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Viewing cable 05DUBLIN143, PEACE PROCESS: GOI SHAKEN BY SECOND IRA STATEMENT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05DUBLIN143 2005-02-04 16:06 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Dublin
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DUBLIN 000143 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2015 
TAGS: PREL PTER PINR EI UK NIPP
SUBJECT: PEACE PROCESS: GOI SHAKEN BY SECOND IRA STATEMENT 
BUT FAVORS "INCLUSION" 
 
 
Classified By: AMB JAMES C. KENNY 
 
 1. (S)  SUMMARY:  Amb Kenny met February 4 with Michael 
Collins, second Secretary General to PM Ahern, and Ahern's 
senior advisor on Northern Ireland.  The ambassador indicated 
that the USG is inclined not to invite Northern Ireland 
political parties to the March 17 White House event. Collins 
said the GOI believes engagement with Sinn Fein is better 
than exclusion, and asked if the USG would be willing to 
defer a decision in case the environment improves.  Collins 
said the GOI strategy regarding the peace process was to "sit 
tight" and let Sinn Fein find its way back in, following 
strong messages from the GOI and UK to Sinn Fein leaders. 
However, Collins said the second IRA statement made the 
situation worse.  He said the GOI considered the February 3 
IRA statement "ominous" and was "unnerved" by it.  In 
response to the ambassador's request for more information on 
the bank robbery, Collins said the GOI information came 
mostly from the UK and from PSNI-Garda contacts, a point 
reinforced later on February 4 in a telephone conversation 
from Sean Aylward, Secretary General of DOJ.  Aylward added 
that the GOI has a "very strong view" that Sinn Fein should 
not be excluded from the United States, which he wishes to 
discuss in person with the Ambassador at their scheduled 
February 8 meeting.  (Note: Aylward did not specify on the 
phone whether he was expressing a general view on visas for 
Sinn Fein or a specific view on March 17 events.)  Separately 
this week, POL/ECON chief met with political figures active 
in the peace process, all of whom echoed some of Michael 
Collins' concerns:  uncertainty over whether Sinn Fein is 
serious about peace, whether it can bring the IRA along or 
would be willing to break from the IRA, and uncertainty over 
whether Sinn Fein is in full control of the IRA. 
Interlocutors also commented on the domestic political 
implications of the current impasse.  DCM and POL/ECON Chief 
also attended the meeting with Collins.  End Summary. 
 
March 17 
-------- 
2. (S) On February 4, Ambassador Kenny briefed Michael 
Collins on current USG thinking about the March 17 events, 
emphasizing that the most important aspect of the occasion is 
the President's meeting with the Taoiseach (PM Ahern).  He 
told Collins that the USG at this point is inclined not to 
invite any of the Northern Ireland parties to the White House 
but instead to honor civic leaders.  When asked for GOI 
views, Collins said that it was of course a USG decision to 
make but it was a decision that would have ramifications in 
Ireland.  He said that the situation is "tense" and the GOI 
does not want it to worsen.  The GOI feels that engagement 
with Sinn Fein is better than exclusion.  Noting that the 
situation is fluid, he said that the Taoiseach would prefer 
that no decision be made, yet, on White House participation. 
Collins seemed especially concerned that no decision be 
announced next week, given that the week will already be 
highly charged because of the release of the International 
Independent Monitoring Commission's report on the Northern 
Bank robbery.  The discussion then turned to Sinn Fein's visa 
requests for events in the U.S. around St. Patrick's Day, 
apart from the White House.  Collins reiterated the GOI's 
strong view that giving Sinn Fein visas to the U.S. helps the 
peace process. 
 
 
IRA Statements of February 2 and 3 
---------------------------------- 
 
3.  (C)  Collins said that the long IRA statement of February 
2 had not worried the GOI because it seemed natural for the 
IRA to take its decommissioning offer off the table given the 
abeyance in the peace process. However, he said the February 
3 statement had caught them by surprise. Collins said the GOI 
believed the two statements were written by different 
drafters.  The February 3 statement, he said, looked like the 
style of the Chief of Staff of the IRA.  He called the 
statement "ominous" and said it had left GOI officials 
"unnerved and anxious."  He then referred to Sinn Fein's 
Martin McGuinness' claim of also having no prior knowledge of 
the statement.  He said that if McGuinness genuinely did not 
know in advance that the IRA would issue a second statement 
February 3, that could signal that Sinn Fein is genuinely 
breaking from the IRA.  While that might indicate Sinn Fein's 
seriousness about pursuing peace, it would raise other 
issues.  Was Sinn Fein losing control over the IRA?  If Sinn 
Fein no longer can or will serve as a conduit to the IRA, who 
will? Collins then noted that McGuinness did not repudiate 
the IRA statement, which he implied would tend to indicate no 
change in Sinn Fein's relationship with the IRA. 
 
