This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ALMATY 000537 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/CACEN (JMUDGE), DRL/PHD (PDAVIES) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2015 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV KZ POLITICAL
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: EUR DAS KENNEDY'S MEETING WITH 
OPPOSITION PARTIES 
 
REF: A. 04 ALMATY 4811 
 
     ¶B. ALMATY 377 
     ¶C. ALMATY 166 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John Ordway, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  In a February 5 roundtable with Kazakhstani 
opposition politicians, DAS Kennedy discussed the current 
political environment following flawed parliamentary 
elections and the opposition's attempts to develop a unified 
campaign platform and a single presidential candidate. 
Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan representatives described the 
legal challenges facing the party and called on the USG to 
demonstrate its support.  Representatives of the more 
centrist Ak Zhol party echoed DCK's call for U.S. action, and 
repeatedly raised the specter of growing Islamization of the 
Kazakhstani population.  All participants confirmed the 
opposition's decision to boycott the GOK's 
recently-established National Commission on Democratization 
and Civil Society.  One DCK representative indicated a 
willingness to consider participation if Galymzham Zhakiyanov 
were freed, however.  Several participants expressed concern 
about the image of the U.S. in Kazakhstan, claiming that the 
public saw high-level contacts with the GOK as support for a 
corrupt regime.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) EUR DAS Laura Kennedy held a roundtable with 
opposition party representatives on February 5 at the 
Ambassador's residence in Almaty.  Participants included 
Zharmakhan Tuyakbay, chairman of the Opposition Coordination 
Council; Ak Zhol co-chairman Bulat Abilov, Oraz Zhandosov, 
and Altynbek Sarsenbaiuly; Communist Party head Serikbolsyn 
Abdildin; and Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (DCK) 
representatives Assylbek Kozhakhmetov and Tolen Tokhtasynov. 
 
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Political Overview 
------------------ 
 
¶2. (C) Tuyakbay, clearly now recognized as leader of the 
opposition following his election as chairman of the 
Opposition Coordination Council (OCC, ref A), kicked off the 
conversation with an introduction of the political parties 
present and an overview of the flawed parliamentary elections 
in September-October 2004.  He informed DAS Kennedy of his 
own resignation as speaker of the Mazhilis and deputy 
chairman of President Nazarbayev's Otan party following 
Nazarbayev's refusal to rectify the many problems with the 
elections.  He commented bitterly that Nazarbayev's only 
action had been to present former PA head Imangali 
Tasmagambetov (ref B) with an award and make him mayor of 
Almaty.  Tuyakbay outlined the OCC's priorities of seeking 
reform, including the adoption of a new Constitution, and the 
peaceful transfer of power. 
 
¶3. (C) Abdildin, at 67 the dean of the opposition movement, 
claimed that the opposition is stronger now than ever.  He 
praised Tuyakbay, Zhandosov, and Sarsenbaiuly for their 
knowledge of government operations, and noted that the rest 
were successful businessmen who understood the market 
economy.   Abdildin echoed Tuyakbay's criticism of the 
parliamentary elections, noting that in its history as an 
independent country Kazakhstan had never had an election that 
was transparent and free of falsifications.  He stressed that 
the situation would never change as long as Nazarbayev was in 
power, as he treats the country "as his own property." 
Abdildin criticized the OSCE for not coming right out in its 
report and saying that the elections were not legitimate.  He 
also called on the U.S. to speak out "at the highest levels." 
 
¶4. (C) Sarsenbaiuly explained that Ak Zhol was made up of 
people who had been in government and taken part in the 
economic reforms of the early to mid-1990s.  They believed 
that democratic reform would follow, but eventually left 
government when it became clear that would not happen. 
Sarsenbaiuly claimed that since 2001, the country had been 
moving backward on the political front.  Right now it ranks 
somewhere between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, but soon it 
would slip to between Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan due to 
limits on the press and political parties and the existence 
of political prisoners.  The OCC had been formed to try to 
move the country back in the right direction and counteract 
the move toward authoritarianism and closure of the country. 
 
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Unified Presidential Candidate? 
------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) In response to DAS Kennedy's question about prospects 
for a single opposition presidential candidate, Zhandosov 
confirmed that it was the OCC's primary goal.  Abdildin added 
 
 
that the opposition was developing a coordinated campaign 
platform, the centerpiece of which was a new Constitution. 
Tuyakbay indicated that reforms would focus on the protection 
of individual rights and freedoms, including the right to 
political participation and the creation of the necessary 
conditions.  He stressed the need for a system of true checks 
and balances between the three branches of power, outlining a 
presidential-parliamentary system with a stronger prime 
minister than the status quo and a single-term limit for the 
president.  He also called for the parliament to be formed 
exclusively through single-member district voting, rather 
than by party lists and presidential appointment. 
 
¶6. (C) Abilov stated that the last elections had revealed 
both a crisis of ideas and of trust in the authorities.  He 
claimed that many people did not vote because they have lost 
confidence in the current leaders and want an alternative. 
Abilov claimed that the country is held "hostage" to 
Kazakhgate (i.e. the Giffen trial) and the corruption of 
President Nazarbayev.  He stressed that the opposition is 
realistic and does not expect "a miracle tomorrow;" they are 
focused on unifying in order to achieve a just Kazakhstan. 
(Note:  On February 1, Abilov was elected chair of an OCC 
working group dedicated to the formation of a mass national 
movement of parties, NGOs, and private individuals to be 
called "For a Just Kazakhstan.") 
 
