Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 251287 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AEMR ASEC AMGT AE AS AMED AVIAN AU AF AORC AGENDA AO AR AM APER AFIN ATRN AJ ABUD ARABL AL AG AODE ALOW ADANA AADP AND APECO ACABQ ASEAN AA AFFAIRS AID AGR AY AGS AFSI AGOA AMB ARF ANET ASCH ACOA AFLU AFSN AMEX AFDB ABLD AESC AFGHANISTAN AINF AVIATION ARR ARSO ANDREW ASSEMBLY AIDS APRC ASSK ADCO ASIG AC AZ APEC AFINM ADB AP ACOTA ASEX ACKM ASUP ANTITERRORISM ADPM AINR ARABLEAGUE AGAO AORG AMTC AIN ACCOUNT ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU AIDAC AINT ARCH AMGTKSUP ALAMI AMCHAMS ALJAZEERA AVIANFLU AORD AOREC ALIREZA AOMS AMGMT ABDALLAH AORCAE AHMED ACCELERATED AUC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AORL ASECIR AMG AMBASSADOR AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ADM ASES ABMC AER AMER ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AOPC ACS AFL AEGR ASED AFPREL AGRI AMCHAM ARNOLD AN ANATO AME APERTH ASECSI AT ACDA ASEDC AIT AMERICA AMLB AMGE ACTION AGMT AFINIZ ASECVE ADRC ABER AGIT APCS AEMED ARABBL ARC ASO AIAG ACEC ASR ASECM ARG AEC ABT ADIP ADCP ANARCHISTS AORCUN AOWC ASJA AALC AX AROC ARM AGENCIES ALBE AK AZE AOPR AREP AMIA ASCE ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI AINFCY ARMS ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AGRICULTURE AFPK AOCR ALEXANDER ATRD ATFN ABLG AORCD AFGHAN ARAS AORCYM AVERY ALVAREZ ACBAQ ALOWAR ANTOINE ABLDG ALAB AMERICAS AFAF ASECAFIN ASEK ASCC AMCT AMGTATK AMT APDC AEMRS ASECE AFSA ATRA ARTICLE ARENA AISG AEMRBC AFR AEIR ASECAF AFARI AMPR ASPA ASOC ANTONIO AORCL ASECARP APRM AUSTRALIAGROUP ASEG AFOR AEAID AMEDI ASECTH ASIC AFDIN AGUIRRE AUNR ASFC AOIC ANTXON ASA ASECCASC ALI AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN ASECKHLS ASSSEMBLY ASECVZ AI ASECPGOV ASIR ASCEC ASAC ARAB AIEA ADMIRAL AUSGR AQ AMTG ARRMZY ANC APR AMAT AIHRC AFU ADEL AECL ACAO AMEMR ADEP AV AW AOR ALL ALOUNI AORCUNGA ALNEA ASC AORCO ARMITAGE AGENGA AGRIC AEM ACOAAMGT AGUILAR AFPHUM AMEDCASCKFLO AFZAL AAA ATPDEA ASECPHUM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ETRD ETTC EU ECON EFIN EAGR EAID ELAB EINV ENIV ENRG EPET EZ ELTN ELECTIONS ECPS ET ER EG EUN EIND ECONOMICS EMIN ECIN EINT EWWT EAIR EN ENGR ES EI ETMIN EL EPA EARG EFIS ECONOMY EC EK ELAM ECONOMIC EAR ESDP ECCP ELN EUM EUMEM ECA EAP ELEC ECOWAS EFTA EXIM ETTD EDRC ECOSOC ECPSN ENVIRONMENT ECO EMAIL ECTRD EREL EDU ENERG ENERGY ENVR ETRAD EAC EXTERNAL EFIC ECIP ERTD EUC ENRGMO EINZ ESTH ECCT EAGER ECPN ELNT ERD EGEN ETRN EIVN ETDR EXEC EIAD EIAR EVN EPRT ETTF ENGY EAIDCIN EXPORT ETRC ESA EIB EAPC EPIT ESOCI ETRB EINDQTRD ENRC EGOV ECLAC EUR ELF ETEL ENRGUA EVIN EARI ESCAP EID ERIN ELAN ENVT EDEV EWWY EXBS ECOM EV ELNTECON ECE ETRDGK EPETEIND ESCI ETRDAORC EAIDETRD ETTR EMS EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EBRD EUREM ERGR