This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000718 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2015 
TAGS: PREL PTER KSUM ETRD XF XM IS BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: OLMERT VISIT A SUCCESS, BUT SUMMIT STILL 
DOMINATES ISRAELI CONCERNS 
 
REF: A. BRASILIA 564 
     ¶B. BRASILIA 574 
     ¶C. BRASILIA 658 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN DANILOVICH, Reasons 1.4 (b & d) 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary and Introduction:  Israeli Deputy Prime 
Minister Olmert reportedly enjoyed a successful visit to 
Brazil last week, however, he was apparently unable to 
convince the GOB to take a tougher approach -- from the 
Israeli perspective -- with Arab interlocutors in preparation 
for the Arab-South America Summit in Brasilia in May.  In a 
meeting between President Lula and Olmert, the Brazilians 
studiously avoided any discussion of the Summit.  After 
polling South American colleagues and officials in the 
Ministry of External Relations (MRE), an Israeli diplomat 
told Poloff he sensed Brazilian nervousness that, while most 
if not all South American presidents will be in Brasilia, 
Arab heads of state may stay away.  He surmised that this is 
a not-so-subtle pressure tactic by Arab states to sway 
Brazil, the lead South American negotiator, on Summit 
declaration language.  While the South Americans claim they 
are standing firm vis-a-vis the Arabs on the themes of 
terrorism and Middle East peace, the diplomat noted that 
Israel takes little comfort from the direction the 
declaration seems to be heading.  End Summary 
 
DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER OLMERT "BREAKS BARRIERS" WITH LULA 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶2.  (C)  In follow-up discussions with Poloff March 14 (see 
ref A), Embassy of Israel Minister Counselor Eitan Surkis 
said that Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Olmert had "succeeded 
in breaking barriers" in a one hour March 7 meeting with 
President Lula and in meetings with other key GOB ministers, 
including Minister for Agriculture Roberto Rodrigues; 
Minister for Mines and Energy Dilma Rousseff; Minister for 
Development, Industry, and Trade Luis Furlan; and Secretary 
for Economic and Social Development Jaques Wagner.  In an 
indirect reference to the upcoming Arab-South American 
Summit, Olmert gave Lula his overview of Middle East politics 
and described Israel's unending "sacrifices" on the road to 
peace.  Surkis sensed that President Lula was impressed by 
Olmert's description of Israel's expansion of ties with 
Jordan and a recent press photo showing Prime Minister Sharon 
hugging Egyptian President Mubarak.  Although given the 
opportunity to discuss the upcoming Summit with Olmert, the 
Brazilian President did not take the bait, Surkis said. 
 
¶3.  (C)  The Deputy Prime Minister invited Lula to visit 
Israel, and the Brazilian President responded that he would 
like to do so "during his first mandate," i.e. before the 
2006 presidential electoral campaign season.  Lula noted, 
however, that it might be easier if perhaps either Israeli 
President Katzir or Prime Minister Sharon visited Brazil. 
(Note: Because the Prime Minister was specifically invited, 
Surkis considered this a major concession by the Brazilians. 
End Note)  Surkis pointed out that the Ministry of External 
Relations (MRE) had been almost a non-player in the 
preparations for Olmert's visit; the GOI had coordinated the 
visit directly with the GOB Presidency.  (Foreign Minister 
Amorim himself was traveling in Africa when Olmert was in 
Brazil.)  In any case, Lula reiterated that the Foreign 
Minister intended to visit Israel in June/July 2005. 
 
¶4.  (C)  The expansion of commercial ties was a key theme for 
Olmert's visit to Brazil, Surkis said.  Regarding Mercosul, 
President Lula told Olmert that Brazil "would not put up any 
obstacles" for Israel to have an agreement with the trading 
group.  The Israelis, Surkis commented, had heard this 
message before.  Olmert reminded Lula that Israel had first 
sought a trade pact with Mercosul in 1997.  Yet Egypt, which 
had first broached the idea of a Mercosul agreement in 2004, 
had already been rewarded with an agreement.  Surkis added 
that the two sides also discussed the possibility of creating 
a binational commission. 
 
COULD THE SUMMIT BECOME A BUST? 
------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C)  Surkis and Poloff then compared notes on the lead-up 
to the Arab-South America Summit.  In addition to meeting 
with key MRE officials, Surkis had already met with diplomats 
from most of Brasilia's South American embassies.  Based on 
his conversations, Surkis believes almost all South American 
presidents would attend the Summit.  However, as of last 
week, he understood that no Arab head of state had yet 
confirmed his attendance.  This was probably a not-too-subtle 
ploy by the Arabs to play hardball on the declaration 
language, Surkis opined.  While there is little doubt that 
participating Arab countries would be represented by foreign 
ministers, if Arab heads of state were not in attendance, 
Surkis felt the event could turn into an embarrassment for 
President Lula.  Surkis sensed that regardless of the 
declaration talks, the King of Morocco is an almost certain 
Summit attendee.  In addition, he believed Abu Mazen from the 
Palestinian Authority would like to come, if there is no 
immediate crisis in the territories.  The big question mark, 
he believed, is Mubarak.  The Israeli Embassy in Cairo had 
reported "contradictory indications" in the press as to the 
Egyptian President's attendance at the Summit.  Egypt has 
been the lead for the Arab League in negotiations over the 
Summit declaration. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Based on his consultations with South American 
diplomats, Surkis believes South American concurrence has 
been achieved on "95%" of the Summit declaration.  During the 
recent South America group meeting in Rio, three political 
themes were discussed: (1) land-locked countries, (2) 
terrorism, and (3) the Arab-Israeli peace process.  Regarding 
terrorism, Colombia reportedly insisted, successfully, that 
declaration language refer to terrorism "in all its forms and 
manifestations."  This tact, Surkis felt, could perhaps 
negate any Arab attempt to differentiate between state and 
non-state terrorism or "legitimate" types of activities that, 
of course, were clearly terrorism.  While the South Americans 
agreed they would not allow the declaration to contain 
"tough" language against Israel, Surkis said it would be 
small comfort to Israel if the final Summit declaration, in 
addition to referring to acceptable UNSC Resolutions such as 
242 and 338, referred also to other UN resolutions that 
Israel finds onerous.  It was also Surkis' understanding that 
the South Americans may agree to language calling on Israel 
to withdraw to the frontiers of June 4, 1967.  "What does 
this Summit have to do with this (issue)?" Surkis asked. 
 
 
¶7.  (C)  Surkis again emphasized that the South Americans, 
including the Brazilians, are evidently unaware of all the 
sensitivities surrounding the Mideast peace process.  "They 
are believers in UN resolutions," he added, "and do not want 
to invent anything new."  Given the various stages of 
negotiation of the declaration, the last chance to make 
changes to it would be in Brasilia just before the opening of 
the Summit itself. 
 
¶8.  (C)  COMMENT:  The Israeli Embassy has pulled out all the 
stops to gauge the Summit preparatory process, and their 
perspective about Brazilian diplomacy leading to the Summit 
coincides closely with our own.  As with us, MRE is being 
very cautious in what they tell the Israelis.  We sense that, 
from the Brazilian perspective, if after tedious negotiations 
with the Arabs the Summit declaration refers only to classic 
(i.e., approved) UN resolutions, withdrawal to 1967 borders, 
etc., and does not blatantly blame Israel, this would be 
evidence of successful Brazilian diplomacy.  The other South 
Americans, themselves amateurs to the vagaries and nuances of 
the peace process, will likely follow Brazil's lead. 
 
Danilovich