This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 MAPUTO 000150 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
AF/S FOR HTREGER, INR/AA 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MZ
SUBJECT: MOZAMBIQUE: WHO IS INCOMING PRESIDENT GUEBUZA? 
 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED. NOT FOR INTERNET DISTRIBUTION. 
 
¶1. (U) The following is a brief sketch of incoming 
Mozambican president Armando Guebuza, who will be 
inaugurated on February 2 to succeed President Joaquim 
Chissano. This analysis was drawn by our political LES. 
We offer it as a preliminary glance at Guebuza, only part 
of a composite picture we will develop of him and his 
presidency in coming months. 
 
¶2. (SBU) In his first interview with a news organization 
after he was announced the winner of the 2004 elections, 
president-elect Guebuza said something that captures the 
one characteristic for which Armando Guebuza is perhaps 
best known: the drive to change things. Guebuza said in 
the interview that he was not pleased with the composition 
and the structure of FRELIMO decision-making bodies at the 
national and local levels, implying that these bodies had 
not been up to the ambitious task of revitalizing FRELIMO 
party cells at all levels in preparation for the 2004 
general elections. 
 
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REVITALIZING FRELIMO 
-------------------- 
¶3. (SBU) When Guebuza took over as secretary-general of 
FRELIMO in early 2002, he immediately learned what many 
outside the party knew already -- that FRELIMO had lost 
touch with its electorate and had become increasingly 
unpopular. He quickly did what he could to reverse this 
trend: crisscrossing the country, talking to communities, 
revitalizing party cells, and increasing party membership. 
More importantly, he made a point of stressing for the 
electorate a new image of FRELIMO, a FRELIMO with leaders 
intent on solving the problems of the people rather than a 
FRELIMO with a leadership of old 
Marxists-turned-capitalists with illicit wealth who rarely, 
if ever, visited the provinces. And, of course, as 
Chissano's designated heir in FRELIMO for the presidency, 
the trips served as early campaign swings. But their chief 
aim, it appears, was to boost FRELIMO's credibility, and in 
this they appear to have been somewhat successful. It 
helped to advance the image that FRELIMO was about changing 
the lives of the people for the better that his visits 
often coincided with the inauguration of various social and 
economic infrastructure projects (sometimes funded by 
foreign donors). 
 
¶4. (SBU) But Guebuza was introducing these changes to 
FRELIMO in a limited way, hobbled by the fact that Chissano 
was president of the state and president of FRELIMO. Now 
that he is about to succeed Chissano as president of the 
country, he will have much more freedom to revamp FRELIMO 
in ways he wants. One sticking point, though, is that 
Chissano still remains FRELIMO president. A change of 
FRELIMO leadership will require a party congress, and the 
next congress is not scheduled until very late in 2005 or 
early 2006. Guebuza can be expected to leave a greater 
imprint on FRELIMO before then, but he will have to 
compromise with the Chissano camp to do so. 
 
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MOZAMBIQUE FOR THE MOZAMBICANS 
------------------------------ 
¶5. (SBU) Guebuza and his group within FRELIMO are believed 
to share the view that Mozambique has been independent for 
almost three decades now but a good part of its citizens 
have not enjoyed fully the fruits of this independence, 
particularly on the economic front. They are said to be of 
the opinion that many factors may have contributed to this, 
but above all that the political and social climate have 
not been conducive to the development of a strong, 
prosperous, competitive and genuinely Mozambican business 
class. 
 
¶6. (SBU) In the FRELIMO electoral manifesto (seen as 
Guebuza brainchild) the party vows to continue with the 
system of a market economy, which is described as one of 
the catalysts needed to speed up sustainable economic 
development of the country. But the chapter on economy 
begins with the affirmation that the eradication of 
absolute poverty calls for the ownership by Mozambicans of 
the tools and the processes of economic development. It 
may not be by mere coincidence that this statement is 
placed at the top of the chapter on economy. Guebuza is a 
well-known champion of what is already being called the 
Mozambicanization of the economy. 
 
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AND SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL 
---------------------- 
¶7. (SBU) The manifesto, which may soon be turned into a 
five-year government program and submitted to the new 
National Assembly for approval, goes on to enumerate a 
series of initiatives that a Guebuza government will put in 
place to make Mozambique more competitive and attractive to 
private local and foreign investment: creation of 
incentives for the development of the various sectors of 
activity, the creation of small and medium-sized companies, 
the creation of more flexible and less onerous financial 
mechanisms, the readjustment of customs tariffs with a view 
to stimulating the development and consumption of local 
products, etc. 
 
¶8. (SBU) These initiatives seem to reflect Guebuza views 
expressed in interviews and public statements, particularly 
the initiative concerning the creation of small and 
medium-sized companies. Guebuza seems to believe that such 
mega- projects as Mozal (Mozambique's aluminium smelter) 
and Moma Heavy Sands (a mining project), are important for 
the national economy, but they do not necessarily address 
his view of the need to create and promote a Mozambican 
business class and thus create a sense of ownership of the 
tools and processes of economic development by 
Mozambicans. It is important to note here that in the 
enumeration of these initiatives in the electoral 
manifesto, the creation of small and medium-sized companies 
comes as the second item in a list of eight initiatives. 
The new number one man in Mozambique also states in his 
campaign message that his government will encourage those 
small and medium-sized that employ Mozambican labor in an 
intensive way. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
BUT WILL HE FRIGHTEN OFF FOREIGN INVESTMENT? 
-------------------------------------------- 
¶9. (SBU) It is widely believed that one of the concerns 
that FRELIMO had with the choice of a nationalist like 
Guebuza to replace Chissano was that such a move would 
scare away important foreign investors and donors. Guebuza 
and his supporters in FRELIMO were quick to counter this 
perception with visits to key European capitals and by 
making the most of his invitation to the 2004 Democratic 
Convention in the U.S. to reach out to foreign government 
officials. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Some wonder how Guebuza will be able to implement 
his vision of Mozambicanization of the economy, when the 
measures for the implementation of such a vision do not 
necessarily go hand in hand with the aims of bilateral and 
multilateral donors. Guebuza has made it clear that 
Mozambique will continue to honor its international 
commitments, and in this he has always mentioned the IMF 
and the World Bank. But what if he pushes for government 
intervention over market economics? For instance, Guebuza 
might favor the recruitment of Mozambican labor at the 
expense, at times, of hiring more competitive expatriates. 
One thing seems fairly certain: the Guebuza government will 
seek to considerably increase ties with countries like 
China, India and Brazil, as a way of finding cooperation 
partners for its Mozambicanization of economy policy. 
 
