This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HELSINKI 000242 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/IET, EUR/NB, AND INR/EAP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2015 
TAGS: PREL PHUM MOPS MARR EAID ASEC ID FI
SUBJECT: ACEH TALKS: CONVERSATION WITH AHTISAARI'S OFFICE 
 
REF: A. HELSINKI 228 
 
     ¶B. JAKARTA 2068 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: POL Chief John Hall for reasons 1.4(B) and (D) 
 
Summary and Action Request 
-------------------------- 
 
¶1. (C) On February 24, POL Chief and UK DCM met with 
Meeri-Maria Jaarva of former Finnish President Ahtisaari's 
staff for a more detailed read-out of the second round of the 
GoI-GAM talks held February 21-23 (Ref A).  Jaarva described 
discussions in each of the agenda items, and said both sides 
have been charged with bringing written, concrete proposals 
to the next round, scheduled for April 12-17, and to be 
prepared to negotiate in detail.  Ahtisaari and the GoI had 
wanted to hold the next meeting in March, but the GAM needs 
more time to prepare -- particularly because they are short 
of legal expertise.  Jaarva was told by the GoI delegation 
that they are hoping for "something tangible" by July or 
August; she herself is uncertain whether that goal can be 
achieved, but is gratified that at least a process is under 
way. 
 
¶2. (C) Jaarva said that one area of special GAM concern is 
whether the TNI will go along with a GoI/GAM agreement; in 
this regard the GAM had said it is hoping that contacts 
between the TNI and the U.S. military can be used to help 
bind the armed forces to an agreement.  Jaarva also mentioned 
that Ahtisaari's office needs financial support for the 
process: Ahtisaari's Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) 
currently pays for the transportation and hotel costs of the 
GAM delegation.  We would appreciate the Department's advice 
as to whether the CMI might usefully approach a corporation 
with strong ties to Aceh, to ask for financial sponsorship. 
End Summary and Action Request. 
 
Moving Forward on the Agenda 
---------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) As reported Ref A, Jaarva said the GAM spent the first 
day stonewalling -- insisting on full independence for Aceh 
as the only possible outcome, and unwilling to tackle the 
point-by-point agenda of Ref B.  By mid-afternoon of February 
21, Ahtisaari realized that the talks were "going nowhere", 
so he adjourned for the day to give the GAM side a chance to 
consult internally.  He also met separately with them Monday 
evening to urge a more constructive stance.  On February 22, 
the GAM attitude was altogether different, and Ahtisaari was 
able to take both sides through the agenda.  Jaarva gave us 
the following additional detail on the key items, which 
should be read in conjunction with Ref A: 
 
-- Political parties: Jaarva said there was quite a long 
discussion on political participation, which collided with 
the fact that Indonesian law rules out formation of a 
political party that essentially has its strength in one 
province and which at most would represent two per cent of 
Indonesia's people.  Ahtisaari has specifically charged the 
GoI with preparing a proposal during the inter-round break on 
how the GAM can play a political role within the framework of 
the Indonesian constitution.  Jaarva said the CMI had earlier 
asked some Finnish legal experts to review the Special 
Autonomy law.  Their analysis was sharply critical, said 
Jaarva, and Ahtisaari gave the GoI delegation a non-paper 
with their comments. 
 
-- Human rights: The GAM is eager to see past injustices 
investigated, but Ahtisaari feels this is not the time to 
launch a truth and reconciliation process.  He is counseling 
the GAM to hold back on that demand until a settlement has 
had a chance to take hold. 
 
-- Amnesty/Reintegration of fighters: The GoI says it has 
prepared a draft amnesty law, which it will table in Round 
Three.  There is also a GoI plan for providing some land to 
disarmed GAM fighters, but Ahtisaari has not seen the details. 
 
-- Security: The GoI remains unwilling to discuss a ceasefire 
except as part of an overall settlement, and in any case 
Ahtisaari feels a ceasefire would be impossible to monitor at 
present.  Decommissioning of GAM weapons remains to be sorted 
out -- as does disarming of government-supported militias. 
The GoI apparently provided some figures on the extent to 
which TNI forces and paramilitaries would remain in the 
province. 
-- Monitoring: Both sides agreed that both military and 
civilian monitors will be needed.  The GoI suggested that 
ASEAN as an organization perform this task.  Ahtisaari felt 
ASEAN "would not be credible enough" for the GAM, but 
suggested that ASEAN and the EU together might suffice.  He 
left this thought (which he has already mentioned to Solana) 
for both sides to consider. 
 
