Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 251287 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AEMR ASEC AMGT AE AS AMED AVIAN AU AF AORC AGENDA AO AR AM APER AFIN ATRN AJ ABUD ARABL AL AG AODE ALOW ADANA AADP AND APECO ACABQ ASEAN AA AFFAIRS AID AGR AY AGS AFSI AGOA AMB ARF ANET ASCH ACOA AFLU AFSN AMEX AFDB ABLD AESC AFGHANISTAN AINF AVIATION ARR ARSO ANDREW ASSEMBLY AIDS APRC ASSK ADCO ASIG AC AZ APEC AFINM ADB AP ACOTA ASEX ACKM ASUP ANTITERRORISM ADPM AINR ARABLEAGUE AGAO AORG AMTC AIN ACCOUNT ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU AIDAC AINT ARCH AMGTKSUP ALAMI AMCHAMS ALJAZEERA AVIANFLU AORD AOREC ALIREZA AOMS AMGMT ABDALLAH AORCAE AHMED ACCELERATED AUC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AORL ASECIR AMG AMBASSADOR AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ADM ASES ABMC AER AMER ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AOPC ACS AFL AEGR ASED AFPREL AGRI AMCHAM ARNOLD AN ANATO AME APERTH ASECSI AT ACDA ASEDC AIT AMERICA AMLB AMGE ACTION AGMT AFINIZ ASECVE ADRC ABER AGIT APCS AEMED ARABBL ARC ASO AIAG ACEC ASR ASECM ARG AEC ABT ADIP ADCP ANARCHISTS AORCUN AOWC ASJA AALC AX AROC ARM AGENCIES ALBE AK AZE AOPR AREP AMIA ASCE ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI AINFCY ARMS ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AGRICULTURE AFPK AOCR ALEXANDER ATRD ATFN ABLG AORCD AFGHAN ARAS AORCYM AVERY ALVAREZ ACBAQ ALOWAR ANTOINE ABLDG ALAB AMERICAS AFAF ASECAFIN ASEK ASCC AMCT AMGTATK AMT APDC AEMRS ASECE AFSA ATRA ARTICLE ARENA AISG AEMRBC AFR AEIR ASECAF AFARI AMPR ASPA ASOC ANTONIO AORCL ASECARP APRM AUSTRALIAGROUP ASEG AFOR AEAID AMEDI ASECTH ASIC AFDIN AGUIRRE AUNR ASFC AOIC ANTXON ASA ASECCASC ALI AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN ASECKHLS ASSSEMBLY ASECVZ AI ASECPGOV ASIR ASCEC ASAC ARAB AIEA ADMIRAL AUSGR AQ AMTG ARRMZY ANC APR AMAT AIHRC AFU ADEL AECL ACAO AMEMR ADEP AV AW AOR ALL ALOUNI AORCUNGA ALNEA ASC AORCO ARMITAGE AGENGA AGRIC AEM ACOAAMGT AGUILAR AFPHUM AMEDCASCKFLO AFZAL AAA ATPDEA ASECPHUM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ETRD ETTC EU ECON EFIN EAGR EAID ELAB EINV ENIV ENRG EPET EZ ELTN ELECTIONS ECPS ET ER EG EUN EIND ECONOMICS EMIN ECIN EINT EWWT EAIR EN ENGR ES EI ETMIN EL EPA EARG EFIS ECONOMY EC EK ELAM ECONOMIC EAR ESDP ECCP ELN EUM EUMEM ECA EAP ELEC ECOWAS EFTA EXIM ETTD EDRC ECOSOC ECPSN ENVIRONMENT ECO EMAIL ECTRD EREL EDU ENERG ENERGY ENVR ETRAD EAC EXTERNAL EFIC ECIP ERTD EUC ENRGMO EINZ ESTH ECCT EAGER ECPN ELNT ERD EGEN ETRN EIVN ETDR EXEC EIAD EIAR EVN EPRT ETTF ENGY EAIDCIN EXPORT ETRC ESA EIB EAPC EPIT ESOCI ETRB EINDQTRD ENRC EGOV ECLAC EUR ELF ETEL ENRGUA EVIN EARI ESCAP EID ERIN ELAN ENVT EDEV EWWY EXBS ECOM EV ELNTECON ECE ETRDGK EPETEIND ESCI ETRDAORC EAIDETRD ETTR EMS EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EBRD EUREM ERGR