This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001076 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2015 
TAGS: CY TU PREL MOPS MARR
SUBJECT: USG SHIP VISIT TO CYPRUS:  WEIGHING THE COST 
 
REF: A. NICOSIA 0304 
 
     ¶B. 2004 ANKARA 6615 
     ¶C. IIR 689801035 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman, E.O. 12958, 
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  A USN ship visit to the Republic of Cyprus 
(ROC) at this time (ref A) would have a negative impact in 
Turkey.  The Turks, including the military, will interpret a 
visit now (post-April 24 referendum) as support for 
Papadopoulos and a slap at the Turkish Cypriots.  End 
Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) Reftel provides Embassy Nicosia's analysis of the 
impact of a ship visit to the ROC on Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots.  We provide below our view of the likely impact in 
Turkey of a USN ship visit to the Republic of Cyprus. 
 
What to Expect in Turkey 
------------------------ 
 
¶3.  (C) Turks in general have the perception that the Turkish 
Cypriots have received almost no benefit from voting for 
reunification and a solution this past April.  They see Greek 
Cypriots, on the other hand, as having paid no price for 
having voting against it.  They view any U.S. or EU actions 
on Cyprus through that prism. 
 
¶4.  (C) A USN ship visit would likely redirect toward the 
U.S. Turkish ire currently aimed mostly at the EU.  After our 
recent trade delegation to the north, which engendered 
significant good will, there is broad recognition we have 
tried to pursue a positive course.  A ship visit to the south 
will wipe that out, and will be perceived as a USG slap in 
the Turkish Cypriots' face. 
 
-- This perception will be exacerbated by the Turks' 
long-standing objection to Greek Cypriot "closure" of the 
north's ports. 
 
-- Our Cyprus policy has been a welcome exception to the 
recent wave of anti-Americanism in Turkey (ref B); a ship 
visit would put that at risk. 
 
-- Albeit wrongly, Turks will perceive the visit as support 
for Papadopoulos.  Any Greek Cypriot gloating over the visit 
will receive prominent media coverage here, to our detriment. 
 
-- A ship visit would also revive popular speculation and 
conspiracy theories about the U.S. desire for bases on Cyprus 
at a time when they had finally died down. 
 
-- Ref C suggests that a ship visit to Cyprus could also 
damage navy-to-navy relations. 
 
¶5.  (C) The only potential ameliorating factor could be 
portraying the visit as the continuation of a normal pattern 
of visits.  Unfortunately, as we understand the 
circumstances, there has been no port call to the ROC by any 
significant USN ship since September 11, 2001.  The visit of 
a seagoing tug and a few off-shore submarines do not create 
the necessary patterns.  This would prevent us from employing 
this counter argument. 
 
Marmaris Maritime Festival 
-------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) We understand that one option that has been under 
consideration would be to have the ship participating in the 
Marmaris International Maritime Festival conduct a follow-on 
visit to Cyprus.  This would be problematical.  The Turks 
deny entry to aircraft whose previous or subsequent 
destination is the Republic of Cyprus.  They will likely have 
the same policy with a USN vessel, necessitating at minimum 
an intervening port.  The Turks will view as USG deception a 
subsequent visit to Cyprus by a USN vessel that previously 
participated in the Festival, regardless of any intervening 
port. 
¶7.  (C) Comment:  Our summary judgment is that a ship visit 
to the Republic of Cyprus at this time will have a 
significant negative impact in Turkey.  End Comment. 
EDELMAN