This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS  ALMATY 001130 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
STATE FOR INR/R/MR, EUR/CACEN (JMUDGE), EUR/PPD (JBASEDOW), 
EUR/ACE (MO'NEAL/ESMITH), DRL/PHD (PDAVIS) 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KPAO KDEM KZ POLITICAL
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN'S MEDIA COVERAGE OF KYRGYZSTAN 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  From the start of the revolt in southern 
Kyrgyzstan, international media speculated on how events 
there might affect their rich neighbor in the north.  Many 
international media relied on the Interfax wire service in 
their reporting, although Interfax sometimes posted 
uncorroborated and contradictory accounts, particularly 
regarding Akayev's whereabouts.  Kazakhstan's television 
and print media were relatively slow in publishing 
reaction, because of a local holiday March 21 and 22, and 
because some managers ordered news editors in the beginning 
only to repeat wire service accounts.  The first television 
reports on March 23 highlighted GOK officials' appeals for 
a peaceful resolution to the crisis and their concern for 
their neighbor-citizens in Kyrgyzstan.  Pro-government 
media considered the demonstrations unprovoked and hinted 
that funding from Western NGOs may have played a role in 
the denouement.  Political analysts were split over the 
effect on Kazakhstan's opposition, which warned that 
Kazakhstan was next in line for revolution.  Initial 
official reaction from the GOK was mostly subdued and 
issued off-camera through official statements.  President 
Nazarbayev's assessment on March 25 citing accumulated 
socio-economic problems, mass poverty and the "weak" Kyrgyz 
authorities was almost identical the statement from 
President Putin.  END SUMMARY. 
 
TELEVISION COVERAGE GETS A LATE START 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) As events in Kyrgyzstan unfolded, the independent 
Russian wire service Interfax often scooped other media. 
This was sometimes at the expense of getting corroboration 
for their reports, such as their contradictory statements 
on Akayev's whereabouts.  Many international media relied 
on Interfax reporting to augment their own coverage. 
Kazakhstan's television coverage of the events began only 
on March 23, in part because of a March 21 and 22 holiday. 
None of the three nationwide broadcasters - official 
Kazakhstan 1, pro-government Khabar and centrist Channel 31 
- reported the events unfolding to the south on prime time 
news March 22.  A source told emboff that managers at 
Khabar, which has a correspondent based in Bishkek, ordered 
news directors to only repeat wire service accounts, and 
not provide any additional coverage. 
 
¶3. (U) Television coverage was generally factual, with some 
editorializing.  Prime time news on March 23 focussed on 
the opening session of Kyrgyzstan's newly elected 
parliament, efforts to maintain order in Bishkek, and 
Akayev's declaration that he would not resort to violence 
to restore order in the "mutinous cities of Dzhalalabad and 
Osh" (pro-government, regional Rakhat).  Both television 
and print reports from Ambassador Ordway's press conference 
that day led with the Ambassador's comments that the U.S. 
did not interfere in the internal affairs of other 
countries and wanted a peaceful resolution to the crisis 
through dialogue.  The pro-government daily Ekpress K 
attributed the following comment to him, which he did not 
make:  "We do not want that situation in Kyrgyzstan to get 
out of control and develop according to the Ukrainian 
scenario." 
 
¶4. (U) In reporting the storming of the White House in 
Bishkek March 24, Khabar noted that "demonstrations 
organized by the opposition turned into mass disorder and 
pogroms" and concluded with a rhetorical question:  "Arson, 
assault, a run on banks, pillaging - is this a victory of 
democracy?"  Kazakhstan 1 similarly characterized the 
events as "an alarming revolution." 
 