EAGRBN EAUD EFI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ETRO ENRGY EGAR ESSO EGAD ENV ENER EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ELA EET EINVETRD EETC EIDN ERGY ETRDPGOV EING EMINCG EINVECON EURM EEC EICN EINO EPSC ELAP ELABPGOVBN EE ESPS ETRA ECONETRDBESPAR ERICKSON EEOC EVENTS EPIN EB ECUN EPWR ENG EX EH EAIDAR EAIS ELBA EPETUN ETRDEIQ EENV ECPC ETRP ECONENRG EUEAID EWT EEB EAIDNI ESENV EADM ECN ENRGKNNP ETAD ETR ECONETRDEAGRJA ETRG ETER EDUC EITC EBUD EAIF EBEXP EAIDS EITI EGOVSY EFQ ECOQKPKO ETRGY ESF EUE EAIC EPGOV ENFR EAGRE ENRD EINTECPS EAVI ETC ETCC EIAID EAIDAF EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EAOD ETRDA EURN EASS EINVA EAIDRW EON ECOR EPREL EGPHUM ELTM ECOS EINN ENNP EUPGOV EAGRTR ECONCS ETIO ETRDGR EAIDB EISNAR EIFN ESPINOSA EAIDASEC ELIN EWTR EMED ETFN ETT EADI EPTER ELDIN EINVEFIN ESS ENRGIZ EQRD ESOC ETRDECD ECINECONCS EAIT ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EUNJ ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ELAD EFIM ETIC EFND EFN ETLN ENGRD EWRG ETA EIN EAIRECONRP EXIMOPIC ERA ENRGJM ECONEGE ENVI ECHEVARRIA EMINETRD EAD ECONIZ EENG ELBR EWWC ELTD EAIDMG ETRK EIPR EISNLN ETEX EPTED EFINECONCS EPCS EAG ETRDKIPR ED EAIO ETRDEC ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ERNG EFINU EURFOR EWWI ELTNSNAR ETD EAIRASECCASCID EOXC ESTN EAIDAORC EAGRRP ETRDEMIN ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN ETRDEINVTINTCS EGHG EAIDPHUMPRELUG EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN EDA EPETPGOV ELAINE EUCOM EMW EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM ELB EINDETRD EMI ETRDECONWTOCS EINR ESTRADA EHUM EFNI ELABV ENR EMN EXO EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EATO END EP EINVETC ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EIQ ETTW EAI ENGRG ETRED ENDURING ETTRD EAIDEGZ EOCN EINF EUPREL ENRL ECPO ENLT EEFIN EPPD ECOIN EUEAGR EISL EIDE ENRGSD EINVECONSENVCSJA EAIG ENTG EEPET EUNCH EPECO ETZ EPAT EPTE EAIRGM ETRDPREL EUNGRSISAFPKSYLESO ETTN EINVKSCA ESLCO EBMGT ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EFLU ELND EFINOECD EAIDHO EDUARDO ENEG ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EFINTS ECONQH ENRGPREL EUNPHUM EINDIR EPE EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS EFINM ECRM EQ EWWTSP ECONPGOVBN
KFLO KPKO KDEM KFLU KTEX KMDR KPAO KCRM KIDE KN KNNP KG KMCA KZ KJUS KWBG KU KDMR KAWC KCOR KPAL KOMC KTDB KTIA KISL KHIV KHUM KTER KCFE KTFN KS KIRF KTIP KIRC KSCA KICA KIPR KPWR KWMN KE KGIC KGIT KSTC KACT KSEP KFRD KUNR KHLS KCRS KRVC KUWAIT KVPR KSRE KMPI KMRS KNRV KNEI KCIP KSEO KITA KDRG KV KSUM KCUL KPET KBCT KO KSEC KOLY KNAR KGHG KSAF KWNM KNUC KMNP KVIR KPOL KOCI KPIR KLIG KSAC KSTH KNPT KINL KPRP KRIM KICC KIFR KPRV KAWK KFIN KT KVRC KR KHDP KGOV KPOW KTBT KPMI KPOA KRIF KEDEM KFSC KY KGCC KATRINA KWAC KSPR KTBD KBIO KSCI KRCM KNNB