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CONFIDENTIAL NICOSIA 000304 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2014 
TAGS: CY TU PREL MOPS MARR
SUBJECT: SHIP VISIT TO CYPRUS: CALLING IN THE NORTH IS A 
BAD IDEA 
 
REF: IIR 689801035 
 
Classified By: Ambassador M. Klosson, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C)  SUMMARY.  Embassy Nicosia supports a visit by the USN 
to the Republic of Cyprus (south), but opposes a ship visit 
to north Cyprus under the current circumstances.  The 
Republic of Cyprus has hosted many visits by the United 
States Navy (USN) over the years without incident.  The 
Cyprus government has been supportive of these visits, which 
have enabled the US military to maintain its presence in the 
region while supporting the Combatant Commander,s Theater 
Security Cooperation (TSC) strategy.  The Republic of Cyprus 
is ideally suited to support USN visits in terms of port 
infrastructure, support architecture, and security.  The US 
Embassy is in a position to provide the necessary support, as 
well as leverage the events to further support the U.S. 
government's goals and policies for Cyprus.  A USN visit to 
north Cyprus, on the other hand, would do little to help ease 
the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community, and would 
have a significant negative impact on areas of key policy 
cooperation with Cyprus -- such as counter-terrorism and 
non-proliferation cooperation, including halting negotiations 
close to agreement on a PSI shipboarding MOU.  Furthermore, 
the north is ill suited to support such visits. 
Security/Force Protection, port infrastructure, support 
architecture, and personal security are all questionable at 
best.  A USN visit would highlight the Turkish military 
presence because the TGS would likely be heavily involved in 
many aspects of the visit.  END SUMMARY. 
 
BACKGROUND ON USN VISITS TO CYPRUS 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) The Republic of Cyprus has been the beneficiary 
without incident of USN ship visits for the past 14 years. 
Since 1999, Cyprus has hosted 40 visits, 34 prior to 9/11, 
and 6 since with approximately another 10 non-routine visits 
(medevac).  In all, since 1991, Cyprus hosted 72 ship visits 
by the USN.  As recently as March 2004, NAVEUR Headquarters 
London listed Cyprus as one of the top ten countries to 
conduct ship visits in support of European Command's Theater 
Security Cooperation Strategy.  These visits are an integral 
engagement strategy for Cyprus, country campaign plan (CCP), 
recently developed to maintain access to the region, build 
relationships to curb the flow of illegal goods and services, 
and support the counter-proliferation efforts in the region. 
No country has protested the USN,s right to conduct these 
visits, and all have occurred with little to no fanfare.  In 
addition, France, India, Greece, and the UK have conducted 
ship visits without incident.  No U.S. or other non-Turkish 
naval vessels have visited the north since 1974. 
 
 
VISITING THE SOUTH: POLITICALLY HELPFUL AND EASY TO DO 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
3.(C) A USN ship visit to the south would directly advance 
our non-proliferation and counter-terrorism objectives.  A 
ship visit to the south would signal that, while we will 
press ahead with our policy of easing the isolation of the 
Turkish Cypriots, cooperation in other areas of interest to 
both sides will continue. 
 
¶4. (C) From an infrastructure standpoint, the Republic of 
Cyprus is ideally suited to support a USN Ship visit.  Both 
of its main seaports have been inspected by the US Navy and 
have a current port inspection survey on file (PIVA).  As a 
result of the previous history of USN visits, the support 
architecture is in place to support a variety of sea going 
vessels to include submarines.  Husbanding agents have 
supported everything from Carrier Strike Groups on exercises 
in the eastern Mediterranean, to Expeditionary Strike Groups 
conducting humanitarian assistance measures for earthquake 
victims, to Presidential Summit meetings between the U.S. and 
the Soviet Union on Malta.  The USG, through an exchange of 
diplomatic notes with the Republic of Cyprus, has a SOFA-like 
agreement to protect military personnel in the event that 
legal issues arise as a result of liberty visits.  Everything 
is in place to resume successful ship visits to the Republic 
of Cyprus. 
 
VISITING THE NORTH: IMPRACTICAL AND ... 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) While the south is well suited to host a USN Ship 
visit, north Cyprus is not.  Port facilities are well below 
what is available, and already certified, in the south. 
Access to the institutions that would support such a visit is 
difficult.  The lack of a recognized local political entity 
poses significant coordination difficulties; for example, 
SOFA-like protection of military personnel arranged via the 
exchange of diplomatic notes would be impossible in the 
north.  Security/force protection is also a questionable 
area, and would unhelpfully highlight Turkey's extensive 
presence and interference in the north.  Husbanding agents 
are currently unknown and untested.  As a result, the ability 
of the Embassy to support a ship visit is limited at best. 
 
... A COLOSSAL POLICY BLUNDER 
----------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) A USN visit to the north would also have a disastrous 
effect on key U.S. interests in Cyprus and would provoke an 
unprecedented firestorm of Greek Cypriot protest.  Such a 
 
 
visit would require, by definition, intimate cooperation with 
the Turkish military in north Cyprus, which is considered an 
army of "occupation" by the GOC and whose presence in Cyprus 
has been condemned repeatedly by UNSC resolutions.  Greece, a 
new UNSC member, would certainly raise the issue in the 
Council.  Perhaps more importantly, the ROC would respond 
immediately by stopping cooperation in policy areas of 
importance to the United States, including but not limited to: 
 
-- Counterterrorism and non-proliferation.  The USG is close 
to finalizing a PSI shipboarding agreement with the 
Government of Cyprus that would improve oversight of the busy 
seaports in the south.  The GOC would come under significant 
pressure to reject cooperation with forces that had 
&legitimized8 the Turkish &occupation8 by visiting the 
north. 
 
-- Bicommunalism.  The GOC is already threatening to pull out 
of long-standing bicommunal programs, including Fulbright 
scholarships.  A ship visit would push the GOC to be more 
aggressive in undermining bicommunal activity. 
 
-- UN Settlement Process.  A ship visit would further damage 
U.S. credibility among Greek Cypriots and harm our ability to 
press for a more constructive Greek Cypriot position on 
renewing UN settlement talks. 
 
¶7. (C) Furthermore, a USN ship visit would provide very 
little concrete, long-term benefit to the Turkish Cypriots -- 
especially if it rendered USG help to their community more 
difficult.  A port call by a U.S. military asset is a 
symbolic gesture that would actually work against our efforts 
to provide substantive assistance to the Turkish Cypriots.  A 
ship visit in no way advances the most important priorities 
we share with the pro-settlement Turkish Cypriot leadership: 
laying the ground for a Cyprus settlement by ending north 
Cyprus, isolation from international trade, and encouraging 
the sustainable development of their economic and business 
infrastructure.  North Cyprus needs freighters, not frigates. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶8. (C) Previous ship visits to the south have been 
non-problematic, and another visit to the south would help 
advance U.S. policy priorities with the GOC.  A visit to the 
north would be both impractical and politically disastrous in 
the current climate. END COMMENT. 
 
KLOSSON