This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAMA 000158 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR T, NEA/ARPI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2015 
TAGS: PARM PREL PGOV PTER BA IR KICC
SUBJECT: U/S BOLTON PRESSES FOR MOVING IRAN NUCLEAR ISSUE 
TO SECURITY COUNCIL, ARTICLE 98 RATIFICATION 
 
 
Classified by Ambassador William T. Monroe for reasons 1.4 
(b) and (d). 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  (C) Under Secretary Bolton January 30 met with Foreign 
Minister Shaikh Mohammed, Defense Minister Shaikh Khalifa, 
and Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Abdul Ghaffar to 
discuss Iran's nuclear program and bringing into force the 
bilateral Article 98 agreement.  In response to U/S Bolton's 
presentation on Iran, Shaikh Mohammed agreed that the matter 
is very serious and important, and said that Bahrain 
supported keeping the issue in the IAEA for now.  Public 
opinion required that the GOB allow the IAEA to take the lead 
until there is a decision to move the issue to the UN 
Security Council.  Noting that Bahrain currently chairs the 
GCC, he offered to coordinate a GCC statement on Iran, if the 
U.S. thought it would be helpful.  MinDef Shaikh Khalifa said 
that Bahrain recognizes the Iranian threat and estimates that 
Iran is 3-5 years away from acquiring nuclear weapons.  The 
focus of international efforts must be on stopping Iran's 
program, preferably by means other than military force.  On 
Article 98, Shaikh Mohammed asserted that Bahrain would 
continue to protect Americans in Bahrain, and the GOB was 
considering the best way to bring the agreement into force. 
The government was still developing a relationship with 
parliament, which was reconstituted only two years ago, and 
the parameters for concluding executive agreements vice 
parliamentary ratification were not yet clear.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
Iranian Strategic Decision to Acquire Nuclear Weapons 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Under Secretary for Arms Control and International 
Security Bolton, accompanied by T Senior Advisor Timbie, 
opened his January 30 meetings with Foreign Minister/Deputy 
Prime Minister Shaikh Mohammed bin Mubarak Al Khalifa, 
Defense Minister General Shaikh Khalifa bin Ahmed Al Khalifa, 
and Minister of State for Foreign Affairs/Information 
Minister Mohammed Abdul Ghaffar by briefing them on U.S. 
concerns related to Iran's nuclear program.  He asserted that 
we are opposed to Iran getting a nuclear capacity, and we 
believe that Iran made a strategic decision to acquire 
nuclear weapons and the ballistic missiles to carry them. 
The UN Security Council is the proper forum for dealing with 
Iran, and U/S Bolton passed the Bahraini officials a paper on 
options for dealing with Iran in the UNSC.  The EU-3 fully 
agree with our assessment of Iran's nuclear program but 
believe they can bring about a change in Iranian behavior 
through negotiations.  The EU-3 and Iran are far apart on the 
central issue of cessation of Iran's nuclear fuel cycle 
efforts, so the negotiations may well not succeed.  This is 
not just a confrontation between Iran and the U.S.; rather, 
it is between Iran and the rest of the world.  The United 
States' overwhelming preference is to reach a negotiated 
solution but, though we have no military plans now, we have 
taken no option off the table. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
ForMin:  IAEA Responsible for Iranian Nuclear File 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶3.  (C) ForMin Shaikh Mohammed agreed that this is a very 
serious and important issue.  Saying that Iran is "next 
door," he stated that the international community must 
convince Iran not to proceed with its nuclear program.  He 
noted that he had raised this issue during his August 2004 
visit to Iran, and his interlocutors insisted Iran is not 
developing nuclear weapons. 
 
¶4.  (C) Shaikh Mohammed said that the IAEA should be in 
charge of the Iran nuclear file.  It is the organization 
responsible for nuclear matters, and Bahraini public opinion 
would only support the IAEA taking the lead.  The GOB 
supports the United States and will agree to move the issue 
to the UNSC if necessary.  But the IAEA should be given the 
chance to see through its investigation.  Bahrain currently 
is chair of the GCC, and the GOB could coordinate a GCC 
statement on Iran based upon the IAEA position, if the U.S. 
considered this to be helpful. 
 
