This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HARARE 000229 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF/S FOR BNEULING 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2010 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ZI MDC ZANU PF
SUBJECT: MATABELELAND RESTIVE AS CAMPAIGNS COMMENCE 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell under Section 1.4 b/d 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  During the Ambassador's visit to Bulawayo 
February 7-8, MDC and civil society figures reviewed the 
election environment in surrounding Matabeleland, a 
historically marginalized region that is the principal home 
to Zimbabwe's leading minority Ndebele tribe (about 15 
percent of the population).  In contrast to other areas of 
the country, police in the region were reported to be 
stepping up efforts to restrict public assembly.  However, 
opposition and civil society interlocutors said they were 
proceeding with public meetings with or without official 
approval.  Consistent with national trends, ruling party 
militia and war veteran elements were maintaining low 
profiles and anti-MDC violence was markedly reduced compared 
to prior pre-election periods.  Most predicted that, unless 
the GOZ engineered a violent anti-opposition crackdown, 
ZANU-PF would not win more than six or seven seats out of 21 
in Bulawayo, Matabeleland North and Matabeleland South.  Some 
complimented the Secretary's designation of Zimbabwe as an 
outpost of tyranny and asked what its implications were for 
U.S. policy.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Violence Down; Fear Remains 
------------------------ 
 
¶2.  (C) The Ambassador met on February 7 with a group of MDC 
MPs from Matabeleland: Moses Mzila-Ncube, Thokozani Khupe, 
and Abednico Bhebhe.  On February 8 he met with a civil 
society group: Peter Khumalo, a prince of the Ndebele royal 
family and businessman; Nigel Johnson, Catholic priest and 
Station Manager of Radio Dialogue; and George Mkhwananzi, 
member of the National Constitutional Assembly -- all three 
officers of the USAID-funded Bulawayo Agenda.  The MPs 
offered an optimistic appraisal of the party,s election 
prospects in Matabeleland on the heels of the party,s 
official re-entry into the race the previous week.  The MPs 
and civil society prepresentatives agreed that 
anti-opposition militia and war veteran activity in rural 
districts were markedly less than earlier campaigns and 
continued not to be a problem in urban areas.  The MPs 
reported that some war veterans and village headmen were 
being discreetly supportive of the MDC despite relentless GOZ 
efforts to co-opt them with perks and pledges of assistance. 
 
¶3.  (C) Mzila-Ncube described the atmosphere in his rural 
South Matabeleland constituency as notably more restive over 
the weekend, however, with people fearing a possible 
escalation of violence consistent with past contested 
elections.  Local ruling party structures were conflicted: 
their leaders consistently called for non-violence and 
tolerance, but they feared certain election defeat if they 
were not allowed to resort to  intimidation as in the past. 
All agreed that there remained an atmosphere of fear, 
particularly in the rural areas, as most of the electorate 
remained skeptical of the ruling party's public commitment to 
non-violence.  Indeed, they all forecast a sudden "snap" of 
violence in rural areas if ZANU-PF leaders began to think it 
was in real danger of losing.  However, all were confident 
that Bulawayo was too public a venue and too solidly 
pro-opposition to experience any significant violence. 
 
Public Assembly Occurring Despite Constraints 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) The three MPs asserted that police and the CIO in 
Matabeleland were playing an increasingly disruptive role in 
their efforts to reach the people.  Khupe was scheduled to 
appear in court February 10 to answer charges associated with 
her arrest last month with 80 supporters for an alleged 
violation of the Public Order and Security Act (POSA). Bhebhe 
was late for the lunch because he had to meet with police in 
connection with their "investigation" of his attendance at a 
"Burial Society" meeting, also a possible POSA violation. 
Still, all agreed that some junior police supported the MDC 
and many more were sympathizers; senior levels, however, were 
pro-ZANU-PF and thoroughly politicized and all levels were 
constrained by career considerations.  Mzila-Ncube emphasized 
that official harassment in any event was hardly 
insurmountable and cited the courage of Iraqis voting last 
month as an inspirational example for Zimbabweans in enduring 
and overcoming their own obstacles to democracy. 
 
