This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 CANBERRA 000354 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
STATE FOR T, EAP/K, EAP/ANP AND NP/RA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2015 
TAGS: MARR PARM PREL KNNP AS KS KN IAEA
SUBJECT: COMMANDER OF UN FORCES IN KOREA GENERAL LAPORTE 
DISCUSSES NORTH KOREA WITH AUSTRALIAN FM DOWNER 
 
Classified By: CDA BILL STANTON FOR REASONS 1.4 (A, B AND D). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  In a meeting with Australian Foreign 
Minister Alexander Downer on February 16, U.S. General Leon 
LaPorte, Commander of the UN Command in Korea, described the 
dramatic changes taking place in the ROK, in particular at 
the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), where the UN Command's role is 
also changing rapidly.  He outlined the significant 
transformation of the U.S. and ROK forces and gave context to 
the drawdown of 12,500 troops from South Korea, a "rock 
solid" U.S. ally.  While agreeing that the Six-Party Talks 
should continue, Downer thought the international community 
ought to do more to pressure the DPRK, such as by 
invigorating Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) 
activities against the North Koreans.  As LaPorte described 
the current conventional war-fighting capabilities of the 
DPRK military, Downer speculated on the actual number of 
nuclear warheads Pyongyang might possess.  Downer suggested 
that aid that could prop up the DPRK's failing infrastructure 
should be withheld in order to bring an end to the regime's 
tyranny.  End Summary. 
 
CHANGES ON THE KOREAN PENNINSULA 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) General LaPorte briefed FM Downer, at his request, on 
the current status of the Korean Penninsula.  Explaining that 
he was visiting Australia and New Zealand in his role as UN, 
and not U.S., Commander, LaPorte noted the significant 
changes taking place in the ROK.  The Demilitarized Zone 
(DMZ), after 50 years as the world's most heavily defended 
turf, had also changed dramatically over the past 18 months. 
While only handfuls of people had traversed the DMZ 
previously, now hundreds, and potentially thousands, were 
doing so daily, thanks to the construction of two super 
highways and railway lines linking the two sides.  The UN 
Command's role was to enforce the armistice and facilitate 
crossings, so its role was changing as well.  This was a 
result of the Roh Government's outreach policy to the North 
Koreans.  LaPorte praised the ROK as a "rock solid" ally of 
the U.S. 
 
RECONFIGURING U.S. FORCES 
------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Asked by Downer about the downsizing of U.S. Forces 
in Korea, LaPorte explained that a total of 12,500 U.S. 
troops would be withdrawn from a total of 37,500 over five 
years.  Five thousand had already departed.  Meanwhile, 
technological capabilities were dramatically improving.  The 
U.S. forces had been spread among 100 camps and stations 
across South Korea.  Where they had once been "at the end of 
a dusty trail," many of the U.S. bases were now surrounded by 
urban developments and therefore needed to be reconfigured. 
As both U.S. and ROK forces transformed and consolidated 
their bases to reduce irritants to local communities, certain 
military tasks were also being transferred to ROK forces. 
Because the U.S. military was an all-volunteer force, it was 
significant that the consolidation of bases would enable 
improvements to the quality of life for the stationed troops, 
which would in turn facilitate recruitment. 
 
¶4.  (C) Downer agreed that capabilities were more important 
than numbers of troops in this era, but he asked whether all 
South Koreans agreed that this was the right time to 
downsize.  LaPorte said some Korean conservatives were 
concerned, but after 50 years it was time to readjust the 
U.S. force structure.  The USG's commitment and adherence to 
the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty with the ROK remained 
steadfast, and USFK were being transformed in cooperation 
with the ROKG and the South Korean people.  He pointed to a 
USD 11 billion investment in improving U.S. forces' 
capabilities in the ROK. 
 
CAPABLE ROK FORCES 
------------------ 
 
¶5.  (C) Downer asked for details on ROK forces.  LaPorte told 
him there were 780,000 in uniform, and about 450,000 of those 
were army.  He said the South Korean conscripts were quite 
well-equipped and trained.  Downer asked COL Moug, the 
Australian Defence Attache in Seoul who attended the meeting, 
for details of interaction between the Australian Defence 
Force (ADF) and ROK forces.  Moug replied that most 
interactions were high-level exchanges, although several 
South Korean exchange students were also at Australian 
Defence Academies.  He noted that the two countries' Special 
Forces officers had expressed interest in exercising together. 
 
NORTH KOREAN MILITARY CAPABILITIES 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (S/NF) FM Downer asked if it was correct that DPRK forces 
could unleash artillery shells and missiles into the Seoul 
basin and inflict tremendous damage before UN forces could 
neutralize their capability.  LaPorte said there were some 
250 North Korean underground artillery positions within range 
of Seoul which could fire high-explosive or chemical-filled 
shells.  DPRK missiles could reach all of South Korea and 
Japan.  However, the North Koreans' ability to win a 
conventional war was doubtful.  Even with 1.2 million under 
arms, its air force and naval capabilities were limited.  The 
DPRK had 18 MIG-29s; the other airplanes were much older. 
Its tanks were mostly old T-55s.  DPRK pilots averaged 12 
hours of flight training per year, while U.S. and ROK pilots 
received 12 - 15 hours per month.  Sustainability and 
logistics capabilities were "not there," LaPorte stated.  The 
artillery, though old, was the main threat.  So the DPRK's 
leverage, Downer surmised, was the damage it could inflict on 
Seoul.  LaPorte concurred, calling it the "tyranny of 
proximity."  "Not that any of us believe in pre-emption," 
Downer chuckled, but what could the UN forces do if they 
thought it was necessary?  General LaPorte emphasized that 
all of the Combined Forces Command (CFC) operational plans 
were premised on reacting to a North Korean attack. 
 
