This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 000715 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PLEASE PASS TO USTR 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2015 
TAGS: PREL BR ETRD MARR FTAA US
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: AMBASSADOR'S 14 MARCH MEETING WITH FM 
AMORIM 
 
REF: A. (A) DANILOVICH-NORIEGA TELCON 14 MARCH 05 
     ¶B. (B) DEPARTMENT WHA/BSC -- EMBASSY E-MAILS 14 
        MARCH 05 
     ¶C. (C) STATE 43965 
     ¶D. (D) BRASILIA 574 
     ¶E. (E) BRASILIA 660 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN J. DANILOVICH. REASONS: 1.4 
(B)(D). 
 
¶1. (C) Introduction.  Ambassador was called for a one-on-one 
meeting with Foreign Minister Amorim on the afternoon of 14 
March.  Amorim focused initially on reiterating his strong 
interest in meeting soon with Secretary Rice, in spite of 
unsuccessful efforts to schedule a Washington meeting in late 
March or mid April. (Amorim said he may cancel his April trip 
to Washington in light of the Secretary's unavailability on 
18-19 April, when Amorim had considered combining a call on 
her with participation at a World Bank meeting on Haiti.) 
Amorim said that he and President Lula da Silva believe it 
would be important and highly positive for bilateral 
relations if the Secretary could visit Brazil soon, and he 
expressed the hope that she could stop here en route to or 
from the Community of Democracies summit in Chile in late 
April.  Amorim then noted Ambassador's recent meetings with 
Deputy Foreign Minister Guimaraes (ref E) and Amorim's chief 
of Staff Patriota (ref D), and reviewed key issues from those 
discussions with Ambassador (per below).  End introduction 
 
VENEZUELA 
 
¶2. (S) Ambassador outlined points (refs A-C) on the USG's 
growing concern about Chavez's rhetoric and actions, and 
stressed that the USG increasingly sees Chavez as a threat to 
the region.  Per refs, he asked that FM Amorim consider 
institutionalizing a more intensive political engagement 
between the USG and GOB on Chavez, and standing up a 
dedicated intelligence-sharing arrangement.  FM Amorim was 
clear in his response:  "We do not see Chavez as a threat." 
Amorim said that Chavez has been democratically elected (in a 
general election that was reaffirmed by a referendum), enjoys 
substantial domestic support, is a popular figure on the 
international left and is leader of a major power on the 
continent.  For those reasons, "we have to work with him and 
do not want to do anything that would jeopardize our 
relationship with him," Amorim affirmed. 
 
¶3. (S) Amorim said the GOB would welcome intensifying its 
political dialogue with the U.S. on Chavez, but has no 
interest in intelligence sharing (although Amorim allowed 
that the GOB would be willing to look at any intelligence we 
wished to provide unilaterally).  Describing Brazil's 
relationship with Venezuela as "sensitive," Amorim said the 
GOB needed to take care not to take steps (e.g., intelligence 
activity with the USG) that could undermine its credibility 
with Chavez and undercut the GOB's ability to influence him 
in a more positive direction.  Amorim said that he did not 
want to exaggerate the importance of Brazil's role in curbing 
Chavez's more extreme behaviors, but in example Amorim noted 
Brazil's work with the Friends Group (where he said Brazil 
weathered criticism from various sides to produce a balanced 
outcome), Lula's recent suggestion to Chavez in a meeting in 
Uruguay that he tone down his rhetoric, and also told a story 
of how Lula had personally persuaded Chavez not to go 
swimming at a Chilean beach where Chavez intended to proclaim 
to gathered press that he was bathing in a spot which should 
be Bolivia's coastline on the Pacific.  Amorim also noted 
that the meeting between Presidents Lula, Chavez, Uribe and 
Zapatero scheduled for 29 March may occur in the Brazilian 
Amazon frontier town of Santa Helena for a discussion of 
economic integration (Note:  This does not track with 
information from Lula's foreign affairs staff, who recently 
told PolCouns that the meeting would focus on 
counternarcotics and border security issues.  End note.) 
 
BOLIVIA 
 
¶4. (S) Segueing into a discussion of Bolivia, Amorim said 
that Lula had been in direct contact with opposition leader 
Evo Morales in recent days.  Lula and the GOB are trying to 
persuade Morales that he needs to act in a democratic 
fashion, Amorim said, noting that, as with Chavez, it must be 
understood that Morales has "political legitimacy," with 
popular support among a significant percentage of Bolivia's 
population.  The USG, Brazil and others need to "take a 
steady and balanced approach" in supporting democracy in 
Bolivia in the next crucial weeks, Amorim added. 
The economic exposure of Brazilian companies in Bolivia, 
along with the threat posed to regional stability by unrest 
there, make developments in Bolivia of vital interest to 
Brazil, Amorim said. 
 
