This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 000164 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2015 
TAGS: PREL PHUM PTER EAID KPAL BK CU IR IZ UP CH NL EUN
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/EU:  EXPECTATIONS FOR JAN 31 FOREIGN 
MINISTERS' MEETING (GAERC) 
 
REF: A. STATE 9678 
 
     ¶B. THE HAGUE 2831 
     ¶C. THE HAGUE 3083 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew Schofer for reasons 1.4 (b) a 
nd (d). 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  The U.S. and EU need to agree to disagree 
on China and prepare a soft landing for the transatlantic 
relationship after the inevitable lift of the China arms 
embargo, Jaap Werner (MFA, Political Director) and Bahia 
Tahzib (MFA Deputy European Correspondent) told Poloff during 
discussion of reftel points January 20.  Werner and Tahzib 
urged us to accentuate the positive aspects of the U.S.-EU 
relationship and welcomed the President's February visit to 
Brussels.  The UN should continue coordinating Tsunami relief 
for now, they said, noting some in the EU press for a 
free-standing, prominent EU role.  There is fresh hope in the 
Middle East and the EU has some fence-mending to do with 
Israel, Werner admitted.  On designation of Hizballah, the 
Dutch maintain a strong preference for collective rather than 
unilateral action and believe that USG efforts should focus 
on undecided members, such as France and even the UK.  On 
Iraq, Werner said that message coordination on the outcome of 
the elections is critical but will be difficult, not least 
because the EU must try to arrive at a common position first, 
including bringing France along.  On Croatia, the GoNL is 
skeptical that there will be cooperation on Gotovina; 
Luxemburg has not set the rest of the Balkans agenda for the 
GAERC.  Iran is not on the agenda for the GAERC; the GoNL 
thinks the February 28 IAEA deadline is too soon to honestly 
assess Iran's intentions.  Finally, on Cuba, Werner expects 
the June measures to be modified, with an emphasis on 
broadening outreach to the dissident community.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C)  China: 
 
Werner warned that the USG and the EU "need to start putting 
things into play to soften the landing" of the "inevitable 
lifting of the arms embargo in a few months."  He and Tahzib 
took exception to reftel's characterization of a lift as 
"blow to transatlantic relations."  They pointed to notable 
areas of recent cooperation, such as with the tsunami 
response and in the Ukraine and argued that "the U.S. knows 
all the details of the lift by now and has had time to 
prepare."  He acknowledged Poloff's point that the February 
visit of the President was intended to help renew the 
transatlantic relationship (more below), and that a premature 
lift could poison the visit.  Werner said he had appreciated 
but "had not been overwhelmed by" the numerous presentations 
given to explain the USG objections and he still believes the 
tool box/code of conduct "covers the issue." He urged the 
U.S. to realize "it's not the end of the world; the EU has 
these alternate arrangements in place."  Poloff countered 
that the USG message has been consistent, and negative, about 
lifting the embargo, most recently in The Hague during 
Secretary Powell's December visit.  Werner said that we might 
 
SIPDIS 
have to resolve the case as "agreeing to disagree."  Poloff 
urged Werner to work to delay any lift as long as possible 
and reminded him that the issue remained very sensitive not 
only for the executive branch in Washington but also for 
Congress, which has its own dynamic and strong interests in 
this matter which must not be underestimated. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Transatlantic Relations: 
 
Pointing to "positive vibes from Secretary-designate Rice," 
Werner said his high expectations - and active planning - for 
the President's February visit were matched across the EU. 
The EU will try not to lecture the President, and he hoped 
the President would likewise refrain from lecturing them.  He 
hoped EU President Luxemburg would "orchestrate, not 
pre-cook" it while acknowledging that the welcome "needs to 
be carefully managed by both sides."  As for broader and 
longer term dialogue and action, Werner clearly welcomed 
Poloff's reminder that the USG highly values Dutch input and 
ideas on the widest range of topic and warmly promised to 
keep lines of communication and cooperation open and active 
at all levels. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Tsunami Disaster: 
 
The Dutch are satisfied with how OCHA (UN Humanitarian 
Affairs) and the UN had coordinated tsunami response in the 
near term, Werner said, and he expected the UN to continue in 
this role into the midterm.  He noted that the political 
aspects (and hence, the work for diplomats rather than aid 
workers) of the crisis are only beginning to emerge.  Longer 
term, he said the Dutch await the results of the ongoing 
World Bank needs assessment.  He strongly praised the "rapid 
and generous USG response," noting how "impressed he had been 
that we had had aircraft carriers on the spot within days 
flying helicopter missions for all the world to see";  this 
will be "good for the USG image in Europe and the region," he 
added with a smile.  He said the EU is now discussing whether 
the UN should  continue to have primacy in coordinating all 
response or whether there is a defined role that the EU can 
assume for itself, as some EU member states strongly desire, 
he revealed.  Luxemburg is organizing a review of the EU's 
crisis response capacity, Werner concluded. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Middle East: 
 
