This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 001268 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2015 
TAGS: PREL LE SY FR
SUBJECT: ELYSEE ON POSSIBLE THREAT TO LEBANESE OPPOSITION 
PROTEST, NEXT STEPS ON UNSCR 1559 IMPLEMENTATION 
 
REF: EMAIL ZEYA-FELTMAN 2/28/2005 
 
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Presidential Middle East Advisor Dominique 
Boche summoned us February 28 to pass on urgent, unverified 
threat information that possible sniper attacks might take 
place at the planned Lebanese opposition demonstration today 
in Beirut's Martyr's square.  The targets of the possible 
sniper attacks could include unnamed opposition leaders. 
Boche described the GoF as looking at possible options in the 
event Syria does not take any steps to implement UNSCR 1559, 
including working with the U.S. on a second UNSCR.  The GoF 
was also reflecting on Lebanon's spring parliamentary 
elections, and whether they would be legitimate in the wake 
of no Syrian gestures on 1559.  For now the GoF supported 
keeping the election date, and applying maximum pressure in 
the interim.  Boche speculated that Syria was likely to 
redeploy some troops, but questioned the significance of such 
a gesture given Syrian military intelligence (SMI) control 
over Lebanon.  Speaking in unusually blunt terms, Boche said 
the implementation of UNSCR 1559 spelled the end of Syria's 
Alawite-dominated regime, which had shown, in assassinating 
Hariri, that it was willing to risk international reprobation 
rather than cede anything on Lebanon.  At the same time, 
Boche stressed that we should continue to press Syria via the 
Lebanon issue rather than directly confront Damascus, which 
could backfire and generate Arab support for the embattled 
Syrian regime.  He also cautioned against taking steps on 
Hizballah, such as EU designation, which he said could 
further push Lebanon's Shi'a community into Syria's camp. 
The Gof is seeking dialogue with Parliament Speaker Nabih 
Berri to seek to explore prospects for Shi'a support for the 
Lebanese opposition.  End summary. 
 
THREAT INFORMATION 
-------------- 
¶2. (C) Presidential Advisor on the Middle East summoned Pol 
M/C and poloff February 28 to convey urgent, unverified 
threat information regarding possible sniper attacks at the 
February 28 Lebanese opposition demonstration.  The 
information, which the French Embassy in Beirut had received 
from sources it would like to protect, suggested that snipers 
might target the crowd of protestors or specific, unnamed 
opposition leaders.  While cautioning that he could notassess 
the reliability of the information, Boche said the GoF had 
wanted to share this with us right away, especially given 
PDAS Satterfield's ongoing visit to Beirut. (Note: We passed 
the threat information to Beirut, NEA and EUR, via ref email 
immediately after conclusion of the meeting.  End note.) 
Commenting on the possible motivations for such an attack, 
Boche speculated that Syria might be pursuing a Machiavellian 
strategy, by seeking to generate panic among Lebanese that a 
departure of Syrian troops meant a return to instability. 
Nevertheless, the threat had not been borne out yet; citing 
wire service reports, Boche commented that as of 1300 local, 
the Beirut protest appeared to be proceeding peacefully with 
some 20,000 to 50,000 protesters seeking to converge on 
central Beirut. 
 
 
NEXT STEPS ON 1559 IMPLEMENTATION 
------------------ 
 
¶3. (C) Boche confirmed the MFA was working on an options 
paper on next steps, in the event Syria did not make any 
gestures on UNSCR 1559 implementation, to include possibly 
initiating a second UNSCR in collaboration with the U.S.  The 
MFA was also examining the question of how to address 
Lebanon's May parliamentary elections, especially if Syria 
failed to allow a free and fair electoral process.  For now, 
the GoF supported maintaining the election date, and applying 
maximum pressure in the interim.  If, however, the Karame 
governnment were to fall, this would call into question the 
elections timing and likely result in a delay.  On a possible 
Syrian redeployment, Boche speculated that some Syrian move 
was likely given the public pronouncements already made by 
Damascus.  He questioned, however, whether such a 
redeployment would be significant, particularly if it simply 
involved the move of a few 100 soldiers "here or there." 
Boche further downplayed the possible significance of a 
redeployment, noting that Syrian troops were already largely 
out of Beirut and that Syrian military intelligence remained 
in real control of Lebanon. 
 
