This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CANBERRA 000310 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR T, PM/DAS GSUCHAN, EAP/C, EAP/ANP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2015 
TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC ETRD AS CH
SUBJECT: AUSTRALIA'S VIEW ON THE EU'S INTENTION TO LIFT ITS 
ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST CHINA 
 
REF: A. USEU BRUSSELS 299 
 
     ¶B. CANBERRA 298 
 
Classified By: DCM WILLIAM A. STANTON FOR REASONS 1.4 (A, B AND D). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY: Several articles in the Australian press 
over the past several days have miscast the GOA's policy on 
the EU's professed intention to lift its ban on arms exports 
to China.  Contacts at the Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade (DFAT) have assured us that the GOA fully shares the 
USG concern about the introduction of any new destabilising 
armaments or technologies in the Asia Pacific region, and is 
vigorously demarching EU capitals to reinforce this message 
and to press for consultations with Australia before the ban 
is lifted, given Australia's stake in the region.  The GOA 
has not joined in on USG and Japanese demarches in EU 
capitals, however, because Canberra lifted its arms export 
ban in 1992, and therefore has not wanted to risk weakening 
U.S. and Japanese arguments.  Foreign Minister Alexander 
Downer has been particularly active with EU counterparts in 
recent weeks to urge them to do nothing that would negatively 
impact on the strategic balance in the Pacific region, 
emphasizing that the GOA's rigorous application of its export 
controls has meant that its lifting of its ban in 1992 has 
proven merely symbolic.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C)  In the February 12-13 weekend edition of the 
conservative "Australian" newspaper, the normally reliable 
Australian journalist Greg Sheridan had a front-page article 
entitled "PM Defies Bush Over China Arms" in which he alleged 
that FM Alexander Downer "will not oppose the EU lifting the 
arms embargo imposed after the 1989 Tiananmen Square 
massacre."  A related article in the same edition by defense 
journalist John Kerin asserted that, "A number of Americans 
believe that Australia has been both bribed and bullied by 
the Chinese to the extent that we have lost sight of our own 
interests."  FM Downer immediately refuted the articles, 
commenting that since the GOA had lifted its 
Tiananmen-inspired arms ban on China back in 1992, it was not 
able to make the argument to the Europeans that they should 
not do what it had already done.  Rather, he had told both 
the EU Commission and EU Presidency some 10 - 12 days earlier 
that, if the EU should lift its embargo, it should do so in a 
way that "has no impact on the power balance or the strategic 
structure of the East Asian region," and in addition, 
Australia expected to be consulted on the details of the EU 
Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers. 
 
¶3.  (C) On February 14 we checked with Richard Neumann, 
Executive Officer on the DFAT China Desk, on the veracity of 
Sheridan and Kerin's articles.  Neumann told us the China 
desk had briefed Sheridan about the GOA's policy for his 
article, but Sheridan had deliberately chosen to get the 
story wrong, presumably because it made a splashy front page 
headline.  In fact, Neumann stressed, the GOA did oppose the 
EU lifting its ban, concerned that European technology could 
tip the strategic balance in the Asia Pacific region or have 
other unintended consequences, but had to couch its arguments 
in terms of making sure the Europeans were doing it right if 
they proceeded. 
 
GOA POSITION ON THE EU ARMS EMBARGO 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) On February 17, we sought more information from 
Neumann and Jane Lambert, DFAT Defence Policy and Liaison 
Office Director.  Neumann handed us a non-paper which laid 
out the GOA position.  Begin Text: 
 
EU Arms Embargo 
 
-- Australia shares the United States' goal of not wanting to 
see the introduction of any new destabilising armaments or 
technologies in the region. 
 
-- We have made this clear to EU members: 
 
      - during Mr Downer's recent visit to Europe, he urged 
interlocutors to ensure that in (the) event of the EU embargo 
being lifted, the EU should have a comprehensive, transparent 
and robust export control regime or code of conduct in place; 
 
      - such a code is required to prevent the introduction 
of any new armaments or technologies in the region that could 
upset the balance of power, be used against allies or to 
abuse human rights; 
 
       - Mr Downer also urged the EU to consult with 
Australia and others with direct interests in the region in 
formululating its strengthened Code of Conduct. 
 
-- Australia's approach on lobbying the EU to keep its 
present embargo in place was different from the United 
States' as Australia does not have an arms embargo as such in 
place: 
 
       - Australia's embargo was relaxed in 1992. 
 
-- That said, Australia has an effective, robust export 
control regime in place and in practice, has not exported 
armaments or militarily significant technologies to China; 
 
      - Australia considers proposals for defence-related 
exports, including to China, on a case-by-case basis, taking 
into consideration a number of criteria, including possible 
impact on human rights, regional security and on allies. 
 
END TEXT OF NON-PAPER. 
 
¶5.  (C) Lambert and Neumann elaborated that China had never 
raised the EU arms embargo issue with Australia, nor 
Australia with China, but the GOA had raised it many times 
with EU members.  FM Downer had done so in particular with 
the French Foreign and Defense Ministers on his swing through 
Europe in early February, as well as to the EU Presidency in 
Luxembourg, pressing for a robust and transparent Code of 
Conduct and strict application of export controls.  Since the 
GOA had no ban in place, its argument to the Europeans was 
based on the premise that its own arms exports to China since 
1992 had actually been neglible, both in terms of dollar 
value and military significance, consisting mainly of 
sporting guns.  Each export request to China was carefully 
vetted case-by-case.  In fact, the GOA had not joined in U.S. 
and Japanese demarches in Europe because it did not want risk 
weakening Washington and Tokyo's arguments.  However, another 
of Downer's main themes in his individual approaches was that 
Australia expected the Europeans to consult with Canberra on 
issues of strategic significance in the Pacific region; the 
consequences for Australia were "immense." 
 
¶6.  (C) Lambert told us that, at a private dinner earlier in 
the week for all the Australian Heads of Mission in Europe, 
FM Downer had instructed his Ambassadors to make this issue a 
priority.  Lambert was at that moment drafting an instruction 
cable to all Australian embassies in EU countries to 
reinforce Downer's message on the need for consultations and 
to respect Australia (and Japan's) strategic interests, as 
well as the need for a clear understanding, prior to lifting 
the ban, of what it would actually mean, and how it would be 
implemented.  Australia wanted more information, Lambert 
said, on both the EU "Toolkit" and Code of Conduct (Ref A), 
and on what sort of signal on human rights by the Chinese 
would be sufficient to lift the ban.  She also frankly noted 
Australia's desire to maintain its military "edge" in the 
region (Ref B), adding that DFAT had also raised its concerns 
with the British during February 9 bilateral Pol-Mil Talks in 
Canberra. 
 
SCHIEFFER