Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 251287 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AEMR ASEC AMGT AE AS AMED AVIAN AU AF AORC AGENDA AO AR AM APER AFIN ATRN AJ ABUD ARABL AL AG AODE ALOW ADANA AADP AND APECO ACABQ ASEAN AA AFFAIRS AID AGR AY AGS AFSI AGOA AMB ARF ANET ASCH ACOA AFLU AFSN AMEX AFDB ABLD AESC AFGHANISTAN AINF AVIATION ARR ARSO ANDREW ASSEMBLY AIDS APRC ASSK ADCO ASIG AC AZ APEC AFINM ADB AP ACOTA ASEX ACKM ASUP ANTITERRORISM ADPM AINR ARABLEAGUE AGAO AORG AMTC AIN ACCOUNT ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU AIDAC AINT ARCH AMGTKSUP ALAMI AMCHAMS ALJAZEERA AVIANFLU AORD AOREC ALIREZA AOMS AMGMT ABDALLAH AORCAE AHMED ACCELERATED AUC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AORL ASECIR AMG AMBASSADOR AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ADM ASES ABMC AER AMER ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AOPC ACS AFL AEGR ASED AFPREL AGRI AMCHAM ARNOLD AN ANATO AME APERTH ASECSI AT ACDA ASEDC AIT AMERICA AMLB AMGE ACTION AGMT AFINIZ ASECVE ADRC ABER AGIT APCS AEMED ARABBL ARC ASO AIAG ACEC ASR ASECM ARG AEC ABT ADIP ADCP ANARCHISTS AORCUN AOWC ASJA AALC AX AROC ARM AGENCIES ALBE AK AZE AOPR AREP AMIA ASCE ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI AINFCY ARMS ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AGRICULTURE AFPK AOCR ALEXANDER ATRD ATFN ABLG AORCD AFGHAN ARAS AORCYM AVERY ALVAREZ ACBAQ ALOWAR ANTOINE ABLDG ALAB AMERICAS AFAF ASECAFIN ASEK ASCC AMCT AMGTATK AMT APDC AEMRS ASECE AFSA ATRA ARTICLE ARENA AISG AEMRBC AFR AEIR ASECAF AFARI AMPR ASPA ASOC ANTONIO AORCL ASECARP APRM AUSTRALIAGROUP ASEG AFOR AEAID AMEDI ASECTH ASIC AFDIN AGUIRRE AUNR ASFC AOIC ANTXON ASA ASECCASC ALI AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN ASECKHLS ASSSEMBLY ASECVZ AI ASECPGOV ASIR ASCEC ASAC ARAB AIEA ADMIRAL AUSGR AQ AMTG ARRMZY ANC APR AMAT AIHRC AFU ADEL AECL ACAO AMEMR ADEP AV AW AOR ALL ALOUNI AORCUNGA ALNEA ASC AORCO ARMITAGE AGENGA AGRIC AEM ACOAAMGT AGUILAR AFPHUM AMEDCASCKFLO AFZAL AAA ATPDEA ASECPHUM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ETRD ETTC EU ECON EFIN EAGR EAID ELAB EINV ENIV ENRG EPET EZ ELTN ELECTIONS ECPS ET ER EG EUN EIND ECONOMICS EMIN ECIN EINT EWWT EAIR EN ENGR ES EI ETMIN EL EPA EARG EFIS ECONOMY EC EK ELAM ECONOMIC EAR ESDP ECCP ELN EUM EUMEM ECA EAP ELEC ECOWAS EFTA EXIM ETTD EDRC ECOSOC ECPSN ENVIRONMENT ECO EMAIL ECTRD EREL EDU ENERG ENERGY ENVR ETRAD EAC EXTERNAL EFIC ECIP ERTD EUC ENRGMO EINZ ESTH ECCT EAGER ECPN ELNT ERD EGEN ETRN EIVN ETDR EXEC EIAD EIAR EVN EPRT ETTF ENGY EAIDCIN EXPORT ETRC ESA EIB EAPC EPIT ESOCI ETRB EINDQTRD ENRC EGOV ECLAC EUR ELF ETEL ENRGUA EVIN EARI ESCAP EID ERIN ELAN ENVT EDEV EWWY EXBS ECOM EV ELNTECON ECE ETRDGK EPETEIND ESCI ETRDAORC EAIDETRD ETTR EMS EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EBRD EUREM ERGR