This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 BOGOTA 001751 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR P, WHA, WHA/AND. NSC FOR INTER-AMERICAN DIRECTORATE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL GOV
SUBJECT: UNDER SECRETARY GROSSMAN MEETS PRESIDENT URIBE, 
LEGAL ADVISER OSPINA 
 
REF: BOGOTA 1296 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons: 1.4 (b) & (d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On February 14, U/S Grossman and President 
Uribe discussed the demobilization law, Uribe's preparations 
for his meeting with President Chavez the following day, 
securing support from neighboring countries in the fight 
against narco-terrorism, human rights, and potential GOC 
counternarcotics assistance to Afghanistan.  On 
demobilization, the U/S said the drafting and approval of the 
law was a matter for Colombians but stressed the importance 
the U.S. placed on a strong law that provided for peace with 
justice and dismantled the paramilitaries.  Uribe expected 
negotiations with the Congress to be difficult and would 
insist the law be applicable to all illegal armed groups (the 
U/S and Ambassador agreed), but was committed to working with 
Senator Pardo, who had introduced an alternative draft, to 
reach a compromise.  He believed compromise could be reached 
within three weeks and that a law could be adopted by June. 
Grossman and Uribe agreed that the bill's joint introduction 
by the GOC and Pardo would be the ideal scenario.  Uribe was 
not optimistic about his meeting with Chavez.  The GOV was 
resisting any mention of the word "terrorism" in the 
communiqu, and Chavez, busy trying to create a modern 
Marxist regime in Venezuela in the image of Castro, was 
showing no willingness to fight drugs or terrorism.  The U/S 
said the U.S. had been trying to raise the consciousness of 
the region regarding what was happening in Venezuela and 
counseled Uribe to keep the focus on Venezuela's failure to 
fight narco-terrorism.  The U/S, Ambassador and Uribe agreed 
that recently-publicized FARC links to the kidnapping of the 
former Paraguayan President's daughter would internationalize 
the problem of the narco-terrorist FARC, heretofore only 
considered Colombia's concern. 
 
¶2. (C) SUMMARY CONTINUED: U/S Grossman met with Presidential 
Legal Advisor Camilo Ospina prior to seeing Uribe.  Ospina 
was also optimistic that consensus could be reached on the 
demobilization law within a three-week timeframe.  The U/S 
underscored that the most important result would be a law 
that all concerned could publicly support.  Ospina raised the 
letter recently sent to Uribe by several major drug 
traffickers, indicating a willingness to negotiate surrender. 
 Ospina said it was not a serious offer and the GOC would not 
respond.  On the issue of the Supreme Court resuming the 
processing of extradition cases frozen last month over 
concerns that the U.S. was not living up to its assurances on 
sentencing, Ospina said he was delivering a report to the 
court on the status of every extradited Colombian which 
reflected no irregularities.  Ospina suggested that U.S. and 
Colombia court officials communicate more to avoid future 
misunderstandings. END SUMMARY. 
 
¶3. (C) On February 14, U/S Grossman met President Uribe at 
the Casa de Huespedes in Cartagena.  The U/S was accompanied 
by Ambassador Wood, P special assistant Hunt and polcouns 
(notetaker).  Uribe, who had remained in Cartagena since 
February 3 due to an inner-ear infection, said he was feeling 
better but still suffered occasional bouts of dizziness.  He 
was scheduled to depart for Caracas to meet Hugo Chavez the 
following day (septel).  Before the meeting began, Uribe 
presented Grossman with the Order of San Carlos, the highest 
decoration given to foreigners for providing outstanding 
assistance to Colombia. 
 
