This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

171032Z Feb 05

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FM AMEMBASSY GABORONE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1721
INFO SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
NSC WASHDC

UNCLAS  GABORONE 000243 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
AF/S FOR DIFFILY 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV BC
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION PARTIES CONSIDER COOPERATION, AGAIN 
 
REF (A) 04 Gaborone 1816 REF (B) 04 Gaborone 1606 REF (C) 04 
 
Gaborone 1873 REF (D) Gaborone 56 
 
¶1. (SBU)  Summary:  Energized by growth in their share of 
the popular vote in the October 2004 elections, Botswana's 
opposition parties are debating with renewed vigor how 
cooperation could embarrass, if not unseat, the ruling 
Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) in 2009.  In order to 
achieve that objective, opposition leadership will have to 
demonstrate a quantum shift toward a more pro-active, 
practical style and map out a coherent strategy.  Despite 
residual suspicious attitudes toward the U.S., the Mission 
will continue to reach out to opposition parties to 
cultivate more informed views on the U.S. and its policies 
in their growing ranks.  End Summary. 
 
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OPPOSITION SUPPORT GROWING 
-------------------------- 
 
¶2. (U)  The results of the October 2004 elections have 
inspired opposition parties to re-examine the importance of 
solidarity with greater enthusiasm (Ref A). The Botswana 
National Front (BNF), the biggest opposition party, 
contested elections in partnership with the much smaller 
Botswana Alliance Movement (BAM) and Botswana People's Party 
(BPP).  The BNF garnered 12 parliamentary seats, doubling 
its previous number; BAM and BPP did not win any.  The 
Botswana Congress Party (BCP) lost its parliamentary seat 
from Okavango but gained one from the Gaborone Central 
constituency.  Both the BNF and BCP significantly increased 
their numbers of local council members. 
 
¶3. (U)  Although opposition parties won less than a quarter 
of the seats in the National Assembly, they attracted 48 
percent of the popular vote, up from 43 percent in 1999.  In 
twelve constituencies, a BDP candidate won with less than 
half the vote, thanks to competition between opposition 
parties.  In two more, the combined opposition vote fell 
short by fewer than 100 ballots.  Both the BNF and the BCP 
have unanimously acknowledged the need for cooperation if 
they want to avoid, in the National Assembly of 2009, a 
recurrence of their disproportionate under-representation. 
 
¶4. (SBU)  The response to these facts and figures on the 
part of the ruling BDP has been mixed.  Former party 
Executive Secretary and now specially-elected MP Botsalo 
Ntuane downplayed the likelihood that the opposition parties 
will find a means to combine their support in the next 
election.  In contrast, Ntuane's successor as Executive 
Secretary, Batlang "Comma" Serema, asserted that the BDP is 
 
SIPDIS 
in danger of losing the government.  MP and former cabinet 
minister Boyce Sebetela told the press "the numbers indicate 
that the opposition is taking power.  The writing is on the 
wall."  If, like Ntuane, the BDP over-confidently dismisses 
the threat posed by a united opposition, it could find 
itself with a significantly diminished parliamentary caucus 
in five years. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
EARLY SIGNS POSITIVE FOR OPPOSITION UNITY 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (U)  Initial indications of the likelihood that 
opposition parties will devise a means of cooperation are 
positive.  Reports from Botswana Congress Party (BCP) 
internal consultative workshops in January suggest that the 
party leadership is leaning toward a pact-like arrangement 
with the other opposition parties.  Ironically, the BCP 
declined to join a similar joint venture for the 2004 
elections, arguing that the proposal emerged too late to act 
upon it.  The BNF has reiterated the imperative of 
opposition unity and expressed its desire to work with the 
BCP.  Some in the Botswana Alliance Movement have spoken in 
favor of merging all opposition groups into a single party. 
Such a merger would have to include the BNF and BCP to make 
an appreciable impact, but the BCP has already rejected the 
notion. 
 
¶6. (U)  Hard feelings between members of the BNF and BCP, 
stemming from their 1998 split, which contributed to their 
resounding defeat in the 1999 election, could impede 
attempts at unity.  Competition for coveted positions at the 
local level, however, poses a greater threat.  A senior 
leader in the BNF argued that shortsighted reluctance among 
council candidates to make way for their colleagues from 
other parties where the latter have an advantage could sink 
efforts to cooperate.  In the recent election, the Pact 
failed to prevent incidents of such rebellion when it 
 
consisted only of the BAM, BPP, and the much larger BNF. 
Adding the BCP, which actually contested more constituencies 
than did the BNF in 2004, would magnify this challenge. 
Given Botswana's relatively small political class, 
personalities and personality conflicts play a 
disproportionate role in national politics.  Whether or not 
old grudges and unwillingness to make short-term sacrifices 
frustrate attempts to forge opposition unity hinges on the 
leadership within these parties. 
 
------------------------ 
CHARISMA, WHAT CHARISMA? 
------------------------ 
 
¶7. (SBU)  Leaders within the two biggest opposition parties, 
the BNF and BCP, have an indifferent record of creating and 
exploiting opportunities to undermine support for the BDP. 
BNF Secretary General and leader of the opposition in 
parliament Akanyang Magama unwittingly but brilliantly 
captured part of this problem by stating in a February 7 
interview "I don't know about this charisma that people are 
talking about." Former BNF leader Dr. Kenneth Koma, by 
contrast, largely built the party on his ability to move a 
crowd.  Although the passing of Koma from the political 
scene has liberated the BNF from his personality cult and 
his ideological focus, the party's current leaders have not 
similarly aroused and inspired supporters. 
 