EAGRBN EAUD EFI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ETRO ENRGY EGAR ESSO EGAD ENV ENER EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ELA EET EINVETRD EETC EIDN ERGY ETRDPGOV EING EMINCG EINVECON EURM EEC EICN EINO EPSC ELAP ELABPGOVBN EE ESPS ETRA ECONETRDBESPAR ERICKSON EEOC EVENTS EPIN EB ECUN EPWR ENG EX EH EAIDAR EAIS ELBA EPETUN ETRDEIQ EENV ECPC ETRP ECONENRG EUEAID EWT EEB EAIDNI ESENV EADM ECN ENRGKNNP ETAD ETR ECONETRDEAGRJA ETRG ETER EDUC EITC EBUD EAIF EBEXP EAIDS EITI EGOVSY EFQ ECOQKPKO ETRGY ESF EUE EAIC EPGOV ENFR EAGRE ENRD EINTECPS EAVI ETC ETCC EIAID EAIDAF EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EAOD ETRDA EURN EASS EINVA EAIDRW EON ECOR EPREL EGPHUM ELTM ECOS EINN ENNP EUPGOV EAGRTR ECONCS ETIO ETRDGR EAIDB EISNAR EIFN ESPINOSA EAIDASEC ELIN EWTR EMED ETFN ETT EADI EPTER ELDIN EINVEFIN ESS ENRGIZ EQRD ESOC ETRDECD ECINECONCS EAIT ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EUNJ ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ELAD EFIM ETIC EFND EFN ETLN ENGRD EWRG ETA EIN EAIRECONRP EXIMOPIC ERA ENRGJM ECONEGE ENVI ECHEVARRIA EMINETRD EAD ECONIZ EENG ELBR EWWC ELTD EAIDMG ETRK EIPR EISNLN ETEX EPTED EFINECONCS EPCS EAG ETRDKIPR ED EAIO ETRDEC ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ERNG EFINU EURFOR EWWI ELTNSNAR ETD EAIRASECCASCID EOXC ESTN EAIDAORC EAGRRP ETRDEMIN ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN ETRDEINVTINTCS EGHG EAIDPHUMPRELUG EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN EDA EPETPGOV ELAINE EUCOM EMW EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM ELB EINDETRD EMI ETRDECONWTOCS EINR ESTRADA EHUM EFNI ELABV ENR EMN EXO EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EATO END EP EINVETC ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EIQ ETTW EAI ENGRG ETRED ENDURING ETTRD EAIDEGZ EOCN EINF EUPREL ENRL ECPO ENLT EEFIN EPPD ECOIN EUEAGR EISL EIDE ENRGSD EINVECONSENVCSJA EAIG ENTG EEPET EUNCH EPECO ETZ EPAT EPTE EAIRGM ETRDPREL EUNGRSISAFPKSYLESO ETTN EINVKSCA ESLCO EBMGT ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EFLU ELND EFINOECD EAIDHO EDUARDO ENEG ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EFINTS ECONQH ENRGPREL EUNPHUM EINDIR EPE EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS EFINM ECRM EQ EWWTSP ECONPGOVBN
KFLO KPKO KDEM KFLU KTEX KMDR KPAO KCRM KIDE KN KNNP KG KMCA KZ KJUS KWBG KU KDMR KAWC KCOR KPAL KOMC KTDB KTIA KISL KHIV KHUM KTER KCFE KTFN KS KIRF KTIP KIRC KSCA KICA KIPR KPWR KWMN KE KGIC KGIT KSTC KACT KSEP KFRD KUNR KHLS KCRS KRVC KUWAIT KVPR KSRE KMPI KMRS KNRV KNEI KCIP KSEO KITA KDRG KV KSUM KCUL KPET KBCT KO KSEC KOLY KNAR KGHG KSAF KWNM KNUC KMNP KVIR KPOL KOCI KPIR KLIG KSAC KSTH KNPT KINL KPRP KRIM KICC KIFR KPRV KAWK KFIN KT KVRC KR KHDP KGOV KPOW KTBT KPMI KPOA KRIF KEDEM KFSC KY KGCC KATRINA KWAC KSPR KTBD KBIO KSCI KRCM KNNB