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R 051659Z JAN 05
FM USMISSION USNATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7915
INFO NSC WASHDC
JCS WASHDC
OSD WASHDC

05.01.2005: NATO MOVES FORWARD WITH LANDMARK BALLISTIC MISSILE
THREAT ASSESSMENT

S E C R E T USNATO 000003
STATE FOR EUR/PRA, EUR/RPM, NP/PPC, AC/DS
OSD/ISP FOR SCHLESS, ROSE
OSD/MDA FOR KIEFER, SEARSE
NSC FOR VOLKER, DICASAGRANDE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/06/2014
TAGS: NATO KNNP PARM MNUC
REF: C-M(2004)109

Classified By: Ambassador R. Nicholas Burns for Reasons 1.4 (b/d)

¶1. (S) Summary: During the December 9 Ministerial meeting of
the North Atlantic Council, Foreign Ministers noted the
completion of the Longer-Term Analysis of Ballistic Missile
Risks and Threats. The fruit of more than 18 months of
negotiations, the Analysis fulfills in part a 2002 Prague
Summit tasking to examine options for addressing ballistic
missile threats to the Alliance. At 180 pages, it provides
the most comprehensive assessment of WMD and ballistic
missile (BM) proliferation trends the Alliance has ever
produced. Among the documents key findings are that some
countries currently have the capability to launch a ballistic
missile attack on NATOs southeastern flank and U.S. forces
in the Pacific, and that the risk of a ballistic missile
attack on any Alliance territory, population centers or NATO
forces, while moderate, will remain a concern in the decade
to come. The Analysis contains unprecedented consensus
positions on the intentions, capabilities and proliferation
record of Iran, Syria and North Korea as well as Russia and
China. It also addresses the contributions of
non-proliferation instruments, including new approaches such
as PSI and UNSCR 1540, as well as the implications of the
A.Q. Khan network.

¶2. (C) Combined with two major feasibility studies and
ongoing technical consultations, the Analysis provides NATO
with the political consensus and general assessment necessary
to move forward with Alliance deliberations on the
acquisition and fielding of defense capabilities against the
full range of ballistic missile threats. In this context,
USNATO fully appreciates the Intelligence Communitys strong
support for the Analysiss development, will continue to
request relevant U.S. intelligence releasable to NATO, and
welcomes high-level and expert USG officials available to
brief Allies in the Senior Politico-Military Group on
Proliferation (SGP) and the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on
WMD and BM proliferation-related topics. End Summary.

Context of the Longer-Term Analysis
-----------------------------------

¶3. (U) While NATO has yet to make a definitive decision on
missile defense for populations and territories, NATOs
Strategic Concept notes that NATOs posture against the
proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery "must
continue to improve, including through work on missile
defense." At the 2002 Prague Summit, NATO Heads of State and
Government agreed "to examine options for addressing the
increasing missile threat to NATO territory, forces and
population centers in an effective and efficient way through
an appropriate mix of political and defense efforts, along
with deterrence" as well as to initiate a Theater Missile
Defense (TMD) Feasibility Study.

¶4. (C) This TMD feasibility study, which focuses on the
technical requirements, costs, and time scale of possible
architectures for an Active-Layered Theater Ballistic Missile
Defense (ALTBMD) system to protect NATO deployed forces, was
completed in 2003. In January 2004, a second Missile Defense
Feasibility Study was contracted to examine options for
protecting Alliance territory and population centers. Upon
its scheduled completion in July 2005, this study will be
submitted to the Conference of National Armaments Directors,
which will review and approve a consolidated report in late
¶2005. This report in turn will be forwarded to the Executive
Working Group (Reinforced) (EWG(R)), NATOs primary forum for
missile defense consultations.

¶5. (C) During the December 9 Ministerial meeting of the
North Atlantic Council, Foreign Ministers noted the
completion of the Longer-Term Analysis of Ballistic Missile
Risks and Threats (reftel), which fulfilled another 2002
Prague Summit tasking to assess current and potential WMD and
ballistic missile threats to the Alliance over the next ten
years. The fruit of more than 18 months of negotiations,
this 180-page Analysis contains unprecedented consensus
positions on key countries of proliferation concern and
provides the most comprehensive assessment of WMD and BM
risks and threats the Alliance has ever produced.

¶6. (S) The Analysis is divided into five chapters, which
address non-proliferation regimes and national measures;
capabilities and intentions; alternative means of delivery;
secondary proliferation and procurement networks; and
intelligence gaps. As a whole, it clearly demonstrates that
NATO already faces certain risks and potential threats, and
that the Alliance must continue to closely monitor the
intentions and capabilities of countries of proliferation
concern.