¶5.  (C) Given constraints posed by police restrictions and 
the party,s lack of access to the media, the MDC MPs said 
their party was being creative in its efforts to connect to 
the people.  In addition to approved rallies at established 
venues, unauthorized meetings were led from the back of 
pick-up trucks, which allowed for quick dispersal if 
necessary. Meetings at the homes of constituents were popular 
and could accommodate as many as 50 people at a time.  In 
rural areas, business centers and pubs were gathering areas 
that could be used for political communication on an 
impromptu basis.  House-to-house canvassing was important, 
albeit risky, and Khupe said she was planning an ambitious 
personal letter campaign.  All emphasized the importance of 
VOA's "Studio 7" (an hour-long Zimbabwe-specific program), 
which they said was widely heard in rural areas, and were 
pleased with the Ambassador,s news that it would be expanded 
to include two programs per day for the pre-election period. 
 
¶6.  (C) The civil society interolocutors  said civil society 
groups were also managing to meet publicly in spite of 
official obstacles.  Khumalo said Bulawayo Agenda organized 
about one public forum per month, bringing together party and 
community figures to address topical issues.  Police often 
denied applications for meeting authorizations, sometimes on 
specious grounds.  They imposed conditions to reduce 
participation, such as requiring meetings be conducted during 
working hours, and typically sent police representatives to 
monitor each meeting.  Ruling party figures were invited but 
rarely showed up, presumably because they were barred by 
their superiors or feared a hostile audience.  In any event, 
people were quite outspoken during the meetings and did not 
appear to suffer retribution.  Personal relationships were 
important as NGOs pursued their objectives, according to Fr. 
Johnson, and some NGOs, including Bulawayo Agenda, were 
tentatively building relationships of growing two-way trust 
with selected authorities. 
 
Town Square Test 
---------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) The three Bulawayo Agenda participants agreed that 
President Bush's "town square" test could be met in some 
parts of Zimbabwe but not others.  In Bulawayo, the urban 
masses were sufficiently numerous and unanimous in their 
loathing of the government that one could speak relatively 
freely.  Group expressions of speech could be exercised 
without retribution -- but often only with official approval. 
 Rural areas were a different story altogether, and even in 
Harare the atmosphere seemed considerably more chilled, 
perhaps because there was so much traffic between 
ZANU-PF-dominated Mashonaland and the city.  In any event, 
the well-publicized arrests of people for innocuous criticism 
of the President in public areas made people think twice, 
even if they were not common occurrences.  Ever-restrictive 
laws such as the Public Order and Security Act (POSA), the 
Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA), 
and the pending NGO bill similarly chilled free speech even 
if they were not enforced rigidly. 
 
Campaign Issues 
--------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) The three MDC MPs reported that they would be pushing 
GOZ failure to address basic needs - food, health, shelter, 
jobs - in its campaign.  ZANU-PF,s threat to individual 
security based on its historical reliance on violence also 
would be highlighted.  Convincing people that their vote was 
secret and mattered would also be an important campaign 
 
SIPDIS 
priority.  The opposition also would expose land reform as a 
fraud, although Mzila-Ncube conceded that the party had not 
fully come to grip with how to address the diverse challenges 
of land reform.  People understood the ruling party,s effort 
had been a complete failure but the MDC had not offered a 
coherent, comprehensive alternative.  The civil society group 
warned that hunger was a growing problem; children on the 
Hwange Road were now hand-signalling their hunger to all 
passers-by and the situation was even worse in the remote 
areas around Binga. 
"Opposition Will Win Matabeleland" 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) The MPs and civil society representatives were 
confident that recent ZANU-PF turmoil would boost opposition 
prospects in the election.  The MPs lamented the removal of 
more constructive ruling party elements from the ZANU-PF 
parliamentary slate but asserted that many of the discarded 
MPs were actively working against their successor candidates. 
 At a minimum, their supporters would be less inclined to 
vote even if they would not go as far as supporting the 
opposition.  Any who ran as an independent (as Jonathan Moyo 
is rumored to be considering) would divide the ZANU-PF vote, 
further enhancing opposition prospects.  Civil society 
figures agreed that support for the MDC in Matabeleland still 
stemmed primarily from opposition to ZANU-PF more than the 
appeal of any MDC platform.  All agreed that the opposition 
would lose no more than six or seven seats of 14 in 
Matabeleland North and Matabeleland South and would sweep 
Bulawayo's seven seats. 
 