-- Timetable: The GoI apparently did not provide Ahtisaari 
with the level of detail discussed by VP Kalla in Ref B, but 
did say that they would like to see "something tangible" by 
July or August.  They originally proposed that Round Three 
begin in March.  The GAM argued that they needed more time to 
prepare, so the dates for the third round will be April 
12-17.  In particular, the GAM is short of legal expertise. 
Apparently their primary legal expert was in jail in Banda 
Aceh at the time of the tsunami, and was killed with all 
other inmates.  A second legal advisor is still incarcerated. 
 We commented to Jaarva that it might be a useful 
confidence-building measure for the GoI to release this 
person; she said the GAM had in fact asked for this but the 
GoI only reiterated that any amnesty provision must await the 
final settlement. 
 
¶4. (C) Ahtisaari adjourned the round at midday on February 
23, and charged both sides with preparing written proposals 
on each of the agenda items to bring to the table April 12, 
and to be ready for several days of detailed negotiation. 
Jaarva said that the Finns too wish the next round could take 
place in March, since something could happen in the meantime, 
but concede that the GAM needs a longer preparation time than 
does the GoI.  Ahtisaari appealed to both sides to show 
restraint on the ground during the break. 
 
¶5. (C) Summing up, Jaarva said, "I wouldn't bet much money 
yet -- especially my own -- that there will be an agreement 
by July or August.  But at least there's a process going on 
now."  Asked whether Ahtisaari feels both sides are 
negotiating in good faith, Jaarva answered with a cautious 
yes.  A question more difficult to answer is whether the GAM 
negotiators represent only their own people, or wider Aceh 
society.  There was some discussion at the table of engaging 
the Acehnese as a whole in the process, she said, but the GoI 
shied away from anything that might resemble a referendum. 
 
¶6. (C) Jaarva said one troubling question from Ahtisaari's 
point of view is whether the TNI can be counted on to go 
along with a settlement.  MGEN Tippe was a member of the GoI 
delegation and participated in the government side's internal 
deliberations, but not in the talks at the table.  She said 
the GAM fears that the TNI will become a third party to the 
negotiations.  Ahtisaari hopes that U.S.-Indonesian military 
cooperation will help "bind" the TNI to an 
internationally-accepted agreement.  A second, more prosaic 
problem is the cost of these talks.  The CMI is only a small 
office with a limited budget, and currently is funding the 
transportation and hotel costs for the GAM side.  (The 
Government of Finland provides the manor house in which the 
talks are held, and meals served there.)  Ahtisaari's staff 
will spend part of the break hunting for financial assistance. 
 
¶7. (C) We asked whether the presence of Kingsbury and other 
foreign activists had hindered the negotiations.  As reported 
Ref A, Jaarva said that Ahtisaari had allowed these visitors 
onto the grounds of the estate, but had denied them 
permission to join the talks.  At first the GoI side was 
unhappy about the activists, but Ahtisaari made the point to 
the government delegation that these people were not 
participating in the talks -- and besides, the GoI had jailed 
some Acehnese whom the GAM might have wanted to bring 
instead.  For his part, Ahtisaari was concerned that 
Kingsbury was "quite talkative to the press," but on balance 
the presence of the activists may have been positive: Jaarva 
said that Ahtisaari now suspects they did play a role in 
bringing about the GAM delegation's change of attitude on the 
night of February 21. 
 
Delegations 
----------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Jaarva provided this list of the two delegations. 
All spellings and titles are as received from her. 
 
-- Government -- 
 
Supervisor of the delegation: 
Mr. Adi Sudjipto Widodo, Coordinating Minister for Political, 
Legal and Security Affairs 
Delegation: 
- Mr. Hamid Awaluddin, Minister for Justice and Human Rights, 
Chairman of delegation 
- Mr. Sofyan Djalil, Minister for Communications and 
Information 
- Mr. Farid Husain, Deputy Minister for Social Welfare 
- Mr. I. Gusti Agung Wesaka Pudja, Director for Human Rights 
and Security, Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
- Mr. Usman Basyah, Deputy III Coordinating Minister for 
Political, Legal and Security Affairs, Department of National 
Security 
 
In addition to the official delegation: 
- Major-General Syarifuddin Tippe, TNI 
 
-- GAM -- 
 
- Mr. Malik Mahmud 
- Dr. Zaini Abdullah 
- Mr. Bakhtiar Abdullah 
- Mr. M. Nur Djuli 
- Mr. Nurdin Abdul Rahman 
 
In addition to the delegation: 
- Mr. Teuku Hadi 
- Dr. Damien Kingsbury 
- Dr. Vacy Vlazna 
- Mr. Muzakkir Abdul Hamid 
WEISBERG