This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HARARE 000228 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF/S FOR D. MOZENA, B. NEULING 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2010 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM SOCI ZI ZANU PF
SUBJECT: ZANU-PF DINOSAURS, DISSENTERS EXPOSE RULING PARTY 
VULNERABILITIES 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell under Section 1.4 b/d 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  During the Ambassador's February 7-9 trip 
to Bulawayo and Masvingo, ZANU-PF "Old Guard" figures 
Thenjiwe Lesabe and Dumiso Dabengwa excoriated the party's 
younger generation for their unseemly disregard for 
"liberation values," in their view, the basis for ZANU-PF's 
right to rule.  Highly regarded party outsiders Dzikamayi 
Mavhaire and Eddison Zvobgo, Jr., lamented the party's 
deepening ossification in the wake of recent purges, but 
suggested that the supplanting of hard-liners by more 
moderate Old Guard figures in Mugabe's inner circle could 
open opportunities for the opposition and the West.  The 
dissidents predicted that intra-party bitterness could cut 
into the party's election returns and yield surprising 
dividends for the opposition.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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Dinosaurs 
------------ 
 
Lesabe: Liberation Credentials Underlie Party Authority 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) At a February 7 meeting at her family home near 
Bulawayo, ZANU-PF Women,s League Chairperson and Politburo 
member Thenjiwe Lesabe denied having been involved with the 
controversial Tsholotsho meetings last year and asserted that 
her name had been included on the "Young Turks'" alternative 
presidium ticket without permission.  She blasted Information 
Minister Jonathan Moyo and other Young Turks for their 
unseemly disregard for the wishes of the party,s senior 
leadership. Rejected by the party, Moyo was now desperately 
trying to play the ethnic/tribal card -- a strategy destined 
to fail as it had with others in the past.  (N.B. Mtabeleland 
is the heartland of Zimbabwe,s largest minority, the 
Ndebele, who comprise roughly fifteen percent of the 
country,s population.)  Lesabe said Moyo had managed to 
attract support from younger elements in the party, but he 
and his supporters lacked the respect for the party,s 
liberation values that would be required of the party,s next 
generation of leadership.  Lesabe told the Ambassador that 
she remained on the Politburo but, with the President,s 
permission, was reducing her public profile to attend to her 
ailing 90-year old husband. 
 
¶3.  (C) Lesabe declined the Ambassador,s invitation to 
assess ZANU- PF,s prospects in the upcoming election.  She 
acknowledged a generational division in Matabeleland, with 
youth attracted to the MDC while the older generation 
remained loyal to the ruling party.  Lesabe described the 
atmospherics in the region generally as calm; there were some 
"rougher elements" in the cities but rural areas were 
orderly.  The retired teacher maintained that Matabeleland 
had not been left behind other regions in development, but 
later acknowledged that the region had suffered from its 
people,s reluctance to commit support to the government. 
 
Dabengwa: Uncompromising on Young Turks, Opposition, Outside 
World 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Over dinner on February 7, Politburo Member Dumiso 
Dabengwa elaborated on recent ferment in ZANU-PF.  He 
asserted that Jonathan Moyo was finished in the party.  Moyo 
appropriately recognized the party,s weaknesses in 
Matabeleland -- the legacy of massacres in the 1980s and the 
region,s lagging development -- but had tried to combat them 
in an unseemly manner.  He had been profligate in spending 
and had alienated the leadership in trying to sidestep them 
with his so-called "Tsholotsho Declaration."  Dabengwa said 
he and others in the Old Guard overcame Moyo and his allies 
through manipulation of the party,s gender parity 
resolution, specifically by having provincial committees 
declare the seats of certain individuals as reserved for 
female candidates. As an aside, Dabengwa noted that he was 
largely responsible for bringing Moyo into the ruling party 
camp as a result of an encounter at a regional conference on 
governance held at Robben Island in 1999. 
 
¶5.  (C) Dabengwa dismissed suggestions that alienation of the 
"Young Turks" would cost the ruling party, and added that 
they would be welcome back into the fold if they admitted 
their mistakes, as some already had.  For its part, the 
opposition had no record on which to run, according to 
Dabengwa.  He chastised the opposition parliamentary 
delegation from Matabeleland for not taking up his offer to 
collaborate on the Zambezi River Project in which he had 
played a prominent role.  Nonetheless, he complimented some 
of the opposition as conscientious and emphasized the 
importance of a vibrant opposition to Zimbabwe,s future -- 
including a possible ZANU-PF opposition some day. 
 
