This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK 001038 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SEVENTH FLEET FOR VADM GREENERT 
OSD FOR OSD/ISA (STERN AND POWERS) 
PACOM FOR FPA HUSO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/02/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR TH
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF CDR SEVENTH FLEET VADM 
GREENERT 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce.  Reason 1.4 (a and d) 
 
 SUMMARY 
 
¶1.  (C)  Admiral Greenert, your visit to Bangkok and Phuket 
will come as we are winding down the critical U.S. military 
role in providing assistance to Thailand and the other 
tsunami-hit nations in the region.  Your meetings with senior 
 
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Thai officials follow on the heels of visits by a number of 
senior Americans -- then-Secretary of State Powell, Deputy 
Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz and Admiral Fargo -- and will 
 
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allow you to echo the theme of their visits:  the United 
States remains engaged in Southeast Asia and is committed to 
our treaty obligations here.  Your staff talks will allow you 
to drive home a key lesson learned:  the quick ramping up of 
our regional hub at Utapao Royal Thai Navy Air Base and our 
military's ability to interact rapidly with Thai counterparts 
is a direct result of decades of joint combined exercises, 
training and cooperation between Thailand and the United 
States.  While strong on the eve of the tsunami, our combined 
experience over the past six weeks has only enhanced our 
links and relations with Thai civilian and military leaders. 
You can also discuss with your Thai Navy counterparts the 
extent of the damage caused to the Thai Navy base at Phang 
Nga, Thailand's primary facility on the Andaman Sea, and 
explore ways we can improve links between our navies.  By 
pointing out the quick combined response to the tsunami made 
by USN and Thai SEALS, you can underscore the benefits of 
Special Forces training.  End Summary 
 
TSUNAMI AFTERMATH 
 
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¶2.  (U)  The massive rescue and recovery operation undertaken 
by the U.S. military as a result of the December 26 tsunami 
is historic.  Mercifully, U.S. casualties are much lighter 
than those suffered by other countries.  Thousands of Thai, 
Europeans and other Asians were killed in the Phuket area -- 
a haven for vacationers during the holiday season.  Total 
fatalities continue to rise -- Thai officials privately say 
they expect the final death toll to top 8,000.  One of the 
most devastated areas in Thailand was the Phang Nga Naval 
Base.  Phang Nga represents the only strategic naval facility 
on Thailand's west coast.  Pier facilities, the water 
treatment plant, barracks and communications capabilities 
were badly damaged by the tsunami.  Additionally, a patrol 
boat was sunk and a frigate was beached by the tsunami.  We 
have provided a technical assessment to the Thai suggesting 
ways to salvage the frigate.  The RTN has indicated, however, 
that it will undertake the salvage itself.  Locating, 
identifying and processing the remains of victims of the 
tragedy is a key focus of U.S. efforts.  The RTG has shown us 
and the international community that they are taking careful 
steps to identify and preserve bodies. 
 
