This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 002526 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2015 
TAGS: PHUM PTER SNAR CO OAS
SUBJECT: A CLOSER LOOK AT DEMOBILIZED AUC DEATHS 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (C) Thirty-two out of 3,784 demobilized paramilitaries 
have been killed since the United Self Defense Forces of 
Colombia (AUC) began demobilizing in 2004.  This figure does 
not include the nineteen members of the Cacique Nutibara Bloc 
(BCN) killed in Medellin, whose demobilization was not held 
to the same monitoring standards as the other 
demobilizations.  According to the OAS verification mission, 
there is no evidence that the deaths are a result of a 
concerted effort by guerrillas to systematically kill 
demobilized paramilitaries.  Instead, the majority of deaths 
appear to have been caused by common crime or personal 
vendettas.  The GOC has established programs, including 
psychological counseling and information sessions with the 
police, to inform demobilizing paramilitaries about civilian 
life and the importance of respecting state authorities. 
According to the OAS, past peace processes show that an 
average of one percent of demobilized combatants die 
violently after demobilization.  End Summary. 
 
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Roughly One Percent Killed 
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¶2. (C) Excluding the BCN and the minor demobilization of the 
independent self-defense forces of Ortega, 32 out of 3,784 
demobilized paramilitaries have been killed since 
demobilization began in 2004, or just under one percent. 
Thirteen were from the Catatumbo Bloc, 16 from the Calima 
Bloc, and three from the Cordoba Bloc.  Almost all of the 
deaths were violent except for two accidents and one 
illness-related death.  For example, in Valle del Cauca 
Department, where the Calima Bloc demobilized, most of the 
former paramilitaries have been killed by drug traffickers, 
apparently to settle old scores.  In Norte de Santander, 
where the Catatumbo Bloc demobilized, seven members were 
killed in a brawl with private security guards.  One former 
Cordoba Bloc member was murdered after he provided evidence 
to authorities against one of his former fellow 
paramilitaries.  The Department of Administrative Security 
(DAS, rough FBI equivalent) provides security for demobilized 
commanders when they are outside of the concentration zone in 
Cordoba but not to the rank and file. 
 
¶3. (C) Nineteen BCN members have been killed.  The BCN 
demobilization was not as closely monitored as subsequent 
demobilizations.  The Medellin Mayor's Office largely took 
over the reinsertion process, and there have been many 
complaints that BCN members continue to intimidate and exert 
control over their communities.  For this reason, the 
unusually large number of BCN deaths cannot be considered as 
representative of the AUC demobilization process. 
 
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OAS Not Overly Concerned 
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¶4. (C) The OAS verification mission has investigated the 
deaths and determined that there is no evidence of a 
concerted effort by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC) or other illegal groups to systematically 
kill former paramilitaries.  OAS verification mission chief 
Sergio Caramagna told us the vast majority of the deaths were 
a result of common crime or personal vendettas. 
 
¶5. (C) Caramagna does not find the deaths surprising, given 
that former paramilitaries tend to live in poor, dangerous 
neighborhoods and are accustomed to being the de-facto 
authorities in many areas.  According to Caramagna, in most 
demobilizations world wide, an average of one percent of 
ex-combatants are killed after demobilization.  In contrast, 
the armed forces have killed over 1,000 active paramilitaries 
since the peace process began, which is roughly ten percent 
of the estimated 20,000 paramilitaries in Colombia.  We do 
not have data on what percentage of paramilitaries are killed 
each year by guerrillas and other causes, but it is clear 
that chances of survival are better after demobilization. 
Caramagna emphasized, however, that the deaths demonstrate 
the importance of increasing security and social programs in 
former AUC areas.  He is concerned the GOC does not have the 
resources to do so. 
 
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GOC Taking Steps 
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¶6. (U) The GOC is working to inform former paramilitaries 
about civilian life and convince them to rely on state 
authorities to settle security problems.  During the 
demobilization and reinsertion process, a psychologist from 
the Peace Commissioner's Office holds group counseling 
sessions.  Individual counseling is available at the Centers 
for Reference and Orientation (CRO), where former 
paramilitaries report periodically to receive reinsertion 
benefits.  The Peace Commissioner's Office also organizes 
information sessions between former paramilitaries and 
Community Police.  The police instruct the former 
paramilitaries on the importance of not taking security 
matters into their own hands. 
 
 
 
 
WOOD