EAGRBN EAUD EFI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ETRO ENRGY EGAR ESSO EGAD ENV ENER EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ELA EET EINVETRD EETC EIDN ERGY ETRDPGOV EING EMINCG EINVECON EURM EEC EICN EINO EPSC ELAP ELABPGOVBN EE ESPS ETRA ECONETRDBESPAR ERICKSON EEOC EVENTS EPIN EB ECUN EPWR ENG EX EH EAIDAR EAIS ELBA EPETUN ETRDEIQ EENV ECPC ETRP ECONENRG EUEAID EWT EEB EAIDNI ESENV EADM ECN ENRGKNNP ETAD ETR ECONETRDEAGRJA ETRG ETER EDUC EITC EBUD EAIF EBEXP EAIDS EITI EGOVSY EFQ ECOQKPKO ETRGY ESF EUE EAIC EPGOV ENFR EAGRE ENRD EINTECPS EAVI ETC ETCC EIAID EAIDAF EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EAOD ETRDA EURN EASS EINVA EAIDRW EON ECOR EPREL EGPHUM ELTM ECOS EINN ENNP EUPGOV EAGRTR ECONCS ETIO ETRDGR EAIDB EISNAR EIFN ESPINOSA EAIDASEC ELIN EWTR EMED ETFN ETT EADI EPTER ELDIN EINVEFIN ESS ENRGIZ EQRD ESOC ETRDECD ECINECONCS EAIT ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EUNJ ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ELAD EFIM ETIC EFND EFN ETLN ENGRD EWRG ETA EIN EAIRECONRP EXIMOPIC ERA ENRGJM ECONEGE ENVI ECHEVARRIA EMINETRD EAD ECONIZ EENG ELBR EWWC ELTD EAIDMG ETRK EIPR EISNLN ETEX EPTED EFINECONCS EPCS EAG ETRDKIPR ED EAIO ETRDEC ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ERNG EFINU EURFOR EWWI ELTNSNAR ETD EAIRASECCASCID EOXC ESTN EAIDAORC EAGRRP ETRDEMIN ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN ETRDEINVTINTCS EGHG EAIDPHUMPRELUG EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN EDA EPETPGOV ELAINE EUCOM EMW EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM ELB EINDETRD EMI ETRDECONWTOCS EINR ESTRADA EHUM EFNI ELABV ENR EMN EXO EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EATO END EP EINVETC ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EIQ ETTW EAI ENGRG ETRED ENDURING ETTRD EAIDEGZ EOCN EINF EUPREL ENRL ECPO ENLT EEFIN EPPD ECOIN EUEAGR EISL EIDE ENRGSD EINVECONSENVCSJA EAIG ENTG EEPET EUNCH EPECO ETZ EPAT EPTE EAIRGM ETRDPREL EUNGRSISAFPKSYLESO ETTN EINVKSCA ESLCO EBMGT ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EFLU ELND EFINOECD EAIDHO EDUARDO ENEG ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EFINTS ECONQH ENRGPREL EUNPHUM EINDIR EPE EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS EFINM ECRM EQ EWWTSP ECONPGOVBN
KFLO KPKO KDEM KFLU KTEX KMDR KPAO KCRM KIDE KN KNNP KG KMCA KZ KJUS KWBG KU KDMR KAWC KCOR KPAL KOMC KTDB KTIA KISL KHIV KHUM KTER KCFE KTFN KS KIRF KTIP KIRC KSCA KICA KIPR KPWR KWMN KE KGIC KGIT KSTC KACT KSEP KFRD KUNR KHLS KCRS KRVC KUWAIT KVPR KSRE KMPI KMRS KNRV KNEI KCIP KSEO KITA KDRG KV KSUM KCUL KPET KBCT KO KSEC KOLY KNAR KGHG KSAF KWNM KNUC KMNP KVIR KPOL KOCI KPIR KLIG KSAC KSTH KNPT KINL KPRP KRIM KICC KIFR KPRV KAWK KFIN KT KVRC KR KHDP KGOV KPOW KTBT KPMI KPOA KRIF KEDEM KFSC KY KGCC KATRINA KWAC KSPR KTBD KBIO KSCI KRCM KNNB