KBNC KIMT KCSY KINR KRAD KMFO KCORR KW KDEMSOCI KNEP KFPC KEMPI KBTR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNPP KTTB KTFIN KBTS KCOM KFTN KMOC KOR KDP KPOP KGHA KSLG KMCR KJUST KUM KMSG KHPD KREC KIPRTRD KPREL KEN KCSA KCRIM KGLB KAKA KWWT KUNP KCRN KISLPINR KLFU KUNC KEDU KCMA KREF KPAS KRKO KNNC KLHS KWAK KOC KAPO KTDD KOGL KLAP KECF KCRCM KNDP KSEAO KCIS KISM KREL KISR KISC KKPO KWCR KPFO KUS KX KWCI KRFD KWPG KTRD KH KLSO KEVIN KEANE KACW KWRF KNAO KETTC KTAO KWIR KVCORR KDEMGT KPLS KICT KWGB KIDS KSCS KIRP KSTCPL KDEN KLAB KFLOA KIND KMIG KPPAO KPRO KLEG KGKG KCUM KTTP KWPA KIIP KPEO KICR KNNA KMGT KCROM KMCC KLPM KNNPGM KSIA KSI KWWW KOMS KESS KMCAJO KWN KTDM KDCM KCM KVPRKHLS KENV KCCP KGCN KCEM KEMR KWMNKDEM KNNPPARM KDRM KWIM KJRE KAID KWMM KPAONZ KUAE KTFR KIF KNAP KPSC KSOCI KCWI KAUST KPIN KCHG KLBO KIRCOEXC KI KIRCHOFF KSTT KNPR KDRL KCFC KLTN KPAOKMDRKE KPALAOIS KESO KKOR KSMT KFTFN KTFM KDEMK KPKP KOCM KNN KISLSCUL KFRDSOCIRO KINT KRG KWMNSMIG KSTCC KPAOY KFOR KWPR KSEPCVIS KGIV KSEI KIL KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KQ KEMS KHSL KTNF KPDD KANSOU KKIV KFCE KTTC KGH KNNNP KK KSCT KWNN KAWX KOMCSG KEIM KTSD KFIU KDTB KFGM KACP KWWMN KWAWC KSPA KGICKS KNUP KNNO KISLAO KTPN KSTS KPRM KPALPREL KPO KTLA KCRP KNMP KAWCK KCERS KDUM KEDM KTIALG KWUN KPTS KPEM KMEPI KAWL KHMN KCRO KCMR KPTD KCROR KMPT KTRF KSKN KMAC KUK KIRL KEM KSOC KBTC KOM KINP KDEMAF KTNBT KISK KRM KWBW KBWG KNNPMNUC KNOP KSUP KCOG KNET KWBC KESP KMRD KEBG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPWG KOMCCO KRGY KNNF KPROG KJAN KFRED KPOKO KM KWMNCS KMPF KJWC KJU KSMIG KALR KRAL KDGOV KPA KCRMJA KCRI KAYLA KPGOV KRD KNNPCH KFEM KPRD KFAM KALM KIPRETRDKCRM KMPP KADM KRFR KMWN KWRG KTIAPARM KTIAEUN KRDP KLIP KDDEM KTIAIC KWKN KPAD KDM KRCS KWBGSY KEAI KIVP KPAOPREL KUNH KTSC KIPT KNP KJUSTH KGOR KEPREL KHSA KGHGHIV KNNR KOMH KRCIM KWPB KWIC KINF KPER KILS KA KNRG KCSI KFRP KLFLO KFE KNPPIS KQM KQRDQ KERG KPAOPHUM KSUMPHUM KVBL KARIM KOSOVO KNSD KUIR KWHG KWBGXF KWMNU KPBT KKNP KERF KCRT KVIS KWRC KVIP KTFS KMARR KDGR KPAI KDE KTCRE KMPIO KUNRAORC KHOURY KAWS KPAK KOEM KCGC KID KVRP KCPS KIVR KBDS KWOMN KIIC KTFNJA KARZAI KMVP KHJUS KPKOUNSC KMAR KIBL KUNA KSA KIS KJUSAF KDEV KPMO KHIB KIRD KOUYATE KIPRZ KBEM KPAM KDET KPPD KOSCE KJUSKUNR KICCPUR KRMS KWMNPREL KWMJN KREISLER KWM KDHS KRV KPOV KWMNCI KMPL KFLD KWWN KCVM KIMMITT KCASC KOMO KNATO KDDG KHGH KRF KSCAECON KWMEN KRIC