KBNC KIMT KCSY KINR KRAD KMFO KCORR KW KDEMSOCI KNEP KFPC KEMPI KBTR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNPP KTTB KTFIN KBTS KCOM KFTN KMOC KOR KDP KPOP KGHA KSLG KMCR KJUST KUM KMSG KHPD KREC KIPRTRD KPREL KEN KCSA KCRIM KGLB KAKA KWWT KUNP KCRN KISLPINR KLFU KUNC KEDU KCMA KREF KPAS KRKO KNNC KLHS KWAK KOC KAPO KTDD KOGL KLAP KECF KCRCM KNDP KSEAO KCIS KISM KREL KISR KISC KKPO KWCR KPFO KUS KX KWCI KRFD KWPG KTRD KH KLSO KEVIN KEANE KACW KWRF KNAO KETTC KTAO KWIR KVCORR KDEMGT KPLS KICT KWGB KIDS KSCS KIRP KSTCPL KDEN KLAB KFLOA KIND KMIG KPPAO KPRO KLEG KGKG KCUM KTTP KWPA KIIP KPEO KICR KNNA KMGT KCROM KMCC KLPM KNNPGM KSIA KSI KWWW KOMS KESS KMCAJO KWN KTDM KDCM KCM KVPRKHLS KENV KCCP KGCN KCEM KEMR KWMNKDEM KNNPPARM KDRM KWIM KJRE KAID KWMM KPAONZ KUAE KTFR KIF KNAP KPSC KSOCI KCWI KAUST KPIN KCHG KLBO KIRCOEXC KI KIRCHOFF KSTT KNPR KDRL KCFC KLTN KPAOKMDRKE KPALAOIS KESO KKOR KSMT KFTFN KTFM KDEMK KPKP KOCM KNN KISLSCUL KFRDSOCIRO KINT KRG KWMNSMIG KSTCC KPAOY KFOR KWPR KSEPCVIS KGIV KSEI KIL KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KQ KEMS KHSL KTNF KPDD KANSOU KKIV KFCE KTTC KGH KNNNP KK KSCT KWNN KAWX KOMCSG KEIM KTSD KFIU KDTB KFGM KACP KWWMN KWAWC KSPA KGICKS KNUP KNNO KISLAO KTPN KSTS KPRM KPALPREL KPO KTLA KCRP KNMP KAWCK KCERS KDUM KEDM KTIALG KWUN KPTS KPEM KMEPI KAWL KHMN KCRO KCMR KPTD KCROR KMPT KTRF KSKN KMAC KUK KIRL KEM KSOC KBTC KOM KINP KDEMAF KTNBT KISK KRM KWBW KBWG KNNPMNUC KNOP KSUP KCOG KNET KWBC KESP KMRD KEBG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPWG KOMCCO KRGY KNNF KPROG KJAN KFRED KPOKO KM KWMNCS KMPF KJWC KJU KSMIG KALR KRAL KDGOV KPA KCRMJA KCRI KAYLA KPGOV KRD KNNPCH KFEM KPRD KFAM KALM KIPRETRDKCRM KMPP KADM KRFR KMWN KWRG KTIAPARM KTIAEUN KRDP KLIP KDDEM KTIAIC KWKN KPAD KDM KRCS KWBGSY KEAI KIVP KPAOPREL KUNH KTSC KIPT KNP KJUSTH KGOR KEPREL KHSA KGHGHIV KNNR KOMH KRCIM KWPB KWIC KINF KPER KILS KA KNRG KCSI KFRP KLFLO KFE KNPPIS KQM KQRDQ KERG KPAOPHUM KSUMPHUM KVBL KARIM KOSOVO KNSD KUIR KWHG KWBGXF KWMNU KPBT KKNP KERF KCRT KVIS KWRC KVIP KTFS KMARR KDGR KPAI KDE KTCRE KMPIO KUNRAORC KHOURY KAWS KPAK KOEM KCGC KID KVRP KCPS KIVR KBDS KWOMN KIIC KTFNJA KARZAI KMVP KHJUS KPKOUNSC KMAR KIBL KUNA KSA KIS KJUSAF KDEV KPMO KHIB KIRD KOUYATE KIPRZ KBEM KPAM KDET KPPD KOSCE KJUSKUNR KICCPUR KRMS KWMNPREL KWMJN KREISLER KWM KDHS KRV KPOV KWMNCI KMPL KFLD KWWN KCVM KIMMITT KCASC KOMO KNATO KDDG KHGH KRF KSCAECON KWMEN KRIC
