P 091643Z MAR 05
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6689
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY VATICAN CITY VT 
HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ5//

C O N F I D E N T I A L  BEIRUT 000767 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/08/2015 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PTER SY LE
SUBJECT: MGLE01:  PARLIAMENTARY SPEAKER BERRI SEES SYRIANS 
ON THEIR WAY OUT FAST, BUT FEARS DELAY IN ELECTIONS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
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Summary 
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¶1.  (C) Nabih Berri, Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies and 
leader of the Shia Amal Movement, assured the Ambassador that 
Syrian forces would redeploy to the Biqa' Valley in short 
order and complete their withdrawal to Syria within months. 
Looking on the bright side, Berri claimed that Syria's 
departure will give its Lebanese allies more freedom of 
maneuver.  On the other hand, he gloomily conceded that his 
Amal Movement's rival for leadership of Lebanon's Shia 
community, Hizballah, may well steal the show (as Hizballah 
did later that same day, March 8, in a huge downtown rally). 
Berri is emphatically for a strong "national unity 
government," and frustrated by the opposition's lack of 
interest in joining.  Any further delay in forming a 
government makes a delay of parliamentary elections almost 
certain, Berri said.  End summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Syrian withdrawal -- they mean it, Berri says 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Berri was laconic at first when called on by the 
Ambassador and poloff on March 8 at Berri's Beirut residence. 
 The Ambassador asked about the March 7 meeting in Damascus 
between Syrian President Asad and Lebanese President Lahoud, 
whom Berri accompanied.  "Good, no problem," Berri replied, 
turning away to stare at a point in space, lips pursed, hands 
clasped over his knee.  Was he confident the Syrians would 
commit to full withdrawal?  "No problem," Berri repeated, 
pronouncing the two words slowly and exactly. 
 
¶3.  (C) "I'm sure of one thing," Berri told the Ambassador. 
That is that Syria will redeploy its forces to the Biqa' 
Valley, starting possibly as soon as March 9.  Following 
that, UN Special Envoy Terje-Roed Larsen would return to the 
region and arrive at a "more than positive solution" for full 
Syrian withdrawal. 
 
¶4.  (C) Berri expressed frustration with criticism made by 
Lebanese oppositionists, among others, of the results of the 
March 7 Damascus meeting, particularly the fact that it did 
not announce a timetable for full withdrawal.  The plan 
agreed on by Asad and Lahoud would apply the Ta'if Agreement 
"exactly," and "in the way of (UNSCR) 1559" (which Berri 
admitted he opposed, but "in a democratic way").  All 
Roed-Larsen had to do was arrange a "marriage" between the 
Ta'if Agreement and UNSCR 1559, and then he could extract a 
timetable from the Syrians. 
 
¶5.  (C) Berri expressed certainty not only that Syrian forces 
would redeploy to the Biqa' quickly, but also that they would 
start to withdraw across the Syrian border before April. 
Full withdrawal would be completed not within a year, but 
within months.  Queried by the Ambassador, Berri said that 
all Syrian intelligence personnel would be withdrawn as well. 
 
¶6.  (C) Berri insisted that this was not a matter of all talk 
and no action.  President Asad had made clear his intent 
about complying with UNSCR 1559.  The SARG would obey any 
demands made on it by Roed-Larsen's forthcoming report.  The 
reason the SARG was so intent on full withdrawal was that it 
did not want to be responsible for implementation of the 
other provisions of UNSCR 1559, such as disarmament and 
disbandment of militias. 
 
¶7.  (C) Berri said that, faced with the disarmament of 
Hizballah, Asad could say it was "not my business."  Also, 
the SARG wanted to be able to claim credit for implementing 
UNSCR 1559.  That way, it could make a stronger case for 
implementation of other Security Council resolutions dealing 
with the Middle East. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
With Syria leaving, it's Nasrallah's show 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Asked by the Ambassador about the massive rally in 
central Beirut being organized at that moment by Hizballah, 
Berri gloomily said of his rival for leadership of the Shia 
community, Hizballah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, that 
"it is his case now."  With the Syrians withdrawing from 
Lebanon, Nasrallah had "come to the front."  No one could 
claim that the rally was a "Syrian project," claimed Berri. 
 
¶9.  (C) Berri said he was trying hard to keep people "off the 
streets" and minimize the possibility of violence in the 
current tense atmosphere.  He noted reports of violent 
incidents following Asad's March 5 speech, provoked by 
individuals in vehicles flying flags of Berri's Amal Movement 
and driving through pro-opposition neighborhoods.  None of 
the perpetrators were Amal members, he said -- in one case, 
they had been Palestinians.  "Many people want to make 
trouble," he said.  Lebanon was not united, it had too many 
sects, it was -- in a negative metaphor increasingly favored 
by loyalists -- "not Ukraine." 
 
¶10.  (C) The Ambassador suggested that it was a positive sign 
that Lebanese, whether opposition or loyalist, were all 
marching under the same flag, the Lebanese national flag. 
Their confessional identify was not determining their stance 
on the question of the Syrian presence.  Berri, still gloomy, 
answered that it was "apparently" good for the Lebanese to be 
under one flag.  The problem was that "everyone sees their 
own color in the flag."  The Lebanese remained "a divided 
people." 
 
