This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 SANAA 000335 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PLEASE PASS TO G, NICOLE BIBBINS SEDACA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/18/2015 
TAGS: OVIP PREL PGOV PTER KDEM KMPI ECON EAID PREF PHUM GTIP COUNTER TERRORISM DEMOCRATIC REFORM ECON COM TRAFFICKING PERSONS
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF U/S FOR GLOBAL AFFAIR 
DOBRIANSKY TO SANAA 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Thomas C. Krajeski for reasons 1.5 b and d. 
 
¶1. (SBU) Post warmly welcomes the visit of Under Secretary of 
State for Global Affairs Paula J. Dobriansky to Yemen 
February 23-25.  You will meet with President Ali Abdullah 
Saleh, Foreign Minister Abu Bakr al-Qirbi and Deputy Prime 
Minister and Minister of Planning International Cooperation 
Ahmed Sofan, and Minister of Human Rights Amat al-Soswa.  As 
the highest-ranking Department official to visit Yemen in 
some time, you will find the ROYG leadership appreciative of 
your visit and eager to discuss Yemen's role in regional 
democratization efforts.  Events are also planned with 
reformers inside and outside of the ROYG, journalists, civil 
society figures, and leaders in the women's movement. 
 
¶2. (C) President Saleh will tout Yemen as a leader of 
democratic change in the Middle East, pointing to Yemen's 
progress vis-a-vis other regional actors.  You can expect the 
President to demand increased USG development assistance as 
compensation for the cost of Yemen's participation in the 
GWOT.  Ministers Qirbi and Sofan will likely make the same 
point, more subtly.  They will say that to win the long-term 
fight against terrorism the U.S., Europe, and the wealthy 
Gulf states (read: KSA) must do more to help Yemen reduce 
poverty, increase education, as well as invest more in 
Yemen's economy. 
 
------------------------ 
Yemen is at a Crossroads 
------------------------ 
 
¶3. (C) Your visit is an opportunity to impress upon Saleh and 
his Ministers that there is little time left for action on 
economic and political reforms.  With dwindling oil reserves, 
a rapidly depleting water supply and population projections 
through the ceiling, the time is now to get serious about 
much needed reforms.  The U.S. understands it will be a 
difficult endeavor, and we are ready and willing to help -- 
but need to see the ROYG take tangible action to move forward 
on tough reforms, specifically anti-corruption. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Saleh: CT Cooperation Tied to USG Assistance 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Saleh and CT Cooperation:  Since the post-9/11 forging 
of the U.S.-Yemen CT-partnership, President Saleh has 
achieved major counter-terrorism gains and significantly 
improved security in Yemen.  Recent successes include the 
round up of an emerging al-Qa'ida cell with plans to target 
the U.S. Ambassador, and prosecution and conviction of the 
Cole and M/V Limburg terrorists.  Saleh's modus operendi on 
CT cooperation, however, is to leverage successes into 
further U.S. military and security cooperation, intelligence 
support, development assistance, and food aid.  He often 
complains that USG assistance is not commensurate with 
Yemen's GWOT efforts.  Saleh is a master balancer of 
competing interests and power poles and weighs any USG CT 
request against his interests in appeasing domestic tribal 
and Islamic elements.  Saleh's need to balance competing 
interests (and his own financial interests) has also served 
to slow or stall important reform initiatives supported by 
the donor community. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Put Your Money Where Your Mouth Is 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) President Saleh touts Yemen as the most democratic 
country in the Gulf, noting progress on elections, 
decentralization, and the exertion of parliamentary power. 
Yemen held internationally recognized, generally free and 
fair parliamentary elections in 2003.  Presidential and local 
elections are scheduled for 2006.  Parliament has recently 
flexed its muscles on corruption issues, refusing to approve 
some Executive programs, but does not yet have the power to 
present its own agenda for reform.  Saleh has pursued a 
democratic reform agenda which, to date, has not threatened 
his own political power base.  He has kicked more difficult 
political decisions down the road, rendering any concrete 
progress toward democracy less likely in the near term. 
 