¶4. (C) U/S Grossman opened the meeting by expressing U.S. 
gratitude for GOC efforts to free the three U.S. hostages, 
whose second anniversary in captivity had just passed.  The 
U.S. Embassy had held a ceremony marking the anniversary and 
the U/S hoped ongoing efforts by the U.S. and Colombia would 
lead to their early release.  He also expressed U.S. 
condolences for COLMIL losses caused by recent FARC attacks, 
and for the emergency situation caused by recent flooding and 
loss of life in the Santander and Norte de Santander 
departments.  The USG planned to show its solidarity by 
making a contribution to the relief effort.  U/S Grossman 
underscored U.S. support for Uribe's fight against 
narco-terrorism, noting the recent budget submission to the 
Congress for Colombia, which remained consistent with current 
levels of assistance.  He also thanked Uribe for Colombia's 
excellent cooperation on extraditions, and called for 
continued focus on human rights.  Referring to the recent 
donors conference in Cartagena (reftel), Grossman said the 
U.S. was pleased with the results and that the resulting 
Cartagena Declaration was more positive for the GOC.  Uribe 
agreed and declared USAID Administrator Natsios' speech at 
the event as "splendid and extraordinary." 
 
DEMOBILIZATION LAW 
------------------ 
 
¶5. (c) Noting widespread U.S. interest in the demobilization 
law on which deliberations in the Colombian Congress were set 
to begin February 15, U/S Grossman asked how the GOC planned 
to move it forward.  The U/S made clear that the drafting and 
approval of the law was a matter for the Colombians.  But, as 
a friend of Colombia, he also stressed the importance the 
U.S. placed on a strong law that provides for peace with 
justice and effectively puts the paramilitaries out of 
business.  He hoped certain things would occur as a result of 
the law, such as disclosure of past criminal or terrorist 
activities, punishment for serious crimes, reparations, and a 
transparent process.  He referred to a recent letter from 
several Members of Congress on the demobilization process. 
He characterized it as a letter of support for 
demobilizations, assuming the GOC and the Congress could 
agree on a legal framework.  We want to be able to tell our 
Congress that the GOC has managed this well, he said.  With a 
good law, resources would likely accompany political support. 
 
¶6. (C) Uribe acknowledged that discussions with the Congress 
would be difficult.  Although members would likely introduce 
changes, he could not compromise on several points.  First, 
there had to be a minimum sentence of five years.  Second, 
the law had to apply to all illegal armed groups, not just 
the paramilitaries.  Uribe was convinced that many members of 
Congress wanted a softer law for the FARC and ELN.  The U/S 
and the Ambassador agreed with Uribe on these points and said 
he could rely on public U.S. support for them. 
 
¶7. (C) U/S Grossman informed Uribe that he would be seeing 
Senator Pardo (who has led a group drafting an alternative to 
the government bill) later in the day (septel) and sought 
advice to ensure the meeting would be constructive.  Uribe 
explained that he had a high regard for Pardo, whom he 
described as intelligent and honest, but had been surprised 
by some of the Senator's recent action.  Uribe said Minister 
of Interior and Justice Sabas Pretelt thought he had reached 
a deal with Pardo a few days earlier but Pardo later reneged 
citing disagreements within his own group.  The GOC had 
solicited comments from Pardo on a potential law over a year 
ago but Pardo later charged that the GOC was not serious 
about consulting with him.  Uribe stressed that, for the 
first time, the concept of justice was being incorporated 
into the law.  With previous peace processes, including those 
in which Pardo had been involved as Defense Minister, only 
peace and amnesty were considered.  The GOC wanted a 
constructive balance between peace and justice but Pardo had 
become the principal proponent of justice and members of his 
group were advocating softer treatment for the guerrillas. 
Nonetheless, Uribe said he was committed to achieving a 
workable consensus on the balance of peace and justice and 
had instructed Sabas Pretelt and others to work with Pardo to 
agree on the right text.  Uribe predicted it would take a 
couple of weeks to rectify the bills and agree on a joint 
position. 
 