SIX-PARTY TALKS: WHAT ELSE CAN BE DONE? 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Downer stated that the universal line that the 
Six-Party Talks (6PT) had to resume was correct, but they 
also had to be effective.  He thought there ought to be ways 
to bring additional pressure to bear on the DPRK leadership. 
He assumed Japan would be the first to apply sanctions; the 
rest of us needed to have plans in place, he urged.  How the 
North Koreans would react to Japanese sanctions was anybody's 
guess, Downer said.  General LaPorte noted that U.S. 
Ambassador to Korea Chris Hill had been named to replace 
EAP/AS James Kelly, and would take over the U.S. lead on the 
6PT as well.  The General expressed the USG's desire to 
continue the 6PT process and find a diplomatic solution, 
pointing out the irony of the accusations about U.S. 
unilateralism when the U.S. was working hard to keep the 
negotiations with the DPRK multilateral.  North Korea would 
like nothing better than bilateral negotiations with the 
U.S., he remarked. 
 
¶8.  (C) Downer said bilateralizing the talks with the DPRK 
would be a huge mistake, not least because it was China which 
had the most leverage on North Korea.  He noted that China 
wanted to play the role of honest broker and that was not 
good enough; Beijing had to understand that it had to bring 
its leverage to bear on Pyongyang.  In addition, new 
strategies had to be devised to further constrain the North 
Koreans.  The Foreign Minister called the PSI a worthy 
initiative, mentioning that Australia was a core player. 
Perhaps, he suggested, the PSI could be brought to bear more 
vigorously, although the North Koreans would "cry blue 
murder" in Beijing. 
 
NORTH KOREAN NUKES 
------------------ 
 
¶9.  (S/NF) The FM asked General LaPorte how many nuclear 
warheads he thought the DPRK had: two or three?  Downer and 
his Senior Adviser Haynes mentioned that IAEA DG ElBaradei 
had said Pyongyang could have as many as six, based on the 
number of fuel rods the North Koreans possessed.  LaPorte 
thought the DPRK had the capacity to make more than two or 
three warheads, given the amount of plutonium "harvested" 
before the 1994 agreement and based on the DPRK's own claim 
of having reprocessed the 8,000 spent fuel rods after the 
agreement had ended.  It was a high-risk strategy, he 
observed, that the North Koreans thought would lead to a big 
payoff but most likely would not.  Downer agreed, noting it 
only strengthened the resolve of the international community. 
 LaPorte commented that North Korea's ambiguity about whether 
it had nuclear weapons had served it well in the past.  Now 
that it had confessed to having them, countries that had been 
sitting on the fence would have second thoughts. 
 
UN COMMAND, DPRK INFRASTRUCTURE AND BLEEDING HEARTS 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶10.  (C/NF) Asked to describe how the U.S. forces and the UN 
Command structure worked, LaPorte and COL Kevin Madden of the 
UN Command's Military Armistice Commission, explained that a 
U.S. General served as the UN Commander and the U.S. 
Secretary of Defense served as the UN Command's Executive 
 
SIPDIS 
Agent.  The UN Command in Korea reported annually to the UN 
Security Council and could do so more often if it wished. 
LaPorte emphasized that the transportation corridors through 
the DMZ represented the greatest change to the way South 
Koreans, at least, had lived for the past 50 years.  Downer 
and Madden compared their personal experiences in Pyongyang, 
with Downer calling the DPRK capital "pathetic" with its 
darkened streets, cracked pavements and unmowed grass. 
LaPorte concurred that the DPRK infrastructure, including the 
power grid and rail lines, was decrepit.  In closing, Downer 
remarked, "let the whole place go to s--t, that's the best 
thing that could happen."  Speaking off the top of his head, 
he added that aid should not be given that would prop up the 
infrastructure.  If U.S. officials wanted to hear the 
"bleeding hearts" view of "peace and love" with respect to 
North Korea, Downer joked, they only had to visit his 
colleagues in New Zealand.  Downer said he personally agreed 
with President Bush that tyranny had to be ended. 
 
PARTICIPANTS 
------------ 
 
¶11.  (C)  UN/U.S.: Commander of the UN Command in Korea, 
General Leon LaPorte; COL Kevin Madden of the UN Command's 
Military Armistice Commission; and Embassy Polmiloff. 
Australia: FM Alexander Downer; his Senior Adviser Bradley 
Haynes; Australian Defence Attache in Seoul COL John Moug; 
and DFAT Korea Section Executive Officer Charles Adamson. 
 
STANTON