This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 000997 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2015 
TAGS: PREL ETTC PTER BG NP IN PK US
SUBJECT: NEW NSA SIGNALS COMMITMENT TO US-INDIA 
PARTNERSHIP, RAISES CONCERN ABOU...



SUBJECT: NEW NSA SIGNALS COMMITMENT TO US-INDIA  PARTNERSHIP, RAISES CONCERN ABOUT ""TALIBANIZATION"" OF  BANGLADESH 
  REF: NEW DELHI 922 
  Classified By: DCM Robert O. Blake, Jr. for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: In his first meeting with the Ambassador  since his elevation as National Security Adviser, MK  Narayanan identified progress in US-India relations as one of  the three or four top priorities that the PM has tasked him  to focus upon.  Although Narayanan was uninformed about Phase  2 of the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (PolCouns  briefed in detail), the NSA understood the importance of PMO  involvement to maintaining forward momentum, including on the  NSSP export control benchmarks.  Narayanan also welcomed the  Ambassador's proposal to stay in close touch on our  respective regional policies, relating  how King Gyanendra  had explicitly assured Prime Minister Singh in a January  telephone call that there would be no Palace move against the  civilian government.  The NSA was typically preoccupied with  India's eastern neighbors, warning of creeping  ""Talibanization"" in Bangladesh and leadership splits in  Burma.  On Kashmir, Narayanan assessed that violence is ""now  at one of its lowest levels in 15 years, with a vibrant  grassroots democracy.""  But he also warned that this progress  is ""fragile and cannot be taken for granted.""  In a telling  reflection of the NSA's place in the national security  hierarchy, Narayanan mentioned on two issues the need to  check with the Foreign Ministry before getting back to us,  but also emphasized that he, more than most, is attuned to  the political realities of coalition government.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) The Ambassador used a February 7 meeting with  recently-named NSA MK Narayanan to review major issues on our  bilateral agenda and to seek a better sense of where  Narayanan will fit into the new national security team. 
Narayanan continues to occupy the same tastefully decorated  office he used as internal security adviser, a few steps down  the hall from the PM's South Block office, but the stacks of  files on his desk and credenza had grown visibly since the  last time we saw him there.  Responding to the Ambassador's  opening presentation, Narayanan explained that Manmohan Singh  had identified progress in US-India relations as one of the  three or four top priorities that he expected the new NSA to  focus upon.  In this context, he was up to speed on issues  including the Boeing civil aircraft tender (he noted the  importance of the President's phone call) and discussion of a  possible Presidential visit later this year.  Although  familiar with the broad outlines of our Next Steps in  Strategic Partnership (NSSP) Narayanan was unbriefed on the  Phase 2 requirements or the status of Phase 1 implementation. 
 PolCouns briefed in detail on the Phase 2 quid-pro-quos,  reinforcing the Ambassador's hope that the GOI will quickly  build an interagency consensus for the required export  control legislation.  Narayanan asked specifically about the  division of NSSP responsibilities between State and NSC,  sharing his sense that White House (and PMO) backing had been  key to getting us this far. 
  Nepal 
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¶3. (C) The Ambassador noted with concern the pattern of  insurgency and failing governance that seems to be emerging  in much of India's periphery, and flagged the need for us to  coordinate closely, including through intelligence and C/T  channels.  Honing in on Nepal, Narayanan described King  Gyanendra as an ""enigma,"" whose declarations the GOI is no  longer prepared to believe.  To explain this point, the NSA  described a January conversation in which the King conveyed  to the PM his decision to postpone a long-anticipated visit  to New Delhi.  Asked explicitly whether the Palace was  ""planning something,"" the King said no.  These Palace  reassurances were conveyed again in late January, so that  now, Narayanan added, whatever the King says ""we will take  with a ton of salt.""  Echoing the Foreign Secretary (reftel),  Narayanan expressed concern about Chinese efforts to exploit  the crisis in Kathmandu for bilateral advantage, and was  pleased that the US had joined India in demarching Beijing on  the need to oppose the King's action. 
 
¶4. (C) Looking beyond the immediate situation in Kathmandu,  Narayanan described a deep crisis of governance, with the  political parties marginalized, the King hurting democracy  and a crown prince who is a ""loon.""  ""We can starve the RNA,""  Narayanan noted, but what if that just ""strengthens the  Maoists?""  Narayanan said he did not anticipate any changes  in the current GOI position, but asked rhetorically how we  should deal with the Maoists -- pointing to the fact that the  Palace writ now extends only to Kathmandu, and not beyond. 
  Bangladesh/Burma 
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¶5. (C) Turning to Bangladesh, the NSA described with concern  what he called a BDG ""plan to decimate Awami League leaders""  adding that this ""is not something we can accept as part of  their system.""  He argued that Jamat Islami is now firmly  entrenched in rural Bangladesh, warning of what he termed the  creeping ""Talibanization"" of that country.  PolCouns pressed  for better US-India information sharing in this area,  prompting Narayanan to promise to check with the MEA on how  our dialogue might be intensified.  In addition to spill over  effects from Bangladesh, Narayanan was also concerned by what  he called the ""apparent divergence"" within the leadership in  Burma, and the risk that India could find itself surrounded  ""by states which are collapsing."" 
  Kashmir 
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¶6. (C) The Ambassador raised Kashmir, asking about conditions  of governance there.  Narayanan was cautiously upbeat,  reporting that ""violence is now at one of its lowest levels  in 15 years, with a vibrant grassroots democracy.""  But he  also warned that this progress is ""fragile and cannot be  taken for granted.""  (Other Pakistan topics septel).  Concluding this SA overview, Narayanan offered to pursue the  idea of an intensified regional dialogue that addresses the  issues in a less piecemeal manner. 
  Military Sales 
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¶7. (C) The meeting wraped-up with a review of military sales  issues, building on Narayanan's discussion earlier that day  with a delegation from the US-India Business Council headed  by Tom Pickering and Joe Ralston.  The Ambassador cited the  strong US delegation at Aero-India as evidence of the US  intention to play in a big way in the Indian military sales  area.  Narayanan -- who spoke warmly of his past  relationships with Ambassador Pickering and General Ralston 
-- described the US as ""the most important player in the  market"" with a diverse range of offerings.  Nonetheless,  Narayanan said, ""we have a nagging feeling about  reliability.""  The Ambassador argued that US companies are  well positioned to address the Indian interest in  co-production, and underlined that the climate for addressing  reliability issues has totally changed in the US.  
MULFORD