4. (C)  Comment:  Michael Collins' uncertainty about Sinn 
Fein's intentions and Sinn Fein's control over the IRA were 
echoed in comments across the political spectrum this week, 
including in conversations with Senator Martin Mansergh, 
former government advisor on Northern Ireland; staff from the 
Glencree Center for reconciliation; and a Fianna Fail 
political advisor.  That Michael Collins and others so long 
and deeply engaged in the peace process would be so uncertain 
of Sinn Fein's intentions is not a good omen for the peace 
process.  It indicates the degree to which the bank robbery 
destroyed the government's trust in Sinn Fein.  Meanwhile, 
uncertainty about Sinn Fein's interest in peace or control 
over the IRA, combined with the IRA's February 3 statement, 
clearly has officials worried.  The government steadfastly 
holds onto engagement with Sinn Fein because it sees no other 
alternative.  End Comment 
 
Peace Process 
------------- 
 
5. (C)  Michael Collins said that the GOI's approach to the 
peace process was to "sit tight" and let Sinn Fein find its 
way back.  Equally, the GOI will stay engaged with Sinn Fein, 
including a February 4 meeting between FM Dermott Ahern and 
Martin McGuinness, Sinn Fein's chief negotiator.  Collins 
said that until the bank robbery, there was every expectation 
that a comprehensive agreement would be reached.  He said the 
two outstanding issues, decommissioning and criminality, had 
been considered resolvable until the bank robbery -- which he 
termed a "tragedy that stopped everything." Senator Martin 
Mansergh, who remains influential in the peace process and 
close to the Taoiseach, was more expansive.  He said that 
Sinn Fein must get the message to draw a line under 
paramilitarism and criminality.  Echoing what we have also 
heard from DFA, Mansergh said that since the robbery, there 
is no longer any willingness to accept Sinn Fein's argument 
that it needs time to bring the IRA along.  Like other 
contacts, Mansergh said that ten years is long enough and 
this time, all around talks can only begin on the basis of 
the IRA winding up.  Neither Mansergh nor any government 
official has yet defined what they would need from Sinn Fein. 
 They say that they will not again work on a comprehensive 
package only to have it fall apart at the end because of the 
IRA yet also say they would not expect decommissioning and a 
cessation of criminality to be a pre-requisite to all party 
talks. 
 
GOI Information on the Northern Bank Robbery 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
6. (S)  Collins said that the GOI's judgment on the robbery 
was based almost exclusively on UK intelligence.  He also 
said that intelligence is handled very differently in the 
British and Irish governments.  In the Irish government, many 
officials, including himself, do not receive any intelligence 
reports.  The tradition instead is to take the word of the 
Garda.  Later on February 4, at Michael Collins' request, 
Sean Aylward, DOJ Secretary General called the ambassador. 
Aylward said that he would be more precise with the 
Ambassador during their scheduled February 8 meeting, but 
confirmed that UK and PSNI information, combined with 
Ireland's long experience with the IRA, was the basis for the 
GOI assessment that IRA was behind the robbery.  He said the 
GOI has no smoking gun or hard evidence but that the GOI 
considered it 99% certain that IRA conducted the robbery. 
Among several reasons, he said that no group other than IRA 
could have entered the neighborhood in which the bank manager 
lived.  He described it as a "no go" area for the PSNI and 
splinter groups.  He also said no other group would have the 
discipline, this many weeks after the robbery, not to try to 
use a bank note, or provide information on the van or any 
other aspect of the robbery.  He said that the GOI does have 
"rock solid evidence" that Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness 
are members of the IRA military command and for that reason, 
the Taoiseach is certain they would have known in advance of 
the robbery. 
 
Domestic Implications 
--------------------- 
 
7. (C)  The GOI's all-out verbal offensive against Sinn Fein 
has tongues wagging about domestic politics.  Martin Mansergh 
volunteered that as much as the Taoiseach is thinking about 
the 2007 elections, he values the peace process more and 
would sacrifice political gain if he thought peace would be 
advanced.  Mansergh told POL/ECON chief that the bank robbery 
has damaged Sinn Fein in the Republic.  While not yet 
reflected in poll numbers, Mansergh and other political 
operatives, believe (or hope) that some Sinn Fein voters will 
go elsewhere now that it is clear that Sinn Fein can not 
become part of any government in the Republic as long as IRA 
activity continues.  On radio, Mansergh made the point more 
colorfully: "The truth is that Sinn Fein, regardless of extra 
seats they might or mightn't win, wouldn't come within an 
asses' roar of power north or south of the Border until the 
IRA is off the pitch." 
8. (C) Another idea sporadically under consideration is that 
Fianna Fail could start competing in elections in Northern 
Ireland.  The argument is that Fianna Fail's best way of 
confronting Sinn Fein in the Republic is to become an 
all-island party.  Some think doing so could also give 
nationalists in the north an alternative to Sinn Fein, given 
the SDLP's waning fortunes.  Mansergh did not see this as a 
short term prospect, in part because the SDLP has not yet 
indicated an interest in merging with Fianna Fail.  Derek 
Mooney, Fianna Fail's political advisor to the Defense 
Minister, says the opposite.  He said the bank robbery is 
rapidly changing the prospective and it is the right time for 
Fianna Fail to move north.  He noted that most of SDLP's 
former voters are not voting at all, and only a small 
percentage shifted to Sinn Fein.  This, he said, leaves space 
for a nationalist party with a vision for the future, a space 
Mooney thinks SDLP will never re-gain because it is seen only 
as a peace process party.  Mooney said Fianna Fail took a 
significant step in November 2004 when it changed its rules, 
allowing full membership for people not resident in the 
Republic.  The rules also allow a person to be a member of 
both Fianna Fail and SDLP.  Mooney provides campaign advice 
to SDLP. 
KENNY