This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 001481 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2015 
TAGS: KSTC MARR MASS PGOV PREL IN US
SUBJECT: INDO-US SECURITY COOPERATION: THE WAY AHEAD 
 
Classified By: A/DCM Geoff Pyatt; Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  Meeting on 23 February, MEA Joint Secretary 
(Americas) S. Jaishankar and DSCA Director for Middle East, 
Asia and North Africa Ed Ross agreed that a large cooperative 
defense program, such as a P-3 or C-130 sale, would build 
trust and demonstrate US reliability as a defense supplier. 
Jaishankar warned that the IAF cannot continue extending the 
deadline for a US response on the multi-role fighter RFI 
without appearing to give an unfair competitive advantage to 
US contractors.  He was favorably inclined to our proposals 
to post a security cooperation liaison officer at the Indian 
Embassy in Washington, and possibly a military liaison to 
PACOM, as well as to enter into a bilateral dialogue on the 
US Quadrennial Defense Review.  Finally, Jaishankar 
reiterated concerns about how US policy and Indian 
perceptions are affecting progress on the NSSP.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) Opening this February 23 discussion, Jaishankar 
proposed a customer-oriented defense cooperation approach in 
which India and the US look closely at India's problems and 
requirements, and see where the US can provide the most 
assistance.  He made the following additional points in 
relation to security cooperation: 
 
- Both governments must attack the presumption that the USG 
and GOI cannot do business together; 
- The Tsunami relief effort demonstrated "operational 
comfort" between the two countries; 
- Raising the relationship to a new level will require both 
governments to go into new areas; 
- Not everything will work out, but some things will, so the 
relationship is worth pursuing; 
- There was a palpable keenness to do business at the recent 
Aero-India international airshow; i.e. the US aerospace 
industry wants to be in the Indian market; 
- There is residual frustration over problems procuring US 
parts for Sea King and Sea Harrier aircraft, resulting from 
the 1998 sanctions; 
- The Indian military is aware that, in spite of past 
concerns about US "reliability," they should do a risk 
evaluation and move forward; and 
- From a policy standpoint, Jaishankar will recommend to the 
MOD that the time to move forward is now. 
 
¶3.  (U) Ross agreed with Jaishankar's overall approach, and 
asserted that a major US-India project will cause the pace of 
the bilateral relationship to pick up substantially, and will 
help both countries' bureaucracies to mesh.  He also affirmed: 
 
- There is no inherent incompatibility between USG and GOI 
bureaucracies; 
- Only time and effort will help the systems adjust to each 
other; and 
- DSCA is looking for an opportunity to collaborate on a very 
specific program to build trust and demonstrate commitment. 
 
Multi-role Fighter RFI 
---------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) To Jaishankar's query about a US response to the 
Indian Air Force RFI for procurement of 126 multi-role 
fighters, Ross replied that while he could not give a 
specific date, the USG was treating the request very 
seriously and needed "a little more time."  Jaishankar 
acknowledged his recent phone conversation with Peter Flory, 
OSD PDASD (ISA), informing him that the Ross delegation would 
not have a definitive response to the RFI, and would request 
additional time.  Jaishankar said MEA's recommendation to the 
MOD was to be as flexible as possible in allowing more time 
for the US response.  However, he was clear that with answers 
already received from other suppliers, the GOI could not 
extend the RFI deadline much longer without appearing to give 
an unfair competitive advantage to US contractors. 
 
GOI Defense Cooperation Liaisons 
-------------------------------- 
¶5.  (C) Ross recommended that the GOI post a security 
cooperation liaison at the Indian Embassy in Washington to 
interact with DSCA, the US military, and other USG agencies 
involved in security cooperation (similar to a DoD Office of 
Defense Cooperation).  Explaining the advantages of having a 
GOI officer in the US intimately familiar with FMS and export 
licensing procedures, who can contact the right people to 
answer questions from New Delhi, Ross suggested that the best 
time to appoint such a person is before a major defense 
cooperation project gets under way.  Jaishankar expressed 
interest, adding that he would work with the US Embassy on a 
job description. 
 
¶6.  (C) In response to Jaishankar's question on whether other 
countries have liaisons to US commands such as PACOM, USD 
member Jim Alverson, OSD/ISA India desk officer, explained 
that some countries do, and that PACOM had expressed interest 
in a Liaison Officer from India.  Jaishankar said he had 
heard various people make a case for it, and thought India 
should consider the idea. 
 
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Dialogue 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) OSD/ISA's Alverson conveyed an OSD proposal for 
dialogue with the GOI that would inform DoD's work on its 
next QDR.  He explained that DoD wanted to solicit ideas and 
viewpoints from a very small number of allies and partners, 
and wanted India included in this effort.  Jaishankar called 
the proposal a "splendid idea" that could not have come at a 
better time. 
 
MEA Concerns on the NSSP 
------------------------ 
 
¶8.  (C) Jaishankar also went over previously expressed 
concerns related to the NSSP process.  The first involved 
October 2004 USG sanctions against two Indian scientists in 
"a very public way" with "very little proof," over alleged 
technology transfers to Iran.  Though he considered it an 
"aberration" in US-GOI coordination, Jaishankar claimed this 
incident embarrassed him personally.  Specifically, he did 
not understand why State Department officials could contact 
him personally for a "favor" regarding an imminent IAEA 
meeting on Iran, while hours later he had to find out about 
sanctions from the Federal Register. 
 
¶9.  (C) While Jaishankar understood our concern about 
WMD-related technology transfers to Iran, he stressed that if 
US policy is expanded to say India can not "sell a 
screwdriver" to Iran without being sanctioned, "we have a 
problem." 
 
¶10.  (C) Jaishankar's final worry involved the Indian 
Department of Atomic Energy's (DAE's) "very weak" enthusiasm 
for the NSSP's civil nuclear component.  While he did not 
elaborate in this setting, he was concerned that the GOI 
needs DAE support to maintain momentum on the NSSP.  He 
expressed hope that the US would look for NSSP areas that can 
be interpreted generously enough for DAE to feel like there 
is something in it for them. 
 
¶11.  (U) Mr. Ross and Mr. Alverson cleared this message. 
MULFORD