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MOZAMBIQUE THE PEACEMAKER 
------------------------- 
¶11. (SBU) The FRELIMO manifesto further asserts that 
Mozambique enjoys international prestige thanks to the way 
in which the FRELIMO government has been managing 
international affairs, in particular the participation of 
Mozambique in peace-keeping efforts in Africa. In his 
first post-electoral interview, referred to above, Guebuza 
stresses the importance of Mozambique continuing to 
participate in the promotion and preservation of peace in 
Africa, because only through peace can stability be 
established. 
 
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DIFFERENT THAN CHISSANO 
----------------------- 
¶12. (SBU) Both his sympathizers and his adversaries seem to 
agree on one thing: Mr. Guebuza is a tough, heavy-handed 
man who likes to have his way. In his new role as 
president of Mozambique, he may not be the feared man who 
in the early 1980's forced many to migrate to new 
settlements in the north or who gave Portuguese residents 
24 hours to leave in the late 1970's (several years after 
independence). However, they think he will be distinctly 
different from Chissano in a number of aspects. 
 
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MORE DISCIPLINE 
--------------- 
¶13. (SBU) To begin with, Guebuza is perceived as striving 
to put together an obedient and disciplined cabinet (he was 
the national political commissar in the army), with a clear 
and well-defined chain of command that can guarantee the 
implementation of his government program. The outgoing 
government was known for its lack of coordination, both in 
the conception and implementation of its policies. Cases 
abound of individual ministers saying one thing but 
government policy being completely different -- the best 
example being the mishandling of the cases of former 
Mozambican workers in defunct East Germany. 
 
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LESS RED TAPE 
------------- 
¶14. (SBU) One common line in Guebuza public statements is 
"a necessidade de combater o espmrito de deixa andar" (the 
need to fight negligence). It is widely expected that the 
apparent climate of negligence that characterizes most 
government institutions will be a target of the Guebuza 
government. Guebuza has given indications that he believes 
one of the factors that affected negatively the image of 
FRELIMO was the inefficient functioning of the public 
sector, where obtaining a mere license for a barber's shop 
was a complicated process. Analysts predict, therefore, 
that Guebuza will most likely give a new impetus to the 
reform of the public sector, particularly on the 
implementation side. 
 
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FIGHTING CORRUPTION 
------------------- 
¶15. (SBU) Another important area where many expect 
Guebuza's toughness is in fighting corruption. He is 
expected to set out strict guidelines on corruption for his 
ministers in terms of do's and don'ts governing public 
funds and property. Already there are many who say that it 
is a good thing to have a president who is already rich (no 
matter how he got rich) because he will not need to deplete 
the public coffers. 
 
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BETTER SECURITY 
--------------- 
¶16. (SBU) Observers also think Guebuza will be markedly 
different from Chissano in terms of his relationship with 
the Ministry of Interior. Here he is likely to undertake a 
series of reforms with a view toward enabling the police 
force to adequately maintain law, fight crime and reduce 
the now growing number of crimes involving members of the 
police force at different levels. 
 
¶17. (SBU) Analysts also believe that Guebuza's wide vision 
of the need for Mozambicans to recover their pride includes 
the improvement and strengthening of the armed forces. In 
the electoral manifesto, it is stated that the FRELIMO 
government will continue to strengthen the armed forces, 
through training and allocation of material and logistical 
resources in order to enable them to carry out the 
different missions that they are assigned. Guebuza was the 
main government peace negotiator in Rome in 1992. He is 
believed to have strongly opposed the policy of reducing 
the size of Mozambique's new army created out of the 
merging of government and rebel forces, as called for by 
the Rome peace agreement signed with RENAMO. 
 
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NEW FACES IN GOVERNMENT 
----------------------- 
¶18. (SBU) In order to ensure that his policies and programs 
will be implemented, many believe Guebuza will form a 
cabinet comprised of people that he trusts. He may choose, 
then, to rid himself entirely or nearly entirely of all in 
the current Chissano cabinet. 
 
¶19. (SBU) On the political front, Guebuza is seen as having 
no option but to reward people in the central and northern 
provinces who voted for him (despite the low turnout), not 
only to smooth the functioning of his current term but also 
to secure a second mandate. Therefore, a good part of the 
social and economic components of his government program 
will focus on this region of the country. And this most 
probably will mean, also, an increase of northerners in his 
government. 
 
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ROOM FOR ALL? 
------------- 
¶20. (SBU) There are some who read Guebuza vision of 
Mozambicanization of the economy as a veiled manifestation 
of his perceived anti-Portuguese stance, which by extension 
also could include Mozambicans of any European or Asian 
origin. Some degree of disquiet is already being reported 
within these communities. But the veteran Mozambican 
politician-turned-businessman has over the years, during 
the process of the creation and consolidation of his 
personal business empire, developed sound relations with 
Mozambicans and foreigners of all colors and creeds. 
LALIME