---------------------------------- 
DCK is the Canary in the Coal Mine 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Kozhakhmetov gave a lengthy overview of the legal 
challenges facing DCK (ref C), stressing that the 
government's legal move against his party was a result of the 
fact that it could not defeat the opposition on the basis of 
ideology alone.  He noted that DCK had always highly valued 
the support of the USG and international organizations, but 
did not sense that support was as strong now as before. 
(Note:  This was undoubtedly a reference to the fact that we 
have not issued a public statement, as Kozhakhmetov had 
requested, on the liquidation case.)  Kozhakhmetov noted that 
President Bush had referred to support for political 
dissidents in his inauguration speech, and asked what the 
impact would be on U.S. foreign policy.  He declared that 
regardless of the outcome of the next appeal hearing, 
scheduled for February 9, the government would not be able to 
get rid of DCK's supporters and their beliefs. 
 
--------------------- 
The "Islamist Threat" 
--------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Zhandosov explained that the OCC was developing a 
unified electoral campaign based largely on the concept of 
fighting corruption.  When in government themselves, the 
members of the OCC had worked to increase transparency and 
the openness of relations between the government and the 
people.  They themselves had all avoided the temptation of 
corruption.  Zhandosov noted that the investment climate in 
Kazakhstan had worsened because the government did not have a 
sense of accountability.  The situation was bearable for 
large firms, such as Western energy companies, but very 
difficult for small firms.  He stressed that the opposition's 
approach to improving the investment climate meshed well with 
U.S. interests and policy goals.  Shifting to the political 
environment, Zhandosov warned that if the situation does not 
change, in ten years the opposition in Kazakhstan will be 
Islamist and anti-foreign.  The presidential elections will 
be crucial.  Echoing Kozhakhmetov's comments about the 
President's inaugural address, Zhandosov called for concrete 
action to follow.  He proposed that the U.S. work with Ak 
Zhol to identify judges who had issued biased rulings after 
the parliamentary elections in order to exclude them from any 
U.S.-funded training.  He also suggested unspecified action 
against media outlets that spread disinformation during the 
campaign. 
 
¶9. (C) Tuyakbay quickly jumped in to clarify that the 
opposition was seeking the USG's "moral support" as it 
confronted the corrupt authorities running the country.  They 
were not asking the U.S. to bring about the transfer of 
power; rather, the opposition simply wanted the U.S. to speak 
out when things are wrong. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
National Commission on Democratization and Civil Society 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶10.  (C) DAS Kennedy asked the roundtable participants 
whether the OCC's decision to boycott the new National 
Commission on Democratization and Civil Society, which goes 
 
 
by the unfortunate Russian acronym NKVD, still stood. 
Tokhtasynov specified that opposition parties would 
participate if Galymzhan Zhakiyanov were freed; the 
parliamentary elections were declared invalid and re-run; and 
there was direct dialogue with Nazarbayev.  He later offered 
that freeing Zhakiyanov would be a good first step. 
Sarsenbaiuly stated that the NKVD had been created as cover 
for the bad elections and was only a PR move.  He stressed 
that the opposition could not responsibly take part when 
nothing had been done to address election violations, when 
political prisoners were still being held, and when the 
government was attacking opposition parties and newspapers. 
Sarsenbaiuly then added that the USG's decision to receive a 
Kazakhstani official who had been involved in the sale of 
arms to North Korea (note: current MOD Altynbayev) at high 
levels cast doubt on the intentions and priorities of the 
U.S. 
 
------------------------------------ 
U.S. Assistance to Kazakhstan, Image 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶11. (C) Tokhtasynov commented that television coverage of DAS 
Kennedy's February 4 press conference in Astana had been 
slanted, mistranslated, and had presented her comments on 
U.S. assistance for democratic development as an apology or 
justification of U.S. policy.  DAS Kennedy assured the group 
that we stand firmly behind our policy of support for the 
development of a democratic process and are very open in our 
discussions with the GOK.  However, both DAS Kennedy and the 
Ambassador stressed that the U.S. has made it clear it was 
not advocating a Rose or Orange Revolution in Kazakhstan. 
The task of bringing about political change rested with the 
opposition and the people of Kazakhstan, not the USG. 
Sarsenbaiuly commented that the opposition understood that 
the U.S. government's primary goal in the region was 
stability, and that the U.S. saw democratization as a 
necessary condition for stability.  He stressed that the 
Nazarbayev regime could not provide long-term stability:  it 
faced increasing Islamization, the export of narcotics, a 
worsening investment climate, growing corruption, and the 
lack of development/infrastructure.  Sarsenbaiuly claimed 
that high-level U.S. contacts are perceived by the public as 
support for a corrupt regime, and called for the USG to treat 
the GOK as it treats the government of Belarus.  Zhandosov 
echoed Sarsenbaiuly's comments, noting that the U.S. was seen 
in Kazakhstan as the friend of power rather than the friend 
of the people. 
 
 
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