This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 000235 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2015 
TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL AF NL
SUBJECT: DUTCH ISAF AND OEF DEPLOYMENTS 
 
REF: A. STATE 2743 
     ¶B. 04 THE HAGUE 3360 
     ¶C. THE HAGUE 99 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR ANDREW SCHOFER FOR REA 
SONS 1.4 (B AND D) 
 
¶1. (S) Summary:  PolMilOff met with MFA and MOD officials on 
January 26 and 28 to discuss the current status of Dutch 
commitments to NATO's ISAF mission and Operation Enduring 
Freedom.  The GONL is not contemplating use of its contingent 
in NRF IV in support of the parliamentary elections in 
Afghanistan but is prepared to support the deployment of 
NATO's SRF (to which the Dutch have contributed a marine 
battalion) for this purpose.  The GONL is planning on 
deploying F-16s to Afghanistan to provide air cover for ISAF 
following the departure of its Apache helicopters at the end 
of March.  The GONL is seriously considering leading a second 
PRT for ISAF Stage III, though MFA and MOD differ on the 
timing.  Concerning OEF, preparations continue for a possible 
Dutch SOF deployment; a recce team is currently visiting 
Afghanistan to refine the Dutch concept of operations.  The 
Dutch are also considering taking over leadership of CTF-150 
with three ships in December 2005.  End Summary. 
 
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ISAF 
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¶2. (C) PolMilOff met with MFA Security Policy Bureau Deputy 
Director for Operations Joop Nijssen on January 26 and MOD 
Senior Policy Advisor for Afghanistan Maarten van Meurs on 
January 28.  Concerning support for upcoming elections as 
noted ref A, both said the GONL is not contemplating 
deployment of its land contingent in NRF IV (approximately 
4,000 troops).  Van Meurs said Defense Minister Kamp was 
strongly opposed to such a use of the NRF and that for once, 
the Netherlands agreed with France that the NRF was meant for 
crisis situations not anticipated events such as elections. 
For election support the MOD felt there should be "a proper 
force generation process."  (Note:  MFA Political Director 
Hugo Siblesz recently made the same argument to Ambassador 
Sobel.)  According to van Meurs, one of the reasons the 
Netherlands agreed to make available a battalion of Dutch 
marines for the SRF for possible use in Afghanistan was to 
signal its preference for the SRF, rather than the NRF, 
playing this role.  Van Meurs was confident that an SRF 
deployment to Afghanistan would not pose any political 
problems for the GoNL.  Nijssen similarly stated that the 
idea of using the Dutch NRF contingent in Afghanistan was 
simply "not being contemplated" in Dutch government circles. 
He noted that the possibility of sending Dutch troops to 
Afghanistan with SRF, on the other hand, had been mentioned 
in a government letter to parliament (note:  an essential 
first step in the government's decision-making on a 
deployment). 
 
¶3. (C) Both Nijssen and van Meurs confirmed that the current 
Dutch Apache helicopter deployment will conclude at the end 
of March.  The GONL is considering deployment of F-16s to 
provide air cover for ISAF and Dutch recce team recently 
returned from Afghanistan.  Van Meurs said the F-16s would 
likely be deployed to Bagram and that the GONL was hoping to 
involve other European Participating Air Forces (EPAF) 
countries such as Belgium, Denmark, Norway and Portugal in 
the mission.  He expected the Dutch F-16 deployment would 
reach initial operating capacity at the beginning of April 
with at least a few aircraft (less than six). 
 
¶4. (C) Concerning future Dutch PRTs, Nijssen said the MFA's 
preference would be to partner in a Stage III PRT with Canada 
and noted the two MODs were exploring this possibility.  The 
MFA would like to see such a PRT operational by October.  In 
a January 21 meeting with PolCouns and PolMilOff, Nijssen's 
boss, MFA Security Policy Director-General Maurits Jochems 
said that FM Bot and DefMin Kamp had agreed that the 
Netherlands should assume leadership of a second PRT at the 
end of 2005/beginning of 2006.  Van Meurs said the MOD was 
not looking at Dutch leadership of a second PRT before Spring 
¶2006. 
 
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OEF 
--- 
 
¶5. (S) Both Nijssen and van Meurs confirmed that preparations 
for a possible Dutch special operations forces (SOF) in 
support of OEF continue on course (ref B).  Following recent 
discussions at CENTCOM by MOD Operations Director Air 
Commodore Pieter Cobelens and officials, a Dutch MOD recce 
team departed January 24 for Kandahar and Helmand and is 
expected to return on February 1.  As outlined ref B, the 
government will not use its normal approval process for 
military deployments with this mission.  Once the recce team 
returns, the Core Group of the Dutch Cabinet (PM, FM, DefMin, 
two Deputy PMs) will take a final decision on the operation 
in February.  It will then be briefed to political party 
leaders in closed-door session.  Nijssen advised that 
coalition party leaders were sounded out on the mission last 
Fall and were supportive.  The rest of the cabinet and 
parliament will be made aware of the mission in general 
terms.  Nijssen said the Dutch expect to reach initial 
operating capacity by the end of April with full operations 
in May.  Nijssen and van Meurs said the Dutch are also 
contemplating taking over leadership of CTF-150 from the 
French with three vessels, including one of the Dutch Navy's 
new LCF frigates, at the end of 2005 for a period of four 
months. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶6. (S) While preparations for deploying SOF for OEF are 
apparently on track, the final hurdles of a full Cabinet 
decision and the briefing of parliamentary leaders still must 
be overcome before the deployment can proceed.  With regard 
to the NRF/SRF question, it is worth noting that during the 
recent debate on possibly extending the Dutch troop presence 
in Al-Muthanna, DefMin Kamp cited the Dutch commitment to the 
NRF to argue successfully against an extension (ref C). 
Assuming Dutch opposition to using the NRF in Afghanistan 
stands firm, some may question whether the touting of their 
SRF commitment is intended, at least in part, to avoid 
deploying the much larger Dutch NRF contribution to a 
potentially dangerous environment in Afghanistan. 
SOBEL