This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TEL AVIV 000076 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2010 
TAGS: KWBG PREL PTER ASEC GZ IS GAZA DISENGAGEMENT ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: NASSER YUSIF ON POSSIBLE SECURITY ROLE 
 
REF: JERUSALEM 4947 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer, per 1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
ConGen Jerusalem cleared this message. 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary: National Security Force BG Nasser Yusif 
told poloffs recently that, if called upon to join an Abu 
Mazen government as interior minister, he would  bring the 
green-uniform public security forces, Force 17, and the naval 
or coastal police under his personal operational control, and 
then, subject to concurrence by the political leadership, 
focus his attention on the relatively "easy" job of cleaning 
up the West Bank.  Only after order is re-imposed there -- 
within 20 days -- would Yusif turn his attention to Gaza, 
setting up his headquarters there "until the job is done." 
In a drop-by, the Ambassador cited the need for progress in 
the investigation of the October 15, 2003, attack on U.S. 
personnel in Gaza.  He stressed that although the United 
States stands ready to assist Abu Mazen, USG security 
concerns make it extremely difficult to operate effectively 
on the ground in PA territory.  Yusif agreed that law and 
order must be job number one for the PA, and concurred with 
the Ambassador's assessment that the Palestinian people 
themselves need security if their society is to grow.  He 
predicted that security during the January 9 presidential 
election will pose little problem because Abu Mazen maintains 
such a commanding lead in the race.  The real challenge, he 
stressed, will come during the March municipal elections, May 
PLC elections, and August Fatah elections, where no one 
faction has a commanding lead and where militants may choose 
to press their cases by violence.  Accordingly, PA security 
forces must gain control by March.  End Summary. 
 
------------------------------------- 
We Need Progress in the Investigation 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Pol/C and Poloff met at length recently with National 
Security Force (NSF) Major General Nasser Yusif, ranking 
military officer in the Palestinian Authority security 
establishment, and NSF Brigadier General Samir Siksek, during 
a primarily social call beginning at the Embassy and then 
moving to Pol/C's home.  (Note:  Yusif is the number two 
ranking military officer within the PLO, ranking behind only 
Tunis-based MG Ahmed Afani, who, at least until Yasser 
Arafat's death, held the title of deputy chief of staff to 
Yasser Arafat.  Yusif's membership on the Fatah Central 
Committee makes him the de facto more senior officer.) 
During a brief drop-by, the Ambassador reiterated the need 
for progress in the investigation into the October 15, 2003 
attack on Embassy personnel and expressed his hope that PA 
security efforts will have a wider, positive impact on 
Palestinian society as a whole.  The Ambassador explained 
that, in the hope of an improved security situation, the 
Embassy is working to hold on to funds for major water 
projects that were put on hold following the deadly October 
15, 2003 attack, after which all travel to Gaza was halted. 
He urged the PA to make all possible efforts to resolve the 
investigation and to re-impose law and order so that current 
U.S. funding will not be lost and future funds can be 
effectively utilized. 
 
--------------------- 
Open to Possibilities 
--------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Yusif said he had refused then-Chairman Arafat's 
request in 2003 to become minister of interior because there 
was, at that time, no authority attached to the position. 
Now, "if asked, I will serve," he said, adding that "our 
desire to work must be coupled by your (the United States') 
desire to help."  With little or no law and order evident in 
the streets, Yusif said, security is the Palestinians' number 
one concern today.  He added that during a recent visit to 
Gaza, he had been protected by "a batallion" of troops and he 
could not even go to pray in the mosque in Gaza City without 
armed guards.  During his several years as senior NSF 
commander in Gaza in the mid and late '90s, the religiously 
observant Yusif attended daily prayers with little or no 
escort.  For the first time, he said, there are murders, 
rapes, and problems with narcotics in Gaza. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Israel Sets Palestinian Priorities 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) The GOI, Yusif said, will be setting PA security 
priorities in the coming months by virtue of the demands 
Israel makes of the Palestinians.  Should he be appointed 
interior minister, Yusuf said, his own preference would be to 
focus his attention first on the West Bank as the "easier" 
task that would "take 20 days" to clean up.  Once that task 
was complete, Yusif said, he would then physically move to 
Gaza, staying there and personally overseeing the 
establishment of law and order.  If Israel, however, insists 
that Gaza security must -- by virtue of the withdrawal, 
continued rocket fire into Israel, or other reasons -- come 
first, then Yusif said he will be forced to leave the West 
Bank "as is" for the time being in order to focus his full 
attention on Gaza.  If Israel wants to test us, they will 
force the PA to take on Gaza first, he said.  But if they 
want orderly, complete results, the PA will be allowed to 
"clean" the West Bank first.  As a very first step, what 
Yusif referred to as the armed (presumably criminal) gangs 
operating in the territories must be "crushed immediately." 
The PA will only then, he said, be in a position to begin 
taking on the militants step by step, as the militants make 
mistakes.  Yusif acknowledged that unless the PA establishes 
security to prevent attacks against evacuating Gaza settlers, 
disengagement could grind to a halt, and Palestinians could 
suffer heavy IDF responses to attacks. 
 