KBNC KIMT KCSY KINR KRAD KMFO KCORR KW KDEMSOCI KNEP KFPC KEMPI KBTR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNPP KTTB KTFIN KBTS KCOM KFTN KMOC KOR KDP KPOP KGHA KSLG KMCR KJUST KUM KMSG KHPD KREC KIPRTRD KPREL KEN KCSA KCRIM KGLB KAKA KWWT KUNP KCRN KISLPINR KLFU KUNC KEDU KCMA KREF KPAS KRKO KNNC KLHS KWAK KOC KAPO KTDD KOGL KLAP KECF KCRCM KNDP KSEAO KCIS KISM KREL KISR KISC KKPO KWCR KPFO KUS KX KWCI KRFD KWPG KTRD KH KLSO KEVIN KEANE KACW KWRF KNAO KETTC KTAO KWIR KVCORR KDEMGT KPLS KICT KWGB KIDS KSCS KIRP KSTCPL KDEN KLAB KFLOA KIND KMIG KPPAO KPRO KLEG KGKG KCUM KTTP KWPA KIIP KPEO KICR KNNA KMGT KCROM KMCC KLPM KNNPGM KSIA KSI KWWW KOMS KESS KMCAJO KWN KTDM KDCM KCM KVPRKHLS KENV KCCP KGCN KCEM KEMR KWMNKDEM KNNPPARM KDRM KWIM KJRE KAID KWMM KPAONZ KUAE KTFR KIF KNAP KPSC KSOCI KCWI KAUST KPIN KCHG KLBO KIRCOEXC KI KIRCHOFF KSTT KNPR KDRL KCFC KLTN KPAOKMDRKE KPALAOIS KESO KKOR KSMT KFTFN KTFM KDEMK KPKP KOCM KNN KISLSCUL KFRDSOCIRO KINT KRG KWMNSMIG KSTCC KPAOY KFOR KWPR KSEPCVIS KGIV KSEI KIL KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KQ KEMS KHSL KTNF KPDD KANSOU KKIV KFCE KTTC KGH KNNNP KK KSCT KWNN KAWX KOMCSG KEIM KTSD KFIU KDTB KFGM KACP KWWMN KWAWC KSPA KGICKS KNUP KNNO KISLAO KTPN KSTS KPRM KPALPREL KPO KTLA KCRP KNMP KAWCK KCERS KDUM KEDM KTIALG KWUN KPTS KPEM KMEPI KAWL KHMN KCRO KCMR KPTD KCROR KMPT KTRF KSKN KMAC KUK KIRL KEM KSOC KBTC KOM KINP KDEMAF KTNBT KISK KRM KWBW KBWG KNNPMNUC KNOP KSUP KCOG KNET KWBC KESP KMRD KEBG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPWG KOMCCO KRGY KNNF KPROG KJAN KFRED KPOKO KM KWMNCS KMPF KJWC KJU KSMIG KALR KRAL KDGOV KPA KCRMJA KCRI KAYLA KPGOV KRD KNNPCH KFEM KPRD KFAM KALM KIPRETRDKCRM KMPP KADM KRFR KMWN KWRG KTIAPARM KTIAEUN KRDP KLIP KDDEM KTIAIC KWKN KPAD KDM KRCS KWBGSY KEAI KIVP KPAOPREL KUNH KTSC KIPT KNP KJUSTH KGOR KEPREL KHSA KGHGHIV KNNR KOMH KRCIM KWPB KWIC KINF KPER KILS KA KNRG KCSI KFRP KLFLO KFE KNPPIS KQM KQRDQ KERG KPAOPHUM KSUMPHUM KVBL KARIM KOSOVO KNSD KUIR KWHG KWBGXF KWMNU KPBT KKNP KERF KCRT KVIS KWRC KVIP KTFS KMARR KDGR KPAI KDE KTCRE KMPIO KUNRAORC KHOURY KAWS KPAK KOEM KCGC KID KVRP KCPS KIVR KBDS KWOMN KIIC KTFNJA KARZAI KMVP KHJUS KPKOUNSC KMAR KIBL KUNA KSA KIS KJUSAF KDEV KPMO KHIB KIRD KOUYATE KIPRZ KBEM KPAM KDET KPPD KOSCE KJUSKUNR KICCPUR KRMS KWMNPREL KWMJN KREISLER KWM KDHS KRV KPOV KWMNCI KMPL KFLD KWWN KCVM KIMMITT KCASC KOMO KNATO KDDG KHGH KRF KSCAECON KWMEN KRIC
