This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000251 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ZI ZANU PF
SUBJECT: DINOSAURS AND DISSENTERS - TAKE TWO 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR CHRISTOPHER DELL FOR REASON 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (C) The Ambassador met February 14 with the Minister of 
State for Indigenisation and Empowerment, J.T. Tungamirai, a 
Politburo member and reputedly close to President Mugabe, as 
well as separately with two of the ZANU-PF Members of 
Parliament who lost in the party primaries two weeks ago. 
The two meetings once more framed the debate within the 
ruling party over the way forward.  Tungamirai, though 
advertised as a moderate, went to extreme lengths to defend 
the party line.  The discussion reached a low point when he 
responded to the Ambassador,s criticism of President 
Mugabe,s intemperate, racially offensive, remarks about the 
Secretary with the remark that &she started it.8  By 
 
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contrast, the two soon to be former MPs were open to 
discussion, acknowledged mistakes on the part of the ruling 
party and said the opposition could pull a surprise in the 
elections given ZANU-PF,s failure to deliver stability and 
prosperity.  Both planned to remain loyal to ZANU-PF but both 
were very critical of the party,s leadership, including 
President Mugabe.  End Summary. 
 
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Tungamirai: ZANU Insider; ZANU Moderate? 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Tungamirai said he had fought in the liberation war 
and that after independence he had had served in the Army for 
a year and then switched to the Air Force, which he 
ultimately headed with a rank of Air Marshal.  He retired 
from the military in 1992 and joined ZANU-PF,s 
administrative structure.  He headed the party,s youth wing 
for a number of years.  His election to Parliament last year 
in a by-election in Gutu North, in Masvingo province, was his 
first foray into electoral politics. 
 
Minister with Small Portfolio 
----------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Tungamirai said he was appointed as a Minister a year 
ago and is reviving the Ministry.  To date, he said he had 
ten employees.  The Ministry,s main purpose was to promote 
&indigenous8 ownership.  His near-term goal was to achieve 
50 percent indigenous ownership in all areas of the economy 
with an immediate priority on tourism, mining, manufacturing 
and the petroleum sector.  He said this was to be achieved 
through &negotiation.8  The Ministry would try to find 
willing buyers and willing sellers.  The former would need to 
demonstrate sufficient interest, have adequate capital, and a 
socially conscious business plan.  The Ministry had yet to 
publish guidelines, which required passage of legislation in 
Parliament.  He hoped to be able to do so by the middle of 
this year. 
 
Politics as War 
--------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Tungamirai said he would stand again this year and 
anticipated no problems with his own re-election, despite 
economic problems in his constituency, the foremost of which 
was continuing drought.  In that regard, he noted that the 
party,s goal with respect to land reform was to increase 
production.  Tungamirai said ZANU-PF was committed to a 
non-violent election.  He acknowledged that there had been 
violence in the past, especially in the 2002 Presidential 
election.  He predicted ZANU would win these elections 
handily.  The 2000 party program had been largely achieved 
and the 2005 program would appeal to voters, especially in 
the rural areas where the party was strongest.  Asked about 
ZANU-PF,s target for the election, he said he was a military 
man, and that in politics as in war, the goal was to destroy 
your opponent ) ZANU-PF,s goal was to win all 120 seats. 
That said, he acknowledged that a more realistic result would 
be a two-thirds majority. 
 
¶5. (C) Tungamirai denied any significant turmoil within the 
party, noting that periodically the party &sheds its skin8 
to emerge stronger than ever. Tungamirai suggested 
Information Minister Moyo and his adherents were trying to 
split the party at the instigation of the West, but they 
would be unsuccessful as others had been unsuccessful in the 
past.  The Ambassador asked whether the &anti-Blair8 
campaign had any real resonance with the people.  Tungamirai 
acknowledged that most rural voters probably didn,t know who 
Blair was, but these people would vote ZANU-PF anyway, and 
the message would have resonance with educated urban voters. 
 