PREL PINR PGOV PHUM PTER PE PREF PARM PBTS PINS PHSA PK PL PM PNAT PHAS PO PROP PGOVE PA PU POLITICAL PPTER POL PALESTINIAN PHUN PIN PAMQ PPA PSEC POLM PBIO PSOE PDEM PAK PF PKAO PGOVPRELMARRMOPS PMIL PV POLITICS PRELS POLICY PRELHA PIRN PINT PGOG PERSONS PRC PEACE PROCESS PRELPGOV PROV PFOV PKK PRE PT PIRF PSI PRL PRELAF PROG PARMP PERL PUNE PREFA PP PGOB PUM PROTECTION PARTIES PRIL PEL PAGE PS PGO PCUL PLUM PIF PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PMUC PCOR PAS PB PKO PY PKST PTR PRM POUS PRELIZ PGIC PHUMS PAL PNUC PLO PMOPS PHM PGOVBL PBK PELOSI PTE PGOVAU PNR PINSO PRO PLAB PREM PNIR PSOCI PBS PD PHUML PERURENA PKPA PVOV PMAR PHUMCF PUHM PHUH PRELPGOVETTCIRAE PRT PROPERTY PEPFAR PREI POLUN PAR PINSF PREFL PH PREC PPD PING PQL PINSCE PGV PREO PRELUN POV PGOVPHUM PINRES PRES PGOC PINO POTUS PTERE PRELKPAO PRGOV PETR PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPKO PARLIAMENT PEPR PMIG PTBS PACE PETER PMDL PVIP PKPO POLMIL PTEL PJUS PHUMNI PRELKPAOIZ PGOVPREL POGV PEREZ POWELL PMASS PDOV PARN PG PPOL PGIV PAIGH PBOV PETROL PGPV PGOVL POSTS PSO PRELEU PRELECON PHUMPINS PGOVKCMABN PQM PRELSP PRGO PATTY PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PGVO PROTESTS PRELPLS PKFK PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PARAGRAPH PRELGOV POG PTRD PTERM PBTSAG PHUMKPAL PRELPK PTERPGOV PAO PRIVATIZATION PSCE PPAO PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PARALYMPIC PRUM PKPRP PETERS PAHO PARMS PGREL PINV POINS PHUMPREL POREL PRELNL PHUMPGOV PGOVQL PLAN PRELL PARP PROVE PSOC PDD PRELNP PRELBR PKMN PGKV PUAS PRELTBIOBA PBTSEWWT PTERIS PGOVU PRELGG PHUMPRELPGOV PFOR PEPGOV PRELUNSC PRAM PICES PTERIZ PREK PRELEAGR PRELEUN PHUME PHU PHUMKCRS PRESL PRTER PGOF PARK PGOVSOCI PTERPREL PGOVEAID PGOVPHUMKPAO PINSKISL PREZ PGOVAF PARMEUN PECON PINL POGOV PGOVLO PIERRE PRELPHUM PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PBST PKPAO PHUMHUPPS PGOVPOL PASS PPGOV PROGV PAGR PHALANAGE PARTY PRELID PGOVID PHUMR PHSAQ PINRAMGT PSA PRELM PRELMU PIA PINRPE PBTSRU PARMIR PEDRO PNUK PVPR PINOCHET PAARM PRFE PRELEIN PINF PCI PSEPC PGOVSU PRLE PDIP PHEM PRELB PORG PGGOC POLG POPDC PGOVPM PWMN PDRG PHUMK PINB PRELAL PRER PFIN PNRG PRED POLI PHUMBO PHYTRP PROLIFERATION PHARM PUOS PRHUM PUNR PENA PGOVREL PETRAEUS PGOVKDEM PGOVENRG PHUS PRESIDENT PTERKU PRELKSUMXABN PGOVSI PHUMQHA PKISL PIR PGOVZI PHUMIZNL PKNP PRELEVU PMIN PHIM PHUMBA PUBLIC PHAM PRELKPKO PMR PARTM PPREL PN PROL PDA PGOVECON PKBL PKEAID PERM PRELEZ PRELC PER PHJM PGOVPRELPINRBN PRFL PLN PWBG PNG PHUMA PGOR PHUMPTER POLINT PPEF PKPAL PNNL PMARR PAC PTIA PKDEM PAUL PREG PTERR PTERPRELPARMPGOVPBTSETTCEAIRELTNTC PRELJA POLS PI PNS PAREL PENV PTEROREP PGOVM PINER PBGT PHSAUNSC PTERDJ PRELEAID PARMIN PKIR PLEC PCRM PNET PARR PRELETRD PRELBN PINRTH PREJ PEACEKEEPINGFORCES PEMEX PRELZ PFLP PBPTS PTGOV PREVAL PRELSW PAUM PRF PHUMKDEM PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PNUM PGGV PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PIND PTEP PTERKS PGOVJM PGOT PRELMARR PGOVCU PREV PREFF PRWL PET PROB PRELPHUMP PHUMAF PVTS PRELAFDB PSNR PGOVECONPRELBU PGOVZL PREP PHUMPRELBN PHSAPREL PARCA PGREV PGOVDO PGON PCON PODC PRELOV PHSAK PSHA PGOVGM PRELP POSCE PGOVPTER PHUMRU PINRHU PARMR PGOVTI PPEL PMAT PAN PANAM PGOVBO PRELHRC