¶6. (C) In your meetings with Saleh and senior ROYG officials, 
you may raise needed action on major reform agenda items 
including:  Tackling Yemen,s pervasive culture of 
corruption, creating a more independent judiciary, and 
institution building.  The ROYG must also follow through with 
its decentralization program, meant to give more power to 
local councils, but as yet ineffective because the Minister 
of Finance refuses to allocate appropriated funds to 
municipal and local bodies. 
 
¶7. (C) Many reformers within the ROYG fear Saleh believes he 
has been handed a blank check on reforms due to his CT 
cooperation.  Deputy FM Noman (who you will have an 
opportunity to meet), journalists and civil society leaders 
are likely to ask for increased U.S. pressure on the ROYG to 
follow through on promised democratic reforms.  Your visit is 
an opportunity to highlight for moderates within the ROYG and 
Yemen society that the U.S. is serious about both democracy 
and security in Yemen. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Saleh Behind Rollback in Press Freedoms 
---------------------------------------- 
¶8. (U) Despite Saleh's July 2004 pledge to stop the 
imprisonment of journalists and to reform the Press Law, 2004 
witnessed deteriorating press freedoms in Yemen.  Post has 
repeatedly raised this negative trend with senior Yemeni 
officials to no avail.  Heat is rising on this issue, 
generated by the imprisonment of Abdulkarim al-Khaiwani, 
Editor-in-Chief of opposition daily "as-Shura".  Khaiwani was 
arrested, tried and convicted to a one-year prison term in 
September 2004 for violations of Yemen's press law, specific 
charges include offering "support to the al-Houthi uprising" 
and "public humiliation of the President." 
 
¶9. (C) Most observers believe that Saleh's recent press 
crackdown (which reversed a positive trend), can be blamed on 
his intense sensitivity to public criticism during the 
unexpectedly long and bloody al-Houthi uprising in the 
northern Sa'da region last summer.  Unlike prior cases where 
journalists' sentences were suspended, Khaiwani remains in 
prison and we have credible reports of repeated physical 
abuse.  His plight has become a rallying point for local and 
international journalists and human rights advocates and 
Amnesty International have called for his immediate release. 
 
¶10. (C) Reform-minded ROYG officials complain that Yemen's 
reputation in the international community is suffering 
needlessly due to Khaiwani's continued imprisonment.  FM 
Qirbi and other MFA officials have confided their discomfort 
with the imprisonment of Khaiwani.  Insinuating that the ROYG 
is in a dilemma of its own making.  Deputy Foreign Minister 
Noman told DCM, "We have turned a mediocre journalist into a 
Nelson Mandela."  MFA officials are well aware that this case 
is tarnishing Yemen's international reputation, but when 
pushed Qirbi, like Saleh, will retreat behind the 
Constitution, insisting that they cannot interfere with 
Yemen's "independent Judiciary."  In response you may press 
President Saleh to follow through on his own pledge to amend 
the Press Law. 
 
----------------------------- 
Economic Reform: Now or Never 
----------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) Due to declining oil revenue, a rapidly expanding 
population, high unemployment, and dwindling water resources, 
Yemen faces serious economic challenges in the next five 
years.  An IMF/World Bank, donor supported economic reform 
package designed to enhance the civil service, reform the tax 
code, reduce customs tariffs, scale-back diesel subsidies, 
and improve the general investment law has languished in 
Parliament for two years.   In an attempt to gain political 
cover for economic cutbacks, the Cabinet sent the reform 
package to Parliament for what they miscalculated would be 
immediate passage.  Parliament instead seized the opportunity 
to voice frustration with the status quo by insisting the 
ROYG address corruption before it would approve a reduction 
in the popular diesel subsidy.   ROYG officials blamed 
"democracy" for the failure of the reform package. 
 
¶12. (C) In January, Parliament struck a deal with the 
executive to accept the badly needed economic reforms along 
with amendments addressing some of Parliament's long-standing 
concerns over decentralization, civil service pay, and 
notoriously corrupt ministries.  The compromise calls on the 
Executive to implement Parliament's anti-corruption initiates 
in stages over a six-month period; in return Parliament will 
approval the economic reform plan in progressive stages.  The 
Executive must now demonstrate serious intent to carry out 
painful reforms in order to maintain Yemen's minimally 
performing economy from slipping further. 
 
