P 221547Z FEB 05
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6351
INFO ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
NSC WASHDC

S E C R E T  BEIRUT 000541 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2020 
TAGS: PREL PGOV LE SY
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION A ROLL:  FORCE CABINET TO QUIT, GET 
SYRIA TO BIQA'A 
 
REF: A. BEIRUT 523 
     ¶B. BEIRUT 533 
 
Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, based on 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (C)  Chattering away at a 2/21 dinner hosted by Boutros 
Harb, leading members of the Christian opposition and Walid 
Jumblatt's bloc were visibly buoyed by what they saw as three 
victories earlier that day:  the largest anti-Syrian 
demonstration in Lebanon's history, Parliament Speaker Nabih 
Berri's acquiesence to a confidence debate on the Karami 
government, and President Bush's strong call in Belgium for 
Lebanese independence.  They told the Ambassador that, with 
the need to react to Hariri's death, legislative elections 
have fallen lower in their list of priorities.  Now, they 
define their goals as 1) forcing a credible investigation 
into Hariri's assassination, 2) toppling the Karami 
government, including its intelligence chiefs, 3) achieving a 
significant Syrian withdrawal and shuttering of Syrian 
intelligence headquarters in Lebanon.  Only then should 
legislative elections be held, they said, as only those 
achievements will tip the elections in their favor.  The 
opposition politicians were divided on how loudly to call for 
UNSCR 1559 implementation, which they described as being 
increasingly, and successfully, portrayed as a "Christian" 
issue, with potentially divisive results.  Most preferred to 
rest on the safer "Taif accord" principles of Syrian 
redeployment, while urging the U.S. and international 
community to keep the pressure up on UNSCR 1559.  They were 
relatively relaxed about Hizballah, believing that getting 
Syria out of Lebanon would in itself force Hizballah to move 
into the Lebanese mainstream.  End summary. 
 
UNCHARACTERISTICALLY, OPPOSITION 
IN UPBEAT MOOD AFTER "TRIPLE TRIUMPH" 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C)  Christian opposition politician Boutros Harb hosted 
a 2/21 dinner that included (inter alia) the Ambassador; 
Qornet Shehwan Christian opposition politicians Nayla 
Mouawad, Gebran Tueni, Amin Gemayal and Nassib Lahoud; and -- 
in what he described as his first evening social event since 
the 10/1/04 assassination attempt against him -- Druse MP 
Marwan Hamadeh.  Compared to their bleak moods since Hariri's 
assassination (and their generally doomsday, naysayer 
outlooks), the politicians were almost giddy over the day's 
events. 
 
¶3.  (C)  They spent considerable time reveling in details of 
the day's demonstration (in which all had participated, 
Hamadeh leaning on a cane), the largest anti-Syrian gathering 
in Lebanon's history.  They all remarked on how correct the 
security forces had been in general. "You could see it in 
their eyes -- the soldiers were proud of us!" Nayla Mouawad 
proclaimed, citing speeches that called for the Lebanese army 
to be the only army on Lebanese soil.  They also figuratively 
slapped the Ambassador on the back in joy for President 
Bush's strong remarks about Lebanon delivered in Brussels 
earlier that day;  several guests later got SMS text messages 
on their phones with quotes from President Bush's remarks 
with Jacques Chirac. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Harb's dinner guests also spoke with pride about 
their session that morning with Parliamentary Speaker Nabih 
Berri, in a meeting before the formal demonstration.  Berri 
had "tried everything" to get the 40-some opposition MPs to 
agree to resume work on the draft electoral law, Lahoud said. 
 But the group had pushed for the Speaker's acquiesence with 
their call for a special session -- now scheduled for 
February 28 -- to debate the Karami government, with the 
possibility of a vote of confidence.  (See ref a for Berri's 
version of this meeting.)  Harb's guests all agreed that 
pushing Berri into the corner on this issue was a good show 
of strength. 
 
OPPOSITION PRIORITIES:  WHAT 
IS NEEDED BEFORE ELECTIONS 
---------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C)  As he had with the Hariri family immediately prior 
to the Harb dinner (ref b), the Ambassador asked what was the 
purpose of the Parliamentary debate, when the pro-Syrian 
votes would presumably carry any vote of confidence.  With 
others temporarily deferring to him, Lahoud said that the 
value of this postponement of the electoral law debate was 
clear only in the context of the overall opposition 
priorities, which he defined as follows: 
 
--  Full and credible international investigation into the 
Hariri murder. 
 