¶5.  (C) Yusif said he recognizes both the need for a 
comprehensive security operations plan "from day one," and 
that both the GOI and the donors will be looking for results. 
 He acknowledged that while donors are ready and willing to 
assist, they want to support a strategic approach -- through 
a single approved, transparent, and coordinated channel -- 
rather than through piecemeal, often opaque efforts with 
individual security chiefs.  Yusif indicated that the message 
had been received and said that the "apathy within Fatah" had 
come to an end.  "Arafat tactics won't work for us....  Abu 
Mazen is very serious."  He acknowledged, however, that he 
(Yusuf) currently has no authority to undertake such a 
planning and organizational effort, and that Abu Mazen cannot 
issue such a mandate prior to being elected PA President. 
 
--------------------------- 
Violence in Later Elections 
--------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Yusif said he is confident that, if appointed as 
interior minister, he can plan and initiate operations 
expeditiously, and that, while he cannot promise concrete 
results, he is nonetheless sure that both he and Abu Mazen 
will make the maximum effort.  Yusif predicted that the 
January 9 presidential elections will pose little security 
problem because Abu Mazen commands such a wide lead that the 
election is not in doubt or up for grabs.  The real 
challenge, he stressed, will come during the March municipal 
elections, the May PLC elections, and the August Fatah 
elections, where no one faction has a commanding lead and 
where militants may choose to press their cases by violence. 
He predicted that, absent a major security effort, those 
elections will not be peaceful because they involve real 
political competition and too many armed factions are ready 
to fight.  Accordingly, PA security forces must gain control 
by March. 
 
¶7.  (C) Abu Mazen, he said, should make the political 
decision to act and then "be off the hook," leaving the 
details of security implementation to his subordinates. 
Yusif acknowledged that the March time frame is 
extraordinarily short.  Asked whether it is realistic, he 
responded simply that the effort must be made.  He added that 
the GOI, having "scrapped all mechanisms for coordination" 
with the PA in the past four years, is relying now only on 
(unspecified) personal relationships to facilitate 
cooperation, complicating things for the Palestinians. 
"Allow us to have a security establishment, not 
personalities," Yusif said, arguing for the re-establishment 
of the District Coordination Offices (DCOs) and other 
Palestinian-Israeli security cooperation mechanisms.  Yusif 
said he hoped that the GOI has learned to "stay out of 
Palestinians affairs" and "stop trying to manipulate" the 
militant groups. 
 
¶8.  (C)  Yusif added that he could not overstate the 
importance of the prisoner issue to the Palestinian people 
and to an Abu Mazen government.  He differentiated between 
those prisoners who have conducted "military operations," who 
helped military operations, and who are "normal suspects." 
The latter group, he said, comprise the clear majority of all 
prisoners, and resolving their fate would leave only a very 
small group in jail.  He estimated that the so-called normal 
suspects comprise some 11,500 of what he said are some 12,000 
Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails.  He also called for 
maintenance of labor flows from the territories into Israel 
as critical to Palestinian well-being. 
 
------------------ 
If I Were the Boss 
------------------ 
 
¶9.  (C) Yusif said that he has inherited the title of supreme 
commander of all the armed forces as most senior officer 
remaining in the PLO upon the death of Yasser Arafat, putting 
him in a unique position, if appointed interior minister, to 
command the respect of the various security services and 
begin addressing law and order. (Note: Yusif is also a Fatah 
Central Committee member and is religiously observant.) 
Fatah, he said, has decided that the interior minister 
position must be the ultimate security authority in the PA. 
The Ministry of Interior has two roles, Yusif said: one civil 
and one security/military.  Yusif acknowledged that a trusted 
administrator, several of whom, he said, come readily to mind 
from among Fatah Revolutionary Council members, could and 
should be appointed to run the actual administrative and 
civil elements of the Ministry, allowing Yusif to focus on 
running the security elements. 
 