¶7. (C) Combined with the EWG(R)s ongoing work and the two
Missile Defense Feasibility Studies, the Analysis provides
NATO with the political consensus and general assessment
necessary to move forward with Alliance deliberations on the
acquisition and fielding of defense capabilities against
ballistic missile threats. This includes the goal of
achieving initial operational capability for an ALTBMD system
to protect NATO deployed forces by 2010 as well as possible
steps toward acquiring capabilities to protect Alliance
territory and population centers against the full range of BM
threats.

Key Findings of the Longer-Term Analysis
----------------------------------------

¶8. (S) The risk of a ballistic missile attack on any
Alliance territory, population centers, or NATO deployed
forces, while moderate, will remain a concern in the decade
to come. Iran and Syria have ballistic missiles that can
reach parts of NATO territory and deployed forces, and they
have chemical weapons (CW) for use as warheads. Concerns
over Russian and Chinese BM capabilities are currently
primarily limited to the potential for accidental or
unauthorized launches, and the risk that their technology
will proliferate to unstable countries.

¶9. (S) Current and future assessments of BM capabilities
must take into account scenarios where components
indigenously developed or acquired from abroad are integrated
into existing missile programs to improve accuracy and
operational readiness. Countries developing BMs may not
necessarily follow U.S. or Russian patterns of development or
deployment. North Korea began fielding and selling the No
Dong after a single flight test, and countries today may rely
in part on computer modeling or other means aside from easily
observable test launches to keep their development programs
covert.

¶10. (S) Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are not widely
recognized as an immediate threat to the Alliance, but an
indirect risk to NATO deployed forces is possible. In the
future, there will be an increased risk that UAVs could be
converted to carry and dispense CW and biological weapons
(BW). The willingness of some states and illegal entities to
transfer UAV or cruise missile (CM) components, peripheral
equipment or technology is increasing and requires effective
counter-proliferation measures to reduce their availability.
There is currently no disarmament or non-proliferation
agreement that restrains the production, development or
possession of UAVs and CMs.

¶11. (S) Possession of WMD and their means of delivery has
become a major goal for both state and non-state actors for
reasons of prestige, influence or deterrence. Proliferating
states and entities are employing increasingly sophisticated
measures to obtain WMD- or BM-related equipment, materials
and technologies. Some countries that were proliferation
customers in the 1980s have themselves become suppliers. The
development of indigenous capabilities in relevant dual-use
applications such as nuclear power, biotechnology and space
launch systems can help to conceal ultimate intentions.
North Korea and Iran as well as Russian and Chinese entities
are likely to remain the major suppliers of WMD- and
BM-related equipment, materials and expertise. The
identification, monitoring, and eventual dismantlement of the
A.Q. Khan network show that there is a complicated worldwide
marketplace for these inputs.

¶12. (C) Although arms control agreements and
non-proliferation regimes will continue to slow the
proliferation of WMD and BMs, the capability of both
suppliers and proliferants are likely to improve. The
adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 is the
strongest affirmation of the international communitys
support for multilateral treaties and other international
instruments that seek to prevent WMD proliferation.
Traditional diplomatic measures are enhanced by new tools
such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and Operation
Active Endeavour, which serve to complement and strengthen
international norms and mechanisms.

Select Country-Specific Conclusions
-----------------------------------

North Korea:
¶13. (S) Recent developments in North Korea seem to indicate
ambitions to use WMD combined with BMs not only as a
deterrent but also as a political bargaining chip and a means
of blackmail to obtain economic or financial aid. Various
sources place North Korea has having 10 to 30 kg of
weapons-grade plutonium, and while North Korea claims to have
a nuclear deterrent, there is uncertainty as to whether it
currently has operational nuclear weapons for military use.
It is possible that North Korea would use WMD and BMs if it
felt that the survival of the regime was at stake.

¶14. (S) Pyongyang is reportedly developing a new land-mobile
intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) derived from the
Soviet SS-N-6 submarine-launched BM; if confirmed, this
potential to use a more advanced propulsion technology would
be of serious concern. North Korea has continued with
development work and ground-based testing of the Taepo
Dong-2, which according to some Allies experts with a third
stage could deliver a weapons payload of 500 kg up to 15,000
km--i.e., all of the United States and Europe, albeit with
very poor accuracy. U.S. forces in the Pacific are within
range of North Korean missiles, and it is cause for serious
concern that North Koreas willingness to proliferate
longer-range BM technology will hasten the risk to broad
expanses of NATO territory.