¶8. (SBU)  In a prior meeting with the Ambassador, Magama 
presented himself as a reserved party man with policy views 
heavily colored by outdated ideological debates.  He failed 
to clearly outline his vision for Botswana and a strategy 
for expanding the BNF's support over the next five years. 
Although Magama was able to restore some order to the BNF, 
leadership with a different skill set, including crucial 
intangibles like charisma, would contribute powerfully to 
expanding the party's presence in BDP strongholds. 
 
¶9. (U)  The BNF's publicity secretary Mohammed Khan, who 
possesses some of these qualities, has announced his 
candidacy to replace Magama as party secretary general at 
its triennial congress in July.  Khan, who narrowly lost to 
the BDP candidate in Molepolole North, has long played an 
important role in the BNF and may well defeat Magama. 
 
¶10. (SBU)  Otlaadisa Koosaletse, President of the BCP, also 
lacks charisma.  The BCP prides itself in reaching out to 
the disaffected youth of Botswana.  Consequently, some argue 
that a younger candidate would more aptly fit the party's 
profile.  Koosaletse himself has recognized the importance 
of turning over the reins to a new generation within the 
party but indicated his willingness to remain president for 
another three-year term.  If Koosaletse were to make an 
early exit, however, it is not clear who would replace him. 
Therefore it seems likely that Koosaletse will remain as 
President of the BCP for another three years and use that 
time to groom a cadre of younger leaders. 
 
¶11. (SBU)  The personal appeal of Vice President Khama puts 
the opposition leaders at a particular disadvantage. 
Although Khama is reserved and speaks only rough Setswana, 
his background projects an aura of leadership.  Former 
Commander of the Botswana Defense Force, son of Botswana's 
first president and paramount chief of the Bamangwato, Khama 
fits the profile of a leader.  Charismatic personalities 
such as the BNF's Robert Molefhabangwe and the BCP's 
Dumelang Saleshando do exist within the opposition.  To 
defeat the BDP, the opposition must develop such talent. 
 
------------------------------ 
ATTACK BDP'S GOVERNANCE RECORD 
------------------------------ 
 
¶12. (SBU)  Opposition parties are already united in their 
assessment of the issues on which the BDP is vulnerable. 
Unemployment, poverty, unequal distribution of the benefits 
of growth, and lack of accountability were key themes of the 
2004 campaign and will remain relevant during the next five 
years (Ref B).  While opposition figures uniformly endorse 
Vision 2016, the GOB's development objectives for the 
nation's golden anniversary, they pillory the BDP for poor 
implementation.  Ephraim Setshwaelo, leader in the Botswana 
Alliance Movement, articulated lack of transparency in 
policy formation as an issue of popular concern.  He cited 
the uproar over the recently passed Abolition of Marital 
Powers Act, especially complaints that the Government rode 
roughshod over the House of Chiefs, ignored religious 
groups, and failed to build support among constituents. 
Setshwaelo depicted this incident as indicative of a growing 
 
consensus that the BDP has taken its position of power for 
granted. 
 
----------------------------------- 
BDP RIFT A WINDFALL FOR OPPOSITION? 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶13. (SBU)  A third prong of opposition parties' nebulous 
strategy for 2009 is to exploit the factional fighting 
within the BDP.  The BDP has never been as divided as it is 
today (Refs C and D).  A leading light of the BCP told 
PolOff that the opposition parties are in contact with the 
disaffected members of the BDP and are positioning 
themselves to woo potential defectors.  Their ability to do 
this will rest on their success in forming a common front 
and effectively mobilizing public discontent.  Open 
speculation by BDP Secretary General Daniel Kwelagobe about 
the possibility of a resurgent opposition and a breakaway 
faction of the BDP combining forces to dislodge the ruling 
party suggests that this strategy is not unrealistic. 
 
----------------------------- 
IMPLICATIONS FOR US INTERESTS 
----------------------------- 
 
¶14. (U)  An ascendant opposition likely has no significant 
negative impact on U.S. interests in Botswana.  Some BNF 
leaders have publicly criticized the U.S. for its role -- or 
lack thereof -- in the Israel-Palestine conflict, the war in 
Iraq, and the U.S.' alleged domination of the UN, but many 
within the BDP share the same misgivings.  More 
significantly, the socialist ideological background of the 
BNF, and its spin-off party, the BCP, is gradually receding. 
Whereas the BNF previously rejected privatization of state- 
owned enterprises outright, they now recognize that 
privatization and foreign direct investment have a role to 
play in development.  In short, the opposition parties have 
come to terms with the changing world since 1989. 
 
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INSTITUTIONAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶15. (U)  Certain institutional and demographic factors 
beyond the control of the opposition parties have a 
significant impact on their prospects in the medium to long 
term.  The campaign finance regime and first-past-the-post 
system of representation favor the BDP.  Although opposition 
parties routinely assail this practice as unfair and 
undemocratic, it is unlikely to change soon.  But 
demographic factors, particularly migration from rural to 
urban areas and the gradual passing of the generation old 
enough to vote in the early post-independence period, favor 
the opposition.  These trends mark the end of the BDP's 
extended holiday in power and the beginning of an era in 
which the BDP will have to earn each vote. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶16. (SBU)  Continued growth in support for opposition 
parties will fundamentally transform the role of opposition 
leaders.  Previously, these individuals acted as gadflies to 
the government, ever vigilant to condemn policy mistakes, 
maladministration and corruption but not necessarily bound 
to identify and advance development solutions.  Their 
growing constituency -- among the youth and the urban 
unemployed -- will require that they act as leaders, not 
only of a political movement but also of the nation.  As the 
role of opposition parties changes, Mission will target its 
outreach efforts, aiming to instill in this constituency a 
better understanding of the U.S. and its policies. 
 
HUGGINS 
 
 
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