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 05AMMAN2295, ECONOMIC REFORM PROGRAM ON TRACK

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05AMMAN2295.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05AMMAN2295 2005-03-21 11:05 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Amman
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 AMMAN 002295 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2015 
TAGS: ECON EAID EFIN KPRV EPET PGOV JO
SUBJECT: ECONOMIC REFORM PROGRAM ON TRACK 
 
REF: A. 2004 AMMAN 9311 
     B. 2004 AMMAN 6441 
     C. 2004 AMMAN 4330 
 
Classified By: CDA Christopher Henzel for reason 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: While Jordan remains dependent on foreign 
aid, its economic reform program is making substantial 
progress that has continued, undiminished in scope and 
urgency, since its "graduation" from an IMF program in summer 
2004.  The GOJ has succeeded in limiting the growth of 
current expenditures over the past year, has posted a 
significant increase in domestic government revenues through 
improvements in its collection of taxes, has reacted to 
sustained, higher-than-expected world crude prices by 
reaffirming its plan to implement a phased elimination of all 
fuel subsidies, and plans to conduct one of its most 
significant waves of privatization to date over the upcoming 
18 months. Despite increased political pressures to use 
Jordan's recent economic growth to increase GOJ transfer 
payments to the traditional pillars of support for the King 
and the GOJ, all signs are that the GOJ remains committed to 
reform.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C) Jordan received over $1 billion in aid in 2004; the 
total size of its recorded economy was $10.9 billion.  Since 
the mid-1970s, foreign aid has been the second-largest source 
of foreign exchange, after remittances.  Before this, foreign 
aid was the number one source of foreign exchange. 
Notwithstanding this historical pattern of dependence upon 
foreign assistance and the large role aid still plays in the 
Jordanian economy, both King Abdullah and the GOJ understand 
the lessons of Jordan's economic collapse of 1989 and are 
exerting significant efforts to put GOJ finances - and 
Jordan's economy as a whole - on a sustainable basis that 
would assure its health even in the absence of foreign 
grants.  Jordan's Finance Minister Abu Hammour has repeatedly 
stressed to us the importance of building on IMF-spurred 
economic reforms, and the GOJ's actions have matched his 
words.  Since the beginning of 2004, the GOJ has taken action 
to improve GOJ finances through several measures, many of 
which have been put in place since the end of the IMF program 
in 2004. 
 