--  Resignation of the Karami cabinet, including security 
chiefs Jamal al-Sayyed at Surete General, Raymond Azar at the 
LAF G-2. 
 
--  Significant Syrian withdrawal ("preferably all the way" 
to Syria but at least to the Biqa'a Valley), with a closing 
down of the Syrian Military Intelligence headquarters in 
Lebanon. 
 
Only then, Lahoud specified, did the opposition want to face 
elections.  If legislative elections have to be delayed 
beyond the April 17 commencement in order to finish the list 
of priorities, "we can live with that," Lahoud said. 
 
STRIVING FOR A TECHNOCRATIC CABINET 
TO OVERSEE THE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶6.  (C)  The Ambassador asked what the point was of toppling 
an unpopular, ineffective, directionless government like the 
cabinet of Prime Minister 'Umar Karami.  "It would be a 
victory!" Mouawad said.  "The people would see that they 
don't have to live with what Syria forces on us!"  Others 
agreed that it would be a rallying call for the opposition, 
just as the other steps would be as well.  The Ambassador 
noted that assembling a new cabinet would require 
consultations with President Lahoud, whom all of them had 
largely avoided since Lahoud's 9/3/04 term extension:  would 
then agree on consultations with Lahoud?  Yes, Hamadeh 
responded, "we will follow the constitution" (and its call 
for Parliamentary consultations with the President);  we have 
to respect the constitution." 
 
¶7.  (C)  Everyone agreed that what they desired was a 
"technical" cabinet headed by a Prime Minister and composed 
of a small number of ministers holding multiple portfolios, 
but none of whom (including the PM) would be a candidate for 
legislative elections.  The Ambassador noted that Minister of 
Justice Adnan Addoum, a Sunni not running for Parliament, 
would appear to fit the criteria they described.  "No!" cried 
Mouawad.  Lahoud said that "you know what we mean -- people 
not involved in politics."  When the Ambassador asked who, 
specifically, could serve as the non-political Sunni Prime 
Minister, Hamadeh said, "well, it could have been (current 
Minister of Economy and Trade) Adnan Kassar, if Adnan hadn't 
been part of this government." 
 
DISMANTLING THE 'MUKHABARAT' REGIME 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (S)  As part of the cabinet-toppling exercise, Lahoud 
emphasized that Jamal al-Sayyed (chief of Surete General) and 
Raymond Azar (head of the LAF's Deuxieme Bureau, or G-2) 
"have to go."  They are the ones, "especially Jamil," who 
enforce the Syrian domination of Lebanon.  The opposition 
strives to rid Lebanon not only of Syrian interference but 
also the "whole culture of a 'mukhabarat' (intelligence) 
regime."  Jamil will "not go quietly," but he should be 
forced to leave, even if only on the excuse of the enormous 
breach of security that occurred with Hariri's murder. 
"Everyone knows" Jamil al-Sayyed had to have been complicit 
in Hariri's murder, Hamadeh insisted, adding that 
Presidential Security head Mustafa Hamdan (rumored to have 
plotted the attack against Hamadeh) should be added to the 
list of security chiefs to be sacked prior to elections. 
Only if these security chiefs go can the opposition be 
assured that they won't be defeated by "dirty tricks." 
 
CLOSING DOWN RUSTOM'S HOUSE OF HORRORS 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (S)  Regarding Syrian withdrawal, Harb's feisty dinner 
guests made the same arguments as Hariri's family had earlier 
in the evening (ref b):  the goal is total withdrawal of all 
Syrian forces, but a redeployment to the Biqa'a Valley would 
be sufficient to build support for opposition candidates in 
the elections.  They spent considerable time emphasizing the 
need for the Syrian Military Intelligence (SMI) headquarters 
in Anjar be closed and its head, Rustom Ghazaleh, be 
withdrawn to Syria.  Gemayal noted that, with SMI having 
penetrated so much of Lebanese institutions, Syrian influence 
would still be great.  But Ghazaleh's departure would change 
the atmosphere to the point that the opposition would 
benefit. 
 