USG RELIEF ASSISTANCE 
 
¶3.  (C)  U.S. disaster relief efforts, led by the U.S. 
military, have had an immediate impact on affected areas in 
Thailand.  III MEF Commander, USMC Lt. Gen. Robert Blackman, 
is the commanding general of Combined Support Force 536 (CSF 
536), currently based out of Utapao Royal Thai Naval Air 
Base.  CSF 536 worked closely with the Embassy and JUSMAGTHAI 
to ensure that requests for assistance were promptly 
addressed and to assist coordination of relief from civilian 
agencies, NGOs and corporate donors.  The Royal Thai Armed 
Forces granted the U.S. military blanket overflight 
clearances for relief operations in the region, including for 
aircraft from the USS Abraham Lincoln battle group which 
operated off Sumatra.  In addition to permitting our use of 
Utapao, the Royal Thai Government integrated Thai officers 
into the CSF staff where needed.  During the height of 
operations, over 1800 USG personnel operated out of Utapao. 
We distributed over 660,000 pounds of supplies within 
Thailand including medicine, food, dry ice and body bags. 
USAF C-130s made regular delivery runs from Utapao and 
Bangkok to affected areas for time sensitive supplies while 
bulk shipments tended to go overland.  USN P-3s positioned at 
Utapao conducted search and rescue missions in the vicinity 
of Thailand and in the region.  Teams made up of medical 
specialists from the CDC, the Armed Forces Research Institute 
of Medical Science and the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command 
in Hawaii were also deployed to Thailand to assist with 
victim identification.  U.S. Navy SEALS and a representative 
from the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance worked closely 
with Thai military units to search for the remains of 
American and other victims of the disaster. Embassy Bangkok 
provided 24-hour American Citizens Services for weeks after 
the crisis, and the Embassy maintains a team in Phuket and 
other devastated locations to assist Americans, claim Amcit 
remains and coordinate USG relief efforts.  USDAO Bangkok 
frequently flew C-12 missions responding to specific taskings 
and to provide an immediate assessment of the disaster 
situation.  The aircraft also enabled Embassy and visiting 
VIPs to obtain an orientation from the air and to meet on the 
ground with local officials coordinating relief. 
 
¶4.  (C)  CSF 536's concept of operations set up Utapao as the 
hub for U.S. relief efforts bound for Sri Lanka, Thailand and 
Indonesia.  In each of those countries, Combined Support 
Groups (CSG) were established to interact with the local 
government, the U.S. Embassies and the NGO community. 
CSG-Thailand was based in Phuket and redeployed on January 
¶22.  Since that time, ongoing recovery efforts in Thailand 
are being managed by the Embassy and JUSMAGTHAI.  A key part 
of those efforts is to focus civil affairs projects carried 
out under our military exercise authority in Thailand to 
assist Thais rebuilding in the devastated areas around 
Phuket.  We are excited about the COMREL and Project 
Handclasp efforts you plan to undertake during the USS Blue 
Ridge's visit to Phuket later this month as well as similar 
activities during future ship visits as they will mesh well 
with our overall tsunami assistance efforts. 
 
RESPONSE BY THE SEALS 
 
¶5.  (C)  One of the most visible examples of U.S. military 
assistance to Thailand came in the form of SEAL teams 
immediately helping in the body recovery effort.  It should 
be noted that these SEALS were not attached to CSF 536 in the 
days after the tsunami struck, they were in Thailand for a 
previously scheduled UNDERSEAL combined training exercise. 
With assistance from JUSMAGTHAI, they quickly redeployed to 
assist relief work.  The effort was highly visible, linked in 
the Thai media to our efforts under the CSF 536 umbrella and 
well received.  In fact, Prime Minister Thaksin asked to 
accompany the crews on January 7 and was shown on national TV 
thanking the SEALS for their assistance.  The public 
relations benefit of such opportunities to demonstrate the 
advantages of our bilateral military relationship are 
obvious. 
 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVING LINKS WITH THE THAI NAVY 
 
¶6.  (C)  Historically, we have had much closer links with the 
Royal Thai Army and Royal Thai Air Force than we have had 
with the Royal Thai Navy.  The RTN is the smallest part of 
the Thai military and suffers from budget constraints.  In 
recent years, the RTN has purchased Chinese equipment, 
leading some analysts to conclude that China is attempting to 
improve its links to the Thai military through the Thai Navy. 
 Meanwhile, the RTN is searching for a mission.  In recent 
months, PACOM has worked with the Thai Navy trying to win RTN 
support for the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) 
and support for anti-piracy efforts aimed at the Strait of 
Malacca and elsewhere.  In 1997, Thailand purchased from 
Spain the VSTOL carrier Chakri Nareubet.  At the time, the 
RTN indicated they would use the ship as an emergency relief 
vessel.  Since then, all but one of her Harriers has been 
rendered inoperable. 
 
