This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NEW DELHI 001264 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT PASS TO NRC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2015 
TAGS: CVIS ENRG ETTC IN KNNP KSCA PREL TRGY TSPL NSSP
SUBJECT: NRC COMMISSIONER MERRIFIELD MEETS MEA ADDITIONAL 
SECRETARY MEERA SHANKAR 
 
 
SIPDIS 
 
REF: A. NEW DELHI 1261 
     ¶B. NEW DELHI 1263 
 
Classified By: DCM ROBERT BLAKE, REASON 1.4 (B, D) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  On February 11 NRC Commissioner Merrifield 
met MEA Additional Secretary Meera Shankar who has the 
non-proliferation portfolio within her purview.  Commissioner 
Merrifield expressed satisfaction with his visit to Indian 
facilities and suggested that further cooperation could bring 
regulatory technical personnel to NRC and that thermo 
hydraulic testing facilities at BARC could be of interest to 
NRC in certification of new CANDU reactor designs.  Shankar 
suggested material research, nuclear safety codes, 
proliferation resistant reactors, ITER, and personnel 
exchanges as additional areas for cooperation.  She also 
indicated the importance of imports of nuclear fuel to 
further development of India's nuclear power program.  End 
summary. 
 
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Merrifield Expresses Satisfaction With Indian Engagement 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Commissioner 
Jeffrey S. Merrifield said he came to India with deep 
curiosity and interest about the nuclear safety programs of 
AERB, the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) and the 
Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL).  He told 
Shankar that the AERB capabilities are impressive and that 
Hall 7 of BARC has some extraordinary facilities to carryout 
tests on CANDU related hardware (Ref. B). 
 
¶3.  (C) The Commissioner told Shankar that he was afforded 
good access at Tarapur 1 & 2 and reactor-face access at 
Tarapur 4 as well as unprecedented access at RAPS 1, 2, 3 & 4 
as well as the comprehensive tour of RAPS 5 & 6, which are 
under construction.  The Commissioner told Shankar that he 
had visited all nuclear power plants in the United States and 
over 100 facilities abroad and by international standards the 
material conditions of Indian nuclear power plants compared 
favorably with plants he has seen elsewhere in the world. 
 
¶4.  (C) The Commissioner told Shankar that he feels it is 
important to move forward with bilateral cooperation with 
AERB.  He expressed his wish to accept AERB staff at NRC. 
The Commissioner said that he and the NRC are great 
supporters of World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) 
benchmarking nuclear power stations.  In his view, WANO 
exchanges provide an opportunity for operators of US nuclear 
power plants and operators of Indian nuclear power plants to 
mutually benefit by witnessing best operating and safety 
practices in each other's plants.  Merrifield said that in 
the field of nuclear safety, one can never know or learn 
enough. 
 
¶5.  (C) The Commissioner told Shankar that the visit to India 
has empowered him to push the dialogue further and that 
through his thorough engagement of the India nuclear power 
industry, executives and technical personnel, site visits 
during this journey to India, he has been able to gauge the 
vigor and dynamism of the Indian nuclear industry. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
MEA Shankar's View on U.S.-Indian Nuclear Cooperation and 
Indian Export Controls 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶6.  (C) Shankar expressed satisfaction that Commissioner 
Merrifield visited a number of nuclear power plants, both 
safeguarded as well as unsafeguarded.  She also expressed 
satisfaction about the positive impression that Merrifield 
received.  In India's view, the dialogue on nuclear safety is 
an important part of the overall U.S.-India relationship.  It 
is India's wish that cooperation in the peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy expand. 
 
¶7.  (C) The U.S.-India relationship has undergone a 
transformation, Shankar said, and India wishes it to move in 
a pragmatic way.  With the NSSP the relationship has made 
progress in non-nuclear areas and some progress with regards 
to safeguarded facilities.  Thus, the Government of India 
looks forward to more cooperation. 
 
¶8.  (C) She went on to say that India has a cradle to grave 
control of technologies and materials that apply to nuclear 
exports.  India has the Atomic Energy Act, Shankar said, 
which predates many of the laws that other countries have put 
in place to protect nuclear materials, technology and know 
how.  It is not really in India's interest that its 
technologies fall into the hands of those countries that may 
want harm India's interests.  India has a number of redundant 
checks on issuing licenses for production and transport of 
nuclear materials.  Customs is fastidious on clearances that 
affect nuclear materials.  In addition, India keeps its 
regulations in the nuclear field up to date so that control 
systems remain relevant. 
 