Relations with the West 
----------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Despite the anti-Blair campaign, Tungamirai denied 
that ZANU-PF sought confrontation with the West.  He 
attributed the bad relations of the past few years to 
Britain,s decision to renege on its Lancaster House 
commitments to provide the funds to allow land redistribution 
to go forward.  Asserting that no colonial power wants its 
colonies to succeed, he claimed the U.K. is intentionally 
undermining Zimbabwe.  In that regard, he criticized the 
white Zimbabwean owner of the country,s largest fertilizer 
company, Sable, for deliberately trying to destroy 
Zimbabwe,s agricultural productivity.  The Ambassador asked, 
incredulously, if Tungamirai believed this individual, having 
had his farm seized, was now deliberately destroying his 
remaining business in order to get revenge.  He,s a clever 
man, responded Tungamirai.  (N.B. In fact, we understand that 
the owner of Sable is a Black Zimbabwean and that the GOZ has 
a major interest in the company.  Moreover, the primary cause 
of fertilizer shortages is the l 
ack of foreign exchange -- caused by misguided GOZ economic 
policies -- as well as profiteering by well-connected 
individuals able to obtain excessive amounts of fertilizer at 
subsidized prices, which they can then sell for five times as 
much on the street.) 
 
¶7. (C) The Ambassador noted that every time relations between 
the U.S. and Zimbabwe came up in discussions with the GOZ he 
received a history lesson with a focus on land reform.  The 
U.S. understood the social justice argument.  However, we 
took issue with how land reform was managed and the 
disastrous effect it had had on Zimbabwe,s economy.  He 
added that Zimbabwe was becoming a bad political example for 
the region.  Zambia and Malawi, for instance, were 
considering an NGO bill of their own, a piece of legislation 
we regarded as repressive and inspired by Information 
Minister Jonathon Moyo,s extremism.  The U.S. was more 
interested in discussing Zimbabwe,s future than in endless 
debates on its history and we remain committed to helping 
Zimbabwe reverse the effects of its bad policy choices of the 
past few years. 
 
¶8. (C) Tungamirai responded that the GOZ was very concerned 
about the Secretary,s recent &outpost of tyranny8 
statement.  Zimbabwe felt threatened by the U.S. and its 
policy of ®ime change.8  The Ambassador said President 
Mugabe,s vitriolic and insulting public comments about the 
Secretary would only make things worse.  Tungamirai responded 
 
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that, &She started it.8  The Ambassador said it was 
important to try to depersonalize our disagreements.  He 
added that the U.S. cares about the people of Zimbabwe, and 
that was why we gave USD 20 million a year to fight HIV/AIDs 
and why we had given USD 100 million in food aid over the 
past few years, and why we would be prepared to help again if 
need be.  What concerned us most in Zimbabwe was that the 
trend in this country was so radically in the wrong 
direction.  Once a positive model for Africa, Zimbabwe was 
now a showcase for what not to do. 
 
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ZANU &Losers:8 True Moderates 
----------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) The Ambassador met the same day with two ZANU-PF MPS, 
Victor Chitongo, MP for Murehwa in Mashonaland East, and 
Gibson Munyoro, MP for Makoni West in Manicaland.  Both had 
lost internal ZANU-PF primaries for their seats, and both had 
lost them to sitting Ministers: in Munyoro,s case, 
Agriculture Minister Made; and in Chitongo,s case, Health 
and Child Welfare Minister Parirenyatwa. 
 
Electoral Prospects 
------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Chitongo said this was becoming a pattern in ZANU-PF, 
replacing a popular sitting MP, especially an outspoken or 
independent one, with a Minister or ZANU-PF insider who had 
never before been elected to public office.  And it was 
putting the seats at risk and improving the opposition,s 
chances of pulling off an upset.  ZANU-PF was already in more 
trouble than it realized because of the sad state of affairs 
within the country.  The Ambassador asked if that were the 
case why ZANU-PF was running an &anti-Blair8 campaign 
instead of focusing on ways to improve conditions for average 
Zimbabweans.  Munyoro agreed that this was a foolish approach 
that would have little resonance with average voters, many of 
whom, especially in rural areas, would have no idea who Blair 
was. 
 