-------------------- 
CURRENT EXPENDITURES 
-------------------- 
 
3. (C) At the urging of the USG and IMF, Jordan in 2005 for 
the first time has implemented measures that improve the 
transparency of its budget, by including previously 
off-budget revenue and expenditures as line items on the 
budget.  In the long term, this change will make it more 
difficult for the GOJ to hide subsidies and will therefore 
create domestic pressure for their elimination; in the short 
run, it makes the GOJ's balance sheet look worse.  For 
example, Jordan's large fuel subsidies were included on the 
budget for the first time in 2005.  Their inclusion adds a 
substantial liability to the balance sheet and has provoked 
substantial Parliamentary debate. 
 
4. (C) In its 2005 budget, Jordan's largest sources of 
current expenditures are the fuel subsidies ($437.2 million), 
whose phased elimination is currently scheduled to conclude 
by the end of 2007 (see below), interest on Jordan's debt 
($486 million), salaries of government employees 
(approximately $686.3 million), and pensions ($584.2 
million).  Jordan has made significant progress in reducing 
its debt payments by paying off some of its high-interest 
debt early and replacing it with lower-interest 
domestically-held debt; it has also paid some debt outright 
and received debt forgiveness as a form of aid.  Pensions, by 
their nature, are more difficult to cut; nonetheless, Finance 
Minister Abu Hammour has been able to achieve successes in 
limiting the growth of this liability for the GOJ.  At the 
beginning of 2004, Abu Hammour was able to push through a 
reduction in the size of the pension of new military 
retirees, a significant government constituency (ref A). 
Also from the beginning of 2004, all incoming government 
employees have been transferred to the Social Security 
Corporation (SSC) for their pensions (ref B), a step which 
adds costs to the GOJ in the short term - as it has to pay in 
to the SSC immediately - but will deduct costs from the GOJ 
in the long run, as the SSC will be responsible for paying 
out the pensions instead of the GOJ.  Increases in government 
salaries in the 2005 budget are held to approximately the 
same levels the increases in 2004 and 2003. 
 
-------- 
TAXATION 
-------- 
 
5. (C) Jordan's General Sales Tax (GST) provides the majority 
of Jordan's domestic revenues.  In a region famous for its 
high rates of tax evasion, the GST is the most easily 
collected tax; it is also clearly the most regressive tax, 
making each rise fall disproportionately upon the poorest in 
Jordanian society.  The GST currently stands at 16% on 
virtually everything sold in Jordan (although the IMF had 
originally recommended an increase to 15%, the GOJ had 
managed to secure the higher figure) and it supplies 42% of 
revenue; income tax supplies another 11%, customs income 
contributes 10%, and the balance is supplied by other taxes, 
fees, institutional revenues, and other miscellaneous income 
sources.  Abu Hammour has committed to improving the 
collection of existing taxes rather than the imposition of 
new ones, and he is proud of the success that the tax 
department has had to date in increasing revenues through 
improved efficiency in the collection of taxes - he estimates 
an increase of almost $100 million over 2004 through these 
improvements alone.  To support the Minister's efforts, USAID 
is planning the launch of a subststantive fiscal reform 
program targeting the administration of tax revenues, with a 
planned start date late in 2005. 
 
6. (C) Abu Hammour plans to turn his attention to the Customs 
Directorate in 2005, with USAID support.  He envisions making 
substantial - if slightly smaller - returns.  There is 
substantial scope for improvement in customs receipts since, 
as Abu Hammour puts it, "70% of the Directorate staff is 
corrupt."  This move is likely to provoke substantial 
resistance, as opportunities for corruption have made the 
jobs highly sought after by people with influence. 
Nonetheless, Abu Hammour plans to press on with his reforms 
in this sector, and he appears to have royal support in this 
enterprise. 
 
------------ 
FUEL SUBSIDY 
------------ 
 
7. (C) Constantly rising crude prices - along with rising 
consumption - have given Jordan a moving target as it has 
tried to eliminate its fuel subsidies.  Jordan's initial 
target of a three-year phased rise in the prices it set for 
oil derivatives (including petroleum, diesel, fuel oil, 
kerosene, etc.) was based on the assumption - at the time 
considered conservative - that crude prices would hover at 
between $35-40 per barrel at the end of the three-year 
period.  As Jordan entered the latter half of 2004 (the 
second of the three years) with the global price of crude 
near $50, it became clear that in order to erase the 
differential between the price of Jordan's subsidized oil 
derivatives and their natural cost given the high world price 
of crude, Jordan would need to increase fuel prices in 2005 
by a greater amount than the increases of 2003 and 2004 
combined - and this from a base price already at a 
historically high level.  The GOJ therefore took the decision 
to extend its schedule of fuel price increases for an 
additional two years.  The IMF had suggested that this 
extension might be necessary when we had met with them in 
June (ref C); we heard no complaint about this policy when we 
met in October with Martin Petri, an IMF senior economist who 
collaborated with Jordan during its "workout" program and who 
has visited periodically at Minister Abu Hammour's request in 
order to check up on Jordan's progress since its "graduation." 
 