HAITI 
 
¶5. (SBU) Affirming the USG's support and gratitude for 
Brazil's leadership in the Haiti mission, Ambassador provided 
ref A invitation for Brazil to meet with the U.S. and Canada 
at the assistant secretary level, along with UN senior 
representative Valdes in Port-au-Prince in coming weeks to 
discuss cooperation in assistance projects and enhancing 
political dialogue.  Amorim immediately agreed, and said he 
would designate a representative asap (Note: On the margins 
of the meeting with Amorim PolCouns spoke briefly with 
Ambassador Eduardo Felicio, the ministry's lead officer on 
political issues in the Haiti mission.  Felicio indicated 
that either he or a senior GOB development official would 
likely represent Brazil at the proposed meeting. End note.) 
Amorim took the opportunity to affirm to Ambassador in strong 
terms that the GOB "has no intention of downgrading its 
commitment to Haiti; on the contrary, we plan to bolster our 
presence." 
 
SOUTH AMERICA-ARAB SUMMIT 
 
¶6. (C) Amorim told Ambassador that the GOB intended to do all 
it could to produce a balanced summit statement that would 
use language of existing UNSC resolutions for any passages 
dealing with political issues.  Amorim also noted that in his 
meetings with Syria's foreign minister and President Assad in 
Damascus, Amorim had urged Syrian compliance with UNSCR 1559 
(even though Brazil abstained on that vote).  Amorim claimed 
that, even before Syria publicly announced its pull-back in 
Lebanon, Assad had told Amorim in their meeting that he 
intended to withdraw Syrian forces from Lebanon, although 
Amorim said he did not claim to take credit for Assad's 
decision. Ambassador chided Amorim for Brazil's abstention on 
1559 and post facto commitment to Lebanese democracy, at 
which Amorim smiled.  Amorim reiterated that his recent 
Middle East trip had been focused on providing invitations to 
Arab participants in the summit, that he had no intention of 
slighting Israel and would be visiting Israel in June. 
 
FTAA 
 
¶7. (SBU) Ambassador expressed disappointment that Brazil had 
canceled a March meeting of the FTAA co-chairs, but Amorim 
emphasized that the GOB had sought only a postponement to 
early April, so that Amorim would have the opportunity to 
consult with Brazil's negotiator Bahadian and also with 
Mercosul partners in advance of the co-chairs meeting.  He 
reiterated that Brazil "wants to remain within the Miami 
framework," even though Brazil sees some recent USG actions 
as inconsistent with that goal (e.g., the U.S. approach to 
IPR and possible cross retaliation).  Musing that Brazil is 
"happy enough to say that the negotiations are under an FTAA 
umbrella," Amorim opined that what is actually happening now 
is a Mercosul -U.S. bilateral trade negotiation, since the 
U.S. "has already executed bilateral agreements with everyone 
else." 
 
INSS/ATLANTA CONSULATE 
 
¶8. (SBU) Amorim understood the two issues: property sales and 
INSS payments should be delinked.  However, he added that if 
the U.S. can provide general language in an agreement that 
reflects a U.S. intention to pay past USG debts to Brazil's 
social security system or some other acknowledgment that 
accomplishes that purpose, a solution can be reached.  He 
said "it is in your interest for Brazil to have a consulate 
in Atlanta," reflecting his understanding that the USG is 
using delay of approval for the new consulate as leverage to 
press for a solution on the USG property problem.  Ambassador 
noted that this has been a long-standing issue that was an 
administrative and financial impediment to our diplomatic 
mission in Brazil, and that the time has come to solve this 
matter. Amorim seemed good natured and optimistic about 
resolving the question with some type of appropriate 
agreement regarding the USG "intention" to deal with its INSS 
obligations. 
TSA/Alcantara 
 
SIPDIS 
 
¶9. (SBU) Amorim also said that the GOB is close to being 
ready to engage with the USG on revision of the 2000 
bilateral Technology Safeguards Agreement for participation 
of U.S. firms in commercial space launches at the Alcantara 
facility in northern Brazil.  Amorim noted two specific 
issues -- language referring to safeguard agreements of other 
countries working at Alcantara and USG requirements on 
prohibiting launches by states accused of supporting 
terrorism - as areas where the GOB and USG may need to find 
new common language for the text. 
 
¶10. (S) Comment: Amorim made it very clear that the GOB is 
not buying into our categorization of Chavez as a significant 
threat to the region, to be treated accordingly.  The GOB 
sees him as a legitimate, democratically- elected figure (as 
is also Evo Morales, in the GOB's view) and Brazil is 
committed to working closely with Chavez, ostensibly to 
ameliorate his more extreme behavior by involving him in 
interdependent economic and political relationships.  Brazil 
seems to believe that is the best route to enhancing regional 
stability.  Amorim's flat rejection of intelligence sharing 
was balanced by his willingness to engage more intensely with 
us on a political level in approaching Venezuela, and we 
should look for ways to exploit that opening in making our 
case that Chavez represents a danger. Providing the GOB with 
more detailed information on human rights violations and 
repressive actions within Venezuela, as well as any 
information we can share about Chavez-backed mischief in 
other countries (even if that means offering intelligence 
unilaterally) can be part of the political engagement.  On a 
more positive note, Amorim was forward-leaning on the two key 
bilateral issues discussed -- INSS/U.S. property and the 
Alcantara TSA -- and seems committed to working on 
resolutions in the near future. 
 
Danilovich