Iran:
¶15. (S) Iran continues to put a high priority on an
ambitious BM program focused on the development of both
liquid and solid propellant short-range BMs and medium-range
BMs with assistance from Russia, North Korea and China.
Tehran has announced its intention to put satellites into
orbit, which would establish the technical base to develop an
IRBM or intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability.
Iran already has BM capabilities that put the southeastern
flank of NATO within range, and within the next ten years, it
is likely to produce qualitative and quantitative changes to
its military capabilities that will significantly increase
the potential threat to the Alliance and NATO forces deployed
in the region.

¶16. (S) Concerns have been widely expressed over Irans
nuclear program and its failures and breaches regarding its
Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), and the IAEA cannot positively identify that
Irans nuclear program is solely for peaceful purposes.
Should its nuclear program continue to proceed at the same
pace, Iran could produce sufficient fissile material for a
first nuclear device by 2010. Iran is assessed to have an
offensive BW program and has almost certainly conducted
BW-related research using spray devices and adapted munitions
for delivery. Despite its ratification of the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC), Iran is also assessed to be
retaining an offensive CW program and has the technological
capability to develop a CW warhead for use on BMs.

Syria:
¶17. (S) There is no evidence that Syria plans to attempt to
acquire or develop a nuclear weapons capability, and it
currently lacks the resources, infrastructure and scientific
expertise to pursue one. Syria is judged to have a BW
program in the research and development phase, as well as an
advanced CW program that includes several facilities for
testing, production and storage of CW. Syria can produce
SCUD missile fuel and various solid propellant ingredients,
and continues to make progress in this area with probable
Chinese and Iranian assistance. It can deliver both sarin
and VX with aerial bombs, SCUD-Bs and possibly SCUD-Cs.
Qualitative and quantitative improvements in Syrias WMD and
BM capabilities over the next ten years will increase the
potential threat to NATO territory, notably the southeastern
flank of the Alliance.

China:
¶18. (S) China has a mature capability to develop and launch
BMs with nuclear warheads and is carrying out a strategic
modernization program to improve the quality of its arsenal,
including replacing liquid-fueled ICBMs with solid-fuel
systems and deploying more of its BMs on road-mobile
launchers. China is believed to have an advanced CW program
as well as an offensive BW capability, and its voluntary
declarations under the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention are believed to be inaccurate and incomplete.
While China has the capability to pose a potential threat to
NATO territory or deployed forces, at present Beijing focuses
on a strategic posture that defends its regional influence in
Asia. The greatest concern regarding Chinese capabilities is
the risk of onward proliferation of technology and material
to other countries. In light of all these elements, NATO
must remain aware of developments in China.

Russia:
¶19. (S) While Moscow has no intention of executing military
operations against the Alliance, Russia has a mature arsenal
of BMs capable of delivering nuclear weapons to any part of
NATO territory. It is also modernizing its BMs at a measured
pace and is pursuing warhead refurbishment. While the
Cooperative Threat Reduction program will continue to improve
the security of non-deployed nuclear warheads, weapons-grade
fissile material will likely remain vulnerable to theft.
Russias BW program, which is probably still offensive,
remains active and declarations to date have failed to reveal
the full size and scope of the Soviet program. Russia
possesses a number of unacknowledged CW agents and weapons,
and it cannot be entirely excluded that Russia could pursue
some non-compliant activity without detection. It has given
priority to the development of modern CW systems and agents
designed to defeat NATO protective systems and circumvent the
CWC. In light of its WMD and BM capabilities, NATO must
remain concerned about the potential threat from Russia.

Small Step for NATO MD, Giant Leap for SGP
------------------------------------------

¶20. (S) Comment: While the Longer-Term Analysis is but one
of many inputs into the equation that will determine how NATO
will face the spread of WMD and BM capabilities, it has also
succeeded in highlighting proliferation issues of key
importance to the U.S. Spirited and sometimes contentious
debate with Allies (especially France and Germany) over Iran,
North Korea, and China in the SGP has in the end produced a
broad and agreed foundation for continued engagement with
Allies on tough proliferation questions. In this context,
USNATO fully appreciates the Intelligence Communitys strong
support for the Analysiss development, will continue to
request relevant U.S. intelligence releasable to NATO, and
welcomes high-level and expert USG officials available to
brief Allies in the SGP and the NAC on WMD and BM
proliferation-related topics. While such briefings--and the
debates they provoke--may seem to parallel discussion in
other fora, it is essential that we raise these issues at
NATO Headquarters if the U.S. is to play a leadership role in
shaping Alliance policy, guiding the development of
collective capabilities, and considering operational
responses to curb and counter the proliferation of WMD and
their means of delivery. End Comment.
BURNS