PREL PINR PGOV PHUM PTER PE PREF PARM PBTS PINS PHSA PK PL PM PNAT PHAS PO PROP PGOVE PA PU POLITICAL PPTER POL PALESTINIAN PHUN PIN PAMQ PPA PSEC POLM PBIO PSOE PDEM PAK PF PKAO PGOVPRELMARRMOPS PMIL PV POLITICS PRELS POLICY PRELHA PIRN PINT PGOG PERSONS PRC PEACE PROCESS PRELPGOV PROV PFOV PKK PRE PT PIRF PSI PRL PRELAF PROG PARMP PERL PUNE PREFA PP PGOB PUM PROTECTION PARTIES PRIL PEL PAGE PS PGO PCUL PLUM PIF PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PMUC PCOR PAS PB PKO PY PKST PTR PRM POUS PRELIZ PGIC PHUMS PAL PNUC PLO PMOPS PHM PGOVBL PBK PELOSI PTE PGOVAU PNR PINSO PRO PLAB PREM PNIR PSOCI PBS PD PHUML PERURENA PKPA PVOV PMAR PHUMCF PUHM PHUH PRELPGOVETTCIRAE PRT PROPERTY PEPFAR PREI POLUN PAR PINSF PREFL PH PREC PPD PING PQL PINSCE PGV PREO PRELUN POV PGOVPHUM PINRES PRES PGOC PINO POTUS PTERE PRELKPAO PRGOV PETR PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPKO PARLIAMENT PEPR PMIG PTBS PACE PETER PMDL PVIP PKPO POLMIL PTEL PJUS PHUMNI PRELKPAOIZ PGOVPREL POGV PEREZ POWELL PMASS PDOV PARN PG PPOL PGIV PAIGH PBOV PETROL PGPV PGOVL POSTS PSO PRELEU PRELECON PHUMPINS PGOVKCMABN PQM PRELSP PRGO PATTY PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PGVO PROTESTS PRELPLS PKFK PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PARAGRAPH PRELGOV POG PTRD PTERM PBTSAG PHUMKPAL PRELPK PTERPGOV PAO PRIVATIZATION PSCE PPAO PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PARALYMPIC PRUM PKPRP PETERS PAHO PARMS PGREL PINV POINS PHUMPREL POREL PRELNL PHUMPGOV PGOVQL PLAN PRELL PARP PROVE PSOC PDD PRELNP PRELBR PKMN PGKV PUAS PRELTBIOBA PBTSEWWT PTERIS PGOVU PRELGG PHUMPRELPGOV PFOR PEPGOV PRELUNSC PRAM PICES PTERIZ PREK PRELEAGR PRELEUN PHUME PHU PHUMKCRS PRESL PRTER PGOF PARK PGOVSOCI PTERPREL PGOVEAID PGOVPHUMKPAO PINSKISL PREZ PGOVAF PARMEUN PECON PINL POGOV PGOVLO PIERRE PRELPHUM PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PBST PKPAO PHUMHUPPS PGOVPOL PASS PPGOV PROGV PAGR PHALANAGE PARTY PRELID PGOVID PHUMR PHSAQ PINRAMGT PSA PRELM PRELMU PIA PINRPE PBTSRU PARMIR PEDRO PNUK PVPR PINOCHET PAARM PRFE PRELEIN PINF PCI PSEPC PGOVSU PRLE PDIP PHEM PRELB PORG PGGOC POLG POPDC PGOVPM PWMN PDRG PHUMK PINB PRELAL PRER PFIN PNRG PRED POLI PHUMBO PHYTRP PROLIFERATION PHARM PUOS PRHUM PUNR PENA PGOVREL PETRAEUS PGOVKDEM PGOVENRG PHUS PRESIDENT PTERKU PRELKSUMXABN PGOVSI PHUMQHA PKISL PIR PGOVZI PHUMIZNL PKNP PRELEVU PMIN PHIM PHUMBA PUBLIC PHAM PRELKPKO PMR PARTM PPREL PN PROL PDA PGOVECON PKBL PKEAID PERM PRELEZ PRELC PER PHJM PGOVPRELPINRBN PRFL PLN PWBG PNG PHUMA PGOR PHUMPTER POLINT PPEF PKPAL PNNL PMARR PAC PTIA PKDEM PAUL PREG PTERR PTERPRELPARMPGOVPBTSETTCEAIRELTNTC PRELJA POLS PI PNS PAREL PENV PTEROREP PGOVM PINER PBGT PHSAUNSC PTERDJ PRELEAID PARMIN PKIR PLEC PCRM PNET PARR PRELETRD PRELBN PINRTH PREJ PEACEKEEPINGFORCES PEMEX PRELZ PFLP PBPTS PTGOV PREVAL PRELSW PAUM PRF PHUMKDEM PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PNUM PGGV PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PIND PTEP PTERKS PGOVJM PGOT PRELMARR PGOVCU PREV PREFF PRWL PET PROB PRELPHUMP PHUMAF PVTS PRELAFDB PSNR PGOVECONPRELBU PGOVZL PREP PHUMPRELBN PHSAPREL PARCA PGREV PGOVDO PGON PCON PODC PRELOV PHSAK PSHA PGOVGM PRELP POSCE PGOVPTER PHUMRU PINRHU PARMR PGOVTI PPEL PMAT PAN PANAM PGOVBO PRELHRC

