This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

021725Z Feb 05

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 OTTAWA 000315 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2015 
TAGS: MARR PREL CA NORAD
SUBJECT: CANADA: CABINET TO REVIEW MANDATE TO 
NEGOTIATE/CONCLUDE 2006 NORAD AGREEMENT IN EARLY FEBRUARY 
 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL M/C BRIAN FLORA.  REASON 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C/NF) In meetings January 20 with NorthCom Deputy 
Commander and U.S. NORAD Vice Commander, Lieutenant General 
Joseph Inge, Canadian security policy officials professed 
interest in helping to advance North American security 
cooperation with Mexico, downplayed the likelihood of an 
"early" Canadian decision to participate in the missile 
defense program, acknowledged the need to move quickly on 
negotiations for NORAD renewal and the importance of 
addressing maritime domain awareness, and advocated 
incorporation of BPG functions into NORAD.  PCO milrep, R/Adm 
Jacques Gauvin identified the issue of sharing U.S. 
classified intelligence as vital to enhanced bi-national 
cooperation.  Lt. General Inge noted the need to update 
NORAD's underlying documents, especially with respect to the 
role of NorthCom and the concept of asymmetric threats, 
advocated development of a more flexible, longer-term, 
"living" NORAD Agreement, and affirmed the need to explore 
all domains for mutual cooperation opportunities. 
 
¶2. (C/NF) U.S. representatives accompanying Lt. General Inge 
to his meetings included U.S. Northcom/NORAD Political 
Advisor Deborah Bolton, Embassy Political Minister Counselor 
Brian Flora (notetaker), and U.S. Army Attache Col. Bob 
Applegate.  Canadian representatives assigned to Colorado 
Springs included RAdm. J.D. Fraser (Canadian Liaison to 
NorthCom) and PolAd Patrick Wittman (Norad). 
 
Meeting at Privy Council Office (PCO) 
------------------------------------ 
¶3. (C/NF) Canadian Privy Council Office (PCO) military 
representative, R/Adm Jacques Gauvin, said that the timeline 
for NORAD renewal was short and it was important to come to a 
quick consensus on "where we are headed."  Gauvin noted that 
the government's mandate to negotiate and conclude the 2006 
NORAD Agreement would be presented to Cabinet at its February 
8 meeting.   As currently drafted, the mandate to negotiate 
would be broad and would incorporate the full range of 
recommendations proposed by the Bi-National Planning Group 
(BPG).  The issue of Canadian participation in the U.S. 
missile defense program, however, remained a highly sensitive 
political issue for the minority government and thus would 
continue to be managed by the Prime Minister's Office. 
 
¶4. (C/NF) Lt. Gen. Inge said that Canadian political 
sensitivities about missile defense were understood in U.S. 
circles.  He acknowledged that both sides sensed the urgency 
of the NORAD renewal process.  At the same time, it was 
important to get the basics straight, he said: For example, 
NORAD's basic documents must be updated to include NorthCom 
and the concept of asymmetric threats.  On the question of 
expanding security cooperation to the maritime domain, Inge 
urged a thoughtful approach given that domain awareness was 
considerably larger than the operations domain.  It would be 
important first to identify what we want to accomplish, he 
said, and then decided how and where to manage it.  There was 
room in the operational domain for U.S.-only operations and 
Canada-only operations.  An operational construct was needed 
to decide who does what and the relevant circumstances before 
assigning responsibilities.  Asked if he saw Canada 
eventually joining NorthCom, the General thought it not out 
of the realm of possibility, however such a development would 
need careful thinking-through; a great deal depended upon 
NORAD renewal agreement and the path the U.S. and Canada 
decided to follow. 
 