THE END OF THE ALAWITE REGIME... 
-------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Speaking in unusually tough terms, Boche asserted that 
full implementation of UNSCR 1559 equaled the "programmed 
destruction" of the Alawite-dominated regime in Damascus, 
which had come to depend on Lebanon as a vital source of cash 
for sustaining its rule in Syria.  Boche added that "the fact 
that the Syrians had assassinated Hariri" showed that the 
SARG was willing to provoke international anger rather that 
cede anything on Lebanon.  Boche asked for USG views on 
whether Syrian President Bashar al-Asad was cognizant of the 
assassination plot against Hariri.  When we responded that we 
were not aware of any smoking gun on culpability and that 
there may never be one, Boche signaled eagerness to hear 
further U.S. views if and when the USG reaches conclusions on 
this matter. Commenting on French relations with Syria, Boche 
reported that contacts between the GoF and SARG were 
completely suspended, with the French Ambassador in Damascus 
doing "only technical work," without meeting Syrian 
officials.  Boche added that he and other French officials 
had rebuffed attempts at dialogue from the SARG and its Arab 
intermediaries. 
 
¶5. (C) With Lebanon being a matter of SARG survival, Boche 
added, we needed to think carefully about next steps.  In the 
GoF view, it was best not to confront the Syrian regime too 
directly, but continue instead to use the Lebanon "angle of 
attack," which had the same weight as a direct confrontation 
anyway.  By keeping the focus on Lebanon, there was no way 
that anyone, including Arab states, would oppose us.  On the 
other hand, if the U.S. and France appeared as though they 
were using Lebanon as a way to bash Syria, this would further 
the lie that Syria is defending the interests of the Arab 
world.  Boche expressed passing concern over efforts by 
Syrian FM Shara to curry support through visits to Cairo and 
Riyadh.  He concluded, nevertheless,  that the Egyptians and 
Saudis were looking for a face-saving way for Syria to leave 
Lebanon, with the Saudis privately enraged, and feeling 
personally targeted, by Hariri's assassination. 
 
UNCERTAINTY ON OPPOSITION 
-------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Asked to comment on the state of the Lebanese 
opposition, Boche remarked that the mass popular opposition 
to Syrian occupation was a welcome and new development.  At 
the same time, the political direction of the opposition 
leadership appeared uncertain, due in no small part to the 
fact that its leaders lived under constant fear of being 
killed.  Boche quipped that a number of opposition leaders 
had begun receiving threat messages on their cell phones.  In 
addition, no figure had yet emerged who could fill the void 
left by Hariri's demise.  Much would depend on the evolution 
of the situation on the ground, particularly if there was a 
recourse to violence.  Continued Syrian control over 
southern, eastern, and northern Lebanon meant that the SARG 
continued to control most of Lebanon's political class.  The 
GoF, for its part, was seeking further contact with Lebanon's 
Shi'a community, especially via Nabih Berri, to see to what 
degree the Shi'a could be interwoven into the opposition. 
The GoF continued to remain reserved on EU designation of 
Hizballah, largely because it did not want to create too many 
targets in Lebanon and push the Shi'a community further in 
the Syrian camp.  Boche remained adamant on this point, 
despite February 28 press reports which cited Palestinian 
officials suggesting that Hizballah may have had a role in 
the February 25 Tel Aviv suicide bombing. 
 
 
¶7. (C) Comment: The GoF's passing of this threat information 
is a sign of continued GoF eagerness to collaborate and share 
information on Lebanon.  Based on Boche's pointed 
questioning, it appears that the GoF is interested in U.S. 
views on the culpability of the Syrian regime at the highest 
levels in Hariri's assassination.  Boche's tough talk on "the 
end of the Alawite regime" in Syria is unusual for French 
officials.  End comment. 
Leach