PRO-GOVERNMENT PRESS - UNPROVOKED REBELLION 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (U) The March 24 official and pro-government papers, 
issued before the opposition reached Bishkek, considered 
the rebellion an unprovoked attack on the weak, but well- 
intentioned Akayev.  A page 5 story in Kazakhstanskaya 
Pravda on March 24 noted that, "independent observers found 
no serious or obvious violations" in the second round of 
Kyrgyzstan's parliamentary elections March 13, but the 
ruling party's decisive victory "forced opposition forces 
to aggressive actions - unsanctioned rallies, a massive 
pogrom, attacks on administrative buildings and 
institutions, blockades of airports and highways..."  The 
pro-government daily Express K noted on page one, "As we 
know, he refused to run for a new term in office.  However, 
 
today the political situation with our neighbors is so 
unstable that no political scientists can guarantee Akayev 
a peaceful departure from his presidential post." 
 
THE PRICE OF REVOLUTION, THE USG ROLE 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (U) The daily pro-government Liter on page 1 of its 
March 24 issue said the opposition coaxed participants into 
demonstrations by offering brandy and 200-300 soms ($7), 
which the paper said was a considerable amount of money for 
the impoverished Kyrgyz people.  The pro-government weekly 
Novoye Pokoleniye published several stories March 25, which 
dwelt on how the poverty of the population and Akayev's 
weakness contributed to the popular uprising.  From page 
one:  "It's obvious that people live in dire conditions, 
while the president is accused of robbery and nepotism. 
This, and the weak will of Akayev, are fully exploited by 
the opposition forces and by U.S. Ambassador Steven Young, 
who supported them.  By the way, the latter presumably had 
a big influence on Akayev, because contrary to all 
agreements with neighboring countries (Security Collective 
Treaty, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, etc.), U.S. spy 
planes will be based in Kyrgyzstan."  In another piece on 
page three the author noted, "It's obvious that money came 
from abroad...It's hard to say how much the disorder in 
Kyrgyzstan cost, but it's known that help from the West to 
NGOs bossing the Ukraine around during their third round of 
elections was $3 million... Presumably less money was spent 
in Kyrgyzstan.  It should be remarked that power doesn't 
cost much..." 
 
EFFECT ON KAZAKHSTAN - OPINION SPLIT 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶7. (U) Daily pro-government Aikyn shared opinions of 
prominent Kazakhstani political scientists about whether 
Kazakhstan might be "next."  Dos Koshim, president of the 
Republican Network of Independent Monitors, said, "The 
situation will definitely have an influence on Kazakhstan, 
because Kyrgyzstan is not as far away as Georgia and 
Ukraine...  Their protest may be considered an example to 
local [Kazakhstani] opposition."  Political scientist Dosym 
Satpayev said the influence would come from Islamic 
extremists crossing from Kyrgyzstan to Kazakhstan.  "The 
influence of Hizb-ut-Tahrir and Islamic organizations is 
very strong in the south of Kyrgyzstan.  These 
organizations were active in the elections and sided with 
candidates with whom they could make a deal in the 
future...  The influence will be felt here, first of all, 
through refugees passing through our territory, including 
groups with terrorist and extremist intentions.  Second, 
Kazakhstan may suffer economically, because it has 
investments in some of sectors of the Kyrgyz economy, such 
as the banking system." 
 
¶8. (U) Political scientist Murat Laumulin disagreed: 
"Kazakhstan has a different economic and political 
situation from Kyrgyzstan... our opposition has no ability 
to organize a situation similar to the Kyrgyz one." 
Opposition journalist Sergey Duvanov posted a similar 
comment on the progressive website, navi.kz:  "Our 
authorities are in a fairly firm position, we have a middle 
class (certainly by our standards), who are fed by the 
regime and stabilize a part of society.  We also have a 
weak opposition, that has not up to the present 
accomplished anything." 
 
KAZAKHSTAN'S OPPOSITION - WE'RE NEXT 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶9. (U) Warnings from Kazakhstan's opposition to their own 
government were published March 25 in the opposition weekly 
Respublika.  Opposition presidential candidate Zharmakhan 
Tuyakbay said, "Disregarding public opinion caused the 
logical collapse of Akayev's regime, but the situation with 
parliamentary elections - to be more precise, the obvious 
vote rigging - is very similar to our September elections. 
It's high time for authorities to understand a simple truth 
- that only fair and just elections, when votes are not 
stolen, can be a guarantor of not repeating similar events 
here."  Communist party leader Serikbolsyn Abdildin said, 
"I would compare events in Kyrgyzstan with analogical 
events in Ukraine.  In both cases, the votes and the 
expressed will of the people were boldly stolen...  Akayev 
forced his son and daughter through to parliament, this is 
 
unthinkable!  He created an absurd situation and got what 
he deserved.  Let this be a good lesson for dictators of 
all suits!" 
 