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 05ROME574, Italy's 2005 budget - Smoke and Mirrors

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05ROME574.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05ROME574 2005-02-22 09:14 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Rome
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS  ROME 000574 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/WE, EUR/ERA, EB/IFB/OMA 
PARIS ALSO FOR USOECD 
TREAS FOR HULL 
STATE PASS CEA 
STATE PASS FRB FOR GUST 
FRANKFURT FOR WALLAR 
USDOC 4212/ITA/MAC/OEURA/CPD/DDEFALCO 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: ECON EFIN ELAB PGOV IT KPRP ITALIAN POLITICS
SUBJECT: Italy's 2005 budget - Smoke and Mirrors 
 
Ref: 04 ROME 4922 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. For the last several years, Italy has relied on 
extraordinary one-off revenue measures and spending 
deferrals to avoid bumping up against the euro zone 
budget deficit/GDP ceiling of three percent.  Finance 
Minister Siniscalco, a technocrat, has sworn off tax 
amnesties and pursued the most challenging fiscal reforms 
in the last decade, while also implementing Prime 
Minister Berlusconi's long-promised tax cut.  However, 
domestic and international budget experts agree that the 
2005 mix of spending and tax cuts, coupled with revenue 
enhancements, will not keep Italy's deficit under the EU 
ceiling, especially with prognostications now that GDP 
growth rate will grow at best 1.4 percent, or even less. 
The GOI will again need to turn to extraordinary 
budgetary measures to accommodate another swollen budget 
deficit, most likely after spring elections.  End 
summary. 
 