¶11.  (C) Perhaps indicative of his bad mood, Berri proceeded 
to instruct the Ambassador on points that, while arguably 
true, were irrelevant.  If Hariri had not been assassinated, 
Berri asserted, the Sunni community would not have joined the 
opposition.  If the Syrians are proven innocent of Hariri's 
assassination, the Sunnis will "change in one day."  Druze 
leader Walid Jumblatt subscribes to the Ta'if Agreement but 
not UNSCR 1559; he is therefore in favor of the Syrians 
remaining in the Biqa' Valley (comment:  while the first 
point is true, the second is clearly not). 
 
---------------------- 
Politics without Syria 
---------------------- 
 
¶12.  (C) With the Syrians gone, Berri claimed, Syria's 
Lebanese allies would be more free to do what they want.  For 
example, Berri expected more elements on the loyalist side 
(Hizballah, President Lahoud) to move closer to his original 
position on the electoral law.  That is, they would support 
large electoral districts drawn along the lines of the 
"mohafazah" administrative unit, rather than the smaller 
"qada."  Berri himself had supported the "qada" plan only 
because of Syrian pressure to go along with a supposed deal 
between Damascus and the Maronite Patriarch. 
 
¶13.  (C) Another example:  Berri and his Amal Movement could 
now take full credit from their constituents in return for 
largesse.  Previously, they had often faced constituents 
suspicious that the real donor of state-funded projects and 
services was "the ally," i.e., Damascus, not Berri and Amal. 
"We (the Amal Movement) paid the price sometimes!" 
 
--------------------------- 
Forming a new government... 
--------------------------- 
 
¶14.  (C) Berri told the Ambassador that a strong government, 
a "national unity government," was needed in the aftermath of 
the Karami government's February 28 resignation.  Only a 
strong government could handle the several "big issues" that 
any successor to Karami's government would face:  the 
investigation of Hariri's assassination, Syrian withdrawal, 
and the new electoral law.  He joked that, in response to 
opposition demands, he had tried to look up the term "neutral 
government" in "my dictionary of Lebanese politics."  It 
didn't exist. 
 
¶15.  (C) Berri expected 'Umar Karami to come back as Prime 
Minister in the next government.  The list of viable 
candidates to fill the post was short:  Karami, Salim 
al-Hoss, Fouad Siniora, and Adnan Kassar.  Berri opposed 
naming an anti-Hariri figure, so that ruled out Hoss.  On the 
other hand, Hariri supporters did not want Siniora or Kassar 
elevated to the position.  That left Karami.  Berri believed 
Karami would be a good choice; if brought back, Karami would 
"try to make it work." 
 
¶16.  (C) Berri said he wanted the opposition to join the new 
cabinet.  They were making a serious mistake if they held 
back.  There was a precedent for effective national unity 
governments in Lebanon, such as the one that brought 
civil-war-era leaders on both sides of the East Beirut-West 
Beirut divide into the same cabinet in 1984 (comment:  a grim 
precedent). 
 
¶17.  (C) Berri claimed to be puzzled by the opposition's 
demand that seven security service heads be dismissed before 
the opposition would consider joining a new government.  The 
Ambassador said that the opposition was arguing that there 
was no sense in joining a cabinet when the real power 
remained in the hands of unaccountable security chiefs. 
Based on our conversations with the opposition, however, it 
seems that the opposition might be willing to bargain to an 
extent, perhaps agreeing to let the other chiefs remain in 
place for the time being in return for the immediate 
dismissal of Internal Security Force Director General Ali 
al-Hajj.  "Why the innocent one and not the guilty one?" 
Berri asked, without clarification (but presumably in 
reference to fellow Shia Jamil al-Sayyed, whom Berri detests 
-- and the feeling is mutual). 
 
¶18.  (C) Berri fretted about the confessional complications 
that would come into play with the dismissal of any or all of 
the security service chiefs.  Anyway, the cabinet would have 
to name a replacement for any dismissed security service 
chief -- why did the opposition not want to be in the cabinet 
and influence the decision? 
 
--------------------------------- 
... and holding elections on time 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶19.  (C) Berri told the Ambassador that the consultations for 
designating a new Prime Minister and forming a cabinet could 
easily take a week.  A genuine "national unity government" 
could take even longer to form.  Then there was the matter of 
the election law, and parliamentary elections cannot begin 
less than one month after the law enters into effect. 
 
¶20.  (C) Berri said that, until now, plans to hold elections 
on schedule in May have remained in the realm of feasibility. 
Any further delay would put these plans in jeopardy, 
however.  The Ambassador told Berri that a genuinely strong 
government cannot be formed until after elections, so they 
need to remain on schedule. 
 
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Comment 
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¶21.  (C) The massive demonstration in central Beirut on the 
afternoon of March 8 appeared to vindicate Berri's fears 
about being left behind, coughing in Hizballah's dust on a 
post-Syrian Lebanese political landscape.  Some of the 
concerns he tried to raise and link with Syrian withdrawal -- 
Hizballah ascendancy, civil disorder, pro-Syrian elements 
having an even freer hand -- sounded a little disingenuous, 
given that the Syrians still have yet to leave. 
 
 
FELTMAN