¶7.  (C)  During his January visit to Thailand, ADM Fargo 
suggested to the Royal Thai Supreme Command that using the 
Chakri Nareubet as a helicopter carrier might make more 
sense.  Senior Thai officials liked the idea and asked for 
assistance in training Thai helicopter pilots to operate off 
the carrier.  In conjunction with disaster relief efforts, 
continuous daytime embarked helicopter operations were 
conducted from the Chakri Nareubet for six weeks.  In 
addition to these operations, the carrier conducted search 
and rescue, remains recovery and medical support missions to 
tsunami-devastated Phi Phi island.  This deployment 
 
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represented the longest such operation ever performed in the 
ship's brief history.  (Note:  In May 2004, the USN 
demonstrated for the Ministry of Defense missions and 
capabilities of the USS Essex (LHD-2) as a model for the 
Chakri Nareubet's use.  End Note.)  In light of the tsunami, 
it might be fruitful to discuss with your RTN counterparts 
joint exercises that could further enhance the RTN's ability 
to respond to a disaster and to use their carrier more 
effectively.  In the past, RTN officials have asked American 
counterparts for assistance in acquiring new Harriers.  If 
you receive such a query, we suggest you remind your 
interlocutors that our Harriers are committed now and we do 
not expect to have any available for Thailand. 
 
¶8.  (C)  The Cooperative Afloat Readiness and Training 
(CARAT) exercise continues to be the RTN's premiere exercise 
with the USN.  This year's exercise will focus on RMSI themes 
while maintaining proficiency in traditional surface warfare 
tactics.  This is an encouraging sign that the RTN wishes to 
improve bilateral cooperation.  While here, you may want to 
encourage the RTN to participate in multi-lateral exercises. 
Traditionally, Thailand has been reluctant to participate in 
multi-lateral exercises such as the Southeast Asia 
Cooperation Anti-terrorism event (SEACAT).  The Embassy 
believes that SEACAT represents the best opportunity to 
improve communications and interoperability among navies in 
the region. 
 
¶9.  (C)  As mentioned above, USN SEALS operated heroically 
during the tsunami relief effort.  Our SEALS have extensive 
links with their RTN counterparts and train together 
regularly.  However, Thai Special Forces in general, and RTN 
SEALS in particular, do not have a patron on the senior 
command staff to support their training.  It would be useful 
for you to flag the mutual benefits of having our SEALS and 
other special forces working closely together. 
 
¶10.  (C)  Another issue you might want to raise is our desire 
to help the RTN improve facilities at Utapao.  A number of 
systems, including Utapao's antiquated air traffic control 
and radar systems should be upgraded.  JUSMAGTHAI is working 
with PACOM to identify a number of projects which will make 
Utapao a more useful facility.  In a similar vein, we 
understand that the RTN might receive supplemental funding to 
upgrade some assets in the wake of the tsunami.  You may wish 
to probe your interlocutors on this point and remind them 
that U.S. equipment has been consistently validated on the 
high seas and in combat. 
 
¶11.  (U)  In 2004, twenty-four U.S. Navy ships visited 
Thailand, calling on either Phuket or Sattahip.  The visits 
by USN/USMC personnel in conjunction with these ship visits 
has added a boost to Thailand's economy, which was buffeted 
by the Bali bombings, SARS and the Asian Bird Flu epidemic. 
Our resumption of ship visits following an easing of threat 
concerns in the south of the country led to the return to 
Phuket of third country navies as well.  The Thai business 
community fully supports these visits, while law enforcement 
is very proactive in ensuring Force Protection requirements 
are either met or exceeded.  In light of the tsunami-related 
devastation to the Phuket area, future ship visits are seen 
by the Thais as a symbol of the island's recovery from the 
disaster. 
 