PREL PINR PGOV PHUM PTER PE PREF PARM PBTS PINS PHSA PK PL PM PNAT PHAS PO PROP PGOVE PA PU POLITICAL PPTER POL PALESTINIAN PHUN PIN PAMQ PPA PSEC POLM PBIO PSOE PDEM PAK PF PKAO PGOVPRELMARRMOPS PMIL PV POLITICS PRELS POLICY PRELHA PIRN PINT PGOG PERSONS PRC PEACE PROCESS PRELPGOV PROV PFOV PKK PRE PT PIRF PSI PRL PRELAF PROG PARMP PERL PUNE PREFA PP PGOB PUM PROTECTION PARTIES PRIL PEL PAGE PS PGO PCUL PLUM PIF PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PMUC PCOR PAS PB PKO PY PKST PTR PRM POUS PRELIZ PGIC PHUMS PAL PNUC PLO PMOPS PHM PGOVBL PBK PELOSI PTE PGOVAU PNR PINSO PRO PLAB PREM PNIR PSOCI PBS PD PHUML PERURENA PKPA PVOV PMAR PHUMCF PUHM PHUH PRELPGOVETTCIRAE PRT PROPERTY PEPFAR PREI POLUN PAR PINSF PREFL PH PREC PPD PING PQL PINSCE PGV PREO PRELUN POV PGOVPHUM PINRES PRES PGOC PINO POTUS PTERE PRELKPAO PRGOV PETR PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPKO PARLIAMENT PEPR PMIG PTBS PACE PETER PMDL PVIP PKPO POLMIL PTEL PJUS PHUMNI PRELKPAOIZ PGOVPREL POGV PEREZ POWELL PMASS PDOV PARN PG PPOL PGIV PAIGH PBOV PETROL PGPV PGOVL POSTS PSO PRELEU PRELECON PHUMPINS PGOVKCMABN PQM PRELSP PRGO PATTY PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PGVO PROTESTS PRELPLS PKFK PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PARAGRAPH PRELGOV POG PTRD PTERM PBTSAG PHUMKPAL PRELPK PTERPGOV PAO PRIVATIZATION PSCE PPAO PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PARALYMPIC PRUM PKPRP PETERS PAHO PARMS PGREL PINV POINS PHUMPREL POREL PRELNL PHUMPGOV PGOVQL PLAN PRELL PARP PROVE PSOC PDD PRELNP PRELBR PKMN PGKV PUAS PRELTBIOBA PBTSEWWT PTERIS PGOVU PRELGG PHUMPRELPGOV PFOR PEPGOV PRELUNSC PRAM PICES PTERIZ PREK PRELEAGR PRELEUN PHUME PHU PHUMKCRS PRESL PRTER PGOF PARK PGOVSOCI PTERPREL PGOVEAID PGOVPHUMKPAO PINSKISL PREZ PGOVAF PARMEUN PECON PINL POGOV PGOVLO PIERRE PRELPHUM PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PBST PKPAO PHUMHUPPS PGOVPOL PASS PPGOV PROGV PAGR PHALANAGE PARTY PRELID PGOVID PHUMR PHSAQ PINRAMGT PSA PRELM PRELMU PIA PINRPE PBTSRU PARMIR PEDRO PNUK PVPR PINOCHET PAARM PRFE PRELEIN PINF PCI PSEPC PGOVSU PRLE PDIP PHEM PRELB PORG PGGOC POLG POPDC PGOVPM PWMN PDRG PHUMK PINB PRELAL PRER PFIN PNRG PRED POLI PHUMBO PHYTRP PROLIFERATION PHARM PUOS PRHUM PUNR PENA PGOVREL PETRAEUS PGOVKDEM PGOVENRG PHUS PRESIDENT PTERKU PRELKSUMXABN PGOVSI PHUMQHA PKISL PIR PGOVZI PHUMIZNL PKNP PRELEVU PMIN PHIM PHUMBA PUBLIC PHAM PRELKPKO PMR PARTM PPREL PN PROL PDA PGOVECON PKBL PKEAID PERM PRELEZ PRELC PER PHJM PGOVPRELPINRBN PRFL PLN PWBG PNG PHUMA PGOR PHUMPTER POLINT PPEF PKPAL PNNL PMARR PAC PTIA PKDEM PAUL PREG PTERR PTERPRELPARMPGOVPBTSETTCEAIRELTNTC PRELJA POLS PI PNS PAREL PENV PTEROREP PGOVM PINER PBGT PHSAUNSC PTERDJ PRELEAID PARMIN PKIR PLEC PCRM PNET PARR PRELETRD PRELBN PINRTH PREJ PEACEKEEPINGFORCES PEMEX PRELZ PFLP PBPTS PTGOV PREVAL PRELSW PAUM PRF PHUMKDEM PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PNUM PGGV PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PIND PTEP PTERKS PGOVJM PGOT PRELMARR PGOVCU PREV PREFF PRWL PET PROB PRELPHUMP PHUMAF PVTS PRELAFDB PSNR PGOVECONPRELBU PGOVZL PREP PHUMPRELBN PHSAPREL PARCA PGREV PGOVDO PGON PCON PODC PRELOV PHSAK PSHA PGOVGM PRELP POSCE PGOVPTER PHUMRU PINRHU PARMR PGOVTI PPEL PMAT PAN PANAM PGOVBO PRELHRC