¶8. (C) U/S Grossman said a text introduced by the GOC and 
Pardo would be good step forward. The sooner the GOC reached 
agreement with the Pardo group the better.  We have people 
trying to divide you and us through Pardo, said Grossman. 
Uribe said he was committed to making all efforts to "get a 
decent law." 
 
¶9. (C) U/S Grossman and Ambassador reiterated that the law 
needed to provide: (1) disclosure of past criminal or 
terrorist activities, a key step toward national 
reconciliation; (2) punishment for all those responsible for 
serious crimes; (3) dismantlement of the narco-terrorist 
organizations through seizure of property, and individual and 
collective reparations; (4) transparency; and (5) government 
monitoring and control to ensure that those demobilized do 
not return to crime. 
 
VENEZUELA 
--------- 
 
¶10. (C) Uribe said that he expected the next day's meeting 
with Chavez to be difficult and solicited the U/S's advice on 
how to proceed. Foreign Minister Carolina Barco had remained 
behind in Bogota to hear from the Spanish Cooperation 
Minister how the agreement between Spain and France to 
cooperate against terrorism along their border was working, 
and whether this was something to pursue with Venezuela. 
 
¶11. (C) U/S Grossman said GOC efforts to keep the focus on 
Venezuela and what it failed to do should be continued. 
Granda was a FARC operative living on a false passport in 
Caracas.    The issue was the fight against terrorism. 
Chavez had to deal with Colombia in a serious way; protecting 
Granda and the FARC was not the way.  The U/S noted the 
Secretary's recent remarks that Venezuela was not playing a 
 
SIPDIS 
positive role in the region.  The USG had hoped earlier that 
it could identify issues with which to constructively engage 
Venezuela, but this had failed.  It was important for Uribe 
to go to Venezuela, underline his philosophy to Chavez that 
terrorism is a struggle, and that every nation in the 
neighborhood, including Venezuela, needed to be a part of it. 
 
¶12. (C) Uribe was not optimistic about the Chavez meeting. 
Negotiations over a draft communiqu were not going well. 
Venezuela had refused to accept mention of the word 
"terrorism."  The Venezuelans instead were pushing for a text 
that highlighted "neutrality," which the GOC had rejected. 
We cannot accept the primacy of "neutrality" when dealing 
with terrorist groups, said Uribe.  The Venezuelans had then 
come back offering language expressing a willingness to 
cooperate against "specific crimes" or "delinquents."  Uribe 
said the text remained in brackets and he instructed FM Barco 
to halt further negotiations and let him sort it out with 
Chavez directly. 
 
¶13. (C) Uribe noted that, when Fidel Castro had sent his 
personal representative to discuss the situation with 
Venezuela, the Cuban asked for Uribe's proof that Granda had 
committed a crime.  Uribe responded that he had no evidence 
that linked Granda to a specific case of kidnapping or other 
serious crimes.  However, he was an open member of the FARC, 
a terrorist organization, and therefore complicit in crimes 
committed by it and had certainly helped cover them up.  To 
strengthen his position in Caracas, Uribe was hopeful that 
the Attorney General of Paraguay would later in the day hold 
a press conference on links between the FARC and the 
Paraguayan kidnappers of the daughter of former President 
Cubas.   He said GOC investigators were uncovering evidence 
suggesting others from the FARC in addition to Granda were in 
contact with Paraguayan guerrillas, instructing them on how 
to carry out kidnappings and other crimes, and finance 
operations. 
 
¶14. (C) The Ambassador underscored the importance of 
revealing the FARC connection to Paraguay.  Identifying the 
international aspects of FARC activities added a new 
dimension.  Most see the FARC as a Colombian problem, he 
said, but this makes it an international one, subject to 
international agreements, including Security Council 
resolution 1373 and others, that bound nations to fight 
international terrorism. 
 