VIOLENCE IN THE SOUTH 
 
¶12.  (C)  Besides dealing with the tsunami aftermath, Prime 
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra's biggest domestic challenge is 
the unsettled security situation in the southern part of the 
country.  Southern Thailand, and in particular the three 
southernmost Muslim majority provinces of Pattani, Yala and 
Narathiwat, has experienced episodic violence since it was 
incorporated into the Siamese Kingdom in 1902.  However, last 
year witnessed a dramatic increase in the level of violence, 
with over 500 people killed either by militants or by 
security forces.  Local Muslim separatist militants have 
attacked symbols of Thai and Buddhist authority, and there 
continue to be almost daily incidents of violence, notably 
even after the tsunami disaster of December 26.  Attacks most 
often involve isolated shootings of local officials, although 
increasingly sophisticated bombing attacks have become more 
common.  While there is no credible evidence of Jemaah 
Islamiyah (JI) or al-Qaeda direction of the violence, there 
is concern that they might attempt to exploit the local 
violence for their own purposes. 
 
¶13.  (C)  Thaksin has recently acknowledged that the problem 
in Thailand's south is not simply the work of criminal gangs 
as he once declared, and is an issue that potentially reaches 
beyond Thailand's borders.  Last December, Thaksin claimed 
publicly during a radio address that Thai militants are 
training in Malaysia and that Indonesian extremists are 
instigating some of the violence.  This rather clumsy public 
assertion apparently deeply offended the two fellow ASEAN 
governments.  That said, Thaksin is not likely to ask for 
direct U.S. assistance as the RTG maintains that the southern 
situation is primarily a "domestic" issue.  Reporting has 
consistently pointed out that this violence is directed 
strictly at RTG institutions with no evidence of attacks 
directed towards foreign or U.S. interests.  Additional 
reporting shows no migration of the violence north from the 
aforementioned southern provinces.  In your meeting, Thai 
officials may ask you for U.S. equipment and technology such 
as UAVs to support efforts to monitor militant movements in 
the south.  We recommend you be receptive but noncommittal, 
and suggest that technical experts follow up. At the same 
time, Thaksin -- and most Thais -- are sensitive about any 
perception that the U.S. wants to establish a security 
presence in the south. 
 
MILITARY COOPERATION 
 
¶14.  (C)  We conduct a wide range of major exercises and 
training programs with Thailand each year, including Cobra 
Gold, the annual exercise which in 2004 involved 
approximately 13,500 U.S. service members and 6,000 Thais. 
Cobra Gold 2005 will be smaller than last year, primarily due 
to U.S. commitments elsewhere and the large number of U.S. 
forces sent to the region for tsunami relief.  Nonetheless, 
planning for Cobra Gold 2005 is underway; we expect this 
year's exercise to be a disaster response training program 
involving several thousand U.S. troops.   Utapao, currently 
being used as the primary staging area for U.S. disaster 
relief efforts in the region, is a critical support hub for 
U.S. aircraft transiting the region.  Over 420 DoD aircraft 
use it each year.  From January 25 until February 4, we 
conducted our largest air exercise with the Thai, Cope Tiger. 
 This year, F-18's from the USS Abraham Lincoln participated. 
 
 
THAILAND AND IRAQ 
 
¶15.  (C)  Thailand sent troops to Afghanistan as part of OEF 
and dispatched two deployments to Iraq as part of OIF.  In 
December 2003, two Thai soldiers were killed by a car bomb 
while on duty in Karbala.  Thailand's second six-month 
deployment of 443 medics and engineers to Iraq ended in 
September 2004.  Notably, despite RTG sensitivity to the 
prospect, participation in OIF did not cause a domestic furor 
in Thailand as in other countries.  It would be appropriate 
for you to thank the Thai for their contribution to OIF and 
OEF.  Washington has asked us to monitor Thai receptiveness 
to making another deployment to Iraq.  During your visit, you 
may want to ask senior Thai officials whether they expect 
Thailand to send more troops to support OIF. 
BOYCE