This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 000655 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR M/R 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AODE AMGT APER ECON EWWT ASEC PTER KMRS SP
SUBJECT: NSDD 38: Department of Homeland Security/U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection - Permanent Staffing of 
Container Security Initiative Teams in Spain 
 
REF:  (A) STATE 014517, (B) STATE 066580 
 
¶1. Summary. Embassy Madrid supports the establishment of a 
new CSI program in Spain.  This program would enhance 
Mission's MPP goal of prevention and response to terrorism. 
In order to effectively meet the duties required of CSI 
Spain, Embassy requires personnel and operational control 
changes to the proposed DHS NSDD 38.  Embassy has 
determined that eight permanent Americans are warranted at 
ports in Spain, but the proposed criminal investigator and 
intelligence positions in Madrid are only authorized a 
three month TDY status to evaluate their contribution to 
the initiative.  Embassy has also determined an additional 
locally engaged support staff will be required for DHS 
Madrid to meet the needs of this program.  Operational 
control for CSI in Spain must be based with the Chief of 
Mission and staff in Madrid.  The program cannot move 
forward until the government of Spain signs a Memorandum of 
Understanding that allows DHS personnel status as 
Administrative and Technical Staff.  End Summary. 
 
Personnel 
--------- 
 
¶2. Embassy has reviewed Reftel (A) NSDD 38 request and 
approves establishment of eight new, full-time, permanent 
(FTP), American direct-hire (USDH), DHS/CBP Container 
Security Initiative (CSI) positions at these locations in 
Spain:  Algeciras (2), Barcelona (3), and Valencia (3). 
 
¶3. However, for Madrid, embassy approves two (2) positions 
requested in reftel (A) on a three-month TDY basis, and 
reiterates a request for one (1) Mission Support Specialist 
position (Locally Engaged Staff), on a permanent basis. 
Total positions approved equal eleven (11), eight (8) of 
which are permanent, direct hires; one (1) of which is 
permanent, locally engaged; and two (2) of which are TDY. 
 
¶4. Post's decision on the Madrid positions is based on the 
interest of remaining lean and reducing layers of personnel 
who might duplicate work.  Mission is therefore limiting 
the criminal investigator and intelligence positions to a 
TDY trial period.  At present, post remains unconvinced of 
the need for additional criminal investigators or analysts 
due to the ample presence of U.S. law enforcement personnel 
currently in Madrid.  The evaluation period will allow DHS 
to justify the positions without increasing the overlapping 
jurisdictions of agencies already at post. 
 
Operational Control 
------------------- 
 
¶5. Mission seeks to clarify DHS/CBP's justification for 
placing operational control under CBP Headquarters. 
Mission believes that operational control should reside 
with the Chief of Mission through the DHS chief in Madrid. 
Overall program direction can remain with Office of 
International Affairs, CBP in Washington. 
 
Administrative Support 
---------------------- 
 
¶6. Administrative support for the proposed DHS/CBP 
Container Security Initiative is dependent first and 
foremost on the successful negotiation of a bilateral 
agreement or Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the 
Government of Spain (GOS) that resolves two primary issues: 
the official status, privileges and immunities of deployed 
personnel and family members, and the provision of adequate 
and secure office space within the designated port areas. 
 
Official Status -- Privileges and Immunities 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. It is Mission Spain's intention to negotiate an MOU in 
which the GOS affords the proposed DHS/CBP CSI personnel 
and their family members a status equivalent to that given 
to the Administrative and Technical staff members of the 
Embassy and their family members in accordance with the 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of April 18, 
1961, or consular employees in accordance with the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations. Spain is a signatory to 
the Vienna convention, and has signed a similar bi-lateral 
agreement regarding Mission Spain's NASA representative. 
In addition, the USG has afforded Administrative and 
Technical status to the Educational Counselors of the GOS 
currently deployed in 23 different states in the U.S. Thus, 
there is both precedence and reciprocity to support our 
request for DHS/CBP CSI.  This agreement must be signed 
before DHS/CSI personnel can apply for visas to deploy to 
Spain to fill any permanent positions approved by this 
NSDD-38 process.  Prior to this agreement, DHS/CBP CSI 
personnel deployed to Spain will be subject to individual 
country clearance approval and restricted to three-month 
temporary duty (TDY) assignments as governed by the maximum 
length of official visas for temporary visits. 
 
Provision of Office Space 
------------------------- 
 
¶8. As the Algeciras pilot project has shown, DHS/CBP CSI 
personnel must have office space within the port in order 
to perform their duties effectively.  Commercial office 
space outside the port areas will be significantly less 
effective, and will be very difficult and expensive to 
lease and make-ready to meet security standards. 
Therefore, it is vitally important that the MOU with the 
GOS include provision of office space within the port 
areas. If successful, this will limit start-up costs to 
procurement/shipping of office furnishings and equipment, 
and installation of commercial voice and data links. 
 