¶9.  (C) Responding to DCM Blake's observation that in order 
to move forward on NSSP the U.S. was looking forward to 
India's progress on export control regulation, Shankar said 
that India is making progress, that there is much on India's 
agenda and that India is actively engaged.  However, it is 
tough to develop a consensus, Shankar said.  Common ground 
develops in inter-agency meetings in Delhi, but the common 
ground quickly crumbles when participants try to develop 
consensus in and buy-in from the institutions they represent. 
 Shankar mused that in this regard there is a lot to be said 
about authoritarian governance as it forges consensus without 
effort. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Further Development of Nuclear Power in India 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) Shankar explained that India's goal is to have in 
place 20 gigawatts of nuclear power by 2020, an option that 
it can insure using a thorium based fuel cycle.  This option 
is attractive because it will allow India to expand the 
nuclear power program based on internal resources.  Nuclear 
energy has its advantages as it is environmentally benign and 
produces no greenhouse emissions.  The costs of building 
nuclear power plants have gone down dramatically for NPCIL, 
so India believes that nuclear power generation is quickly 
becoming very cost effective when compared to other sources 
of energy. 
 
¶11.  (C) Thus, supplies of nuclear fuel continue to be of 
interest to India and it is an area where the U.S. might want 
to have a re-look given the zooming price of liquid 
hydrocarbons.  India understands that constraints of U.S. law 
prevent the US from providing fuel.  But, if other states 
agreed to provide nuclear fuel to India, the US, perhaps 
ought not to oppose such arrangements, Shankar said. 
 
¶12.  (C) In the nuclear field, India is looking at options 
that would allow it to obtain nuclear fuel from elsewhere. 
One option worth considering is to put nuclear power plants 
that are built through international cooperation under 
site-specific safeguards.  At this time, however, India does 
not intend to put the power plants it has built on its own 
under site-specific safeguards. 
 
¶13.  (C) Given the objectives of sustained economic growth 
and India's demographics, if India is going to insure rapid 
development it must ensure its energy program keeps pace. 
Constraints on expanding the nuclear program will hold back 
India's development, as nuclear energy is a critical part of 
India's energy supply mix.  The Indian energy market, Shankar 
said, is very price inelastic.  Markets cannot absorb very 
sharp energy price increases as resistance to price increases 
in India can lead to anarchic behavior.  Thus, India 
envisions that international cooperation in meeting its 
future energy needs will allow India to develop faster. 
 
¶14.  (C) Shankar then steered the discussion to harmonization 
of guidelines under the nuclear safety convention.  India 
believes that there is a mismatch between nuclear safety 
requirements and availability of equipment under the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group (NSG).  In India's view, it would be 
important to harmonize the nuclear safety exception that will 
allow a more flexible interpretation of NSG rules such that 
technology transfers that promote nuclear safety can take 
place.  In short, India and the U.S. must find creative 
solutions to end the isolation of the India nuclear power 
program and bring about benefits that both the US and India 
can share. 
 
¶15.  (C) Merrifield told Shankar that in his view as an 
attorney, legislation and regulation always arise from a 
back-looking perspective.  Thus, now that we are in 2005, the 
U.S.-India dialogue on nuclear matters is far different but 
takes place under a framework that developed over the course 
of 40 years.  There is a need to review these issues with a 
more forward-looking perspective. 
 
¶16.  (C) With regards to nuclear regulation, nuclear safety 
knows no international boundaries, Merrifield said.  It is 
important that the U.S. and India reduce barriers to improve 
safety and be able to move forward under the NSSP framework. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
India's Wishes for Collaboration on Nuclear Safety 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶17.  (C) In the nuclear area, Shankar said, the focus on 
nuclear safety is welcome.  There have been workshops between 
the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) and the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) in India and the U.S. and it 
looks like the agenda that had been agreed to originally has 
been completed.  Thus, perhaps, the U.S. and India ought to 
look at additional areas where future cooperation.  Shankar 
identified four areas that would be of interest to India: 
 
-- New reactor design; 
-- Nuclear reactor material degradation; 
-- Probabalistic risk assessment; and 
-- Training of personnel. 
 
¶18.  (C) Shankar elaborated that India would very much like 
to have an opportunity to place some young scientists, for 
periods of about six months, within NRC or at educational 
institutions that have strong programs in nuclear safety and 
power.  In addition, India is also looking forward to 
validation of nuclear reactor safety software where the US 
and India could validate each other's safety codes. 
 