¶5.  (C) U/S Bolton said that the United States continues to 
work with the IAEA, but is concerned that Iran, in its 
submissions to the agency, has not dealt with many of the 
outstanding questions.  (Note:  Senior Advisor Timbie passed 
the list of unanswered questions to an MFA official attending 
the meeting.  End Note)  Iran has made concessions at the 
IAEA in response to the U.S. threat to take the issue to the 
UNSC. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
MinDef:  Iran 3-5 Years from Acquiring Weapons 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶6.  (C) Defense Minister Shaikh Khalifa told U/S Bolton that 
Bahrain recognizes the Iranian military and terrorist threat. 
 The Iranian Ambassador told Shaikh Khalifa just a few weeks 
earlier that the Iranian nuclear program is for peaceful 
purposes and requested the support of regional countries. 
However, the GCC issued a statement opposing the program. 
Bahrain estimates that Iran is 3-5 years away from developing 
nuclear weapons.  The focus of international efforts must be 
on stopping Iran's program.  The question is the means, and 
using military force should be the last option. 
 
¶7.  (C) Shaikh Khalifa noted that a strike against the 
Bushehr reactor would have environmental, political, and 
military consequences for the countries of the region.  A 
solution coming as a result of negotiations or even sanctions 
would be the best outcome for the region.  The United States 
should be careful and calculate all the risks involved. 
Bahrain supports the U.S., but it cannot apply heat or 
threaten Iran because it is a small country. 
 
¶8.  (C) In response to the MinDef's question, U/S Bolton said 
that the government of Pakistan had provided some information 
on the A.Q. Khan network.  While we know that he passed 
weapons design information to Libya, we do not know if he did 
so to Iran.  He said that Pakistan, along with other OIC 
members Algeria, Tunisia, and Yemen, are on the IAEA board, 
and we encourage Bahrain to encourage them to support moving 
the Iran nuclear issue to the UNSC.  There, the heat and the 
spotlight would be firmly on Iran.  Additionally, Russia 
would see the issue in a new light.  Currently, it acts as a 
supplier of nuclear technology.  But in the UNSC, it would 
have to act as a member of the P-5, with a different set of 
interests.  Shaikh Khalifa noted that the Iranian ambassador 
had told him that all Iranian universities were now involved 
in the development of high tech systems, so Iran may not need 
to rely upon technology from outside sources. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Abdul Ghaffar Supports IAEA Lead 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) Minister of State Abdul Ghaffar agreed that it is 
very important to stop Iran from developing nuclear weapons. 
Concurring with U/S Bolton's statement, he said that in order 
to prevent Iran from portraying the conflict as Iran-U.S. 
rather than Iran and the rest of the world, the international 
community should work the issue through the IAEA.  U/S Bolton 
noted that Iran had not allowed the IAEA to inspect all the 
places it wanted to see, in particular certain military sites 
that we believe are centers for weapons development.  He 
related that at one site in Iran, the IAEA had found several 
feet of soil cleared away, thus preventing the agency from 
checking for the presence of uranium. 
 
------------------------------- 
Activating Article 98 Agreement 
------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) Turning to Article 98, U/S Bolton stated that we 
have signed 97 agreements worldwide, 87 of which had entered 
into force.  Unfortunately, Bahrain is one of the 10 that had 
signed but not activated the agreement.  He noted that there 
were two ways to bring the agreement into force:  by 
parliamentary ratification, and by a legally binding 
agreement between the executive branches of the two 
countries.  The United States did not need to obtain 
congressional ratification and was willing and able to 
activate the agreement with Bahrain via an exchange of 
diplomatic notes. 
 
¶11.  (C) Foreign Minister Shaikh Mohammed assured U/S Bolton 
that the GOB would continue to protect Americans in Bahrain, 
as it had done for over 50 years.  He said that the GOB would 
respect its signing of the agreement.  The government was 
determining the right timing to push the agreement forward to 
parliament.  Currently, the GOB put priority on gaining 
parliamentary ratification of the free trade agreement, and 
did not want to jeopardize this ratification by also 
submitting the Article 98 agreement. 
 
¶12.  (C) U/S Bolton indicated that two-thirds of all the 
Article 98 agreements had entered into force via diplomatic 
notes rather than parliamentary ratification, and asked 
whether this was the better route to use.  Shaikh Mohammed 
replied that the GOB was "at the beginning" of its 
relationship with parliament, which had been reconstituted 
only two years ago.  The government would first need to reach 
agreement with parliament about what comprises an executive 
agreement, vice treaty, before it took this route to activate 
Article 98.  MinDef Shaikh Khalifa told U/S Bolton that 
finalizing the agreement was a domestic political issue that 
the government was working on. 
 
¶13.  (U) Under Secretary Bolton cleared this message. 
 
MONROE