While the EU will continue to "warn Israel when it crosses 
red lines, like with the wall/fence or settlements,"  Werner 
said, he emphasized that the Netherlands welcomes the recent 
positive actions taken by both sides.  He agreed with Poloff 
that the EU "has a credibility problem in the region" and 
believed "this is not the best time to criticize Israel." 
The GoNL believes that "clarity soon on final status issues 
would improve the effectiveness of what we all do now,"  he 
said.  "Supporting Abu Mazen is today's challenge,"  he 
concluded, adding, "We want to see Israel invest in him, too 
and not make of him merely Arafat II." 
 
¶6.  (C)  Hizballah as a terrorist organization: 
 
In a separate conversation with Econoff, Wouter Jurgens (MFA 
political directorate, senior policy officer responsible for 
terrorist finance issues) noted that the issue was not likely 
to be raised at this GAERC.  He said the GoNL position had 
not changed since they argued for EU designation of the 
entire entity during the November 10 EU Clearinghouse 
discussions (refs b and c).  The Dutch still maintain a 
strong preference for collective rather than unilateral 
action on this issue and believed that USG efforts should 
focus on still undecided members, such as France and even the 
UK. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Iraq: 
 
"Iraq should give us a lesson in damage control,"  Werner 
said.  He agreed the EU and USG should coordinate 
post-election messages but he was not sure how to open a 
channel for that purpose.  The EU would first need to get a 
common position, he said, noting that "especially France 
could be a challenge if they take a critical view."   "There 
is a spectrum for choices of words,"  Werner noted, each with 
its own resonance and connotations, such as the elections 
"were a success," or "a qualified success," or, "mostly 
successful but for pockets of problems," and so on.  The GoNL 
would welcome an "active keeping in touch in capitals and 
constant checking" to ensure a clear message to the press." 
He noted that the GAERC follows the scheduled elections by 
one day, and that the elections might still be on-going at 
the time; therefore, GAERC statements might be difficult to 
draft and coordinate with us. 
 
¶8.  (C)  Balkans: 
 
Werner complained that Luxemburg had not yet set the agenda 
for the Balkans discussion.  It could include Bosnia, 
possibly Kosovo;  Croatia is "guesswork at this point." 
Poloff pressed Werner on Gotovina, stressing that the EU 
should not give Croatia a pass on accession negotiations, and 
on being true to the EU's avowed hope for "effective 
multilateralism" in this case.  Werner said the GoNL remains 
"skeptical about Croatia's cooperation." 
 
¶9.  (C)  Iran: 
 
Iran is not on the GAERC agenda, Werner said  The EU, running 
negotiations with Iran on a number of tracks, seems to 
believe the USG is "coming around" to a new look at Iran 
since it appears to have "condoned the EU3 initiative to 
date."  When Poloff raised the February 28 deadline at the 
IAEA's BOG, Werner countered, "Let's take a few weeks of 
months for this; February is too soon to assess Iran in the 
terms of a constructive engagement." 
He noted that the EU was also telling Iran to show its bona 
fides, as laid out in reftel, by not interfering in Iraq's 
election and ending support for Hizballah and Palestinian 
rejectionists.  He offered to "stay in touch to discuss 
strategy and outcomes." 
 
¶10.  (C)  Cuba: 
The GAERC will take the Cuba decision as an A point, Werner 
said, meaning the EU has decided to change its "June 
measures" as earlier reported.  At the same time, the EU is 
"trying to make a swing to a more pro-dissident policy." 
Werner would not admit, though pressed, that the relaxation 
of the June measures would include an insistence on the 
release of the 61 prisoners within the six-month trial 
period, neither could he promise that the EU was planning to 
keep human rights "paramount."  Rather, he said the EU was 
likely to take a more comprehensive view, which includes 
human rights.  (Note:  the MFA's human rights office has 
limited input into the GoNL's overall Cuba policy, he said; 
action lies with the Western Hemisphere and Political 
Director's office.)  Poloff reiterated the USG's request to 
be included in the EU's human rights briefings in Havana. 
RUSSEL