This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 NEW DELHI 001282 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/18/2015 
TAGS: PREL PTER IN PK INDO PAK

SUBJECT: CROSS-LOC BUS DEAL HAILED AS ""MOTHER OF ALL CBMS"" 
 
REF: A. NEW DELHI 1234 
 
     ¶B. NEW DELHI 1175 
     ¶C. NEW DELHI 1113 
     ¶D. NEW DELHI 909 
     ¶E. NEW DELHI 355 
     ¶F. 04 NEW DELHI 7755 
 
Classified By: DCM Robert O. Blake, Jr. for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: After several weeks in which the process of 
Indo-Pak normalization appeared to be grinding to a halt (Ref 
B), this week's Islamabad deal has shifted the dynamic, at 
least temporarily, in a much more constructive direction.  PM 
Manmohan Singh's fingerprints were clearly in evidence in the 
several climb downs from prior MEA positions on travel 
documents for the bus and on linking the gas pipeline to 
other trade issues -- further examples of Indo-Pak diplomatic 
breakthroughs that required high-level political intervention 
(Ref D).  Although a palpable ""can-do"" spirit has followed 
the announcement of the deal, implementing the bus service 
may yet get hung up in the details.  The early criticism of 
the agreement comes primarily from the BJP, who are labeling 
it as a sell-out and may accelerate barb-throwing as 
Parliament reconvenes (septel).  As much as the bus is a 
positive symbol, it is also a target for Kashmir-oriented 
terrorism, and before the ink had dried Jaish-e-Mohammad 
threatened to disrupt the service if it led to ""more 
atrocities by Indian forces in J&K.""  Still, with one large 
box checked off the Indo-Pak agenda, the atmosphere in New 
Delhi is now primed for renewed talks on a short-list of 
confidence building measures, including nuclear CBMs, prior 
notification of missile testing, MoU's on counter-narcotics 
cooperation and maritime security, and revisiting the 
proposed Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline as an economic vice 
political issue.  As talks resume in the coming weeks, we 
need to be perceived as unambiguously behind the peace 
process and appreciative of the political risks that both 
sides have taken to get this far.  End Summary. 
 
Srinagar-Muzaffarabad Bus Deal: The Main Course 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶2.  (C) Most of the Indian media and many of our contacts 
stand behind the words of MEA spokesman Navtej Sarna, who 
characterized the February 16 agreement on the 
Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service as the ""mother of all 
confidence building measures.""  Although Indian newspapers 
had been abuzz for days with speculation that the bus deal 
would be inked during FM Natwar Singh's February 15-17 visit, 
a healthy dose of caution -- born, in part, in the collapse 
of the July 2001 Agra Summit -- was also palpable until TV 
networks broadcast the Foreign Ministers' statements that a 
compromise had been struck and the bus would begin operations 
on April 7.  Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran said that the deal 
was ""an indication that the peace process is beginning to 
yield results.""  Indian newspapers were awash with interviews 
of Kashmiris from ""divided families"" proclaiming the bus 
service to be ""the happiest news of the past 50 years,"" and 
photos of celebrations on the streets of Srinagar. 
 
¶3.  (C) Track-Two activist George Matthew -- who plans to 
bring over thirty Indian panchayatis (local legislators) to 
Pakistan in March -- reflected the overall upbeat atmosphere 
in Delhi, telling Poloff that, by showing that the impasses 
that had dogged the bus proposal (Ref F) could be resolved, 
the service ""opens new vistas of cooperation, opens the 
floodgates of local people-to-people exchanges.""  Matthew, 
who hails from Kerala, was as optimistic as any Delhiite at 
the ""great giant step"" toward normalizing Indo-Pak relations. 
 His words were echoed throughout the Indian media's coverage 
of the agreement. 
 
The Mechanics of the Deal 
------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Recognizing the political value of having Natwar 
Singh bring deliverables home, the GOI climbed down on what 
MEA had previously characterized as bottom-line demands in 
order to reach this deal -- no longer requiring bus 
passengers to obtain visas to transit the LOC or passports as 
identity documents.  Instead, Indian passengers seeking to 
visit Pakistani Kashmir (as well as the Northern Areas) will 
send their applications to the Regional Passport Office (RPO) 
in Srinagar, which will forward the application to its 
counterpart agency in Pakistani Kashmir for validation.  The 
passenger will be notified when the paperwork is approved. 
Then, upon reaching the border, the host government will 
issue an entry permit.  Rather than have a single bus make 
the entire Srinagar-Muzaffarabad run, separate busses on each 
side of the LOC will ferry people from each city to the LOC, 
and carry back travelers from the other side.  Travel onward 
from Kashmir into other areas in the two countries via the 
bus will be prohibited, but New Delhi has not yet explained 
how it plans to enforce this provision aside from requiring 
that visitors check in with police periodically. 
 