¶19.  (C) Regarding U.S.-specific cooperation, India is 
interested in proliferation resistant reactors and would like 
very much to participate in the Gen-IV R&D project, as it 
strongly believes that India has something to bring to the 
table. 
 
¶20.  (C) Merrifield told Shankar that, while NRC is eager to 
benchmark codes and to allow comparison of predictions of 
U.S. and Indian codes, some of the details of what 
cooperation is possible depend on our government's progress 
on the NSSP process.  With regard to Gen-IV, Merrifield told 
Shankar that DOE is in the lead.  The Commissioner is aware 
that India has capabilities that it could bring to the table 
and the Commissioner promised that he would highlight India's 
capabilities and its interest in Gen-IV when he engages DOE 
officials upon his return. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
Use of BARC Facilities For Safety Testing of CANDU Components 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶21.  (C) Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) International 
Affairs Director Raghuraman asked Merrifield to provide some 
clarification about opportunities there may be for safety 
collaborations on thermo hydraulics, which could take 
advantage of equipment in Hall 7 of BARC.  Merrifield 
qualified that the prevalence of Pressurized Water Reactors 
(PWR) in the U.S. called for development of specialized 
facilities that address safety questions that are relevant to 
those reactors.  The U.S. has research facilities that allow 
the NRC to determine that safety requirements for PWRs are 
met.   In contrast, if the NRC were asked to certify a CANDU 
reactor for construction in the U.S., the U.S. does not have 
any CANDU reactors in its inventory, nor does the U.S. have 
any facilities to validate information that the reactor 
manufacturer would need to provide in support of the 
certification requirements.  Thus, if questions were to arise 
with the certification of the new CANDU reactor, it is 
conceivable that the U.S. might consider requesting India's 
collaboration to use the facilities in Hall 7 of BARC. 
 
¶22.  (C) Commissioner Merrifield told Shankar that the NRC, 
as a regulatory agency, looks at issues very broadly and 
examines those in which it can find creative solutions to 
move forward.  As a regulatory agency, NRC embraces other 
regulatory agencies.  In NRC's view, regulation of the 
nuclear industry benefits the public by allowing utilities to 
deliver power, in a safe manner, at costs that are consistent 
with high standards of safety and public protection. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Visas Challenge Indian Participation in WANO 
-------------------------------------------- 
¶23.  (C) As it regards India's participation in WANO, the NRC 
is very supportive of WANO benchmarking and the U.S. nuclear 
industry has already benefited from interactions from NPCIL 
in the WANO context.  In the WANO context, Shankar observed, 
some Indian nuclear power program participants had been 
denied visas to participate in IAEA sponsored activities. 
Merrifield said that while visas are not in the purview of 
NRC, NRC became aware of the difficulties that S.K. Jain, 
Managing Director of NPCIL, was facing in obtaining a visa to 
travel to the United States.  In this case, NRC collaborated 
with Embassy New Delhi to ensure that Jain could travel to 
the United States to participate in the meeting. 
 
¶24.  (C) Regarding visa issues, DCM Blake added that timely 
submission of visa applications provides an opportunity for 
consular and Embassy officials to help insure travel of 
Indian scientists to the United States without delay. 
 
----------------------------------- 
India Wishes to Participate in ITER 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶25.  (C) Shankar also expressed interest for India's 
participation in the ITER project.  India discussed the ITER 
project with the leadership of the European Commission (EC) 
during their visit to India.  India was told that the EC has 
an open mind and Shankar wanted to make sure that it flagged 
India's interest in participation in ITER and hoped that the 
U.S. would support India's endeavors. 
 
¶26.  (C) Merrifield explained that in regard to ITER, the 
site selection has become a challenge that is clouding the 
discussions about those who would like to participate in the 
project.  Nonetheless, he stated that we would inform DOE 
about the interest of the Government of India in this matter. 
 
-------------------- 
Meeting Participants 
-------------------- 
 
¶27.  (C) NRC Commissioner Jeffrey S. Merrifield 
NRC Deputy Director Margaret Doane 
DCM Robert Blake 
SciCouns Marco Di Capua 
Madam Meera Shankar, Additional Secretary, UN, MEA 
Santosh Jha, Deputy Secretary, US and Canada, MEA 
¶K. Raghuraman, Head, International Studies, Department of 
Atomic Energy 
 
¶28.  (C) NRC Commissioner Merrifield cleared this cable. 
 
¶29.  (C) NRC Commissioner also met with Foreign Secretary 
Shyam Saran (Ref. A) and MEA Joint Secretary S. Jaishankar 
(Ref. B) 
MULFORD