¶5. (C/NF) Radm. Gauvin said that with the exception of bmd, 
which would stay in the purview of the PMO, Canada wanted to 
move forward on a broad mandate for NORAD renewal and hoped 
the U.S. would respond in this spirit as negotiations 
proceeded.  The most difficult area, Gauvin said, was with 
regard to intelligence sharing.  For example, Canadians 
needed to know immediately what the threat was when asked to 
board a ship.  Often the intelligence was marked NOFORN or 
not releasable, and it would take days to obtain clearance to 
release or share.  Gauvin said that Canada has a "different 
culture in classifying documents."  Marking a document "CAN 
Eyes Only" was very difficult, so just about everything was 
made releasable to U.S. whereas the U.S. tended to default to 
NOFORN classification. (COMMENT:  Gauvin did not make the 
argument, as other Canadian officials have, that Canada 
should have blanket access to most of the USG's classified 
information and intelligence.  END COMMENT.)   Lt. General 
Inge said that NorthCom was working on the challenge to more 
routinely classify NorthCom-generated intelligence reporting 
as releasable. 
 
¶6. (C/NF) Gauvin observed that the PCO kept a close eye on 
public opinion and that with the exception of missile 
defense, currently there was "strong support" for Canadian 
cooperation with the U.S. on continental defense.  Lt. 
General Inge responded that while the concept of integrated 
common defense was problematic, cooperation and engagement 
should still move forward.  There was even movement with 
Mexico, he noted, indicating that defense delegations 
recently had exchanged visits and that mil-mil cooperation 
had reached unprecedented levels to respond to tsunami relief 
efforts.   The U.S. wanted to move forward with Mexico on 
security issues wherever it could, the General said, but 
recognized we would not have the same relationship as with 
Canada and was prepared to go slow.  He welcomed Canada's 
support in this endeavor.  R/Adm Gauvin responded that while 
the primary focus of Canada's relations with Mexico were with 
regard to economic prosperity Canada nonetheless was 
interested in helping out where it could on the security 
front. 
 
Meeting at Foreign Affairs Canada (FAC) 
--------------------------------------- 
¶7. (C/NF) Assistant Deputy Minister for Global and Security 
Policy, Jim Wright, provided a detailed explanation of the 
government's political dilemma with regard to missile 
defense.  He noted that in addition to domestic political 
divisions over MD, Russian Ambassador to Canada Georgiy 
Mamedov, an arms control expert, was actively lobbying 
against Canadian participation. He was particularly concerned 
about the use of Canadian territory.   At the same time, 
Wright continued, though Mamedov had provided a great deal of 
negative commentary to the press, much of what he had to say 
was non-factual and ideologically motivated.  Against this 
backdrop, Wright said the government was trying to move 
forward on participation and appealed for U.S. patience.  Lt. 
General Inge assured Wright that the U.S. understood Canada's 
situation, and indicated that NorthCom was pleased that 
Canadian officers at NORAD were integrated into the missile 
warning and threat assessment function. 
 
¶8. (C/NF) Wright said that the Martin Government wanted to 
move forward with security cooperation and noted Canada's 
national security policy released in April 2004.   At the 
same time, he cautioned that the current minority government 
situation meant greater parliamentary review of and 
involvement in what would be negotiated for NORAD, and the 
ratification process would be more complicated than before. 
Wright noted that NorthCom had presented a "communications" 
challenge for Canada (and Mexico) when it was first stood up 
and that there were some initial public reservations about it 
on sovereignty grounds.  In this political environment, 
Wright said, clarifying the "complementarity" of NORAD and 
NorthCom would be important.  He endorsed folding the BPG 
into NORAD as part of the renewal process and said it was 
important to address asymmetrical threats.  The government 
was close to getting its negotiating mandate.  Canada was 
ready to consider seriously maritime domain awareness and 
some forms of land cooperation, Wright said, and reiterated 
Gauvin's point that the negotiating mandate would be fairly 
broad.  It was important to be flexible and forward thinking 
in this process, he concluded. 
 
¶9. (C/NF) Lt. General Inge reiterated the points he made to 
PCO's Gauvin, saying the U.S. would like to explore ways to 
improve NORAD and expand its functions, but we needed to see 
what was possible in the short term and find ways to amend 
and add functions when we were ready.  Responding to a 
question about NorthCom, the General said that the Command 
had a platter-ful of issues before it, including force 
protection, working with DHS to define roles and 
relationships, and coordinating JTF actions in a variety of 
areas. 
 
¶10. This cable has been cleared by Lieutenant General Inge. 
 
Visit Canada's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/ottawa 
 
CELLUCCI