This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 002280 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV, EAP/RSP 
DEFENSE FOR OASD/ISA/AP 
PACOM FOR FPA (HUSO) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2014 
TAGS: PREL POL MIL
SUBJECT: UTAPAO NAVAL AIR STATION - OPPORTUNITIES FOR 
IMPROVED FACILITIES 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason 1.4 (d) 
 
¶1. (C) The Royal Thai Naval Air Station at Utapao represents 
the most strategically significant location in Thailand, and 
one of considerable importance regionally.  In the past 
several years Utapao has been used to support OPERATION 
ENDURING FREEDOM, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM and various smaller 
contingencies.  Most recently, while serving as the regional 
hub for the U.S. led OPERATION UNIFIED ASSISTANCE (OUA), the 
value of our nearly unfettered access to the facility was 
once again clearly demonstrated. 
 
¶2.  (C)  In addition to supporting contingency operations, 
approximately 30 U.S. military aircraft routinely transit 
Utapao monthly, and the base is central in supporting an 
average of 40 joint and combined exercises conducted between 
United States and Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF) annually. 
There are also commercial pressures on Utapao that will 
likely grow in the future, including booming business in the 
nearby Eastern-Seaboard industrial zone, international 
charter flights, the base's use as a commercial aircraft 
diversion airfield, and civilian competition for control of 
airfield operations. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Although successive Thai governments have been 
responsive to U.S. requests to use Utapao, we cannot take for 
granted the access we have enjoyed to date.  Despite the high 
tempo of U.S. activity in Utapao, we have offered very little 
in the way of lasting facility improvements or maintenance 
that would provide mutual benefits and be supportive of our 
strategic objectives regarding expanded access and influence. 
 
¶4. (C) The aftermath of OUA and increased interest in further 
development of Utapao as a Cooperative Security Location 
(CSL) requires careful consideration of how to best advance 
our own interests while fully acknowledging legitimate 
partner nation sovereignty and commercialization issues.  In 
this effort, it is critical that all U.S. military 
initiatives that would in any way alter the current status 
quo first receive thorough review, vetting and approval of 
Commander, USPACOM, and that they be considered in the 
context of any other "competing" or complementary programs. 
Those programs approved by Commander, USPACOM should then be 
reviewed by the U.S. Country Team in Thailand to provide a 
perspective on what is achievable given existing political 
realities and conditions, thereby resulting in a 
cooperatively developed product which will have examined all 
equities.  The Joint United States Military Advisory Group 
Thailand (JUSMAGTHAI) will serve as the in-country focal 
point for all U.S. military initiatives potentially affecting 
Utapao, to include construction projects, renovations, 
facility expansion and all interaction with applicable RTARF 
representatives. 
 
¶5. (C) Although the Royal Thai Government (RTG) is aware of 
the general U.S. interest in the CSL concept globally, it is 
important to note that there are no formal agreements with 
any level of the RTG regarding the establishment of CSLs in 
Thailand.  The access that we currently enjoy is solely the 
result of our traditional alliance and military-to-military 
partnership that has been sustained over many years.  The 
past practice of disparate offices from various organizations 
surveying Utapao based on stove-piped coordination and 
objectives inadvertently jeopardizes our current level of 
access through potential Thai misperception of USG intent. 
It is important now, and will become increasingly important 
in the years ahead, that we concentrate efforts to develop a 
single plan, endorsed by USPACOM and the U.S. Country Team, 
that promotes Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP) and 
Mission Performance Plan (MPP) objectives, but is tempered by 
a realistic analysis of RTG concerns and sensitivities. 
 
¶6.  (C) The U.S. Country Team's preferred approach would be a 
plan that is implemented in phases addressing near-, mid- and 
long-term objectives, and that contains elements directly 
benefiting both U.S. and RTG goals.  This approach would seek 
to front-load improvements that would be perceived as most 
beneficial from the Thai perspective in order to both serve 
as tangible evidence of our appreciation for the access we 
have been granted over many years, as well as offset the 
potential impression that follow-on improvements might be 
seen to have greater benefit to the U.S.  Specifically: 
¶A. Near Term:  Provide equipment and services addressing 
immediate needs in improving airport safety and upgrading air 
traffic control capability.  These are areas that have long 
been neglected and represent fundamental, required airport 
capabilities supporting U.S. military, Thai military, and 
commercial aircraft.  Examples of improvements in the near 
term would include: 
1) Area Surveillance Radar (ASR-10); 
2) VOR/DME capability; 
3) UHF/VHF integrated communications package; 
4) Improved fire-fighting and crash and rescue capability; 
5) Airfield Grounding System 
 
¶B. Mid Term:  Develop the largely unused portion of Utapao 
east of the main runway for use as a U.S. lodgment point 
supporting small deployments of U.S. personnel and equipment, 
such as might be expected during an exercise.  The 
significant advantages associated with moving U.S. operations 
to the east side include: 
1) Reduced visibility of U.S. forces; 
2) Reduced interference between military and commercial 
traffic; 
3) A self-contained capability to receive and process U.S. 
military personnel, cargo and equipment separate from primary 
flightline Thai military and foreign commercial operations 
and facilities 
 
¶C. Long Term:  Expand development of the east side, to 
include exploring the possibility of leasing existing 
warehouse structures in order to support larger contingency 
deployments of U.S. TDY personnel, and to formalize U.S. 
presence on a long-term basis.  Consideration should be given 
to the placement of mobile equipment to support greater 
logistics capacity, to include: 
1) Fuel trucks; 
2) MHE (10K forklift, 10K rough terrain forklift, 25K Loader 
(NGSL), ground power unit (GPU), air start unit (ASU), 
aircraft maintenance stands, runway sweeper) 
 
¶7. (SBU) Each of these phases offers the partner nation 
significant benefits and contributes to infrastructure 
improvement necessary to better support routine and 
contingency U.S. deployments.  The option to develop the east 
side creates an ability to expand or contract the U.S. 
footprint, using temporary structures and mobile equipment 
tailored to mission requirements, while avoiding unwanted 
conflicts with ongoing airport operations, particularly on 
the commercial side.  This option does not envision the 
construction of large, permanent structures that would 
advertise the U.S. presence.  It would, however, address 
anticipated RTG/RTARF concerns. 
 
ARVIZU