This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 000595 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2014 
TAGS: KWBG PREL IS GAZA DISENGAGEMENT ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: HAMAS WINS BIG IN GAZA ON "CLEAN GOVERNMENT" 
PLATFORM 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Gene A. Cretz for reasons 1.4 (b 
) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: The Hamas sweep in the local-level Gazan 
elections of January 27 does not indicate a mandate for Hamas 
overall or broad-based support for continued armed struggle 
against Israel, according to numerous Embassy contacts. 
While Fatah compiled a list of candidates perceived as 
corrupt -- in many cases the family members or cronies of 
Fatah leadership -- Hamas-backed "doctors and professors" 
reportedly known for honesty and integrity were the choices 
among the 72 - 90 percent of eligible Gazan voters who cast 
their ballots.  According to Fatah sources, the party will 
more carefully compile its candidate list for the April 
municipal elections and the July PLC elections.  End Summary. 
 
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The Voting by the Numbers -- Hamas Wins Big 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Election observers from the Palestinian Center for 
Human Rights/Gaza told Poloff on election day January 27 
that, "some glitches aside," the voting was a success and 
went smoothly without incidents of violence.  According to 
some observers, 90% of eligible voters turned out, while 
initial data from the Higher Committee on Local Elections put 
the number at 72%.  Of those who voted, 85% reportedly 
registered with the Central Elections Committee (CEC), and 
another 30% were listed on the civil register.  One observer 
reported that despite an overnight shooting in Rafah, the 
early morning surge of prospective voters on election day 
caused polling station officials there to call for PA police 
assistance to organize the waiting crowd. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) According to the Higher Committee on Local 
Elections, 414 candidates -- including 68 women -- competed 
for 188 seats in ten municipalities, and voters cast their 
ballots at 176 polling stations.   The size of the ten 
municipal councils varies from 9 seats to 15, depending upon 
population.  Of the 118 seats up for grabs in the January 27 
elections, Fatah-backed candidates took a mere 39, while 
Hamas-backed lists campaigning under the title the "Change 
and Reform List" won 76 seats.  Two independents also won 
seats, as did one individual affiliated with the PFLP. 
According to PCHR, seven of the ten municipalities who 
carried out elections elected Hamas-dominated councils. 
 
------------------------- 
The Palestinian Anti-Vote 
------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  Mohammad Almbaid, head of USAID's Tamkeen civil 
society project working with local NGO election observers, 
mused January 31 that a segment of the population voted 
against Fatah rather than for another candidate or 
organization.  Some of these voters wanted to register a 
protest vote against Fatah's record of governance to date, he 
said, and others wanted to underscore to Fatah that it cannot 
take for granted the political dominance it has thus far 
enjoyed.  Almbaid argued that the local elections were taken 
much more seriously than the presidential elections, as 
evidenced by the drastically higher turnout for the former. 
Furthermore, he explained, family and tribal connections were 
critically important -- more so even than party affiliations 
-- in local elections as opposed to presidential. 
 
¶5.  (C) Abdulsamia Effrangi, a politically savvy and 
mainstream Fatah member who was involved in developing the 
Fatah candidate lists, told Poloff January 31 that he and 
several others within the Gaza Fatah machine had predicted 
"trouble coming."  The composition of the Fatah candidate 
lists, he said, was influenced by individuals like Rashid Abu 
Shabak and others "interested in preserving their own 
influence," and weighted towards favored candidates rather 
than electable ones.  Effrangi claims to have advised Fatah 
to revise the list, since many of the names that appeared 
were among those known and reviled among the public at large, 
but said his recommendations were not adopted.  When Gazans 
went to the polls, he argued, they in many cases cast their 
vote for "anyone but the Fatah candidate." 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Hamas Win Not a Mandate for Armed Intifada 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶6.  (C) Both Effrangi and Almbaid, cautioned against viewing 
the outcome of the elections as an out and out victory for 
Hamas per se, or as a mandate for the continued armed 
struggle against Israel.  Of the 78 "Hamas" candidates 
elected, Effrangi estimated that only 30-35 or so have any 
genuine affiliation with the organization, and that to 
varying degrees.  The remainder was what Effrangi termed 
independent, "clean" candidates who share or are identified 
with Hamas' anti-corruption or "clean government" platform, 
and who were thus supported by Hamas.  Pepsi CEO and Gazan 
business leader Mohammed Yazgi noted that Hamas had fielded 
"doctors and university professors who had nothing to do with 
Hamas before elections," but whom Hamas knew would be popular 
with voters. 
 
¶7.  (C) Effrangi and Yazgi contended that Fatah must take a 
"good long look" at its bad reputation among the Gazan public 
before assembling candidate slates for the next round of 
municipal elections in April, and certainly before the PLC 
elections set for July 17.  Effrangi said he intends again to 
recommend that Fatah make better efforts to assess 
candidates' electability and popularity among voters as major 
criteria for their inclusion on the list.  Yazgi noted, 
however, that Hamas has already put together another "strong 
list" that may threaten Fatah again.  In his view, Fatah must 
either postpone upcoming elections -- a move that may only 
strengthen accusations of corruption -- or act quickly to 
overhaul its method of candidate selection. 
-------------------------- 
What Does the Future Hold? 
-------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Of the several observers and pundits with whom Poloff 
spoke, non seemed to fear that the Hamas sweep would mean the 
imposition of a "radical" agenda or free reign to militant 
activity.  On the contrary, the comment heard repeatedly was 
"Let them govern and we'll see if they can do it."  The 
Egyptian Charge d'Affaires told Deputy Chief of Mission that 
the significance of the Hamas victories should not be 
exaggerated.  While Hamas has a solid core of adherents, the 
vast majority of voters were Gazans whose position would 
change in response to improvements in their economic 
situation.  Observers from Tamkeen and PCHR, as well as 
various other local contacts agreed that the PLC elections in 
July will be hotly contested, more so perhaps than even these 
local elections.   While it is clear from these elections, at 
least to some, that Fatah must take steps to put its own 
house in order if it is to perform more convincingly in 
upcoming municipal and PLC elections.  Its best opportunity 
to do so, however -- during the Fatah 6th Conference 
scheduled for August 2005 -- will take place after these 
elections have been held.  Another factor affecting Fatah's 
fate at the polls, according to many PA officials who have 
spoken to ConGen officers, will be PA President Mazen's 
performance in the coming months, measured by the extent to 
which he can show Palestinians that their lives have improved 
under his leadership. 
 
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