This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 000860 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PHSA ETRD EWWT XD XO IN NSSP
SUBJECT: INDIAN INTEREST, AND HESITATION, ABOUT MARITIME 
SECURITY INITIATIVES 
 
Classified By: DCM Robert O. Blake, Jr., for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: Despite skepticism from some strategic 
commentators, the Indian government continues to express 
interest in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and 
other maritime security programs, but will not join PSI 
unless the matter of the Core Group is resolved.  In the 
latest signal of GOI support for PSI principles, MOD 
Mukherjee flagged PSI as a necessary response to the threat 
of global proliferation networks.  On a related issue, 
negotiations on Indian participation in the Container 
Security Initiative (CSI) are at an advanced stage, with a 
delegation scheduled to travel to Washington later in 
February to formalize GOI involvement.  CSI may be a useful 
stepping-stone toward engaging with India on maritime 
security issues, but we will not get India off the fence on 
PSI until we clarify the status of Indian membership in the 
Core Group.  End Summary. 
 
Continued Interest -- and Questions -- about PSI 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶2.  (U) In the most positive indication to date that the GOI 
is interested in expanding its maritime security engagement 
with the US, DefMin Pranab Mukherjee on January 29 stressed 
the need for a multilateral mechanism to tackle the threat of 
WMD proliferation.  In comments at a major Institute for 
Defense Studies and Analyses' (IDSA) conference, Mukherjee 
recalled that India had interdicted a North Korean ship 
carrying missile components in 1999, and how the intercept of 
a ship carrying uranium enrichment equipment to Libya 
eventually led to the unraveling of the AQ Khan network. 
"The anxiety is that these instances could well be the tip of 
the iceberg," he warned.  "Some initiatives such as the PSI 
have been mooted.  These need to be examined in greater 
detail.  The underlying need for a consensual multilateral 
effort cannot be denied," the DefMin concluded. 
 
¶3.  (C) In a recent meeting with PolCouns and Pol-MilOff, MEA 
Additional Secretary (International Security) Meera Shankar 
reiterated GOI interest in joining PSI, but not in 
contravention of maritime conventions and not as a "junior 
partner."  According to Shankar, the GOI will not consider 
participating in PSI until there is clarification on the 
status of the Core Group, i.e., whether India will be 
admitted to the Core Group or whether the Core Group is 
disbanded altogether.  "We recognize a convergence of 
objectives on PSI:  maritime security, preventing 
proliferation to non-state actors," she said, "but we can't 
accept discriminatory membership or contravening 
international law." 
 
Skeptics Weigh In 
----------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) The GOI's conditional interest in collaborating with 
the US on maritime security programs such as PSI, the 
Container Security Initiative (CSI), and the nascent Regional 
Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) contrasts with 
strategists' skepticism about these initiatives.  In a 
January 31 article for the influential Delhi-based Observer 
Research Foundation (ORF), Vijay Sakhuja noted that some 
Asian nations have reacted differently to these initiatives, 
reflecting concerns about their status vis-a-vis UNCLOS, the 
legality of consequent interdictions, impact on trade, 
sovereignty, and about a growing US presence in Asian waters. 
 "Although there is broad convergence on issues of common 
security concerns (which) may even provide the impetus to 
bring the Indian and US navies closer, India must be 
conscious about regional security concerns and not get 
muddled in American strategic moves in the region, 
particularly with regard to PSI and RMSI," he cautioned.  He 
went on, however, to encourage support for CSI, to the extent 
that it enables greater trade with the US. 
 
¶5.  (U) Prominent "Hindu" foreign affairs commentator 
Siddharth Varadarajan has also pointed out that PSI does not 
distinguish between WMD and missiles.  "The US may have 
accepted India's de facto nuclear status, but it remains a 
vocal critic of the country's missile program.  Unless 
India's own missile status is formally accepted, it will be 
difficult for New Delhi to participate in the aggressive 
pursuit of international ships suspected of carrying missile 
parts," he argued. 
 
Repositioning India as a Nonproliferation Partner 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶6.  (U) Countering these critics, JNU Professor and frequent 
Indo-US commentator Dr. C. Raja Mohan has argued that 
participation in PSI and CSI may be an opportunity for India 
to reposition itself as part of the global nonproliferation 
solution.  According to Mohan, PM Manmohan Singh wants India 
to "negotiate purposefully on the terms under which it could 
join the new global nonproliferation initiatives, including 
PSI and CSI."  "Getting on board the new global 
non-proliferation arrangements should, therefore, be at the 
top of India's diplomatic agenda.  Meanwhile the Indian 
nuclear discourse must...focus on the new acronyms like the 
CSI and PSI, where the real action is," he concluded. 
 
CSI as a Stepping Stone 
----------------------- 
 
¶7.  (U) On February 1, "The Economic Times" reported that the 
Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) has decided to join the 
Container Security Initiative (CSI) and a high-level meeting 
of MEA, port, and customs officials will meet in New Delhi on 
February 4 to finalize terms and conditions.  A GOI 
delegation is expected to travel to Washington later in 
February to formalize Indian participation.  In a February 2 
conversation with PolCouns, MEA J/S (Americas) S. Jaishankar 
expressed satisfaction with progress on CSI, but also 
cautioned that MEA would need to deal with inevitable 
Parliamentary questions about a "give away" of Indian 
sovereignty.  In this context, he added, it would be 
important for India to negotiate a reciprocal CSI agreement 
that allows the GOI to say its undertakings with Washington 
are mirrored in Indian rights vis-a-vis US commerce. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶8.  (C) India's CSI interest is a useful stepping-stone 
toward greater engagement on maritime security.  We find GOI 
concern about the possible conflict between PSI and 
international maritime conventions something of a red 
herring, given the extent to which other major maritime trade 
nations have already considered and disposed of this issue -- 
and expect the same to happen here when the matter is treated 
at the political level.  The key to getting India off the 
fence on PSI remains clarifying the status of Indian 
membership in the Core Group.  If we can resolve that, we 
will be pushing on an open door to enlist India as a partner 
in our global counterproliferation efforts. 
MULFORD