¶15. (C) According to Uribe, it was becoming clear that Chavez 
was committed to a Marxist ideology and wanted to establish a 
modern Marxist regime.  A prominent Cuban academician was 
editing his speeches.  Castro had told Uribe that he had a 
"sincere, deep friendship" with Chavez, that he was selling 
Chavez $2 billion in services annually, and that Chavez was 
repaying him with oil.  Uribe said Castro saw in Chavez an 
opportunity to expand his revolution to successor generations 
in South America.  However, despite the close political 
connection between the two, Uribe's concern was not Castro 
but Chavez because he was awash in oil money.  He saw no 
commitment from Chavez to fight drugs or terrorism. 
 
¶16. (C) U/S Grossman said he shared Uribe's concerns. 
Castro's vision to pass his revolution to subsequent 
generations through Chavez was a challenge to democracy in 
the region. The U.S. had been trying to raise consciousness 
of what is happening in Venezuela and hoped Colombia would be 
helpful in that regard.  Recent reports of arms sales from 
Russia were also troubling, mostly because some of these 
weapons would end up with the FARC. 
 
SECURING SUPPORT IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD TO FIGHT NARCO-TERRORISM 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------- 
 
¶17. (C) The Ambassador asked Uribe about support from 
Ecuador, Peru and Brazil, in the fight against terrorism, 
noting that none had publicly declared the FARC a terrorist 
group, as the U.S., EU and Japan had done.  Would any of 
these countries be willing to use the word terrorism in 
relation to illegal armed groups? 
 
Ecuador: Uribe declared President Gutierrez a good friend of 
Colombia -- someone he has been able to work with despite 
troubling comments before he was elected.  Uribe conceded 
that Gutierrez did not pro-actively fight the FARC but had 
not been an obstacle either.  Colombia needs Ecuador's 
cooperation, he said.  Uribe said Gutierrez is in a weak 
position and feared FARC retaliation if he actively 
challenged them.  Nonetheless, he thought Gutierrez should be 
tested on whether he would be willing to make public 
statements against the FARC, and agreed to ask FM Barco to 
follow up.  The Ambassador noted the FARC did not retaliate 
against Ecuador when it had cooperated in the capture of 
Simon Trinidad. 
Peru: Uribe said he had considerable evidence that President 
Toledo was personally committed and active in fighting 
narco-terrorism.  Peru had also played a very positive role 
as private mediator in the diplomatic row with Venezuela over 
the capture of Granda. 
 
Brazil: Uribe was unsure about President Lula whom he 
described as a "great puzzle."  Lula appeared constructive, 
charismatic at multilateral meetings, and often spoke out 
against terrorism.  But Uribe saw little evidence Lula was 
willing to convert "his words to realities."  He referred to 
bilateral discussions on how to circumvent drug traffickers 
flying into Brazilian airspace but noted the GOB had taken no 
action so far. 
 
¶18. (C) U/S Grossman encouraged Uribe to approach his 
Ecuadorian counterpart on public statements about the FARC. 
He also mentioned that the U.S. had been working successfully 
to support Brazil's new air bridge denial program.  The 
Brazilians had approached the USG and the two nations were 
working together as allowed by U.S. law.  The effort was 
starting to show results.  This was prompting the U.S. to 
look at a regional air bridge denial program. 
 
HUMAN RIGHTS/MILITARY JUSTICE 
----------------------------- 
 
¶19. (c) U/S Grossman expressed the hope that Uribe would 
continue his leadership role in addressing several 
outstanding human rights cases, including Mapiripan and 
others, and in improving the military justice system.  Uribe 
said he continued to track the human rights cases closely as 
investigations continued, and was working hard to introduce 
transparency in the armed forces to break any remaining 
connections with the paramilitaries. 
 
GOC ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN 
----------------------------- 
 
¶20. (C) Uribe reported that he had recently spoken to 
President Karzai of Afghanistan, expressing his willingness 
to send police to share GOC experiences on counternarcotics 
efforts, and to receive Afghan officials to witness firsthand 
what Colombia was doing on the ground.  U/S Grossman welcomed 
the news, underscoring that it was important for Karzai to 
hear directly from Uribe how Colombia has been conducting its 
own war on drugs. 
 
