-3375, fax: 421- 
2-5922-3497 or through email at adkinslh@state.gov. 
 
THAYER 
 
 
merged only. merged incorrectly by 31 
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