--------------------------------- 
FM al-Qirbi on Democratic Reforms 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶13. (C) FM Qirbi is a life-long reformer with moderate views 
on Foreign Policy.  Although too politic to say so directly, 
he is concerned that the international community and 
specifically the U.S. (i.e. BMENA and MCC) have yet to prove 
a long-term commitment to democracy in the Middle East. 
Behind Qirbi's skepticism of U.S. motives, is a belief that 
GWOT considerations and concerns over regional stability 
undermine the U.S. democratization agenda in the region. 
This is most certainly the view of Deputy FM Noman, who may 
advise you that U.S. programs aimed at reform in the region 
are constrained by a view on the Arab street that years of 
strong U.S. relations with oppressive Arab regimes have 
scuttled the efforts of moderates in the region to effect 
democratic reform. 
 
--------------- 
Why DAD Matters 
--------------- 
 
¶14. (C) As agreed at Sea Island, Italy and Turkey are 
co-sponsoring a BMENA Democracy Assistance Dialogue (DAD) 
with Yemen.  Yemen gave presentations at the RABAT Forum For 
the Future on democracy and microfinance.  Foreign Minister 
Qirbi continues to insist that the DAD co-sponsors fund the 
establishment of a "Democracy Center" in Sanaa to be a 
permanent DAD secretariat.  At Morocco, Qirbi urged that the 
forum be more than just talk, however the lack of movement on 
the DAD gives credence to his fears that BMENA is just 
another set of talking points.  The Italians and Turks, with 
our support, have resisted the idea of a permanent body. 
Setting up a democracy center seems to be Qirbi's red line on 
moving forward on the DAD.  Listen to his proposal, but 
stress the importance of using DAD as a mechanism for 
concrete progress rather then bureaucracy building. 
 
¶15. (C) Although pressing Qirbi on political reform may be 
preaching to the choir, it is important to underscore the USG 
believes it imperative that the ROYG stop talking and move 
forward.  You may congratulate Qirbi on Yemen's MCC Threshold 
status and strongly suggest the ROYG make full use of the 
next two years -- it will not be easy, but a full effort 
should be made to tap into tens of millions of dollars in 
development funds -- or the losers will be the Yemeni people. 
 
 
------------------------------------ 
MFA Concerned About Yemeni Detainees 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶16. (S) Qirbi is likely to raise the status of Yemeni GTMO 
detainees as well as access to two citizens the ROYG believes 
are held at Bagram Air Force Base.  In February the MFA made 
several requests for information on Yemenis their Embassy in 
Baghdad believes are being detainees by U.S. forces in Iraq, 
although Post has no evidence that this is the case.  You can 
respond that the USG takes their concerns for their citizens 
seriously and goes through each request case by case.  These 
are extraordinary circumstances by the U.S. is committee to 
resolving these cases as quickly as possible and will 
continue to Yemen informed on the status their citizens.  You 
may also note that the USG worked with the ROYG to send a 
team of officials to Guantanamo Bay. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Sofan Leads the ROYG's MCC Effort 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶17. (SBU) MCC/Threshold:  The Millennium Challenge 
Corporation selected Yemen as a threshold country for 2004 
and 2005.  Yemen qualified in two of the three MCC categories 
"Economic Freedom" and "Investing in People," but faces 
serious shortcomings in the "Governing Justly" category.  The 
Ministry of Planning recently submitted its Threshold paper 
to USAID, analyzing Yemen's failure to qualify under certain 
indicators and offering a plan for improvement over the next 
two years.  The paper, which requested $14 million in 
assistance over two years, was endorsed by AID and is now 
with the MCC board. 
 
¶18. (SBU) The ROYG's Threshold strategy emphasizes the 
crosscutting theme of improving Yemen's investment climate, 
within which it proposes plans to tackle corruption, 
modernize property rights, increase the rule of law, and lift 
media restrictions.  Post was satisfied with the ROYG's 
general direction, but remains skeptical about the presence 
of political will to make painful reform. 
 