PRE-MEETING WITH LEGAL ADVISER OSPINA 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶21. (C) Prior to seeing President Uribe, U/S Grossman met 
with Presidential Legal Adviser Camilo Ospina.  Ospina raised 
the letter sent recently to President Uribe by drug 
trafficker Diego Montoya and several others indicating a 
willingness to negotiate surrender.  Ospina said the GOC 
would not respond positively.  It was not a serious offer. 
Montoya was prepared neither to accept a minimum sentence nor 
to forego property accumulated by his illegal activities. 
Ospina noted one of the signatories of the letter would be 
extradited to the U.S. in 15 days.  The GOC had no intention 
of stopping it. 
 
¶22. (C) Ambassador raised the issue of extraditions and 
whether the Supreme Court would resume the processing of 
extradition cases, halted by concerns that the GOC did not 
have sufficient controls in place to ensure the U.S. was 
respecting its assurances regarding sentencing and other 
issues. Ospina said he was delivering a report to the court 
on the status of every extradited Colombian which reflected 
no irregularities. Only the case of Alex Restrepo, who was 
given a life sentence, remained a problem.  Ospina suggested 
that the U.S. and Colombian courts "talk to each other more" 
to avoid future misunderstandings.  Ospina insisted that, 
although no decisions on extradition had been taken since 
January 20, "the process continued to function" (see septel). 
 He expected approval for the extradition of Omaira Rojas 
Cabrera (aka Sonia) in March.  (COMMENT: On February 16, the 
Supreme Court rejected the status report on extraditables. 
The Court asked for more information, which the GOC does not 
have.) 
 
¶23. (C) Turning to the demobilization law, Ospina was 
optimistic that consensus could be reached between the formal 
GOC draft and that of the Pardo group.  Most of the 
differences had been resolved.  Disagreements over a minimum 
sentence and the special tribunal had been resolved.  Wording 
over the characterization of the internal situation in the 
country (internal conflict v. terrorism) had been resolved. 
Differences remained over which entity would oversee 
reparations and the extent of the state's responsibility for 
reparations if funds from illicit activities were not 
sufficient. On the latter, Ospina said they had reached 
agreement to limit the amount of reparations.  Ospina also 
confirmed that the issue of extradition remained off the 
table in negotiations on the law.  The GOC would not accept 
any reference to it. 
 
¶24. (C) Ospina predicted the Congress would be "way down the 
road" on the bill by the next week.  He conceded that within 
the GOC, he still had difficulties with Sabas Pretelt.  In 
the Congress, he expected blowback from Senator Cordoba and 
allies, and work would have to be done to "realign" the draft 
that Congressman Benedetti's group presented on February 11. 
U/S Grossman stressed that the most important thing for the 
U.S. was that whatever passed in the Congress could be 
publicly supported by all concerned.  This would help the 
U.S. and other potential donors move forward with assistance 
for the demobilization process.  Ospina confirmed the GOC was 
working toward having Pardo introduce a joint bill.  U/S 
Grossman and the Ambassador warmly welcomed this approach. 
 
¶25. (C) U/S Grossman asked Ospina how he envisioned the 
special session of Congress playing  out.  When would Pardo 
get on the record that he favored a joint bill?  Ospina said 
the process would take three weeks.  That week's goal was to 
gather support for a joint bill.  Next week, the spokesman of 
the various drafts would negotiate the substance, and the 
following week, arrangements for a joint presentation in the 
Congress would be finalized.   Uribe, according to Ospina, 
had earlier in the day ordered GOC officials to present a 
united front, refrain from speaking publicly for themselves, 
and work to reach agreement with the Pardo group. 
¶26. (U) U/S Grossman has cleared this message. 
DRUCKER