¶9. Office space in Madrid can be made available for the 
permanent support position within the CAA adjacent to other 
DHS and law enforcement agency personnel.  For the two TDY 
positions in Madrid, office space can be made available on 
a temporary basis.  Should the positions become permanent, 
an estimate of dislocation and make-ready costs will be 
prepared. 
 
Provision of Housing 
-------------------- 
 
¶10. Post recommends that proposed DHS/CBP CSI positions be 
authorized Living Quarters Allowance (LQA) for residential 
accommodations in Algeciras, Valencia and Barcelona, plus 
full shipment of household effects and personally owned 
vehicles. 
 
¶11. Should the two TDY positions in Madrid become 
permanent, they could join the embassy's short-term leased 
housing pool, appliance pool, and residential maintenance 
services. 
 
ICASS Services and Costs 
------------------------ 
 
¶12. The eight proposed permanent DHS/CBP CSI positions in 
Algeciras, Valencia and Barcelona would be eligible to 
receive the following ICASS services from Mission Spain: 
Basic Package, Security Services, Health Services, CLO 
Services, Procurement, Customs/Shipping, Vouchering, 
Accounts and Records, Pouch and Mail, and Leasing Services. 
Many of these services would be modified to less than full 
services due to the geographical distance between these 
cities and the service providers in Madrid.  We believe 
sufficient administrative support can be provided as long 
as DHS/CBP CSI personnel have daily access to the embassy 
through commercial Internet and telephone.  The current- 
year (FY-05) ICASS charge for the CSI pilot project TDY 
personnel is $38,300.  This NSDD-38 request would affect 
service subscriptions and workload counts for next fiscal 
year (FY-06).  Cost estimates are highly dependent on 
currently unknown variables such as the number of family 
members.  However, an estimated cost for minimal FY-06 
ICASS services is about $100,000.  Pending ICASS Council 
approval, Mission Spain Management Section would utilize 
these resources to establish one new locally engaged staff 
position. 
 
Security 
-------- 
 
¶13. Mission believes that additional staff can be justified 
and do not offer unnecessary security risk providing DHS 
personnel posted at satellite locations carefully observe 
security issues relevant to outside of Embassy locations. 
In addition to the mandatory pre-assignment security 
briefing, Mission RSO recommends careful attention to 
office, residential and personal security measures. DHS 
personnel located at satellite posts will need to take 
greater responsibility for their own security awareness. 
Residences and offices will require security evaluation by 
Mission security personnel.  DHS must be cognizant that 
locating Americans in port areas creates an additional 
target. 
 
 
¶14. Mandatory Personal Security Training.  All personnel 
transferring to an overseas location under COM authority 
must complete appropriate overseas personal security 
training prior to their travel.  Please refer to reftel (B) 
for details.  Additionally, the CSI personnel should 
schedule a security briefing with Embassy Madrid RSO as 
soon as possible after arrival.  Embassy ID card will be 
issued and personnel will receive briefing on current 
threat levels in Spain as well as appropriate residential 
and personal security measures. 
 
¶15. The NSDD-38 Decision. 
 
1) Is the need for the proposed staffing change reflected 
in the most recent MPP?  If so, under which goal?  If not, 
what circumstances have changed to justify the NSDD 38 
proposal? 
 
Yes.  Goal One - Prevention and Response to Terrorism. 
The CSI program fits within Strategy 2: Strengthen 
bilateral law enforcement, judicial, military, financial 
and intelligence cooperation and information sharing 
related to the War on Terror (including ETA). 
 
2) If the agency proposes to add staffing based on 
workload, are there other resources already present at post 
that are performing or could perform the function? 
 
No.  This is a new initiative.  The new staff will be 
integrated into the mission hierarchy by reporting to 
DHS' ICE Attache in Madrid and to the Chief of 
Mission. 
 
3) Could the function be accomplished through the use of 
TDY, Foreign National, contract, or other local hire 
personnel? 
 
During the pilot phase, the program requires 
management and development by an American staff. 
These positions will be privy to secret and possibly 
top secret information.  It is possible that the 
program will continue to require involvement of 
cleared Americans to deal with classified information. 
However, we will review the program once it is 
established, to determine if some of the staffing 
could be taken over by locally hired or contract 
employees. 
 
4) Identify the specific administration support, space, and 
funding arrangements that have been made for the increase 
in staffing. 
 
Provision of space - see paragraph 5 
ICASS services and costs - see paragraph 9 
 
5) Do the benefits of increasing the staff outweigh the 
inherent security risks associated with additional 
personnel? 
 
Yes.  The mission of DHS/ICE includes oversight of the 
Container Security Initiative, a program designed to 
preclude the introduction of weapons of mass 
destruction in the U.S. via commerce and achieve a key 
y 
MPP Goal.  CSI personnel can also limit additional 
security risk by being cognizant of their security 
needs and cooperation with Madrid's Regional Security 
Office. 
 
¶17.  Approval is subject to DHS/CBP acceptance of above 
conditions and ICASS charges. 
 
MANZANARES