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Viewing cable 05SANTIAGO250, CHILE INSCR 2004 REPORT: CORRECTED COPY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05SANTIAGO250 2005-02-02 17:17 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Santiago
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 SANTIAGO 000250 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT THIS IS CORRECTED COPY FOR SANTIAGO 02906 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR CI
SUBJECT: CHILE INSCR 2004 REPORT: CORRECTED COPY 
 
REF: A. SANTIAGO 02906 
     B. SECSTATE 18769 
 
1. The second section of the INSCR 2004 report was 
inadvertently excluded in the first submission.  Please find 
this section at the end of the previously submitted INSCR 
2004 report below. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Section I: International Crime and Narcotics 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
2. Summary. While not a center of illicit narcotics 
production, Chile remains a transit country for cocaine and 
heroin shipments destined for the U.S. and Europe. Chile also 
has an internal cocaine and marijuana consumption problem, 
with ecstasy continuing to grow in popularity.  Chile is a 
source of essential chemicals for use in coca processing in 
Peru and Bolivia.  Chile is a party to the 1988 UN Drug 
Convention. End Summary. 
 
3. Status of Country. Transshipment of cocaine from the 
Andean region is a problem for Chile, as is the persistent 
transit of heroin destined for the U.S. and Europe.  Cocaine 
hydrochloride consumption has increased, although cocaine 
base abuse is more prevalent.  Chilean authorities discovered 
some cocaine and amphetamine labs two years ago, but Chile is 
not a major source of refined cocaine.  Marijuana also 
continues to be widely used in Chile, a drug supplied 
primarily by Paraguay and a handful of production farms in 
Chile. 
 
4. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2004 
a. Policy Initiatives. The Chilean Congress continues to work 
on a comprehensive revision of Chile's 1995 drug laws, a 
project pending since 1999.  In an effort to combat money 
laundering, the Financial Intelligence Unit was created in 
June of 2004.  The National Drug Control Commission (CONACE) 
develops and coordinates the National Drug Control Strategy. 
The current plan covers the years 2003-2008.  CONACE also 
coordinates all demand reduction programs. 
 
b. Accomplishments. In January, 2004, five representatives 
from the Chilean Coalition on Drug Prevention (CHIPRED) 
participated in a Voluntary Visitor program on managing drug 
abuse prevention programs.  Embassy Santiago, in conjunction 
with CONACE, organized the launch of CHIPRED, a network of 
Chilean NGOs working on drug issues, in August 2003.  CHIPRED 
allows better coordination of programs to prevent drug abuse 
and reduce demand, and is a member of the Drug Prevention 
Network of the Americas (DPNA). 
 
In June 2004, the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) was 
launched with a mandate to  investigate money laundering 
activity.  While current laws do not provide adequate 
authority for the FIU, amendments are expected to be approved 
in 2005 to increase the investigative authority of the unit. 
 
The DEA Santiago Country Office, together with the Policia de 
Investigaciones de Chile ("PICH," roughly equivalent to the 
FBI) and the Carabineros (national uniformed police), 
initiated Operation Seis Fronteras VI on March 1, 2004. 
This operation is a six-country initiative to combat the 
diversion of legal chemicals in the production of cocaine. 
As a follow-up, the DEA Santiago Country Office and the 
Carabineros de Chile hosted Operation Seis Fronteras VI 
After-Action Conference on June 9-10, 2004.  DEA and police 
representatives from Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Brazil, 
Peru, Bolivia, Argentina and Chile attended the conference, 
which focused on analyzing the results of the three-month 
Seis Fronteras VI operation. 
 
Chile continues to implement its multi-year criminal justice 
reform project.  As of the January 2004, all of Chile's 12 
regions have adopted the new adversarial judicial system, 
leaving only the metropolitan area of Santiago operating 
under the old system.  The new system involves oral trials 
rather than document-based legal proceedings and should 
generally result in a faster resolution of cases.  The 
Santiago metropolitan region, which accounts for almost 40 
percent of Chile's population, will present special 
challenges.  The transition in Santiago is scheduled to occur 
in June 2005. 
c. Law Enforcement Efforts.  Chilean authorities are 
successfully interdicting narcotics transiting through and 
destined for Chile.  As a result of increased U.S. support 
for interdiction efforts in the Andean source nations, 
narcotics traffickers are using Chile as a transshipment 
point for cocaine and heroin with more frequency. 
Traffickers assume Chile's clean reputation with authorities 
in the U.S. and Europe means that vessels and aircraft 
originating from Chile are less closely scrutinized. 
 