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 05CANBERRA323, NPT ENVOY SANDERS DISCUSSES IRAN WITH AUSTRALIAN

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05CANBERRA323.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05CANBERRA323 2005-02-18 04:28 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Canberra
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CANBERRA 000323 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR T, NP/MNA, EAP/ANP AND NP/RA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2015 
TAGS: PREL KNNP AORC PARM AS IR IAEA
SUBJECT: NPT ENVOY SANDERS DISCUSSES IRAN WITH AUSTRALIAN 
OFFICIALS 
 
REF: A. STATE 18228 
 
     B. 04 STATE 219260 
     C. CANBERRA 322 
 
Classified By: POLCOUNS WOO LEE FOR REASONS 1.4 (B AND D). 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  At a February 10 luncheon with senior 
Australian officials hosted by the DCM, Ambassador Jackie 
Sanders, Special Representative of the President for the 
Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, discussed how to handle 
Iran's nuclear programs at the IAEA.  GOA officials were 
candid in their assessments of the high probability that the 
EU-3 talks with Iran would fail, that Iran's intimidation 
tactics had been successful with several states at the IAEA, 
and that a strategy had to be pre-prepared for the moment 
when the EU-3 and Iran reached an impasse in order to get 
Iran's non-compliance reported to the UNSC.  Ambassador 
Sanders' consultations on the NPT Review Conference (RevCon) 
reported septel.  End Summary. 
 
PARTICIPANTS 
------------ 
 
2.  (C)  The DCM hosted a lunch for Ambassador Jackie 
Sanders, Special Representative of the President for the 
Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, that included Australian 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) First 
Assistant Secretary for International Security David Stuart, 
Ambassador At-Large for Counterterrorism Les Luck, Australian 
Ambassador to Vienna (UN/IAEA Mission) Deborah Stokes, and 
Australian Safeguards and Nonproliferation Office (ASNO) 
Director General John Carlson.  Renick Smith, Special Advisor 
to Ambassador Sanders; Dr. Elizabeth Murphy from the Office 
of Multilateral Nuclear Affairs; John Mentz, Special 
Assistant for Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy from the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense; PolCouns and Polmiloff also 
attended the lunch. 
 