¶11. (C) Chitongo told the Ambassador that for ZANU-PF success 
in the elections would be winning 60 of the 120 contested 
seats.  In addition to the thirty MPs the President 
appointed, this would give ZANU-PF the two-thirds majority it 
needed to amend the constitution and allow President Mugabe 
to dictate his succession.  By contrast, for the MDC 
&success8 would be winning 60 or more seats itself and thus 
forcing ZANU-PF to negotiate constitutional changes with the 
opposition. 
 
¶12. (C) Chitongo predicted that if ZANU-PF won a two-thirds 
majority, Mugabe would step into a &comfortable8 retirement 
within the next two and a half years (i.e. before the 2008 
presidential elections).  However, if they failed to win 60 
seats, he said there would be a major upheaval in the party. 
He added that Mugabe &will not be a Chiluba8 referring to 
the former president of Zambia who unsuccessfully attempted 
to amend the constitution to allow him to run for a third 
term.   Moreover, ZANU-PF would not consider another 
referendum if it did not win two-thirds in Parliament because 
of the risk of losing again. 
 
Personal Plans 
-------------- 
 
¶13. (C) Chitongo said he had many friends in the opposition 
Movement for Democracy (MDC) but had given no consideration 
to switching parties.  He was loyal to ZANU-PF and would wait 
for his turn to come around again.  President Mugabe would 
not last forever, he was in his 80s, and when he went so 
would the clique of insiders that surrounded him.  He added 
that the party had hurt itself with the recent turmoil in its 
ranks, and by dismissing Moyo.  Moyo had been an extremely 
effective Information Minister, a characterization that 
Munyoro seconded.  Moyo,s activities in Matabeleland had 
done much to improve the party,s popularity in the MDC,s 
strongest region.  Munyoro thought that if Moyo ran as an 
independent in Matabeleland he would stand a good chance of 
being elected (N.B. He would need to declare by February 18). 
 For his part, Munyoro said he was done with electoral 
politics and would go back to managing his NGO, which 
disbursed micro credits in his native Manicaland. 
 
&Outpost of Tyranny8 
-------------------- 
 
¶14. (C) Chitongo said he would like to see better relations 
between Zimbabwe and the West.  In that regard, he took issue 
with the Secretary,s characterization of Zimbabwe as an 
&outpost of oyranny8 and noted that many Zimbabweans had 
concluded that the U.S. might be considering invading the 
country.  The Ambassador said this was not on the table but 
that we were very concerned with the very negative trend in 
Zimbabwe ) economic meltdown and political repression ) and 
that we were also very concerned what effect this might have 
on the region.  Munyoro asked how the U.S. could criticize 
Zimbabwe,s political situation when other countries in 
Africa were far more repressive. The Ambassador stated that 
Zimbabwe,s downward trend from initial success politically 
and economically was what concerned the U.S. Zimbabwe was 
both a source of instability, as evidenced by 3 million 
emigrants, and a negative example in a part of the world 
where freedom and democracy had been making headway. 
 
¶15. (C) Chitongo blamed the economic meltdown on the West,s 
reaction to land reform.  If not for land reform, the West 
and the IMF would be pouring investment dollars into 
Zimbabwe.  The Ambassador took issue with that, noting that 
we recognized the legitimate social justice concerns behind 
land reform but not how it was managed: not only was the 
economy ruined but the land had not gone to agricultural 
workers but instead to party insiders.  Chitongo admitted 
that &we8 got the land during land reform rather than the 
people but nonetheless criticized commercial farmers for the 
failures of land reform. 
 
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Comment 
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¶16. (C) These two meetings further reinforced our growing 
impression that ZANU-PF is starting to show deep cracks in 
its formerly united faade and that the elections may not be 
the cakewalk the ruling party expects.  They also reinforced 
the impression that there are moderates in ZANU-PF who may 
one day take this party in a somewhat more democratic 
direction if given a chance.  However, they are not the ones 
now calling the shots.  Tungamirai had been advertised to us 
as an independent-minded, straight-talking former military 
officer and a relative moderate with whom the West could 
work.  In the event, he came across as a party hack and yet 
another dinosaur that doesn,t know his days are numbered. 
DELL