¶5.  (C) Indian commentators have observed that Islamabad made 
compromises as well, noting that the service will be 
available to all Indian and Pakistani citizens (Islamabad had 
reportedly wanted to restrict the service to Kashmiris only). 
 Furthermore, each government is to design its own entry 
papers, which, for travelers from Pakistani Kashmir to J&K, 
will include a Government of India stamp -- another 
concession by Islamabad.  Because of the processing time and 
the need for the MEA to issue instructions to the RPO, 
however, many of the initial passengers from Srinagar are 
likely to be Indian passport-holders, according to Indian 
press reports.  Third-country nationals are barred from 
riding the bus. 
 
¶6.  (C) Some infrastructure obstacles also require attention. 
 For example, patches of the road near the LOC are reportedly 
in dire need of repair, although the Indian Army has already 
begun de-mining areas close to the LOC.  J&K Chief Minister 
Mufti Mohammad Sayeed went so far as to pledge to expand the 
road into a four-lane highway.  The frequency of travel has 
yet to be announced, though most press reports predict it 
will begin with either weekly or bi-weekly service.  Some 
Indians are also asking whether the road will be opened at 
some future time for private vehicles, and for trade. 
 
A Much-Needed Boost 
------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Over the past few weeks, Pakistan-watchers in New 
Delhi had grown concerned that the dialogue process was 
slowing and could grind to a halt.  Director of the Institute 
for Peace and Conflict Studies Maj. Gen. (ret.) Dipankar 
Banerjee was greeted with a roomful of nodding heads when he 
commented at a recent seminar on Indo-Pak relations that ""in 
the absence of movement, the dialogue will end sooner rather 
than later.""  Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis 
Deputy Director Commodore Uday Bhaskar on February 1 
predicted that Natwar Singh's trip would provide ""little 
movement aside from embedding the process further,"" and 
Observer Research Foundation (ORF) Senior Pakistan Fellow 
Wilson John less than a week before the announcement brushed 
aside the prospect of substantial agreement until later in 
the year. 
 
¶8.  (C) Now, however, even the skeptics have also turned 
optomistic.  Former Director of the ORF Pakistan Centre 
Sushant Sareen commented that the most significant aspect of 
the agreement was that it breathed new life into Indo-Pak 
relations, which had been dragging over recent diplomatic 
reversals (Ref C), and Wilson John acknowledged that it was 
""a great step forward, and a good boost to the flagging 
Composite Dialogue.""  Even anti-terrorism hawk Ajai Sahni 
admitted that it was ""a baby step forward."" 
 
BJP Leading the Naysayers 
------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) In addition to the knee-jerk public criticism of the 
bus service from pro-independence hardline Kashmiri 
separatists (Ref A), BJP Vice President Mukhtar Abbas Naqvi 
castigated the compromise on travel documents as ""ignoring 
national interests and security concerns.""  He expanded that 
""the decision will open a floodgate for infiltration by 
terrorists in the garb of tourists.""  Parliamentary 
opposition leader and former Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh 
followed up by publicly questioning whether the UPA 
government had adequately focused on counterterrorism 
concerns while formulating the compromise of travel 
documents.  Although domestic political opposition seems to 
be galvanizing around security issues, BJP leaders are also 
initiating a second line of attack by predicting that the 
compromise will embolden Kashmiri secessionists and ""may lead 
to Kashmiri leaders demanding an independent state.""  Former 
PM Vajpayee will reportedly promote this theme at a campaign 
rally in Patna on February 18. 
 
¶10.  (C) BJP National Executive Member Seshadri Chari took a 
less combative tone in private, telling us that although 
""there is nothing new there, the NDA government has also 
worked on these CBMs."" ""Pakistan's attitude does not seem 
favorable to the peace process, the agreement itself is good 
as long as there are no security lapses,"" he concluded. 
Associate Professor Savita Pandey of JNU's South Asia Center 
took a much harder line, decrying the accord as ""compromising 
and diluting India's stand on Kashmir completely"" and 
predicting that ""the Opposition will raise the 1994 
parliamentary resolution, which maintains that India cannot 
accept any territorial compromise on Kashmir, including 
Pakistani Kashmir."" 
 
Don't Break Out the Champagne Just Yet 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (C) To headlines such as ""LOC on Way to Become Soft 
Border"" that ran in ""The Pioneer,"" Sareen quipped, ""It's much 
too soon to make that determination.""  He acknowledged that 
the bus service and other announcements were ""the important 
start of a series of steps, but not major developments on 
their own.""  Sareen -- who had predicted before the Natwar 
visit that there would be no significant tangible results for 
the first several rounds of talks ""unless forced by domestic 
politics"" -- credited the accord with ""keeping the Composite 
Dialogue alive, keeping the process going.""  He noted that, 
as with the visa process, people seeking to use the bus could 
be denied entry permits for political as well as security 
reasons.  More broadly, Sareen cautioned that ""Pakistan may 
see the signals the wrong way ... they may read this as 
weakness of resolve by New Delhi, that would be a terrible 
miscalculation to make if they think that they will get their 
way on the entire agenda.""  ORF's Wilson John also pointed 
out that the March 1999 kick-off of the Delhi-Lahore bus 
service -- which was also hailed as groundbreaking -- did not 
impede the Kargil war. 
 