¶10.  (C) As he told ConGen pol chief (reftel), Yusif said he 
would consolidate all security-related elements into three 
branches under the Interior Ministry: 
 
-- the blue-uniform police, the Preventive Security 
Organization (PSO), and civil defense. 
-- the general intelligence service. 
-- the green-uniform national security (or public security) 
forces, Force 17, and the naval or coastal police (sometimes 
called the marines).  Several other elements, such as 
military intelligence and special forces, that are 
technically part of the public security forces now but 
operate autonomously, and the Palestinian part of the Joint 
Security Committee (with Israel) would be integrated into the 
public security forces. 
 
¶11.  (C) Yusif said that in order to press ahead with what he 
anticipates will be the difficult task of bringing security 
to the territories, he would take personal operational 
control over the third branch, which he referred to 
collectively as the public security forces.  These forces 
currently fall under the commands (at least nominally) of MG 
Mousa Arafat in Gaza and MG Haj Ismail in the West Bank. 
Yusif suggested that, depending on performance, either or 
both commanders could be moved to senior staff jobs under 
him, removing them from operational command of forces.  Once 
he turns his attention to Gaza, he would move his 
headquarters there to maintain more effective operational 
control over what he said is a far more difficult task than 
subduing the West Bank. The other two security branches would 
be under Interior Ministry authority, but operate under the 
direct operational control of their designated chiefs, who 
would report to the interior minister.  The Mukhabarat, which 
is currently outside the Interior Ministry, and the PSO, 
which is technically already part of Interior, would be 
limited to gathering and developing intelligence only, rather 
than taking actions in the field as they currently do. 
 
¶12.  (C) Every commander, Yusif said, would be given a chance 
to demonstrate his competence -- "even Mousa (Arafat)."  If 
the commander does not perform as instructed or up to 
expectation, then that commander will be removed, Yusif said. 
 He cautioned, however, that to hold each and every person 
responsible for actions during the Intifada would be a recipe 
for failure as no one would be clean enough.  Arafat's legacy 
is that almost everyone is tainted by how they were forced to 
operate for the last 40 years.  Yusif was nonetheless 
confident that there are sufficient competent people with 
whom he could effectively staff a ministry. 
 
---------------------- 
And What About Dahlan? 
---------------------- 
 
¶13.  (C) Yusif was skeptical that Muhammad Dahlan would or 
should again have a position of authority in a future Abu 
Mazen administration.  Dahlan has no experience, Yusif said, 
and failed in his previous tenure as minister of state for 
security.  As an example of Dahlan's lack of stature, Yusif 
cited the November attack on Abu Mazen in the Arafat mourning 
tent in Gaza City, which took place while Dahlan was 
"standing right there."  Many more-senior and more competent 
officers stand ahead of him, both in rank and within Fatah, 
Yusif continued.  Furthermore, "you can't talk about 
corruption without talking about Dahlan."  Yusif opined that 
Dahlan might again rise to a senior position in the next 10 
to 15 years.  In the near term, however, the only way for 
Dahlan to move ahead would be for the Fatah Conference to 
elevate him or else for him to successfully run for a seat in 
the PLC. 
 
¶14.  (C) Noting that the GOI and others had pressured Abu 
Mazen into bringing Muhammad Dahlan into Abu Mazen's previous 
government to run security, Yusif said that Abu Mazen must be 
able to appoint someone whom he trusts and with whom he can 
work.  That relationship will be extremely important 
throughout the spring and summer months, as the security 
services must be able to ensure law and order during the 
municipal elections, PLC elections, and then the Fatah Party 
Conference. 
 
----------------------------- 
Showing Results Towards Peace 
----------------------------- 
¶15.  (C) Yusif warned that "extreme measures" might, at times 
have to be taken in the order to assert control and revive 
the unity of the legitimate armed forces, in Gaza in 
particular.  Yusif said that he would expect "reasonable 
help" from the GOI in his endeavor.  The Palestinian people, 
Yusif continued, are not capable of swallowing any more 
hardships, defined as either "Israeli aggression" or PA 
"disorders and failures."  The situation has long been 
untenable, but now must certainly be resolved before the 
Fatah conference in August, Yusif said.  "The Palestinians 
must take decisions then.  Should we proceed with the peace 
with Israel or not?"  A portion of that question would be 
answered by Israeli actions in the coming months, he said. 
The best option would be for the Party Conference to be held 
simultaneously with a resumption of  the political track, so 
that the PA leadership could show the people some results. 
 
¶16.  (C) BIO NOTE:  Yusif, who appeared in good health and 
was once a hearty eater, declined to eat any meat during 
lunch, citing what he said was a diagnosis that he suffers 
from excess "uric acid."  He now eats only vegetables and 
fish.  He described no other symptoms or conditions affecting 
his health or capabilities. 
 
 
 
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