-------------------- 
RECENT BUDGET TRENDS 
-------------------- 
 
2. For years, Italy's government spending has been high, 
even by the standards of free-spending EU member states. 
The result has been large public sector deficits financed 
by debt.  In the early 1990s, however, Italy started to 
address its macroeconomic problems to qualify for first- 
round EMU membership.  Nonetheless, even at the end of 
the virtuous path of the nineties, the public sector 
deficit (as a percentage of GDP) was still dangerously 
close to the three-percent EU Stability and Growth Pact 
ceiling.  In July 2004, to avoid a EU Commission Early 
Warning, Italy implemented a 7.5 billion euro deficit 
reduction package to bring the 2004 deficit in line with 
the three-percent ceiling.  On December 29, 2004, 
Parliament approved the 2005 budget, totaling euro 645.4 
billion (or 45.8 percent of GDP, down from 47.8 percent 
in 2004). On the surface, the 2005 budget incorporates 
one of the most aggressive deficit reduction packages in 
the last decade and seeks both 24 billion euro (or 1.7 
percent of GDP) in spending cuts and revenue increases to 
shrink the budget deficit/GDP ratio to 2.7 percent. 
 
3. The level of public debt, the highest as a share of 
GDP within EMU countries and the second largest of 
industrialized countries, has started to decline, but 
still remains over 100 percent of GDP (105.8 percent of 
GDP at end-2004, down slightly from 106.2 percent at end- 
2003).  Budget drafters think this ratio will not fall 
below 100 percent before end-2007. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
BUDGET/GROWTH ASSUMPTIONS TOO OPTIMISTIC 
---------------------------------------- 
 
4. The IMF estimates 2005 GDP growth at 1.7 percent, 
while the GOI estimates 2.1 percent.  The Fund warns its 
projected lower growth, if not offset by further deficit 
reduction measures in 2005, could lead Italy to overshoot 
the GOI 2.7 percent budget deficit/GDP target and perhaps 
even the euro zone three-percent budget deficit/GDP 
ceiling.  The European Commission also questions Italy's 
budget assumptions and predicts a deficit exceeding the 
three-percent ceiling in 2005 and 2006.  The Commission 
also believes that 2005 tax cuts are not offset by enough 
structural spending cuts.  Finance Minister Siniscalco, 
however, has underscored with the EU the GOI commitment 
to keep the budget deficit/GDP ratio below three percent. 
 
5. If economic performance continues as lackluster in 
2005 as it was in 2004, even the IMF growth projections 
will be hard to hit.  Preliminary data indicate a 0.3 
percent decline in GDP in fourth quarter 2004.  This is 
the first negative quarter-to-quarter result since second 
 
quarter 2003, and the worst quarter-to-quarter 
contraction since 1998.  This fourth quarter performance 
reflects weak Italian exports and a struggling industrial 
sector, especially in the textile, leather, footwear, and 
car sectors.  Industrial production is technically in 
recession for the last two quarters, and it indicates a 
weak economy with no prospect for strong short-term 
recovery.  The original GOI assumption of 2.1 percent 
growth in 2005 now appears too optimistic, as does the 
IMF estimate of 1.7 percent.  However, even the more 
conservative 1.4 percent projected by The Economist 
appears unrealistic, given negative fourth quarter 2004 
performance.  This situation should force the GOI to 
rethink its budget strategy for 2005 and consider the 
possibility of GDP growth in 2005 slightly higher than 
the modest 1.1 percent return in 2004. 
 
