This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 VIENNA 000372 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NP/MNA, IO/P, EUR/ERA, AND EUR/AGS 
GENEVA FOR CD DEL 
USUN FOR POL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2015 
TAGS: PARM KNNP AU NPT IAEA EUN
SUBJECT: NPT 2005 REVCON PREPARATIONS: AUSTRIAN RESPONSE 
 
REF: STATE 18228 
 
Classified By: ECONOMIC-POLITICAL COUNSELOR GREGORY E. PHILLIPS 
REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
¶1.  (C) Embassy conveyed reftel demarche to Austrian MFA 
Non-Proliferation Bureau on February 2.  PolOffs followed up 
on February 4 with Robert Zischg, MFA director for Nuclear 
Nonproliferation, Disarmament, and Arms Control.  Zischg's 
likely successor, Alexander Kmentt, also participated. 
Zischg expressed appreciation for USG efforts to engage 
foreign officials on RevCon preparations.  The GoA fully 
shares U.S. concerns over non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS) 
noncompliance with NPT Articles II and III and misuse of 
Article IV, he said.  Zischg stressed the need, though 
"politically and legally complicated," to strengthen the NPT 
regime regarding "sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle," 
especially uranium enrichment and reprocessing. 
 
IRAN 
---- 
 
¶2.  (C) Zischg assured us that the EU is focused on 
discrepancies in Iran's accounting of its "civilian" nuclear 
program.  The EU expects "clear assurances from Tehran that 
it is in compliance."  Zischg noted that Austria is not a 
supporter of civilian nuclear energy and believes that Iran's 
much-cited "right" to exploit nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes under NPT Article IV depends on full and verifiable 
Iranian compliance with Articles II and III.  The GoA expects 
that the IAEA Director General's report will deal 
forthrightly with the Iranian problem.  Zischg cited the case 
of Iran as proof that Additional Protocol (AP) must be the 
"new minimum standard" for safeguards and reiterated 
Austria's support within the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) 
for AP compliance as a Condition of Supply. 
 
SIGNALS NEEDED ON DISARMAMENT 
----------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Zischg praised the U.S. record on Article VI, but 
noted that the RevCon's mandate will be to assess progress in 
the period 2000-2005, not any broader timeframe.  He reviewed 
Austria's position that the "balance" inherent in the NPT 
will require strong signals from Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) 
that they are making rapid progress on disarmament.  This is 
an incentive to others to remain within the NPT regime, or 
(as in the case of India and Pakistan) to join.  Austria will 
urge the U.S. and Russia, in particular, to redouble 
disarmament efforts.  Zischg expressed concern that U.S. 
plans to modernize warheads "sends the wrong signal" and 
"runs counter to disarmament."  He drew a qualitative 
distinction between developing new classes of weapons and 
"stewardship" programs for existing systems. 
 
¶4.  (C) Zischg said that achieving a final declaration as the 
outcome of the 2005 RevCon is a high priority for Austria. 
He noted that in the medium term, Austrian public attitudes 
on the prospects for the future of IAEA and the NPT regime in 
general would depend on getting a good outcome from the 
RevCon.  His views tracked closely with reftel assessment, 
however, that the environment for achieving consensus at the 
RevCon is substantially more difficult this time than in 
¶2000.  He hoped the U.S. would be "forward looking" and that 
the USG would be prepared to agree to some equivalent of the 
2000 RevCon's "13 Steps." 
 
¶5.  (C) Kmentt (who recently transferred back to MFA from the 
Austrian delegation to the Conference on Disarmament in 
Geneva) mentioned that recent talks on the Fissile Material 
Cutoff Treaty had failed to produce a program of work.  He 
asked whether Washington was shifting its position on the 
"Shannon Mandate," a move thought would not be helpful to 
achieving consensus at the NPT RevCon.  Note: Kmentt will 
probably accompany Austrian A/S-equivalent for 
Non-Proliferation Wernfried Koeffler to the RevCon.  Koeffler 
will soon thereafter depart MFA to take up a new assignment 
as Austria's Ambassador to Latvia. 
 
PUBLIC AFFAIRS STRATEGY 
----------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Post believes that there is sufficient convergence of 
views between the U.S. and the GoA to make it worthwhile to 
structure an ongoing dialogue on NPT issues.  Austria's EU 
Presidency in the first half of 2006 and rotation into a seat 
of the IAEA Board of Governors in September 2006 represent 
opportunities to leverage our broad agreement with Austria on 
nonproliferation matters. 
¶7.  (SBU) The issue of Iran's nuclear programs (and possible 
U.S. actions to counter them) attract the most attention here. 
 
-- Our Austrian interlocutors expressed interest in 
participating in private bilateral meetings or public 
roundtable discussions with U.S. nonproliferation experts. 
In Embassy's view, such events might be easiest to arrange on 
the margins of trips by U.S. officials to Vienna on IAEA 
business. 
 
-- A DVC might be effective if a senior U.S. official were 
available to interact with Austrian nonproliferation experts 
and/or selected media representatives. 
-- Austrian newspapers are generally reluctant to print 
Op-Eds by current U.S. officials.  PA section has had recent 
success in placing Op-Eds signed by the Ambassador.  Op-Eds 
by former U.S. officials and independent experts may also be 
welcome. 
 
-- There are few, if any, academic journals on international 
affairs and security issues that attract an adequate 
readership to justify placement of articles.  On the other 
hand, PA is often able to arrange interviews with 
well-regarded journalists who write for the more responsible 
mass-circulation dailies.  Again, such an interview could 
take place on the margins of IAEA business with a minimum 
investment of time. 
Brown