In 2004, Chilean authorities seized 2697 kilograms of cocaine 
hydrochloride, 8.8 kilograms of heroin, and over fifty-six 
million Chilean pesos (approximately USD$90,000).  Law 
enforcement agencies also arrested 9400 persons for 
drug-related offenses, an increase from 8343 in 2003. 
Chilean authorities are also addressing the domestic 
distribution sources of cocaine, marijuana, and ecstasy. 
d. Corruption. Narcotics-related corruption among police 
officers and other government officials is not a major 
problem in Chile.  The government actively discourages 
illicit production and distribution of narcotic and 
psychotropic drugs and the laundering of proceeds from 
illegal drug transactions.  No current Chilean senior 
officials have been accused of engaging in such activities. 
The high-profile scandals related to Pinochet's activities 
provide an example of the gravity and attention that Chile 
attaches to corrupt behavior by former or current government 
officials.  Transparency International's Annual Corruption 
Perception Index ranked Chile 20th in 2004, one spot lower 
than the U.S. but three positions down from last year. 
 
e.  Agreements and Treaties.  Efforts are currently underway 
to update the U.S.-Chile Extradition Treaty signed in 1900, 
under which no Chilean citizen has ever been extradited to 
the U.S. In late 2002, Chile expressed interest in updating 
the current treaty, and exploratory meetings with discussions 
of draft language are taking place.  The U.S. and Chile do 
not have a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT).  The U.S. 
is hoping that Chile will ratify the OAS MLAT to which the 
U.S. is a party.  Chile is party to the Inter-American 
Convention Against Corruption. 
 
The September 2002 letter of agreement between Chile and the 
U.S. remains the most recent accord for cooperation and 
mutual assistance in narcotics-related matters.  U.S. 
assistance programs are implemented under this agreement. 
Although the GOC and the DEA signed an agreement in 1995 to 
create a Special Investigative Unit (SIU) within the 
Carabineros, no SIU currently operated in Chile.  Due to the 
very low level of corruption and the resulting 
professionalism in the ranks of Chilean law enforcement, 
there is currently no pressing need for an SIU.  Chile has 
bilateral narcotics cooperation agreements in force with 
Argentina, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Croatia, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, Uruguay and 
Venezuela. 
 
f. Cultivation/Production.  There is no known major 
cultivation or production of drugs in Chile, and the 
Department of State does not identify Chile as a "major" 
drug-transit country.  Very small amounts of marijuana are 
cultivated in Chile to meet domestic demand. 
 
g. Drug Flow/Transit. Increasing amounts of drugs are 
transshipped from Andean source countries through Chile, 
destined for the U.S. and Europe.  Chile's extensive and 
modern transportation system make it attractive to narcotics 
traffickers.  Maritime and land route trafficking has 
increased; the most recent trend is to traffic drugs via 
Chile's road system and out of the country via maritime 
routes.  The Santiago International Airport is also used to 
transit particularly heroin to the U.S. and Europe.  Most 
narcotics arrive by land routes from Peru and Bolivia, but 
some enter through Argentina.  The efforts of Chilean 
authorities are hampered by treaty provisions allowing cargo 
originating in Bolivia and Peru to transit Chile without 
inspection to the ports of Arica and Antofagasta. 
 
No labs producing synthetic drugs have been found in Chile to 
date.  Ecstasy enters the country primarily in small amounts 
via couriers traveling by air. 
 
h. Demand Reduction Programs.  The Chilean government has 
expressed concern about domestic drug use.  The most recent 
study, completed in 2002 and released by CONACE in July 2003, 
demonstrates that the existing treatment infrastructure in 
Chile is insufficient.  According to the survey, 5.7 percent 
of Chileans had used drugs in 2002, a slight decrease from 
6.3 percent recorded in 2000.  Prevalence of marijuana 
dropped from 5.8 percent in 2000 to 5.2 percent in 2002, 
although current information indicates marijuana use is 
significantly higher than the numbers suggest.  The report 
also states the use of cocaine base fell from 0.7 percent to 
0.5 percent, but use of refined cocaine rose slightly from 
1.5 percent to 1.6 percent.  Current indications suggest an 
increase in use of both types of cocaine.  The 2002 survey 
also found that 22.9 percent of respondents had used illegal 
drugs at least once in their lives.  CONACE continues to work 
with NGOs, community organizations, and schools to develop 
demand reduction programs.  With the launch of CHIPRED last 
year, the network of NGO prevention and treatment 
organizations, CONACE is able to cooperate more effectively 
with the NGO community. 
 
5. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs 
a. U.S. Policy Initiatives. U.S. support to Chile in 2003 
reinforced ongoing priorities in five areas: 1) Training for 
prosecutors, police, judges, and public defenders in their 
roles in the criminal justice system reform; 2) Demand 
reduction; 3) Enhanced police investigation capabilities; 4) 
Police intelligence capability; and 5) Money laundering. 
 
b. Bilateral Cooperation.  During 2004, the U.S. Government 
pursued numerous initiatives based on the above priorities. 
These include: 1) a two-part training series on the 
nationwide drug intelligence computer network for 
carabineros; 2) the first Intellectual Property Rights week 
including a workshop for law enforcement and prosecutors, 
public awareness campaign and youth concert; 3) the first 
presentation on drug abuse prevention programs by students 
from four communities as a result from the launch of PRIDE in 
2003; 4) an INL-funded judicial reform intensive training 
program for prosecutors and defenders, preceded by Digital 
Video Conferences with the University of the Pacific; 5) an 
INL-funded seminar for judges on DNA Forensic Technology; 6) 
a workshop for Chilean authorities on how to investigate 
Intellectual Property Rights crimes; 7) a DOJ-funded course 
on cybercrime for prosecutors, law enforcement and government 
officials from five countries; 8) a public affairs section 
grant to Fundacion Paz Ciudadana to implement ADAM (Arrestee 
Drug Abuse Monitoring); 9) five CHIPRED representatives 
participated in a voluntary visitor program on managing drug 
abuse prevention programs; 10) one IVP on the Financial 
Intelligence Unit; 11) two U.S. speakers on drugs in the 
workplace and drug courts; 12) INL-funded support of the 
police to provide equipment for counter-narcotics operations; 
13) two IVPs on drug prevention and drug prosecution; 14) a 
series of radio programs on drug prevention recorded and 
distributed to more than 80 radio stations; 15) continued 
discussions towards updating the 1900 U.S./Chile extradition 
treaty. 
 
c. The Road Ahead.  In 2005, the U.S. Government will 
continue to support Chilean efforts to combat the 
narcotics-related problems listed above.  The U.S. plans to 
continue to provide capacity-building assistance to the 
on-going criminal justice system reform.  Efforts to enhance 
the counter-narcotics capabilities of both the Carabineros 
and the Investigations Police pursuant to the Letter of 
Agreement will also continue. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
Section II: Money Laundering and Terrorist Finance 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
7.  Chile has a large, well-developed banking and financial 
sector, and it is a stated goal of the government to turn 
Chile into a major regional center.  The Chilean government 
does not believe there is a significant money laundering 
problem, but information is lacking as to the extent of money 
laundering activity.  Money laundering appears to be 
primarily narcotics-related, and until 2003, money laundering 
was only a crime when it involved the direct proceeds of drug 
offenses.  Chile is not considered to be an offshore 
financial center, and offshore banking-type operations are 
not permitted.  Bank secrecy laws are strong in Chile, and 
the privacy rights enshrined in the constitution have been 
broadly interpreted and present challenges to Chilean efforts 
to identify money laundering. 
 
8.  Money laundering in Chile is criminalized under Law 
19.366 of January 1995 and Law 19.913 of December 2003. 
Prior to the approval of Law 19.913, Chile's anti-money 
laundering program was based solely on Law 19.366, which 
criminalized only narcotics-related money laundering 
activities.  The law required only voluntary reporting of 
suspicious or unusual financial transactions by banks and 
offered no "safe harbor" provisions protecting banks from 
civil liability; as a result, the reporting of such 
transactions was extremely low.  Law 19.366 gave only the 
Council for the Defense of the State (Consejo de Defensa del 
Estado, or CDE) authority to conduct narcotics-related money 
laundering investigations.  The Department for the Control of 
Illicit Drugs (Departmento de Control de Trafico Ilicito de 
Estupefacientes within the CDE functioned as Chile's 
financial intelligence unit (FIU) until a new FIU with 
broader powers was created under Law 19.913. 
 