¶6.  (C) Dabengwa confirmed ZANU-PF plans to change the 
constitution after the parliamentary elections, with the 
collaboration of the opposition if necessary.  The new 
arrangement would create a Senate and a new office of Prime 
Minister.  Far from fueling a divisive fight like that 
precipitated by the recent presidium election, the new rash 
of positions would enable the ruling party to better balance 
competing factions. 
 
¶7.  (C) Dabengwa rehearsed familiar criticism of US 
"sanctions policy" and perceived double standards, and blamed 
the ruling party,s chaotic approach to land reform on 
purported US and British reneging on promises to support land 
reform compensation.  The Ambassador clarified US policy and 
corrected Dabengwa's historical mischaracterizations. 
Dabengwa bristled at the Ambassador,s challenging of GOZ 
policies and concluded that Zimbabwe would "find its way" 
regardless of what outsiders thought.  Echoing others in the 
ruling party, Dabengwa was contradictory on US sanctions, 
suggesting at once that they were causing Zimbabweans to 
suffer but not hurting him personally. 
 
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Dissenters 
------------- 
 
Mavhaire: President in Charge of Dysfunctional Party 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) ZANU-PF elder statesman and former Politburo member 
Dzekimayi Mavhaire told the Ambssador over dinner on February 
8 that the ruling party was paralyzed by a lack of meaningful 
debate.  The Tsholotsho debacle and the manipulation of 
primaries reinforced President Mugabe,s unquestioned grip on 
the party.  Ironically, though, Mugabe,s triumph on those 
fronts could cost the party in parliamentary elections - many 
disaffected party leaders and supporters would likely stay 
home on election day.  The party,s repression prevented 
ZANU-PF from competing effectively with the opposition -- the 
ruling party had little idea what the opposition stood for 
much less how it was doing with the electorate.  Moreover, 
ZANU-PF continued to kill the economy by stifling the private 
sector and encouraging public dependency on the ruling party. 
 In sum, ZANU-PF was digging itself into a hole. 
 
¶9.  (C) Mavhaire, who was suspended from the party leadership 
when he called for Mugabe's resignation in 1999, predicted 
that the election would produce some surprises.  The ruling 
party was devoting a lot of resources to reclaiming the one 
Masvingo seat it lost in 2000; it could take it back.  On the 
other hand, the rural masses "were not as sleepy as one might 
think:" and even though the financially crippled opposition 
had no record on which to run, resentment of the poverty 
wrought by ruling party policies was growing.  Disaffection 
among the ZANU-PF troops over recent purges was an additional 
factor.  The MDC could therefore make inroads into some of 
the ruling party's traditional rural strongholds. 
 
¶10.  (C) Mavhaire dismissed the potential significance of 
high profile Masvingo factional divisions -- the President 
would continue to manipulate their leaders with prospective 
punishments and rewards measured by loyalty to him.  Mavhaire 
described Vice President Msika and retired General Solomon 
Mujuru as the system,s only "untouchables."  Fallen heir 
apparent Emmerson Mnangagwa would continue to be potentially 
significant, but only insofar as his ability to get others to 
tow the line, not in his ability to stand up to the 
President.  Should a post-election constitutional amendment 
create a Prime Minister,s position, Mavhaire predicted that 
the cowed party would not suffer the kind of competitive 
ferment it experienced in the run-up to last year,s 
presidium contest -- the President would simply name his 
choice and that would be that. 
 
Zvobgo: Don't Give Up on Zimbabwe 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶11.  (C) Eddison Zvobgo, Jr., son of the late Masvingo 
political giant, forcefully echoed Mavhaire in forecasting 
potential trouble for the ruling party in the coming 
elections.  The party would suffer for its "disastrous" 
primaries and the abuse of gender diversity objectives. 
Bringing women into the leadership was a laudable goal, but 
it had been disingenuously pursued for cynical political 
advantage.  Zvobgo added that the ascendant Old Guard would 
be less effective than the recently purged Young Turks at 
delivering the vote.  He said that the MDC had meaningful 
chances not only to hold Masvingo,s urban seat, but to claim 
two to three new rural ones as well.  The opposition would 
remain strong in urban areas nationally as well as throughout 
Matabeleland.  He thought the MDC could win as many as 62 
seats, and probably at least 55 if the ruling party did not 
engineer too violent a crackdown.  However, if the leadership 
recognized its vulnerability, it would unleash violence at 
the local level, although the SADC microscope might serve to 
contain the scale to some extent. 
 