------------------------------------- 
EFFECTS OF TAX CUTS AND TAX INCREASES 
------------------------------------- 
 
THE FACTS 
--------- 
 
6. The 2005 budget includes a 4.2 billion euro tax cut to 
increase disposable income and stimulate domestic demand. 
The tax cuts provide for three brackets (23, 33, and 39 
percent) instead of the previous five (with the highest 
personal income tax level at 45 percent).  Cuts are to be 
funded in several ways.  First, for 2005 only, a four- 
percent "solidarity contribution," or tax surcharge, will 
be levied on incomes above 100,000 euro.  In addition, 
there are also increases in indirect taxes and a utility 
rate increase.  Further, the GOI will increase stamp 
taxes on some transactions, including, banking, boat and 
real estate purchases.  Higher stamp taxes will increase 
taxes up to 30 percent on real estate and boat sales, 
fishing, and trademarks.  According to a leading consumer 
association, these tax increases will result in an 
additional tax burden on households of some 50 to 60 euro 
a year. 
 
ANOTHER VIEW 
------------ 
 
7. Italian private think tank CER estimated that 2005 tax 
cuts would have a 0.2 percent positive impact on GDP 
growth, and a 0.5 percent increase on consumption - 
although these effects would be mostly offset by 
inflation.  Further, tax cuts will disproportionately 
benefit higher-income households, as tax cuts did in 
2003. 
 
8. In addition, increasing other taxes to off set income 
tax decreases does not come without a secondary cost. 
This creates uncertainty among consumers/tax payers, 
which could cause them to be more cautious about future 
spending, thus dampening the expected stimulus of the tax 
cut.  In the case of real estate, the tax increase will 
have a further negative impact on consumer confidence. 
 
------------------ 
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE 
------------------ 
 
9. Severe budget difficulties forced the GOI to reduce 
its foreign assistance budget for 2005.  As a percentage 
of GDP, Italy's 2005 aid budget equals 0.08 percent, down 
from the 0.11 percent in 2004.  While GOI-pledged funds 
for Tsunami relief (euro 70 million) are just a different 
allocation within the 2005 appropriation, the euro 31 
million debt relief to Indonesia and euro 7.2 million 
debt relief to Sri Lanka, are not reflected in these 
figures. 
 
10. Comment: Italy's foreign assistance has not always 
been this low.  In the early nineties, Italy's aid budget 
was 0.42 percent of GDP; but in 1992, to get finances in 
order for Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) membership, 
then-PM Amato more than halved Italy's foreign assistance 
 
to 0.2 percent.  Outlays have hovered close to the 1992 
levels since then, partially due to the overall budget 
strictures of EMU membership.  Now, Italy limits its 
assistance to a few key regions.  For this reason, 
Italy's GOI Monterey Summit commitments in 2000 to 
increase its Foreign Assistance/GDP ratio to 0.7 percent 
should be seen as a longer-term goal.  End comment 
 
------- 
DEFENSE 
------- 
 
11. (Note: The "defense function" includes the budgets of 
the Army, Navy, and Air Force, but excludes domestic 
security and other non-essential MOD budget functions. 
"Defense function" is the largest part of MOD funding. 
Peacekeeping operations are a separate budget item 
outside of "defense function."  End Note.) 
 
12.  FY 2005 MOD funding totals Euro 19.0 billion, down 
4.0 percent, or 790 million Euro, from FY 2004 funding 
(19.8 billion Euro).  As a percentage of GDP, 2005 MOD 
funding amounts to 1.35 percent of GDP, compared to 1.47 
percent in 2004. (In real terms, assuming a 2.0 percent 
inflation rate in 2005, the 2005 MOD appropriation is a 
six-percent decrease from 2004.)  The 4.0 percent 
decrease in total MOD funding includes a 3.7 percent 
decrease in "defense function." In terms of GDP, defense 
function equals 1.0 percent of GDP in 2005, compared to 
1.1 percent of GDP in 2004.  This ratio is lower than 
that for the UK, France, and Germany.  (Note: the GOI had 
earlier committed to increase the defense function 
funding/GDP ratio to 1.5 percent by end-2006.  Later, 
however, due to continuing budgetary problems, the target 
became, more realistically, a medium-long term one. End 
note.) 
 
