This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 001105 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/BCLTV, INR/B 
PACOM FOR FPA HUSO 
OSD FOR OSD/ISA (STERN AND POWERS) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR TH POL MIL BURMA PKO IMET
SUBJECT: THAILAND: AMBASSADOR CALLS ON ROYAL THAI SUPREME 
COMMANDER CHAISIT 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce.  Reason 1.4 (d) 
 
SUMMARY 
 
¶1.  (C)  On February 8, the Ambassador met with Royal Thai 
Armed Forces Supreme Commander General Chaisit Shinawatra to 
discuss a variety of security issues.  Chaisit was grateful 
for U.S. assistance to help Thailand mitigate the impact of 
the tsunami and correctly noted that our use of Utapao as a 
regional hub was due to years of U.S.-Thai cooperation.  He 
explained that his Government hopes to use military to 
military ties with Rangoon to improve Thai-Burmese relations 
since it is especially difficult for Thai civilian leaders to 
develop relationships with Burmese military counterparts. 
Chaisit several times suggested that change in Burma will be 
a slow, step by step, process.  He was critical of some 
aspects of the RTG's policies to curb unrest in the south. 
For instance, he suggested that it would be wiser to place 
Thai soldiers along the Thai-Malaysian border rather than 
have them billeted in urban centers.  General Chaisit was 
convinced that foreign influences and lack of economic 
opportunity combine to encourage Muslim youth in the south to 
explore separatist causes.  When the Ambassador asked about 
the possibility of Thai troops returning to Iraq, Chaisit was 
caught unaware that Thailand had recently agreed to dispatch 
peacekeepers to Burundi, but his staff noted the importance 
of working with UN forces.  Chaisit's staff wanted increased 
U.S. assistance to combat narcotics and to build a National 
Training Facility to improve their unconventional warfare 
tactics.  When they asked us to increase our IMET funding, 
the Ambassador noted that Thailand could increase its quota 
of students by co-paying transportation and per diem costs. 
End Summary. 
 
TSUNAMI ASSISTANCE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
¶2.  (C)  Chaisit began the meeting by mentioning he had just 
visited Utapao naval air station and had met with CSF-536 
commander LtGen Blackman.  He again expressed his 
Government's gratitude for U.S. assistance after the December 
26 tsunami.  Noting the importance of using Utapao as a 
regional relief hub, Chaisit said our bilateral cooperation 
was only possible due to decades of working together. 
 
COBRA GOLD 
 
¶3.  (C)  Saying he was glad that Cobra Gold 2005 would still 
take place, Chaisit explained the importance of U.S.-funded 
Exercise Related Construction (ERC) projects.  LTG Kemarat 
Kanchanawat, Chaisit's J-3, said that ERC projects are 
generally planned out five years in advance and that, even 
though this year's Cobra Gold will take place in the northen 
part of Thailand, Supreme Command supports doing some ERC 
projects in the south to help mitigate the impact of the 
tsunami. 
 
SIPDIS 
 
BURMA 
 
¶4.  (C)  The Ambassador asked about Chaisit's recent visit to 
Burma.  Chaisit is convinced that the best way to reduce much 
of the cross-border tension is to build up the legitimate 
cross-border economic trade.  He also cited the large number 
of displaced persons without a national identity in Burma as 
the cause of many border problems.  Chaisit discussed the 
difficulty his Government has working with Rangoon's SPDC 
ruling junta, citing that each of the 17 members has his own 
agenda and own power base.  Due to the military structure of 
Burma's government, he explained, the RTG's engagement 
strategy with Burma is to use military to military links to 
help the Thai Foreign Ministry effectively engage with 
Burmese counterparts.  Even then, Chaisit emphasized, it 
remains difficult to understand with confidence who is best 
to work with on any given problem. Chaisit also focused on 
the difficulty of governing a country as diverse as Burma. 
He seemed convinced that Burmese ethnic factionalism and the 
lack of a common national identity make the SPDC's job even 
more difficult.  Although he believed that Aung San Suu Kyi 
would eventually be released from captivity, Chaisit said 
that the resolution of her case, as well as the pace of 
reform generally in Burma, will be a slow, step by step 
process. 
 
SOUTHERN THAILAND 
 
¶5.  (C)  Turning to the separatist problems in southern 
Thailand, Chaisit again emphasized the need for economic 
development and better education.  He explained that the lack 
of legitimate jobs in the region force many to work on the 
gray or black market.  He was suprisingly frank and critical 
of two political decisions in the south.  First, he said that 
he strongly disagreed with the decision made three years ago 
to remove Thai troops from the region.  During that period 
when troops were not present, he observed, separtists used 
the opportunity to become stronger and to enhance links with 
outside groups.  Second, Chaisit was very critical of the 
Royal Thai Army's decision to billet troops in urban areas. 
While quick to point out that overall responsibilities for 
tactics in the south belong to the Royal Thai Army, not 
Supreme Command, General Chaisit told me that if the decision 
were his, he would move all of his troops to the 
Thai-Malaysian border, sealing that border, and only have 
undercover operatives working in the cities.  He confirmed 
previous DAO reporting that a new Infantry Division, the 
15th, would be set up to work in the south. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Repeating a theme Thai leaders have mentioned 
frequently lately, Chaisit seemed convinced that foreign 
influence among Muslim youth in the south is growing.  The 
lack of educational opportunities coupled with high 
unemployment make them ripe targets for recruitment by 
separtist organizations, he noted.  He mentioned how many 
Muslim boys could not speak Thai effectively and were lured 
to Pakistan and other countries to receive instruction at 
Koranic schools. 
 
ANOTHER PKO OPPORTUNITY 
 
¶7.  (C)  The Ambassador noted the RTG's recent decision to 
send peacekeepers to Burundi and asked whether we could 
expect a return of Thai troops to Iraq.  Chaisit was caught 
unaware of the Burundi PKO mission, his staff was up to speed 
and quickly mentioned the importance of coordinating such 
work through the United Nations. 
 
 
INCREASED U.S. ASSISTANCE 
 
¶8.  (C)  As expected, Chaisit and his staff had a number of 
suggestions for how the United States could improve our 
military cooperation.  General Kemarat noted the importance 
of jointly developing a National Training Facility that could 
help the Thai and U.S. improve capabilities in counter 
narcotics, counter terrorism, and urban warfare.  LTG 
Chayasit Linthong, Supreme Command J2, said that he had read 
recently that Secretary Rice had promised increased 
assistance to U.S. allies in the War on Terror.  If this is 
true, J2 Chayasit said, Thailand would like to know whether 
funds would be available for Thailand.  Supreme Commander 
Chaisit repeated earlier requests for U.S. assistance in 
acquiring Cobra helicopters.  He said these could be used in 
conjunction with UAVs to strike at militants. 
 
IMET 
 
¶9.  (C)  The Ambassador used LTG Kemarat's request that we 
augment our IMET assistance to Thailand to remind GEN Chaisit 
that Thailand was currently America's fourth largest 
recipient of IMET funds.  The Ambassador suggested that 
Thailand could increase the number of students training in 
the U.S. if the RTG would begin copayments to cover 
transportation and per diem costs, as they had prior to the 
1997 economic crisis.  Chaisit's staff countered by saying 
their own training budget to support IMET was shrinking.  The 
Ambassador said he might raise this issue with Prime Minister 
Thaksin, which the Thai side heartily endorsed. 
BOYCE