8. (C) The GOJ currently predicts that in absolute terms, its 
fuel product price increase will be slightly greater in 2005 
than in 2004 and 2003; it plans similarly-sized price hikes 
in 2006 and 2007.  The GOJ will, however, stop making large 
annual increases and shift to smaller quarterly increases, in 
hopes of limiting popular reaction. 
 
------------- 
PRIVATIZATION 
------------- 
 
9. (C) Due to foreign investors' lack of interest in 
Jordanian assets in the period leading up to and immediately 
following the March-April 2003 regime change in Iraq, most of 
Jordan's privatization program was put on ice.  Now, however, 
the ramping-up of several previously shelved privatizations 
that began in late 2003 has reached its culmination, and 
Jordan's Executive Privatization Commission - supported by 
the USAID privatization program - has a full plate for 
2005-6.  Jordan's Ministry of Energy has launched a strategic 
plan envisioning the privatization of almost the entirety of 
Jordan's power sector (septel).  The MOE has already issued a 
request for proposals (RFP) from interested parties for the 
sale of the GOJ's 100% stake in CEGCO, Jordan's 
power-generation company; in the future, either the 
privatized CEGCO will build power plants or other private 
corporations will do so under build-operate-transfer (BOT) 
contracts.  In addition, the government is moving to sell its 
stakes in two regional power-distribution companies by the 
end of the year.  Once these sales are completed, the GOJ 
will only retain the country's power-transmission backbone. 
Similarly, Jordan's Civil Aviation Authority has taken on a 
consultant to prepare it for the privatization of its 
remaining non-core functions.  The GOJ has also announced its 
intent to sell off its remaining shares of Jordan Telecom 
later this year; privatization of the postal service is to 
follow in 2006. 
 
10. (C) In its pursuit of full privatization of government 
assets, Jordan has shown a surprisingly strong willingness to 
challenge politically important constituencies.  Planned for 
September of 2005, for example, is an RFP for a strategic 
partner to take 40% of GOJ's stake (and a management 
contract) in the perennially money-losing Jordan Phosphate 
Mining Corporation (JPMC), the largest single employer by far 
in Ma'an Province, an area of southern Jordan known for its 
Islamist leanings.  The JPMC privatization plan is scheduled 
to go forward despite the repeatedly expressed objections of 
parliamentarians to the sale of any part of the company. 
Virtually the only major corporation in which the GOJ plans 
to retain ownership by mid-2006 will be Royal Jordanian 
Airlines (RJ), and the RJ CEO has noted to us his belief that 
RJ will hold an IPO in late 2006 - before the promulgation of 
an Open Skies policy throughout Jordan. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
11. (C) Nine months after the end of its IMF program, the 
GOJ's economic reform program remains on track.  Despite 
pressures from several directions to relax its fiscal 
discipline, the Ministry of Finance has kept a tight rein on 
the expansion of the government; royal backing and 
internally-imposed limits such as the Public Debt Law (which 
calls for debt to be reduced to 60% of GDP by the end of 
2006) have ensured that the Ministry has held the line, and 
the GOJ is putting in place measures that will help to 
further restrain spending growth.  Improvement in domestic 
revenue collection and phased elimination of fuel subsidies 
will continue at the same pace in 2005 as in previous years. 
At the same time, a massive sell-off of GOJ assets and of GOJ 
stakes in a variety of companies both underlines the 
commitment of the GOJ to the economic reform agenda proposed 
by the IMF and holds out the promise of further reductions in 
current expenditures - both through the debt that will be 
retired through sale of Jordanian assets and the divestiture 
of enterprises that run deficits which the GOJ has been 
forced in the past to cover. 
HENZEL