¶10. (U) Despite its recent liquidation, the Democratic 
Choice of Kazakhstan party published their statement on the 
opposition website, kub.kz:  "The People's Party, 
Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan, congratulates our brothers 
in the Kyrgyz Republic on their victory... DCK is sure that 
the Kyrgyz revolution will become the starting point for 
building a democratic society in Central Asia.  The leading 
role of the people of Kyrgyzstan in this process will 
remain in history forever.  Our hearts are with you - Your 
today is our tomorrow - Together we will win!" 
 
GOK'S PUBLIC, LOW-KEY RESPONSE 
------------------------------ 
 
¶11. (SBU) The first GOK comment on the unfolding revolution 
was low key, and came from government ministers, rather 
than the president.  In a March 22 statement, Foreign 
Minister Kasymzhomart Tokayev said that Kazakhstan was 
observing the events in Kyrgyzstan with concern, and called 
on the authorities and the opposition to find a common 
language and to come to agreement without using force, on 
the basis of the Kyrgyz constitution.  Once the 
demonstrators had reached Bishkek, Prime Minister Daniyal 
Akhmetov's appeal to resolve the issues in the "brother 
state" in accordance with the law appeared on the regional 
pro-government station Rakhat and the pro-government Almaty 
municipal station, Yuzhnaya Stolitsa, but not the national 
stations. 
 
¶12. (U) Tokayev's reaction to the storming of the White 
House appeared March 25 on page 2 of the official 
government daily Kazakhstanskaya Pravda.  (Unofficial 
translation follows).  "Firstly, we are tied to this 
country by traditional and neighborly relations.  We 
sincerely feel what our neighbors are going through. 
Secondly, further confrontation can have an adverse affect 
on the socio-economic conditions of citizens in that 
country.  Thirdly, we are concerned for our fellow citizens 
living in Kyrgyzstan.  Events in Kyrgyzstan once again 
testify to the correctness of policies set by our head of 
state.  Thanks to our political stability and international 
harmony, Kazakhstan joined the dynamically developing 
countries in the world, and became an example for our 
region and all CIS countries..." 
 
AND FINALLY NAZARBAYEV'S ASSESSMENT - WEAK AUTHORITY 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶13. (U) Interfax posted a statement made by President 
Nazarbayev at a business forum in Astana on March 25.  "It 
is absolutely obvious that the socio-economic problems that 
were accumulating in that country for years led to mass 
poverty and unemployment.  This triggered spontaneous 
protests in many regions of the country.  The weakness of 
the authorities, who were unable to prevent the rioters and 
vandals from doing whatever they wanted, also played a 
negative role."  None of the television reports that 
evening included President Nazarbayev's reaction, although 
Kazakhstan 1 and Khabar did include President Putin's 
statement, which was almost identical. 
 
¶14. (SBU) COMMENT:  Considering their shared border, 
history and cultural ties, more prominent coverage in 
Kazakhstan's media of Kyrgyzstan's revolution might have 
been expected.  However, the subdued reaction from the GOK 
and pro-government media clearly reflect a concern 
regarding the potential for spillover into Kazakhstani 
politics.  With his public statement, Nazarbayev appeared 
to minimize the potential for unrest in Kazakhstan, while 
laying down a marker that any uprisings would be dealt with 
forcefully.  While it is too early to predict whether the 
GOK will take additional steps to ensure stability, post 
certainly expects the pattern of pressure on opposition 
parties and media to continue.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶15. (U) Dushanbe minimize considered. 
 
Ordway 
 
 
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