This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 001573 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/BCLTV, DRL. US PACOM FOR FPA HUSO. 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2015 
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV TH HUMAN RIGHTS
SUBJECT: THAI MFA PERMSEC SUMMONS THE AMBASSADOR OVER 2004 
HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 
 
REF: BANGKOK 1527 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce.  Reason 1.4 (b, d) 
 
 ¶1. (C) Summary:  Foreign Ministry (MFA) Permanent Secretary 
Krit Garnjana-Goonchorn told the Ambassador March 2 that the 
2004 Human Right Report (HRR) on Thailand presented 
government actions (at Khru Se mosque and Tak Bai) in the 
deep South in a misleading light by failing to place them in 
the context of the separatist insurgency.  He raised a few 
other specific "inaccuracies" and complained about the 
general methodology of the report. His main message, however, 
was that the RTG regards the HRR as "interference" and that 
it  creates difficulties in the bilateral relationship.  He 
said the MFA would try to limit the damage caused.  MFA has 
by and large tried to play down the issue after calling in 
the Ambassador.  Krit said MFA has advised PM Thaksin not to 
react publicly.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) On March 2, the Ambassador was called in to the MFA by 
Permanent Secretary Krit Garnjana-Goonchorn over the Thailand 
chapter of the 2004 HRR.  Krit said he wished to express the 
Royal Thai Government's deep unhappiness over some of the 
content of the HRR as well as the way release of the report 
had been handled.  The report had hurt bilateral relations, 
he said, and he wanted to discuss with the Ambassador how to 
limit further damage.  Krit was accompanied by MFA Americas 
Director General Nongnuth Petcharatana, Ministry spokesman 
Sihasak Puangketkaew and other Americas Department officials. 
 Polcouns Clarke took notes for the Ambassador. 
 
MFA ASSERTS HUMAN RIGHT REPORT IS FLAWED... 
 
¶3. (C) Krit, referring to an article in the February 28 
edition of the English-language newspaper The Nation which 
purported to preview the HRR, complained about "prior 
leakage."  He assured the Ambassador that nobody at MFA was 
responsible.  (Note: The Nation has hinted to us that its 
source was MFA which, while not in possession of an advance 
copy, had been well-briefed for months about major events at 
Khru Se mosque and Tak Bai that are condemned in the HRR. 
End note.)  He also said that "members of Thai civil society" 
who had attended an Embassy meeting with NGO representatives 
and RTG officials about the HRR on March 1, were "dual 
capacity" and had provided quotes to the press.  DG Nongnuth 
interjected her familiar objection that the U.S. should not 
be "PR'ing" its criticisms of human rights in Thailand. 
(Note: NGO reps  did in fact accurately quote from the 
discussion, but primarily gave the press their reactions, 
generally favorable, to the HRR. End Note.) 
 
¶4. (C) Krit said that he was aware the U.S. had been open 
over the past year to MFA explanations of human rights abuse 
incidents.  However, it was the view of the RTG that our 
final 2004 Report had a "greatly reduced value" because of 
"fundamental flaws."  These, he said, fell into two areas: 1) 
"misleading presentation," where an overall context of 
positive human rights developments in Thailand had been 
omitted or minimized; and 2) where the "unscientific nature" 
of the collection methodology resulted in assertions that 
were "off the mark." 
 
¶5. (C)  Krit offered several specific complaints.  The 
opening pages of the HRR contain a number of sweeping 
generalizations, including about corruption.  Many incidents 
may be committed by individuals, he said, but the implication 
is that the government was involved.  Readers pick up unduly 
negative impressions from sections when they don't understand 
the background.  Writing about the Khru Se mosque incident, 
for example, cannot be balanced without discussion of the 
violent insurgency that the RTG faces in the South.  Peaceful 
handling the South is on the top of the Thai national agenda, 
Krit said.  PM Thaksin had just established a National 
Reconciliation Commission headed by Anand Panyarachun, so the 
situation was not as static as portrayed in the HRR. 
 
¶6. (C)  Krit also raised a reference to the murder of a 
Pattani Court judge which seemed to suggest that he was 
killed by RTG authorities.  He said that under common law 
there is a presumption of innocence until proven guilty, and 
this assertion with no attribution stepped over the line. 
(Note: The judge almost certainly was killed by 
anti-government gunmen. End note.)  Further, Krit said that 
under the "unlawful killings" section, the HRR had reported 
on deaths of persons from land mines.  "How could deaths by 
landmines be classified as a human rights abuses and put in 
this section," he asked.  (Note:  The category is actually 
"Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life," and inclusion of 
land mine death figures -- as arbitrary deaths -- is in the 
HRR drafting instructions.  End Note.) 
 