13.  Comment: Continuing budget constraints might have a 
negative impact on funds for armed forces modernization 
projects and multi-year commitments.  One result is that 
Italy would be looking for smaller/less costly projects. 
For its part, the military will sell off Euro 1.2-1.3 
billion in property this year in an effort to maintain 
capabilities.  Funds deriving from the sale of military 
real estate will be earmarked for future military 
appropriations.  End Comment. 
 
PEACEKEEPING 
------------ 
 
14.  As mentioned above, peacekeeping funding (for 
Italy's military missions in Afghanistan, Ethiopia and 
Eritrea, Sudan, the Balkans, Hebron, and Iraq) is 
separate from both MOD funding and defense function 
funding.  If we were to add total 2005 MOD budget funding 
(Euro 19.0 billion) to peacekeeping funding (Euro 1.26 
billion, assuming the same level as that for 2004, total 
defense spending for 2005 would then be USD 20.3 billion, 
or 1.44 percent of GDP. 
 
15.  Note: The Treasury budget department (Italy's OMB- 
equivalent) has confirmed that the 2005 budget includes a 
euro 1.26 billion appropriation for Italian peacekeeping 
missions, the same level set in the 2004 budget. 
However, the Government and Parliament must together 
agree on how this money will be allocated among the 
various peacekeeping missions.  End Note. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
THE TWO-PERCENT GOVERNMENT-SPENDING CAP 
--------------------------------------- 
 
16. One of the pillars of the 2005 budget strategy is a 
two-percent government-spending cap to trim 1.93 billion 
euro of the total 9.5 billion euro in spending cuts 
included in the 2005 budget.  According to a 
"confidential" Central Bank document, the cap will not be 
entirely effective; and, for this reason, public sector 
spending (net of interest payments) is expected to 
increase by 2.6 percent in 2005.  The two-percent cap 
 
will not apply across the board, but just on current 
spending. 
 
------------- 
PRIVATIZATION 
------------- 
 
17. The 2005 budget does not provide details on the GOI 
plan to raise euro 100 billion over the next four years 
through privatizations of state-owned firms and, in the 
process, to reduce the debt/GDP ratio from 105.8 percent 
in 2004 to a target 98.8 percent in 2008.  However, as 
market conditions improve, we expect the GOI to sell off 
assets again.  This year, privatizations could involve 
ANAS, the State road agency and GOI real estate holding 
company.  The GOI may also sell some of the defense 
holding companies, Finmeccanica and Terna.  Another 
possibility would be to spin off part of Wind, the 
integrated communications company (fixed, mobile, 
internet), owned by ENEL, and thus indirectly by the GOI. 
Finally, the GOI could privatize RAI, the wholly owned 
GOI TV and radio firm, before yearend. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
18. The EU, OECD, IMF, and Bank of Italy have all 
expressed concern that the budget deficit will exceed 
three percent of GDP in 2005, and that supplemental 
measures will be needed.  It is difficult to speculate 
what those measures might be - one-time measures, 
spending freezes, sale of real estate, etc.  The IMF has 
suggested covering the budget shortfall, euro 6 billion 
by their estimates, by having consumers pay for some 
usually free medicines and public services and by 
implementing a public-sector wage cap -- both tough sells 
in an electoral campaign season. 
 
19. Looking ahead to 2006, despite EU and IMF remarks on 
the impact of tax cuts on the three percent deficit/GDP 
ceiling in 2005, the GOI is still planning a twelve 
billion euro tax cut for 2006, reducing tax brackets from 
three to two, eliminating the four-percent tax surcharge 
for income exceeding 100 million euro.  While promising a 
2006 tax cut will be an important plank in the electoral 
campaign for spring 2005 regional elections and for 
spring 2006 national elections, the GOI must still come 
up with politically-expedient spending cuts to at least 
partially finance 2006 tax cuts.  End comment. 
 
SEMBLER 
 
 
NNNN 
	2005ROME00574 - Classification: UNCLASSIFIED