This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HELSINKI 000228 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/IET, EUR/NB AND INR/EAP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM MOPS MARR EAID ASEC ID FI
SUBJECT: ACEH TALKS:  FINNISH MEDIATORS POSITIVE AFTER DAY 2 
 
REF: A. STATE 28557 
     ¶B. JAKARTA 02068 
     ¶C. HELSINKI 0185 
     ¶D. JAKARTA 01596 
     ¶E. HELSINKI 0127 
     ¶F. STOCKHOLM 086 
     ¶G. JAKARTA 0564 
     ¶H. JAKARTA 0414 
     ¶I. STATE 05915 
     ¶J. JAKARTA 0380 
 
Classified By: ACTING POL CHIEF DAVID ALLEN SCHLAEFER FOR REASONS 1.4 ( 
B AND D) 
 
A Possible Breakthrough 
------------------------ 
¶1.  (C)  Poloff spoke with Meri-Maria Jaarva of the Crisis 
Management Initiative (CMI) on the night of February 22. 
Jaarva is the chief assistant of former Finnish President 
Martti Ahtisaari for the Aceh talks.  Jaarva said that there 
had been an "enormous change" in the demeanor and attitude of 
the GAM representatives from Monday (Day 1) to Tuesday (Day 
2).  She said that the GAM's position was so hardline on 
Monday that she and Ahtisaari were unsure if the GAM 
representatives would actually show up Tuesday morning or if 
they would break off the talks.  She had gone so far as to 
begin preparing contingency points for the press in the event 
of a break down.  However, the GAM representatives arrived 
Tuesday prepared to immediately discuss substantive issues 
and details about what a comprehensive settlement in Aceh 
might look like.  They were prepared to drop (in effect) 
their demand for eventual independence as well as their 
insistence on negotiating a series of staged or tranched 
measures (beginning with a cease-fire) rather than discussing 
a comprehensive settlement all at once.  Jaarva said that she 
did not know what had happened during the night of Feb. 21-22 
to account for the dramatic shift;  she speculated that the 
GAM negotiators may have received the approval or support of 
field commanders to move forward, but was unsure. 
 
¶2.  (C)  The most important development was agreement between 
the GAM and the GoI on the semantics of autonomy.  Jaarva 
said that the GAM representatives told the GoI side that the 
phrase "special autonomy" was pejorative for their supporters 
and a non-starter;  it would be impossible to sell an 
agreement based on "special autonomy" to certain key GAM 
figures outside the talks.  After some discussion, the 
alternative formulation of "self-government inside Indonesia" 
was agreed on.  The GoI's initial "special autonomy package" 
would still be the starting point for negotiations, but the 
new semantics would be used henceforth.  Jaarva said that she 
believed this would allow the GAM negotiators to claim to 
their supporters that they had not sacrificed "independence" 
for "autonomy."  Jaarva expressed surprise with media reports 
that GAM "Prime Minister" Malik had publicly stated the GAM 
was dropping its demand for independence;  she said that she 
did not believe the GAM representatives in Helsinki would 
want such reports reaching their supporters at this stage. 
 
 
Areas of Discussion 
------------------- 
¶3.  (C)  Jaarva said that the negotiations had then moved on 
to short but substantive discussions of a number of key areas 
that would have to be resolved as part of any comprehensive 
settlement. 
 
--  Political Parties:  The GoI did not want to change its 
electoral system to allow "separatist" political parties to 
legally operate, but recognized that some way would have to 
be found for the GAM to form a party(ies) and participate in 
municipal and provincial elections and politics.  There were 
a number of ideas on both sides about how this might be 
achieved. 
 
--  Timing of Elections 
 
--  Amnesty for GAM leaders and fighters 
 
--  Economy and Taxation:  The two sides discussed how 
revenues would be shared, and what type of auditing system 
could be put in place to verify equitable distribution and 
prevent malfeasance. 
 
--  Reintegration of fighters into Indonesian society 
 
--  Security:  Disarmament and "decommissioning" of GAM 
military formations. 
 
--  Human Rights Issues:  Jaarva said that there was an 
extensive discussion of various human rights issues, as well 
as some discussion of ongoing humanitarian relief efforts in 
the wake of the tsunami. 
 
--  Monitoring of Agreement:  Both sides agreed that there 
would have to be an external monitoring body put in place for 
an extended period.  Both sides were unenthusiastic about the 
UN being the basis for such a monitoring body.  There seemed 
to be a consensus that a regional organization or "something 
with the Australians and Americans" would be preferable to 
the UN. 
 
Next Steps:  Tentative agreement was reached to hold a third 
round of talks in Helsinki from April 12-17 (Note: Jaarva was 
unsure that she had the exact date range correct).  She said 
that the longer gap was necessary to allow both sides to 
prepare position papers on the various issues, to consult 
with legal and political advisors, and, in the case of the 
GAM, to win acceptance from key GAM commanders for the 
concept of a settlement. 
 
 
Outside Influence? 
------------------ 
¶4.  (C)  Jaarva told Poloff that the American Aceh activist 
Neeson was not/not present in Helsinki because he had become 
ill at the last moment and canceled his trip.  However, she 
said that Kingsbury and "another Aussie woman (sic)" were 
with the GAM representatives as political advisors.  The two 
Australians did not participate in the negotiation sessions, 
but appeared to play an active role in the intra-GAM 
deliberations.  Jaarva said that she did not know if the role 
they were playing was benign or malign as far as facilitating 
agreement, or if they played any role in either the hardline 
stance the GAM took on Monday or the overnight change that 
subsequently took place.  Jaarva also said that there were 
two other foreign advisors, a German and a Swede, that 
unexpectedly appeared with the GAM representatives.  Jaarva 
said that Ahtisaari thought it impolitic to refuse them 
admission into the estate where the talks were being held, 
and that although they were "poking around" the site, they 
did not insinuate themselves into the talks and appeared 
"harmless." 
 
 
 
Christensen Upbeat 
------------------ 
¶5.  (C)  DCM Weisberg also received a late call from Juha 
Christensen, the Finnish businessman who originally brought 
Ahtisaari into the process as a mediator.  Christensen has 
been present during the talks and actually participated in at 
least some of the negotiation sessions.  Christensen told the 
DCM that he was optimistic after Day 2 and cited the same 
change in the GAM's demeanor that Jaarva had.  Christensen 
opined that he believed a breakthrough might indeed have been 
achieved.  Christensen declined to go into further details 
over the phone, but agreed to meet with the DCM later this 
week to discuss his impressions. 
 
 
Day 3 
----- 
¶6.  (C)  CMI mediators indicated that the talks on Wednesday 
(Day 3) would focus on preparing the agenda for the April 
round.  Ahtisaari plans to give a press conference at 3:00pm 
local time (8:00am EST) on Wednesday.  Ahtisaari's official 
statement on the talks will be posted to the CMI website 
(www.cmi.fi) at some point on February 23. 
 
 
 
WEISBERG