This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 001826 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR PRM AND NEA 
GENEVA FOR RMA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2015 
TAGS: KPAL PREL PREF IS JO ICRC
SUBJECT: MDA ISSUE: EMBLEM WORKING GROUP'S NEXT STEPS 
 
REF: A. STATE 34521 (NOTAL) 
     ¶B. SANTOS-GREENE EMAIL 2/25/05 
     ¶C. AMMAN 1199 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires David Hale for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
. 
 
¶1. (C)  SUMMARY: Based on recent consultations with regional 
members of the Emblem Working Group, the Chair of the 
International Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement's Standing 
Commission is confident the majority of Arab National 
Societies can be persuaded to actively support the 
reconvening of the aborted October 2000 conference that would 
have resolved the issue of Israeli membership by adopting an 
additional Third Protocol to the Geneva Convention.  Dr. Al 
Hadid intends to ask Arab Societies to start lobbying their 
respective governments at an Arab Red Crescent Society 
Meeting in Riyadh March 20-21.  Dismissing Palestinian 
support as "important but not a must," Al Hadid argued that 
visible Swiss support would be key to any regional diplomatic 
approaches.  He urged the USG to join him in lobbying the 
Swiss FM to appoint a high-level official to signal 
international support for the conference, and also suggested 
specific steps the USG could take vis-a-vis the Egyptians and 
Israelis in a March 5 meeting.   END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C)  As instructed ref A, Amman-based refcoord called on 
Dr. Mohammed Al Hadid, President of the Jordanian Red 
Crescent Society and the current Chair of the Red Cross/Red 
Crescent Movement's Standing Commission (SC), March 5 to ask 
for his assessment of potential regional opposition to the 
idea of reconvening the aborted 2000 conference that would 
have paved the way for Israeli National Society membership by 
establishing a third emblem.  Al Hadid confirmed that he 
broached the idea of using the upcoming March 21-21 Arab Red 
Crescent Assembly meeting in Riyadh to advance the notion of 
the conference during his talks with SC Emblem Working Group 
Chair Ambassador Philippe Cuvellier and Egyptian Red Crescent 
SecGen Dr. Mamdouh Gabr in Amman February 21.  Al Hadid said 
he also used the margins of a recently-concluded 
International Humanitarian Law Conference in Cairo to sound 
out Syrian RC President Abdul Rahman Attar, when Attar failed 
to join their meeting in Amman. 
 
POTENTIAL OPPOSITION 
-------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Al Hadid said that he was confident, following those 
meetings, that he could successfully press Arab National 
Societies to start lobbying their respective governments for 
the conference.  Al Hadid explained that the critical 
countries to bring on board, in his view, are those 
"surrounding Israel."  The one wildcard -- Syria -- now 
appeared containable because Attar had told him in Cairo that 
he believed the SAR would not/not oppose the conference. 
According to Al Hadid, Attar believed the SAR would view 
opposition as "a waste of time with no political gains." 
Although Al Hadid acknowledged that the Syrian National 
Society "cannot move on an issue without informing its 
Government" he trusted Attar's preliminary judgment.  Asked 
about potential opponents in the larger region, Al Hadid said 
that the key countries to target would be Lebanon, because of 
its proximity to Israel, and Iran.  He explained that he had 
revised his earlier assessment that Iran would not be an 
opponent (ref C)  after meeting the Iranian National Society 
President in Amman March 4 at a training seminar on natural 
disasters.  Al Hadid noted that Iran's position was "clearly 
no where near as tough as it had been in the 1990s," but 
cautioned that the Iranians might be inclined to politicize 
the issue simply to oppose the U.S.  Contrary to some 
third-hand accounts, Al Hadid said that he did not/not think 
we needed to focus on Sudan. 
 
¶4. (C)  Asked about Palestinian influence, Al Hadid 
acknowledged that Palestinian Red Crescent Society (PRCS) 
President Younis Al Khatib had become more critical of the 
MDA in recent years because of the PRCS's opposition to MDA 
operating in the West Bank.  While he acknowledged that the 
Palestinians would have political influence in the region, Al 
Hadid argued that their support is "not a must."  He added 
that MDA-PRCS outreach would be helpful if it was conducted 
in a manner that did not appear to the Palestinians as if 
they were being "bribed."  Al Hadid noted that the Jordanian 
Red Crescent was in the process of seeking EU funds to 
support an MDA training program, and might be well positioned 
to offer trilateral Jordanian Red Crescent-MDA-PRCS training 
opportunities, provided if it could secure external funding. 
Al Hadid added that he was "more hopeful" that the incoming 
MDA Chair would focus on strengthening MDA's relations with 
regional societies, noting that Avi Zohar had turned down 
several opportunities to visit Jordan during his tenure. 
 
AL HADID'S REGIONAL STRATEGY 
---------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Turing to his regional strategy, Al Hadid explained 
that his next step would be to raise the conference issue at 
the Arab Assembly Executive Committee meeting March 20 in 
Riyadh.  Because prior commitments will make it impossible 
for him to remain in Riyadh to address the full Assembly 
March 21-22, he planned to ask Dr. Gabr to convey a two part 
message on his behalf: 1)  The SC Chair believes the time is 
right to reconvene the 2000 conference and 2) that he was 
counting on Arab National Societies to lobby their 
governments, especially government officials appointed since 
¶2000.  Al Hadid predicted that there would be "little 
opposition" in Riyadh as the issue was ultimately a decision 
for governments.  Continuing, he intimated that lining up 
Swiss support would be key to securing the support of Arab 
governments.  He argued that it was critical, in his view, to 
convince the Swiss to appoint a Commissioner or 
Ambassador-at-Large responsible for the conference, as they 
had done in 2000, as this would pave the way for any 
diplomatic overtures by sending a clear signal of the level 
of international support.  Al Hadid said that Ambassador 
Cuvellier would be seeking a meeting with the Swiss FM in the 
coming month, and that he would also attempt to raise the 
issue with the Swiss MFA during his March 7-13 visit to 
Switzerland. 
 
 
AL HADID ON US INFLUENCE 
------------------------ 
 
¶6. (C)  Al Hadid thought the USG should also start making 
diplomatic overtures in the region.  He strongly suggested 
approaching Egypt first, given its standing in the region on 
the Arab-Israeli issue.  Al Hadid argued that FM Aboul Ghaith 
would be a more effective ally than the Egyptian Government 
spokesman identified by Ambassador Cuvellier in Ref. B to 
generate regional support, but recommended that the American 
RC ask the Egyptian RC to lay the groundwork with the FM 
first in case the issue is unfamiliar.  With regard to other 
bilateral USG approaches, Al Hadid noted that it is important 
to argue that the third emblem would assist countries other 
than Israel, such as Eritrea.  He also appealed to the USG to 
join him in underscoring the importance of statute compliance 
with the Israelis.  Commenting that "we have to get Israel to 
pull its act together," Al Hadid said meetings he has had 
with visiting MDA officials over the last month have left him 
increasingly concerned that they do not fully realize that 
adoption of the third protocol alone will not guarantee 
membership. 
 
HALE