¶12.  (C) Security is another concern yet to be fully 
addressed.  Because the bus service has become a symbol of 
the health of Indo-Pak relations, it is certain to become a 
target for Kashmir-oriented terrorist groups.  Even before 
the ink on the deal had dried, Jaish-e-Mohammad threatened to 
disrupt the service if it led to ""more atrocities by Indian 
forces in J&K.""  The raised stakes will require closer 
cooperation between Indian and Pakistani paramilitary forces, 
as intelligence sharing to detect and prevent an attack on 
the bus will be essential. 
 
Other Transport Links Face Fewer Political Obstacles 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶13.  (C) The hand-shake on the Munnabao-Khokhrapar rail 
service to link Rajasthan and Sindh starting in October will 
likely mute criticism -- from the MEA (Ref E) and elsewhere 
-- that Islamabad is only interested in ""Punjab-to-Punjab"" 
contacts.  The rail link and the proposed Amritsar-Lahore bus 
service cross the International Border, not the LOC, so they 
could be accommodated under the standard passport/visa regime 
that is used for the Lahore-Delhi bus and train. 
Furthermore, the prospect of bus services between 
Amritsar-Lahore and Amritsar-Nankana Sahib (the birthplace of 
Sikhism's founder Guru Nanak) was cheered by veteran Sikh 
leader Manjit Singh Calcutta as ""delighting Sikhs all over."" 
 
Movement Proposed on Opening Consulates in Business Hubs 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶14.  (C) Also broadening the appeal of this week's 
deliverables is the announcement that the GOP and the GOI 
will work toward re-opening their consulates in Mumbai and 
Karachi, respectively.  More than the protection of their 
nationals abroad, this proposal seems targeted to the 
business communities in the two countries' commercial hubs, 
and should facilitate cross-border business travel.  For 
example, ""The Telegraph"" on February 16 reported that a 
Karachi-based software firm and a New-Delhi based IT 
organization are submitting a joint bid for a $1 million 
Sindh government project to train call center workers.  As 
would be expected, however, news of the Mumbai consulate 
re-opening was publicly slammed by Shiv Sena senior leader 
Pramod Nawalkar, who threatened, ""The Sena will never 
entertain any Pakistanis in Mumbai."" 
 
Slew of CBMs Teed Up for Spring Discussions 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶15.  (C) A cluster of CBMs that Delhi-based Pakistan-watchers 
had previously considered low-hanging fruit have been 
short-listed for early attention.  Renewed talks on nuclear 
CBMs, the agreement on details for prior notification of 
missile testing, as well as MoU's on counter-narcotics 
cooperation and maritime security (to include modalities of 
dealing with the hundreds of fishermen who are jailed for 
crossing the maritime boundary) are all expected in the 
coming months.  Some of these had reportedly come remarkably 
close to completion during technical deliberations last year. 
 The GOI and GOP said they would also discuss larger issues, 
such as the proposed Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline (Ref B); 
broader ones, such as increasing bilateral trade; and more 
contentious ones, including the Baglihar and Kishanganga 
hydro-electric projects. 
 
Unsticking the Wicket 
--------------------- 
 
¶16.  (C) Press reports also indicate that a compromise has 
also been brokered on the Pakistani cricket team's February 
25-April 18 India tour.  Details will be reported septel. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶17.  (C) It is hard to accurately capture the wave of 
optimism in New Delhi without appearing to have forgotten the 
history of Indo-Pak relations.  As one of Delhi's most 
prominent Pakistan watchers, ""Asian Age"" editor MJ Akbar, 
noted: ""There is a law of Indo-Pak relations -- nothing has 
happened until it has happened, so much scalding tea has 
spilled between the cup and the lip (the Agra summit being 
the most famous instance) that only the very brave predict 
good news.  A sub-law indicates that when things happen, 
everything seems possible.""  The fact that the February 16 
announcement -- the most significant breakthrough since the 
Composite Dialogue kicked off -- comes after several weeks of 
negative Indo-Pak news exemplifies the sine curve of South 
Asian diplomacy.  The hype is certain to settle down as the 
bureaucracies work to operationalize the agreement; and, 
admittedly, an additional 40 visitors on a weekly basis 
hardly constitutes ""opening the floodgates.""  Although much 
can happen in the seven weeks until April 7, and detractors 
have already sharpened their word processors, this accord 
gives the Composite Dialogue a much-needed shot in the arm. 
The GOI deftly and simultaneously positioned itself as both 
magnanimous and responsible, and surprised most with the 
speed and intensity of the diplomatic momentum it can muster. 
 While acknowledging that there is still a long way to go on 
the road to normalization, this week's breakthroughs are a 
welcome kick-off to the 2005 Indo-Pak Diplomacy Season.  On 
the Indian side, much of the credit goes posthumously to NSA 
Dixit, whose implementation of the PM's admonition to ""think 
outside the box"" made the bus deal possible.  This success 
also demonstrates the degree to which Prime Ministerial 
engagement is imperative to progress in the Indo-Pak 
relationship.  In this context, we need to be perceived as 
unambiguously behind the peace process and appreciative of 
the political risks that both sides have taken to get this 
far. 
MULFORD