¶12.  (C) For his part, Zvobgo said his disappointment over 
being excluded from the parliamentary race would not drive 
him from politics.  He said he and other younger elements in 
the business community had long eschewed politics, preferring 
to wait until the system changed more to their liking.  In 
the past year, however, he and others had decided to be more 
proactive, and despite recent failures, they would bide their 
time until the opportunity came to make a more forceful 
contribution to change in Zimbabwe.  Zvobgo would not 
facilitate the ruling party in its national campaign but 
would maintain his party credentials by campaigning for 
fellow Young Turk Walter Mzembi in his father,s old 
constituency and by contributing to regional development.  He 
recently founded the Masvingo Press Club and was working on 
ways to bring investment and revenue to the area, such as the 
re-opening of Masvingo airport to commercial traffic and a 
road toll concept (N.B. Masvingo is on the main trucking 
route from South Africa). 
 
¶13.  (C) Looking ahead to post-election Zimbabwe, Zvobgo said 
that if the MDC won at least 50 seats, ZANU-PF would have to 
adopt a more engaging posture in order to effect its priority 
of constitutional change.  In any event, hard-liners Jonathan 
Moyo and Patrick Chinamasa would be sidelined and 
atmospherics would likely soften after the election. 
 
¶14.  (C) Zvobgo emphasized that the United States was in a 
position to make important contributions to Zimbabwe,s 
political development but expressed concern that we may be 
giving up on Zimbabwe.  The ascendancy of "moderates" at the 
expense of hardliners in recent purges presented us with an 
opportunity.  Old Guard moderates like Nkomo, Shamuyarira, 
Gono, and even retired General Solomon Mujuru were in a 
position to influence Mugabe positively, but needed to be 
able to show him that a more moderate approach at home and 
abroad could bring advantages:  "The ice needs to melt before 
they can get their heads above water."  The international 
community could exert positive influence on key issues, like 
the NGO bill, with proper care.  Shrill denunciations and 
public demands only provoked more rigid resistance and 
fortified a sterile anti-imperialist posture.  As an aside, 
Zvobgo asserted that we should not count on South Africa for 
any decisive influence -- Mugabe had correctly assessed that 
there were no conditions under which Mbeki would be willing 
to stand up to him or exert any meaningful pressure on the 
GOZ. 
 
Comment 
----------- 
 
¶15.  (C) The contrasting accounts offered by dinosaurs Lesabe 
and Dabengwa and dissenters Mavhaire and Zvobgo underscore 
the ruling party's most glaring vulnerability: its increasing 
brittleness and internal divisions.  Representative of many 
in the ascendant Old Guard, Lesabe and Dabengwa seemed 
thoroughly out of touch with the bread and butter priorities 
central to the lives of most Zimbabweans -- food security, 
education, health care, employment.  Their denial of ethnic 
tensions in historically marginalized Matabeleland is at odds 
with the accounts we heard from opposition members and civil 
society in the region (to be reported septel).  The sole 
basis of their claimed legitimacy to lead -- devotion to the 
liberation struggle -- is increasingly irrelevant to most of 
the electorate, half of which was "born free" after 
liberation. 
 
¶16.  (C) The alienation of figures sidelined by Tsholotsho 
and the primaries -- including a majority of provincial 
chairmen, many of the party's most dynamic backbenchers, and 
a number of prominent businesspersons -- could dent the 
party's considerable systemic advantages going into the 
elections.  Certainly, the absence of these figures from the 
party's inner circles will likely leave the party more 
moribund in outlook and less nimble in responding to changing 
events.  That said, the sacking of influential hard-line 
Young Turks might also lead to more moderate domestic and 
foreign policies, especially economic, and may give us an 
opening to increase our influence with and leverage over the 
regime.  Interestingly, none of our disaffected interlocutors 
or their alienated colleagues appear even to consider the 
possibility of "defecting" to the opposition.  They 
apparently calculate that ZANU-PF remains the vehicle 
best-suited to address their personal priorities for now, 
even as they bide their time for a change in leadership they 
desire but are unwilling to fight for. 
 
DELL