Ethnic/Tribal Resentments Festering 
-------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) The MPs and civil society leaders asserted that the 
contrast between heightened police disruption in Matabeleland 
with documented trends of greater openness in Shona-dominated 
areas reflected the ruling party's deep-seated fear of 
Ndebele rebelliousness.   Some emphasized the continuing deep 
resentment felt by the Ndebele at large over the massacres of 
the 1980s and the region's economic and political 
marginalization by the GOZ ever since.  They maintained that 
the Ndebele were so used to oppression that no amount of 
intimidation would make many vote ZANU-PF.  Still, they 
conceded that discredited hard-line Information Minister 
Jonathan Moyo had achieved inroads among the Ndebele by 
delivering tangible goods -- computers, blankets, clinics -- 
to populations that heretofore had gotten nothing from the 
ruling party but intimidation.  ZANU-PF had shot itself in 
the foot by punishing his success and reasserting the 
dominance of ZANU-PF's Ndebele heavyweights such as John 
Nkomo and Dumiso Dabengwa, who were loathed as sell-outs by 
most Ndebele, according to our interlocutors. 
 
¶11.  (C) Mkhwananzi asked the Ambassador why the USG was not 
more sensitive to and supportive of Ndebele resistance 
against the Shona-dominated GOZ.  He argued that ethnic 
resentments presented the USG with an opportunity that it 
should exploit in trying to press for change in Zimbabwe. 
Drawing on the lessons of history, the Ambassador explained 
that the USG saw no advantage to fanning ethnic divisions in 
Zimbabwe or elsewhere.  The key to resolving the plight of 
the Ndebele and many other suffering Zimbabweans lay in good 
governance and establishment of a government that reflected 
the will of all of its people.  Mkhwananzi nonetheless later 
pressed the issue again, asserting that no Shona-dominated 
government, regardless of party, would ever treat the Ndebele 
fairly. 
 
Appreciation for USG Engagement 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (C) The MPs and civil society leaders expressed strong 
appreciation for the Secretary,s public characterization of 
Zimbabwe as an outpost of tyranny and stressed its importance 
as an emotional boost to a despondent populace that was 
beginning to re-energize.  Several asked what the statement 
would mean in terms of future USG commitment of resources. 
The Ambassador stressed the depth of USG commitment to 
liberty as exemplified by the Secretary's and President 
Bush's recent public statements and the USG's ongoing work 
with democratic forces in Zimbabwe. 
 
Comment 
--------- 
 
¶13.  (C) Matabeleland may be where ZANU-PF suffers most for 
its Tsholotsho and primaries debacles -- whatever local 
loyalty Moyo may have bought with his aggressive sales job 
appears to have been for naught.  Ndebele resentment of the 
ruling party is much more apparent from within Matabeleland 
than it is from Harare.  While the MDC does not appear to be 
actively exploiting that ethnic tension, it no doubt will 
continue to benefit from it.  We also got the sense that the 
local MDC MPs are more in touch than many in either party's 
national leadership with the bread and butter issues -- 
hunger, education, health, jobs -- that are central to the 
suffering of their constituents.  Deeply resentful of the 
government, the alienated electorate may produce a surprise 
result March 31.  However, overt opposition momentum may lead 
the ruling party to resort to violence, which could also 
prove a key factor in this part of Zimbabwe. 
DELL