This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINGSTON 000292 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CAR AND EB/TRA (BYERLE AND MATTINGLEY) 
STATE PASS FAA FOR KRISTA BERQUIST 
MONTREAL FOR U.S. MISSION TO ICAO 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAIR ECON ETRD PREL JM
SUBJECT: JAMAICA CIVAIR: INFORMING GOJ OF FAA REQUEST FOR 
IMMEDIATE FINAL DISCUSSION ON POSSIBLE DOWNGRADE TO IASA 
CATEGORY TWO STATUS 
 
REF: A. STATE 13346 
 
     ¶B. 04 STATE 130299 
     ¶C. 04 KINGSTON 1738 
     ¶D. 04 KINGSTON 1683 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (SBU)  Per Ref A instructions, on January 27 Pol/Econ 
Chief and Econoff met with Transport Minister Robert 
Pickersgill, Jamaica Civil Aviation Authority (JCAA) Chief 
Col. Torrance Lewis, and members of their staffs, to advise 
of the areas in which the FAA found the Jamaica Civil 
Aviation Authority (JCAA) to be out of compliance with 
minimum ICAO standards.  Emboffs further requested that the 
GOJ schedule, soonest, final consultations with the FAA to 
review corrective actions thus far and determine whether 
Jamaica should be downgraded to Category 2.  There were some 
initial protests from the GOJ representatives that the USG 
wasn't giving the GOJ the time or notification it had 
promised in June 2004 (Ref B), but Pickersgill silenced the 
protests and informed Emboffs of his intention to cooperate 
fully with the FAA's request and to work with the USG to 
ensure the safety of Jamaica's air travel industry. End 
Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Per Ref A instructions, on January 27 Pol/Econ Chief 
Mark Powell and Econoff Eric Salzman met with Transport 
Minister Robert Pickersgill, JCAA Chief Col. Torrance Lewis, 
JCAA Chairman Tony Kelly, and members of their staffs 
(including legal officer Marva Gordon Simmonds), to advise 
them of the areas in which FAA found the Jamaica Civil 
Aviation Authority (JCAA) not to be in compliance with 
minimum ICAO standards.  P/E Chief also specifically 
requested that the GOJ agree to hold immediate formal final 
discussion with FAA to discuss the shortcomings in the 
present safety oversight system and related deficiencies.  On 
January 26, the day prior to the briefing for Pickersgill et 
al, P/E Chief telephoned Joy Wheeler, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Foreign Trade (MFAFT) Director for the Americas 
and the Caribbean, to inform her of the next day's briefing 
for Minister Pickersgill, and agreed to provide her the text 
of the documents he would hand to Pickersgill the following 
day.  Wheeler expressed appreciation for the prior notice. 
P/E Chief also attempted to contact Claudia Barnes, MFA 
Acting Director for Economic Affairs, with the same heads-up, 
leaving a message with her secretary. 
 
¶3. (U) At the outset of the meeting with Pickersgill, 
Pol/Econ Chief officially informed him that the USG considers 
the demarche delivery to be "consultations" under the terms 
of Article 6, and formally requested that the GOJ schedule 
and hold final discussions with the USG (as represented by 
the Department of State and the FAA) to go over the specific 
deficiencies noted in the December assessment.  Pol/Econ 
Chief then delivered the talking points verbally, before 
handing to Col Lewis, the Minister and others, copies of Ref 
A letter to Col. Lewis from FAA's James Ballough, FAA 
Reassessment Report, and talking points. 
 
¶4. (SBU)  Pickersgill questioned the time-frame for the final 
decision-making process, citing the 60-day period given in 
the June 2004 demarche letter (Ref B).  Pol/Econ Chief 
replied that the extent of the safety issues was not apparent 
at that time, and that the severity of the oversight lapses 
necessitates a shortening of the evaluation period.  By the 
end of the discussion, Pickersgill appeared to accept the 
fact that the FAA would make its determination immediately 
following final consultations with the GOJ. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Lewis cited the June letter as well, stating that it 
had promised that a written report on the FAA assessment 
team's findings would be provided to the JCAA no more than 
two weeks after the conclusion of the assessment, which was 
concluded in early December.  He stated that the document 
given to him at the January 27th demarche delivery was the 
first time he'd seen such a report, and that the JCAA had 
been waiting for the report in order to begin taking specific 
corrective actions. 
 
¶6. (SBU)  Pickersgill advised the GOJ representatives at the 
meeting that it was not the time or place to discuss 
technical issues or legalities.  He further instructed them 
to compile reports from their departments on what corrective 
actions had been taken for each of the 18 items noted in the 
FAA assessment report and to have a report on their findings 
ready by the end of the day. 
 
¶7. (SBU) As the meeting wound down, Pickersgill asked Emboffs 
to convey three messages to Washington: 
 
"When it comes to safety, the JCAA exercises no discretion. 
Any problem is reported directly to the political 
directorate.  We are as concerned as anyone about safety.  As 
a major tourism destination, we have an impeccable safety 
record to protect.  We want to demonstrate our seriousness 
and show we are involved.  We will do whatever it takes to 
address the FAA's safety concerns." 
 
"It is not easy for a small country like Jamaica to attract 
and retain people with the necessary technical skills. 
Currently, we use former Air Jamaica employees, but this 
brings up questions of conflict of interest.  We'd like to 
hire retired FAA employees, if that were possible.  We're 
endeavoring our utmost and don't want the FAA to second-guess 
our seriousness." 
 
"We need guidance.  The head of the JCAA was invited by the 
FAA and George Washington University to the Global Summit on 
Regional Aviation Safety Oversight at GWU on Feb 1-3 2005, 
but members of the political directorate are never invited to 
such meetings.  As Minister, I'd like to be able to talk to 
U.S. policy-setting decision makers at my level.  Who can I 
talk with?  I want to hear from someone where we're going 
wrong overall, beyond just the technical issues." 
 
¶8. (U) Following up on P/E Chief's commitment to do so, on 
January 28, Embassy sent the MFAFT's Joy Wheeler and Claudia 
Barnes individual copies of Ref A letter (addressed to Col. 
Lewis from FAA James J. Ballough) and the accompanying 
talking points. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶9. (SBU) Though several GOJ representatives initially sought 
wiggle room regarding the scheduling of final discussions, 
Pickersgill repeatedly made it clear (on several occasions 
going so far as to cut off a protesting member of his staff) 
that quibbling with Emboffs about what constituted 
"immediate" was a waste of time, and that his Ministry and 
the JCAA would do everything possible to work with the FAA to 
bring Jamaica's operations up to acceptable standards. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Despite Lewis' protests that he had not received a 
timely written report from the FAA, several other Ministry 
staffers present at the meeting acknowledged that they had 
been in direct contact with the FAA office in Miami, and that 
they had been working on addressing the FAA's safety concerns 
for several weeks. 
TIGHE