FOCUS ON IRAN 
------------- 
 
3.  (C) Having completed NPT RevCon preparation discussions 
that morning (septel), the DCM suggested focusing mainly on 
Iran over lunch.  Ambassador Sanders led off, expressing her 
appreciation for the GOA's practice of keeping its policy 
disagreements with the USG on the NPT, IAEA or other issues 
in private channels, while generally supporting USG 
initiatives publicly in multilateral fora.  She asked for 
Australian tips on approaching New Zealand (her next stop on 
her swing through Asia) for support at the NPT RevCon. 
Stuart assessed that the Kiwis did understand the need for 
counterproliferation in addition to disarmament, highlighting 
Wellington's cooperation on a variety of issues within the 
Pacific Island Forum (PIF), intervention in the Solomon 
Islands in 2003, and the Proliferation Security Initiative 
(PSI).  Luck offered that the best pitch to make to New 
Zealand would be couched in terms of collective security. 
Iran and others had to be seen no longer as proliferation 
threats in order to enable the disarmament of Nuclear Weapons 
States (NWS) that New Zealand sought under the NPT.  Sanders 
stated that, from her experience at the last two IAEA Board 
of Governors (BOG) meetings in Vienna, New Zealand had been 
good in standing up to Iran.  Stokes added the caveat that 
that was true until the GOI had threatened the Kiwis with the 
loss of trade contracts.  Through its intimidation tactics, 
Iran had met with similar success in softening the stances of 
Japan, South Korea and China, and had "tried it on" with 
Australia, but without success. 
 
4.  (C) Stuart wanted to focus on what would happen when the 
EU-3 negotiating effort with Iran foundered or if the talks 
sputtered along inconclusively.  He found the latter scenario 
worrying, since Iran had been "cheating on the margins" for 
many years.  "We see no evidence that the Iranians are trying 
to get a high price for agreeing to a permanent suspension of 
enrichment," he elaborated, "rather, they are seeking a high 
price for continuing uranium enrichment -- with some sort of 
caveat."  The GOA saw the Iranians as "getting themselves 
into position to be able to make nuclear weapons on short 
notice."  "We agree with you that the Iranians want a 
breakout capacity, and they aren't far from it," Stuart 
concluded.  Carlson pointed out that some GOI officials had 
gone so far as to declare that they already had the capacity 
to build nuclear weapons, although Australia believed this 
was untrue.  Stuart added, "we know the talks are 
foundering," yet all the EU-3 states had a lot at stake in 
seeing the diplomatic process continue.  He and Carlson 
wanted to have a pre-set strategy prepared for what to do 
when the impasse was reached and Iran again claimed its 
"right" to produce the full nuclear fuel cycle. 
 
5.  (C) Ambassador Sanders said the USG fully shared 
Australia's skepticism, noting that Washington had never 
wanted to go down the EU-3 path; Iran should have been 
reported to the UNSC by the November 2003 BOG.  She noted 
that UnderSecretary Bolton would be meeting with G-8 
counterparts the following week and would discuss Iran. 
During bilateral British-Australian political-military talks 
the previous day, Stuart commented, he had asked his British 
counterpart, DG for Defence and Intelligence David Richmond, 
these same questions, but Richmond had not responded 
directly.  Stuart thought the EU-3's goal was to string the 
talks out until they could convince the Iranians to "bite the 
bullet" and stop their illicit nuclear programs, but everyone 
knew the Iranians had systematically cheated for 18 years. 
In addition, he said Richmond had not wanted to consider the 
idea of continuing four-way talks in Vienna with the U.S., 
Canada and Australia.  Richmond had said he would ask when 
back in London, but it was clear he was not interested. 
Sanders was not surprised; she assumed the Brits did not want 
to be challenged on the risk they had taken in the EU-3. 
Luck mentioned that he also had heard that the EU-3 talks 
were "poised to take a serious dive," and that new evidence 
was coming to light that Iran had been cheating, but he did 
not have precise information.  Stuart stated that he had 
asked Richmond and other EU-3 counterparts whether any of the 
EU-3 (Germany in particular) were seeking to lower the bar on 
what would be an acceptable outcome from the GOI, and he had 
gotten different answers.  Mentz offered that the Germans had 
made guarantees to the USG that they would not lower the bar. 
 Stokes commented that the French thought they could solve 
the problem commercially by making nuclear power investments 
and providing reactors to Iran.  Meanwhile, Stuart observed, 
Russian actions had improved: the GOR was now telling Tehran 
it had to permanently suspend its enrichment efforts before 
Russia would provide the fuel.  Stokes said she had found the 
Russians unpredictable, and Carlson thought there was a split 
between the MFA and other ministries in Moscow over what to 
do about Iran.  The GOR as a whole would want to see the EU-3 
effort fail clearly before reporting Iran to the UNSC, he 
averred. 
 
