This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CANBERRA 000342 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR PM/PMAT, EAP/ANP, NEA/I, UN/IO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2015 
TAGS: MOPS MARR PREL PTER PGOV IZ AS
SUBJECT: AUSTRALIA TO SEND ADDITIONAL 450 TROOPS TO IRAQ 
 
REF: A. CANBERRA 331 (NODIS) AND PREVIOUS 
 
     ¶B. BAGHDAD 562 
 
Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, A.I., BILL STANTON, FOR REASONS 1.4 ( 
A, B AND D). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Prime Minister John Howard announced 
February 22 that Australia would increase its troop 
contribution to Iraq by 50 percent by sending 450 additional 
ground forces to protect Japanese military engineers engaged 
in reconstruction efforts in Al Muthanna province.  Some of 
the new Australian soldiers will also be used to train Iraqi 
security forces.  PM Howard said he made the decision, after 
receiving personal requests from Prime Ministers Blair and 
Koizumi, because the situation in Iraq had changed with the 
recent elections, creating an opportunity that should not be 
lost.  The PM also stressed the importance he placed on the 
chance for Australian soldiers to work together with troops 
from Japan, a "close regional partner."  Opposition leader 
Kim Beazley blasted the PM for breaking his election promise 
not to raise the general level of Australian forces in Iraq. 
In a somewhat rambling press appearance, Beazley scored the 
Government for having no "exit strategy" and said, without 
further explanation, that the future of Iraq needed "to be 
settled by Iraqis."  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (U) Australian Prime Minister John Howard announced 
publicly on February 22 that Australia would deploy an 
additional 450 Australian Defence Force (ADF) ground troops 
to the Al Muthanna region of southern Iraq to provide 
security for Japanese military engineers engaged in 
humanitarian missions there.  Some of the troops, the PM 
said, would also be involved in further training of Iraqi 
security forces.  The deployment from the 1st Brigade based 
in Darwin, Australia would begin in about 10 weeks.  Howard 
told the press that the request for Australia to take the 
place of departing Dutch forces had come from the leaders of 
both Japan and the UK: "The Prime Minister of Japan, 
Junichiro Koizumi, telephoned me last Friday night and 
amongst other things invited and requested this Australian 
contribution...Likewise the British Prime Minister Mr. Blair 
telephoned me in Auckland yesterday morning to confirm the 
request that had previously been conveyed by both Jack Straw 
to Alexander Downer and Geoffrey Hoon to Robert Hill, the 
Defence Minister."  Responding to a reporter's question, PM 
Howard said the new deployment was not the result of a 
request from the U.S. and stressed that in his most recent 
conversation with President Bush the President had made no 
request for additional Australian forces for Iraq. 
 
¶3. (U) In explaining his decision to send more troops despite 
his previous statements that the Government had no plans to 
increase significantly the 880-920 Australian soldiers 
currently deployed in the region, PM Howard indicated that 
the situation in Iraq had changed for the better and that the 
country was at a "tilting point" that presented an 
"opportunity" to build stability that should not be missed. 
He also emphasized that the operation, which would cost 
A$250-300 million (US$198-237 million) a year, would offer a 
chance for Australia to work "in partnership" with Japan, "a 
close regional partner" that was making a valuable 
contribution to Iraq's reconstruction.  PM Howard said 
Japanese involvement in Iraq was important both practically 
and symbolically and that working alongside Japan was "very 
important from Australia's point of view." 
 
¶4. (C) Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
(DFAT) Iraq Task Force Director Bassim Blazey told us that PM 
Howard had also talked on February 18 to Iraqi Prime Minister 
Allawi, who warmly welcomed the additional troops.  Australia 
would seek a statement of welcome from the Iraqi Transitional 
Government (ITG) as soon as it had formed, Blazey said. 
Noting that some of the additional forces would be used to 
train Iraqi security forces, Blazey said the ADF planned to 
change its training model starting with this deployment by 
placing Australian troops side-by-side with Iraqi forces 
(along the lines recommended in ref. B). 
 
¶5.  (C) Blazey also informed us that PM Howard had called 
opposition Australian Labor Party (ALP) Leader Kim Beazley 
prior to making the public announcement.  If by doing so the 
PM was looking for understanding or even a modicum of support 
from Beazley, it did not work.  Addressing the press only 
hours after Howard's announcement, Beazley said Australia 
should have rejected the request.  Noting that PM Howard had 
pledged during last October's federal election not to raise 
Australian troop levels in Iraq significantly, Beazley 
demanded the Government explain the broken promise. 
Continuing somewhat disjointedly, Beazley criticized the 
Government for having "no exit strategy" for Iraq and said 
the future of the country needed "to be settled by Iraqis," 
without explaining how the new deployment would thwart Iraqi 
self-determination.  The ALP's policy, Beazley continued, was 
for Australia to be "differently engaged, not more deeply 
engaged" in Iraq.  He did not offer more details other than 
to say that Australia had unique assets to contribute to the 
counterterrorism effort in Southeast Asia. 
 
¶6. (C) Comment: Prime Minister Howard acknowledged during his 
announcement that the new deployment would be unpopular with 
many in Australia, and there is no doubt that the Opposition 
will attempt to make the most of his "broken promise" in 
coming weeks.  Nonetheless, by framing his decision as a 
"difficult" choice based upon changed circumstances and an 
opportunity to cement security and democracy in Iraq, Howard 
appealed to the Australian public's pragmatism and self-image 
of their country as one that does its share -- indeed more -- 
in the interest of the international community.  The phone 
calls from Koizumi and Blair were of enormous help to Howard 
in this regard, as was his ability to state honestly that 
this was not an American request. 
 
¶7. (C) By contrast, the response from opposition leader Kim 
Beazley was disappointing, even if consistent with recent 
statements.  On February 20 Beazley, unaware that the 
Government was even then contemplating a new deployment, 
argued on television that it was time for Australian troops 
to begin withdrawing from the Middle East in order to focus 
more on needs in Southeast Asia.  We believe, however, that 
this position, as well as his knee-jerk rejection of the 
Government's announcement, may reflect less Beazley's 
personal assessment of the requirements of the situation in 
Iraq than his incomplete grip on the Labor Party.  Beazley 
does not yet have the political strength to force a full 
reconsideration of the ALP's entrenched anti-war position. 
End comment. 
 
¶7. (U) BAGHDAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. 
STANTON