TAIF VS. 1559 
------------- 
 
¶10.  (C)  On the question of a redeployment to the Biqa'a, 
the Ambassador cautioned the opposition figures that the U.S. 
would continue to look for ways to push for full 
implementation of UNSCR 1559.  The dinner guests expressed 
relief and support for that position but then launched into a 
lengthy debate about their own public positions.  All agreed 
that UNSCR 1559 implementation was essential to their hopes 
for Lebanon.  Some -- most vocally Gebran Tueni, joined by 
Mouawad -- pressed for the opposition to include support for 
UNSCR 1559 explicitly in its platform.  But Gemayal, Lahoud, 
and Hamadeh pushed back.  UNSCR 1559 can divide the 
opposition, they cautioned;  the Sunnis and Shias in 
particular are suspicious of it.  The Syrians have 
persistently and successfully portrayed UNSCR 1559 as a 
Franco-American/Zionist tool in order to re-establish 
"Christian dominance" in Lebanon.  The opposition -- 
extremely weak in terms of Shia support and potentially weak 
in terms of Sunni participation, if the Hariris adopt a 
standoffish attitude -- should build a movement on consensus. 
 There is a consensus in Lebanon in support of Taif.  Thus, 
it is far better to use Taif now, as a unifying call, and, 
after electoral success, then a new government and new 
Parliament can embrace UNSCR 1559 and push for its full 
implementation. 
 
'LEAVE HIZBALLAH TO US' 
----------------------- 
 
¶11.  (S)  Lahoud brought up Hizballah:  "We know that this is 
an important issue for you -- and it's an important issue for 
us."  The Ambassador commented that disarming militias is a 
requirement of UNSCR 1559, and the subsequent report from the 
UNSYG made it clear that Hizballah is the most significant 
foreign-funded militia in Lebanon.  Yes, Lahoud said, but 
"let us concentrate on Syria first.  If we get Syria out, we 
can deal with Hizballah ourselves."  The Ambassador noted 
that many GOL officials insist that only Syria could disarm 
Hizballah, so, by this rationale, the sequencing of Syria's 
departure must be carefully considered.  His words echoed by 
nods around the table, Lahoud said that Hizballah Secretary 
General Nasrallah will move Hizballah away from armed 
activities and into the political mainstream if his Syrian 
overlords are kicked out of Lebanon. 
 
¶12.  (S)  Above all, Lahoud said, Nasrallah wants to be a 
national politician.  "He's not going to use arms against us; 
 we can handle him."  The Ambassador noted that Hizballah's 
armed activities extend beyond the blue line, and we insist 
that its international activities be stopped immediately. 
Emphasizing that the opposition firmly supported the 
principle that political parties not bear arms ("we learned 
that lesson the hard way, in the civil war"), Lahoud said 
again that the greater danger to Lebanese democracy and 
sovereignty was Syria, not Hizballah.  Fix Syria, and the 
Lebanese can fix Hizballah. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶13.  (C)  As is clear from ref b, the Hariri family (the most 
dominant Sunni faction in the country) and the more closely 
aligned Druse-Christian opposition are thinking alike:  while 
not explicitly calling for a postponement of spring 
legislative elections, they are clearly moving in that 
direction, unless we can force a Syrian withdrawal (or 
redeployment to the Biqa'a) prior to the April 17 
commencement of elections.  At this point, with a defined set 
of priorities and a groundswell of popular disgust against 
Syria, the opposition is, unusually, on the offensive.  By 
contrast, Karami's cabinet and the Presidency seem almost to 
have evaporated into thin air.  But we doubt that real 
underpinnings of Syria's domination of Lebanon -- SMI, the 
mukhabaret, etc. -- are in the same disarray as Karami's 
political ministers.  And there is always the danger that 
Lebanon's confessional demons will come to the fore, driving 
wedges between the tenuously united opposition forces.  As 
for the debate of Taif vs. 1559, we recommend not spending 
much time worrying about it:  the opposition's desire to use 
Taif in order to build a broader alliance does not contradict 
or undermine our 1559 arguments (particularly as we know 
that, privately, most are with us on full implementation of 
UNSCR 1559). 
 
 
FELTMAN