---------------------------- 
MEPI Gaining Ground in Yemen 
---------------------------- 
 
¶19. (U) MEPI's main focus in Yemen is on education and 
democracy and governance, although it is increasingly 
involved in trade and investment issues.  MEPI funds a 
democracy education program for children, vocational training 
for young adults, e-learning schools, and is looking to 
expand cooperation with the Ministry of Education.  MEPI 
recently approved funding for an International Foundation for 
Electoral Systems (IFES) program to assist the ROYG prepare 
for 2006 President and Local Councils elections.  USAID and 
MEPI are jointly funding a program to help the ROYG live up 
to it commitments to decentralize government through the 
mechanism of local councils.  Our MEPI assistance has logged 
considerable gains, including contributing to the success of 
the 2003 Parliamentary elections.  With MEPI funding, the 
Financial Services Volunteer Corps is working on a program to 
reform Yemen's banking sector and encourage domestic 
investment. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
Minister Soswa Carries the Human Rights Banner 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶20. (C) Minister Soswa is a frank interlocutor and effective 
leader, adroit at influencing other Cabinet officials and 
public opinion.  As the most visible woman in Yemen, she is 
aware she serves as a role model for Yemeni women and takes 
this role seriously. Well-known and regarded in Washington 
and internationally, she readily acknowledges that Yemen has 
a long way to go in the field of human rights, and is 
personally committed to getting there.  Issues Soswa is 
likely to raise include protection of press freedoms, due 
process for Yemeni security detainees, human rights training 
for ROYG security forces, and the participation and 
representation of women in political life. 
 
¶21. (C) There is a general belief among women activists and 
civil servants that the ROYG only pays lip service to women's 
rights.  However, some women leaders, particularly those 
affiliated with the ruling GPC party believe women,s' rights 
in Yemen are progressing, albeit slowly.  In the 2003 
Parliamentary election, despite a record numbers of women 
voters, only eleven out of a total of 1400 candidates were 
women, and only one female candidate won a seat.  Since 
Unification in 1990, women in Yemen have lost ten of the 
eleven seats they originally held. In 2001 local council 
elections, 38 women won positions of 6,676 nationwide.  Last 
August, a USAID-sponsored NDI workshop brought together women 
from the three major political parties to formula a joint 
program to gain greater representation within their parties. 
The participants opted for establishing a quota system for 
female candidates.  Soswa supports this platform, which is 
rapidly gaining momentum. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Somali Refugees: A Festering Problem 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶22. (C) Yemen's refugee problems stem from conflict and 
poverty in the Horn of Africa.  UNHCR estimates that there 
are 2,000 Ethiopia and Eritrea refugees in Yemen, although 
this number would be many times higher were it possible to 
count illegal worker.  Somali refugees, who are granted 
"prima-facie" protections in Yemen, are the ROYG's main 
concern.  The Government claims there are over 500,000 Somali 
refugees in Yemen, despite UNHCR's much lower estimate of 
70,000.  Soswa is the ROYG point person on this issue and may 
choose to raise it with you.  She will likely point out that 
Yemen offers the best protection for Somali refugees in the 
region, and that the ROYG is willing to play its part, but 
its resources are extremely limited and the international 
community needs to contribute more.  You may point to our 
contribution to UNHCR, attempts to resettle qualified 
refugees in the U.S., and a DoD project to build a school in 
a Somali refugee camp in Aden. 
 
---------------------- 
Trafficking in Persons 
---------------------- 
 
¶23. (SBU) Although the ROYG is just coming to grips with TIP, 
it has been responsive to USG concerns on the issue.  In the 
past year Yemen has taken several steps to improve its 
understanding of TIP and study its scope in Yemen.  There are 
two main trafficked populations in Yemen: Yemeni children 
from the north trafficked across the border to work illegally 
in Saudi Arabia, and Iraqi women trafficked to Yemen, mainly 
the southern port city of Aden, for the purpose of 
prostitution.  The Ministry of Social Affairs recently 
cooperated with UNICEF to conduct a study on child 
trafficking in Yemen.  UNICEF's report, release in February, 
estimates that 9000 Yemeni children were smuggled to the KSA 
for the purpose of begging or menial labor in the first 
quarter of 2004.  In most cases children were trafficked with 
the consent of their family and returned home between work 
stints.  UNICEF and the ROYG disagree over whether or not 
these cases constitute illegal trafficking, illustrating that 
more work needs to be done to train official and education 
the public about TIP. 
Krajeski