9.  Law 19.913 went into effect on December 18, 2003.  Under 
Law 19.913, predicate offenses for money laundering are 
expanded to include (in addition to narcotics trafficking) 
terrorism in any form (including the financing of terrorist 
acts or groups), illegal arms trafficking, fraud, corruption, 
child prostitution and pornography, and adult prostitution. 
The law also creates the new financial intelligence unit, the 
Unidad de Analisis Financiero (UAF), within the Ministry of 
Finance, which has replaced the CDE as Chile's FIU.  Law 
19.913 requires mandatory reporting of suspicious 
transactions by banks and financial institutions, brokerage 
firms, financial leasing companies, general funds managing 
companies and investment funds managing companies, the 
Foreign Investment Committee, money exchange firms and other 
entities authorized to receive foreign currencies, credit 
cards issuers and operators, securities and money transfer 
and transportation companies, stock exchanges, stock exchange 
brokers, securities agents, insurance companies, mutual funds 
managing companies, forwards and options markets operators, 
tax free zones' legal representatives, casinos, gambling 
houses and horse tracks, customs general agents, auction 
houses, realtors and companies engaged in the land 
development business, and notaries and registrars.  The law 
also requires that obligated entities maintain registries of 
cash transactions that exceed 450 unidades de fomento 
(approximately $12,000) and imposes record keeping 
requirements (five years).  All cash transaction reports 
contained in the internal registries must be sent to the UAF 
at least once per year, or more frequently at the request of 
the UAF.  The movement of funds exceeding 450 unidades de 
fomento into or out of Chile must be reported to the customs 
agency, which then files a report with the UAF. 
 
10.  Shortly after the passage of Law 19.913 in September 
2003, portions of the new law -- specifically those that 
dealt with the UAF's ability to gather information, impose 
sanctions, and lift bank secrecy provisions -- were deemed 
unconstitutional by Chile's constitutional tribunal.  The 
tribunal held that some of the powers granted to the UAF in 
the law violated privacy rights guaranteed by the 
constitution.  The tribunal's decisions eliminate the ability 
of the UAF to request background information from government 
databases or from obligated entities on the reports they 
submit, impose sanctions on entities for failure to file or 
maintain reports, or lift bank secrecy protections.  The law 
went into effect in December 2003 without the above-mentioned 
powers.  A new bill has been drafted to give the UAF the 
ability to fine or sanction obligated entities for 
noncompliance with the reporting requirements.  The UAF was 
initially granted this power in the original version of Law 
19.913, but the constitutional tribunal objected to this 
section on grounds of due process.  The new bill, if passed, 
will address the due process issues by allowing the 
individual or entity 15 days to contest the sanction, and 
also create a stage for sanctions by the regulatory agencies 
prior to sanctions administered by the UAF.  The bill will 
establish processes through which the UAF can request 
information from other government entities. 
 
11.  The Unidad de Analisis Financiero began operating in 
April 2004.  The UAF began receiving suspicious transaction 
reports (STRs) from obligated entities in May 2004 and had 
received 25 STRs as of October 2004.  Suspicious transaction 
reports from financial institutions are received 
electronically, via a system known as SINACOFI (Sistema 
Nacional de Comunicaciones Financieras) that is used by banks 
to send information amongst themselves and the 
Superintendence of Banks in an encrypted format.  The UAF has 
not yet developed a suspicious transaction disclosure form 
for entities other than banks and financial institutions, and 
therefore has not received STRs from non-financial 
institutions.  Non-bank financial institutions currently do 
not fall under the supervision of any regulatory body.  It is 
estimated that the UAF will receive roughly 50-80 suspicious 
transaction reports per year.  Cash transaction reports 
(CTRs) are only reported upon request, and as of October 
2004, the UAF had only requested CTRs from currency exchange 
houses.  Reports on the transportation of currency and 
monetary instruments into or out of Chile must be to the 
customs agency, which sends the reports to the UAF on a daily 
basis.  If an obligated entity or individual fails to file a 
report, the UAF currently lacks the ability to sanction that 
entity or individual for failure to report. 
 
12.  After receiving a suspicious transaction report, the UAF 
may request account information on the subject of the STR 
from the institution that filed the report.  The UAF may also 
request CTRs from obligated entities at any time, but is 
required by law to request at least once per year all CTRs 
filed from each institution.  If the draft law is passed, the 
UAF will be able to request information from any entity that 
its obligated to file suspicious transaction reports, even if 
that entity did not file the STR that is being investigated. 
The draft law will also permit the UAF to request information 
from any entity that is not obliged to report suspicious 
transactions if that information is necessary to complete the 
analysis of an STR, and will allow the UAF access to any 
government databases necessary for carrying out its duties. 
In order to perform these functions detailed in the draft 
law, the UAF will need the authorization of the Santiago 
Appeal Court.  However, in the case of access to government 
databases, the UAF only needs court authorization for 
protected information, such as that which is related to 
taxes.  The UAF's ability to access this information depends 
on the passage of the draft law. 
 
