This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 000295 
 
SIPDIS 
 
UNVIE FOR IAEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2014 
TAGS: PARM KNNP MNUC BR IAEA NPT
SUBJECT: NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE: BRAZIL PERSPECTIVE 
 
REF: A. (A) STATE 18228 
 
     ¶B. (B) STATE 17051 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Dennis Hearne, reason 1.4 (b 
& d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Poloff discussed ref B non-paper with Ministry of 
External Relations' (MRE) Disarmament and Sensitive 
Technologies Division Chief, Santiago Mourao, who is 
preparing the GOB position for the 2005 NPT Revcon.  Mourao 
strongly defended the NPT.  He agreed that the Treaty 
required "strengthening" and noted that it contained 
"asymmetries," but did not view the NPT as fundamentally 
inefficient or weak.  On the contrary, Mourao noted that when 
the NPT was ratified, many believed there would be 20-30 
nuclear weapons countries by now.  Instead, there continue to 
be the five weapons states plus "three on the margins," 
thanks to the NPT. He added that the NPT had also helped to 
unveil a clandestine illicit nuclear proliferation network 
(Khan). 
 
¶2.  (C)  Regarding the Additional Protocol, Mourao said that 
while the AP strengthens the safeguards system, it would not 
help the NPT.  (Note: The GOB will not consider its own 
possible accession to the AP until after the Revcon.  End 
note.)  Brazil will not seek amendments to the Treaty in May 
but would favor a "balanced" document that was 
"non-confrontational" and did not provide "selective 
advantages" to signatories.  Echoing long-standing GOB 
policy, Mourao said the GOB supported strengthening the NPT's 
disarmament aspects in harmony with the non-proliferation 
ones.  Brazil will continue its position of not questioning 
the right of any country under Article IV to develop its 
peaceful nuclear program. 
 
¶3.  (C) Comment.  We welcome ref A's proposals for reaching 
out to GOB officials for bilateral discussions in the months 
before the NPT Revcon.  Meeting regularly with the Brazilians 
in New York, Vienna, and Geneva prior to the Revcon can clear 
the air on any problematic issues before the conference, and 
also demonstrate that GOB views are important to us.  If 
invited, USG officials should be prepared for bilateral 
consultations in Brasilia.  To be most fruitful, bilateral 
engagement with Brazilian interlocutors on NPT objectives 
should also include meaningful discussion of disarmament 
efforts under Article VI. The Brazilians unfailingly flag 
this as a key concern both for the GOB executive branch and 
Brazil's congress, which ratified the NPT with significant 
hesitation because of perceptions of lack of progress in 
disarmament among weapons states, and which will eventually 
have to ratify the Additional Protocol if Brazil signs on. 
 
¶4. (C) Comment continued.  Per para 15 of ref a, we believe a 
public diplomacy effort here on the NPT would be most 
effective if it focuses on high-road themes which are broadly 
supported by the USG, GOB and most other NPT states: e.g., 
the centrality of the NPT to the international community's 
efforts to deal with an increasingly dangerous proliferation 
environment, with perhaps the Khan network and North Korea 
noted as examples of new threats.  The issue of Brazil's 
adherence to the Additional Protocol should be handled deftly 
in PD efforts.  Brazilian media opinion has tended to favor 
Brazilian adherence to the protocol, and GOB statements have 
recently pointed toward adherence at some point (though not 
before the Revcon).  But it remains important that the issue 
be seen in an international context (Brazil-IAEA), and not as 
a bilateral problem.  The approach taken in recent months by 
the USG -- including former Secretary Powell during his 
October 2004 visit here -- has been a productive one: i.e., 
the USG has no concerns about Brazil in terms of weapons 
programs, applauds Brazil's excellent record in 
non-proliferation, and hopes Brazil, working with the IAEA, 
will sign the AP, as other recognized nuclear supplier states 
have done or plan to do.  A PD effort here could also 
usefully elaborate on the advances in disarmament by the U.S. 
and Russia in recent years, including statistics that 
illustrate the dramatic scale of both bilateral and U.S. 
unilateral programs. 
 
Danilovich