6.  (C) Stuart reported that his office had used the USG 
demarche (Ref B) from October about what the UN Security 
Council could do vis-a-vis Iran before applying sanctions as 
the basis for a policy options paper for Foreign Minister 
Downer.  One option, should the intelligence "firm up," he 
related, would be to go public with Iran's misdeeds, but that 
strategy, post-Iraq, was "fraught."  He agreed with a process 
of incremental steps from Presidential Statements to 
resolutions, appealing to Iran to comply with its 
obligations.  The DCM thought it might be good to produce a 
documentary laying out Iran's history of supporting Hizbollah 
and other terrorists, and then ask viewers to consider what 
it would mean to have a nuclear-armed Iran.  Luck agreed -- 
so long as the USG itself did not make the documentary.  He 
noted that much of the world, and particularly Europe, still 
saw the U.S. as a biased party with respect to Iran due to 
the legacy of the 1979 Embassy hostages situation.  There was 
consensus around the table that part of the EU-3 motivation 
to take on Iran was "to teach the USG how to do diplomacy," 
but Stokes asserted that the Europeans "had no idea how hard 
it would be."  Sanders wondered whether it would take an 
egregious error by the Iranians to actually get them reported 
to the Security Council.  Stuart stated, "We cannot be held 
hostage to waiting for them to make a mistake."  Sanders 
noted that any nation could take an issue that threatened 
international peace and security to the Council.  Stuart 
thought that would be difficult in the absence of a clear 
trigger.  He added that the issue would likely come to a head 
again later in 2005, just as it was time to select a new IAEA 
DG. 
 
7.  (C) If the EU-3 were to state in Vienna that Iran's 
actions needed to be reported to the UNSC, that would be in 
the spirit of what they had agreed to in G-8 statements, 
Stuart pointed out.  Ambassador Stokes lamented that she had 
seen enough of the EU-3's watering down of resolutions to 
know that they could not be relied upon for a solution. 
Stuart expressed his frustration with EU practices in 
general, noting that all along, the goal had been to keep the 
Western countries united vis-a-vis Iran.  Procedurally, 
however, it was now very difficult to keep the EU members 
from completing all their negotiating together before they 
talked to other states, by which time their EU position could 
not be changed.  Iran had responded in the past to a united 
Western position, but that was now much more difficult. 
Sanders suggested that there was no need to get bogged down 
on procedures: nearly everyone, including those on the IAEA 
Secretariat below ElBaradei, agreed that Iran was doing 
 
SIPDIS 
something bad.  It was time to focus on doing something about 
it.  Stuart remarked that the Brits needed the breakdown in 
EU-3 talks to wait until after the expected UK federal 
elections in May. 
 
8.  (C) Luck encouraged the USG to do all it could to go to 
and beyond the EU-3 to develop common thinking and responses 
in preparation for action at the UNSC.  All agreed with 
Carlson and Sanders' comments that it was short-sighted of 
states which had succumbed to Iranian intimidation about 
losing oil and gas contracts, or states which still insisted 
on disarmament as the be-all of the NPT.  How would a 
nuclear-armed Iran make either of those situations better? 
This was why support for USG goals for handling Iran and for 
the NPT RevCon had to be sought at the highest levels in 
capitals, Sanders concluded, to get beyond the narrow "CD 
Mafia" type of mindset. 
 
9.  (U) Ambassador Sanders and the delegation have cleared 
this cable. 
SCHIEFFER