13.  The CDE continues to analyze and investigate any cases 
opened prior to the establishment of the UAF.  Until June 
2005, all cases that are deemed by the UAF to require further 
investigation will be sent to the Consejo de Defensa del 
Estado (CDE).  The UAF has not yet sent any cases to the CDE 
for further investigation.  After June 2005, the Public 
Ministry (the public prosecutor's office) will be responsible 
for receiving and investigating all cases from the UAF  Under 
the new law, the Public Ministry has the ability to request 
that a judge issue an order to freeze assets under 
investigation and can also, with the authorization of a 
judge, lift bank secrecy provisions to gain account 
information if the account is directly related to an ongoing 
case.  The Pubic Ministry has up to two years to complete an 
investigation and prosecution. 
 
14.  Given the above legislative restrictions, no money 
laundering cases were prosecuted in 2004.  At the same time, 
the Chilean investigative police (PICH) are actively 
cooperative in pursuing money laundering investigations. 
 
15.  Terrorist financing in Chile is criminailized under Law 
18.314 and Law 19.906.  Law 19.906 went into effect in 
November 2003 and modifies Law 18.314 in order to sanction 
more efficiently terrorist financing in conformity with the 
UN International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism.  Under Law 19.906, the financing of a 
terrorist act and the provision (directly or indirectly) of 
funds to a terrorist organization are punishable.  The 
Government of Chile (GOC) circulates the UNSCR 1267 
consolidated list to banks and financial institutions.  No 
terrorist assets belonging to individuals or groups named on 
the list have been identified to date in Chile.  If assets 
were found, the legal process that would be followed to 
freeze and seize them is still unclear; Law 19.913 contains 
provisions that allow for prosecutors to request that assets 
be frozen based on a suspected connection to criminal 
activity.  Government officials have stated that Chilean law 
is currently sufficient to effectively freeze and seize 
terrorist assets; however, the new provisions freezing assets 
are based on provisions in the drug law, which at times have 
been interpreted narrowly by the courts.  Until a case 
emerges, it will be difficult to judge how smoothly the new 
system will operate.  The Ministry of National Property 
currently oversees forfeited assets and proceeds from the 
sale of such assets are passed directly to the national 
regional development fund to pay for drug abuse prevention 
and rehabilitation programs.  Under the present law, 
forfeiture is possible for real estate, vehicles, ships, 
airplanes, other property, money securities and stocks, and 
instruments used or intended for use in the commission of the 
underlying crime, all proceeds of such criminal activity, and 
businesses involved in the criminal activity or purchased 
with illicit funds. 
 
16.  Chile is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and has 
signed, but not yet ratified, the UN Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime.  In November 2001, the GOC 
became a party of the UN International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.  On December 11, 
2003, the GOC signed the UN Convention Against Corruption. 
Chile is a member of the OAS Inter-American Drug Abuse 
Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money 
Laundering.  Chile is a member of the South American 
Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (GAFISUD) and 
has pledged to come into compliance with the organization's 
recommendations.  The CDE became a member of the Egmont Group 
of financial intelligence units in 1997, and the UAF was 
vetted by the Egmont Group in October 2004 to replace the 
CDE. 
 
17.  In the establishment of the UAF, the Government of Chile 
has created an FIU that essentially surmounts the 
deficiencies of the CDE and meets the Egmont Group's 
definition of a financial intelligence unit.  However, there 
remain several weaknesses that may hinder the operation of 
the UAF, such as its inability to sanction obligated entities 
or individuals for failure to file reports and its lack of 
access to information from other government agencies.  The 
GOC should recognized that the establishment of an effective 
financial intelligence unit that meets the Egmont Group's 
standards is imperative in the fight against money laundering 
and terrorist financing.  If the abilities of the UAF remain 
limited by the current version of the new law, the steps that 
have been taken in Chile over the past years to create a 
regime capable of investigating, punishing, and deterring 
financial crimes may be severely limited, if not negated. 
The GOC should take all necessary steps to ensure that its 
FIU becomes a viable entity capable of combating money 
laundering and terrorist financing to the best of its 
abilities. 
 
KELLY