...AND DAMAGES U.S.-THAI RELATIONS 
 
¶7. (C) Krit said that there certainly could be genuine 
differences of opinion about events, but the main thrust of 
his message to the Ambassador was RTG concern over what was 
seen as an unwarranted interference in the domestic affairs 
of Thailand.  Thais, including the prime minister, did not 
understand why this was happening, especially in the period 
of post-tsunami cooperation. The "sudden" publication of the 
Human Rights Report had created difficulties for the 
bilateral relationship, he said.  Krit said that the RTG 
wanted to avoid the "annual public spectacle" of release of 
the HRR, and would try to dampen public reaction against the 
U.S. in response to this year's report.  The MFA would only 
note to the press that it had been in contact with the 
Ambassador about inaccuracies and asked for corrections. 
However, he added, this should not be understood as lessening 
the strength of the RTG concerns he had outlined. 
 
¶8. (C) Spokesman Sihasak commented that the way that material 
in the HRR was organized was a problem.  He suggested that if 
the U.S. had highlighted the government's efforts to promote 
people's economic well-being and fight trafficking that would 
have toned down the HRR.  He shared his insight that the 
press and politicians were using the HRR against the 
government. 
 
¶9. (C)  The Ambassador said he would report RTG concerns 
about the HRR to Washington and would check on the specifics 
raised.  He said that, while not wanting to sound at all 
defensive about the report, he regretted any inaccuracies 
that it might contain.  He said that the HRR was mandated, 
and he had experienced sensitivities over it in every country 
where he had been posted.  Every effort had been made, he 
said, to ensure factual accuracy and avoid subjective 
analysis.  He pointed out, however, that even if Khru Se and 
Tak Bai had not occurred, human rights are a concern in our 
foreign policy and there would still have been a report. 
 
HANDLING MEDIA COVERAGE 
 
¶10. (C) The Ambassador told Krit that he sought the PermSec's 
guidance on how best to try to keep this "a one day crisis 
and not a five day crisis."  He asked whether he would be 
facing photographers when he exited the MFA.  Krit and 
Sihasak assured him that they did "not practice that kind of 
diplomacy."  As the Ambassador left MFA, the press was in 
fact staked out to cover the departure.  From March 3 news 
articles, the follow-on briefing that Sihasak gave to 
journalists apparently stuck largely to the theme that MFA 
had conveyed its concerns and asked for corrections, although 
Sihasak also provided some detail that Krit had not been 
happy about substance on the South and methodology.  The 
Thai-language newspaper Matichon carried a front page picture 
over the headline, "The MFA deems the southern information 
one-sided, prods the Americans to improve it, and summons 
their big ambassador for acknowledgment," but coverage of the 
HRR was otherwise brief and buried in the inside pages of 
most newspapers on March 3. 
 
MFA ADVICE TO THAKSIN:  BEST NOT TO COMMENT PUBLICLY 
 
¶11. (C)  Krit telephoned the Ambassador on March 3 to touch 
base and apologize for the press presence, explaining they 
had been there for another purpose.  He was pleased that the 
media had played the "summoning in" story in a generally 
straight-forward manner.  The Ambassador noted that Prime 
Minister Thaksin remained quiet on the issue, and Krit 
responded that MFA had sent him a memo immediately after the 
March 2 meeting providing advice in that vein. 
 
¶12. (C)  Comment:  Krit is fully aware that the HRR is a 
mandated annual report.  The inaccuracies he raised are 
debatable, as is the issue of whether our coverage of Khru Se 
and Tak Bai needs any more context than is already provided 
in the report.  While the specific Thai complaints in our 
view do not warrant fixes, the strength of MFA's reaction 
(and reportedly Thaksin's) should not be dismissed as simply 
an annual ritual.  MFA has been lobbying diligently for 
months to try to soften the HRR Thailand chapter, and its 
annual release will continue to create serious bilateral 
tensions.  It remains to be seen whether Thaksin's silence on 
the HRR will survive the week and his opportunity this 
Saturday to comment on it during his weekly national radio 
broadcast.  End Comment. 
BOYCE