This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

231016Z Feb 05

UNCLAS HANOI 000437 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL VM ARF ASEAN
SUBJECT:  EAST ASIA SUMMIT:  VIETNAM'S TAKE ON RECENT ASEAN 
SENIOR OFFICIALS MEETINGS 
 
REF:  A. Vientiane 108; B. 04 Hanoi 3042; C. Hanoi 42 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  During recent Senior Officials Meetings 
in Hanoi and Jakarta, ASEAN members agreed that ASEAN should 
be at the center of East Asia Summit (EAS) process, the 
ASEAN chair should be the EAS chair and the EAS should be 
held in an ASEAN country (with exceptions made only under 
special circumstances).  The issues of openness and 
frequency remain unresolved:  Vietnam is pushing for the 
inclusion of India, Australia and New Zealand and for the 
EAS to take place every three years.  Although our 
interlocutor suggested that a decision to include India and 
others "has already been made," until these issues are 
formally resolved, ASEAN will not officially present its 
position to China, Japan and the ROK.  The March SOM in 
Jakarta may present the next opportunity to reach agreement 
on outstanding issues.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Ministry of Foreign Affairs ASEAN Department Deputy 
Director General Nguyen Tien Minh told us February 23 that 
the February 16-18 ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) in 
Rangoon was a continuation of the ASEAN SOM "brainstorming 
session" held in Hanoi January 12-14 (Ref A), with the 
modalities of the East Asia Summit (EAS) the focus of 
discussion at both meetings.  The ten members of ASEAN 
reached agreement that, whatever form the EAS ultimately 
takes, ASEAN should "be at the center of the EAS process." 
Furthermore, they agreed in Hanoi and Rangoon that, at the 
EAS, ASEAN should "speak with one voice," that the ASEAN 
chair should always chair the EAS and that the EAS should be 
held in an ASEAN country.  That said, a decision to hold the 
EAS outside ASEAN could be made on a "case-by-case basis" 
under "special circumstances," Minh explained. 
 
¶3. (SBU) With several key matters still unresolved, ASEAN is 
not yet ready to present its consensus position to China, 
Japan and Korea.  The most important among these is the 
issue of "openness," Minh continued.  Vietnam's position is 
that the EAS should be open to a number of countries outside 
the ASEAN Plus 3 framework, namely India, Australia and New 
Zealand.  Vietnam considers this position to be "middle of 
the road."  (Note:  Certain ASEAN members are strongly 
opposed to expanding the EAS beyond the current ASEAN Plus 3 
members.  Others want to see many of the current ASEAN 
Regional Forum members included.  Adding India, Australia 
and New Zealand is seen as the middle ground between these 
positions.  End note.)  It seems, Minh said, that the 
"decision to include additional countries such as India has 
already been made," and ASEAN now has to decide "how and in 
what format" to include them.  ASEAN may reach a final 
decision on this during the March SOM in Jakarta, Minh 
added. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The issue of frequency also remains unresolved. 
Vietnam's preference is to hold the EAS every three years, 
but some in ASEAN are looking to increase the frequency to 
once every two years.  From Vietnam's perspective, the EAS 
will be a chance for the region's leadership to get together 
to exchange ideas and "discuss strategic and transnational 
issues."  The EAS is "highly unlikely" to be anything more 
than a "talkfest" like the Asia-Europe Summit Meeting 
(ASEM), and Vietnam will continue to look to APEC and the 
ASEAN Plus 3 as the key forums to discuss and carry out 
cooperative measures. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Comment:  The GVN seems uncomfortable with its 
position in the EAS debate.  Vietnam's regional foreign 
policy is based on maintaining a strong connection to ASEAN 
and on preserving that organization's preeminent position in 
Asian diplomacy as a way to ensure that the smaller 
countries of Southeast Asia (including Vietnam) are not 
trampled by the political and economic heavyweights of 
Northeast Asia.  At the same time, Vietnam maintains close 
relations with China and, on matters that do not involve 
Sino-Vietnamese territorial questions (such as the 
Spratlys), supports Chinese positions in international 
forums.  In the EAS debate, however, Vietnam feels that the 
interests of ASEAN and the interests of China are opposed: 
supporting China's position on the EAS would necessarily 
mean diluting the importance of the ASEAN Plus 3 mechanism. 
Vietnam is finding it difficult to simultaneously placate 
China, shore up ASEAN and avoid confrontation with its pro- 
EAS neighbors.  The likely outcome is that Vietnam, which 
lacks both experience and expertise in multilateral 
diplomacy, will choose the path of least resistance and join 
ASEAN consensus on this issue.  End Comment. 
 
MARINE